>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4354,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658533,"string":"4,658,533"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4435786/\", \"author_raw\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM J BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DAVID F HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"AMY J ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM J BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"DAVID F HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"AMY J ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658533/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 4, 2019\n\n Before\n\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\n\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\n\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 18-2932\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\n\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\n\n\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\n\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4355,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658650,"string":"4,658,650"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4435903/\", \"author_raw\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM J BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DAVID F HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"AMY J ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM J BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"DAVID F HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"AMY J ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658650/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 4, 2019\n\n Before\n\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\n\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\n\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 18-2932\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\n\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\n\n\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\n\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on August\\n20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4356,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658785,"string":"4,658,785"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on\\nAugust 20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436038/\", \"author_raw\": \"Defendant-Appellant. Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM J BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DAVID F HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"AMY J ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM J BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"DAVID F HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"AMY J ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658785/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 4, 2019\n\n Before\n\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\n\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\n\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 18-2932\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\n\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\n\n\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on\nAugust 20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\n\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 4, 2019\\n\\n Before\\n\\n WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge\\n\\n DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\\n\\n AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2932\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District\\n Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.\\n\\n v. No. 4:17-CR-40062\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS, James E. Shadid,\\n Defendant-Appellant. Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the MOTION TO CORRECT OPINION, filed on\\nAugust 20, 2019, by counsel for the plaintiff-appellee United States of America,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. On page sixteen, the first full\\nparagraph is CORRECTED to read: “Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as\\napplied to inchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the district court’s\\nuse of a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines.”\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4357,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658814,"string":"4,658,814"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2619"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2619\\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\\n\\f2 No. 18-2619\\n\\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\\ntion over the state-law claim.\\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\\ntrustees.\\n I. Background\\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 3\\n\\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\\nprovider at any one time.\\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\\n\\f4 No. 18-2619\\n\\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\\nsimilar system.\\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\\nestate’s account.\\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 5\\n\\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\\nis not a purchaser at all.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-2619\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2005).\\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 7\\n\\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\\nby a favorable judicial decision.\\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\\ning”).\\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\\n\\f8 No. 18-2619\\n\\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\\nment … .”).\\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 9\\n\\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\\nsoftware services at all.\\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\\n\\f10 No. 18-2619\\n\\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\\n (2) Improper motive;\\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\\n market restraint;\\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\\n [and]\\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\\n damages apportionment.\\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 11\\n\\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2619\\n\\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\\n(collecting cases).\\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 13\\n\\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\\nhave antitrust standing).\\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\\n\\f14 No. 18-2619\\n\\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\\nThe case was properly dismissed.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436067/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658814/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2619\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\n\f2 No. 18-2619\n\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\ntion over the state-law claim.\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\ntrustees.\n I. Background\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\n\fNo. 18-2619 3\n\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\nprovider at any one time.\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\n\f4 No. 18-2619\n\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\nsimilar system.\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\nestate’s account.\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\n\fNo. 18-2619 5\n\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\nis not a purchaser at all.”\n\f6 No. 18-2619\n\n II. Discussion\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\n2005).\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\n\fNo. 18-2619 7\n\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\nby a favorable judicial decision.\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\ning”).\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\n\f8 No. 18-2619\n\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\nment … .”).\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\n\fNo. 18-2619 9\n\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\nsoftware services at all.\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\n\f10 No. 18-2619\n\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\n (2) Improper motive;\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\n market restraint;\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\n [and]\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\n damages apportionment.\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\n\fNo. 18-2619 11\n\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\n\f12 No. 18-2619\n\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\n(collecting cases).\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\n\fNo. 18-2619 13\n\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\nhave antitrust standing).\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\n\f14 No. 18-2619\n\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\nThe case was properly dismissed.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2619\\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\\n\\f2 No. 18-2619\\n\\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\\ntion over the state-law claim.\\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\\ntrustees.\\n I. Background\\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 3\\n\\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\\nprovider at any one time.\\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\\n\\f4 No. 18-2619\\n\\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\\nsimilar system.\\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\\nestate’s account.\\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 5\\n\\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\\nis not a purchaser at all.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-2619\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2005).\\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 7\\n\\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\\nby a favorable judicial decision.\\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\\ning”).\\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\\n\\f8 No. 18-2619\\n\\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\\nment … .”).\\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 9\\n\\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\\nsoftware services at all.\\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\\n\\f10 No. 18-2619\\n\\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\\n (2) Improper motive;\\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\\n market restraint;\\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\\n [and]\\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\\n damages apportionment.\\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 11\\n\\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2619\\n\\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\\n(collecting cases).\\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 13\\n\\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\\nhave antitrust standing).\\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\\n\\f14 No. 18-2619\\n\\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\\nThe case was properly dismissed.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4358,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658876,"string":"4,658,876"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2327"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2327\\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\\nSA/NV, individually and as\\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2327\\n\\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\\nconsin law.\\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\\n\\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 3\\n\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\\nbeer.\\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\\n 4\\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\\n\\n\\n4\\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 5\\n\\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\\n 6\\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\\n 7\\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\\n\\n6\\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\\n7\\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\\n\\n\\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\\nand the LCBO.\\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 7\\n\\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\\nalcohol.\\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\\n\\f8 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\\n\\n\\n\\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 9\\n\\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\\nan consumers.\\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\\n\\n\\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\\n¶ 108.\\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2327\\n\\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\\nfaced later on.\\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\\n 15\\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\\n\\n\\n\\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\\n15\\n See id. ¶ 102.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 11\\n\\n 16\\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\\n 17\\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\\n\\n\\n16\\n Id. ¶ 103.\\n17\\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\\n19\\n Id. ¶ 112.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2327\\n\\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\\n 20\\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\\noverride any such a directive.”22\\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\\n\\n20\\n Id. ¶ 119.\\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\\nrangement.\\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 13\\n\\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\\n 23\\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\\n 24\\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\\n 25\\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\\nthe LCBO and BRI:\\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\\n\\n23\\n R.49-19 at 4.\\n24\\n R.49 ¶ 122.\\n25\\n Id.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2327\\n\\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\\n to change this status quo, and the Government\\n refused to grant such approval.\\n\\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\\nrate combinations possible.\\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\\n\\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\\ner’s beer.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 15\\n\\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\\n\\n\\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\\n29 Id.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2327\\n\\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 17\\n\\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\\n\\n\\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2327\\n\\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\\ndomestic entities.”39\\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\\nunder international law or under any international trade\\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\\n\\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 19\\n\\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\\n 41\\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\\n 44\\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\\n\\n\\n41\\n Id.\\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n44\\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\\nJune 6, 2019).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2327\\n\\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\\nmenced.\\n B.\\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\\n 45\\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\\n 46\\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\\n 47\\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\\n\\n\\n45\\n R.49 ¶ 243.\\n46\\n Id. ¶ 244.\\n47\\n Id. ¶ 247.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 21\\n\\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\\n 49\\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\\n\\n\\n\\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\\n49\\n Id. ¶ 253.\\n50 Id.\\n51 Id.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2327\\n\\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\\n\\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\\n53 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 23\\n\\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\\n\\n54 R.60 at 13.\\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\\n56 Id. at 14.\\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\\nthe agreement in 2015.58\\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\\nact in a certain way.”60\\n\\n\\n\\n58 Id. at 22.\\n59 Id. at 20.\\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\\nrequire it)).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 25\\n\\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\\n\\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\\n2012).\\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2327\\n\\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\\napply the doctrine to this case.\\n A.\\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\\n\\n\\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 27\\n\\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\\ntry.” Id. at 728.\\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\\n the independence of every other sovereign\\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\\n another done within its own territory. Redress\\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\\n obtained through the means open to be availed\\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\\n398 (1964)).\\n\\f28 No. 18-2327\\n\\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\\n303–04 (1918)).\\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\\n\\n\\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 29\\n\\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\\n\\n\\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\\ntional law.”68 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n67 In full, the Court stated:\\n\\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 31\\n\\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\\n 69\\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\\ndoctrine generally.\\n69\\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\\n (continued … )\\n\\f32 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\\n 70\\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\\n70\\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 33\\n\\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\\n B.\\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\\nhad been overthrown).\\n\\f34 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 71\\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\\n 72\\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\\n\\n71\\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\\nthey are all official acts.”).\\n72\\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 35\\n\\n 73\\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\\nacts of the Ontario government.\\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\\n 74\\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\\n 75\\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\\n 76\\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\\n\\n73\\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\\nacts).\\n74\\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\\n75\\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\\nsold”).\\n76\\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\\n (continued … )\\n\\f36 No. 18-2327\\n\\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\\n 77\\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\\nof the doctrine.\\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\\nStates and Canada”).\\n77\\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 37\\n\\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\\ntain Crest’s allegations.\\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\\n 78\\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\\n 79\\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\\n\\n\\n78\\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\\nremand.\\n79\\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\\n (continued … )\\n\\f38 No. 18-2327\\n\\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\\nrecognized, applicable.\\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\\n\\n( … continued)\\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1963, 1964.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 39\\n\\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\\nregulatory scheme.\\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\\n 80\\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\\n\\n\\n\\n80\\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 81\\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\\nraise these matters in the district court.\\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\\n\\n\\n81\\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 41\\n\\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\\nclaims in due course.\\n Conclusion\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436129/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658876/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2327\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\nSA/NV, individually and as\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\n\f2 No. 18-2327\n\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\nconsin law.\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\n\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 3\n\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\nopinion.\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\n\n\n\n( … continued)\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\nbeer.\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\f4 No. 18-2327\n\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\n 4\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\n\n\n4\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\n\fNo. 18-2327 5\n\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\n 6\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\n 7\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\n\n6\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\n7\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\n\f6 No. 18-2327\n\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\n\n\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\nand the LCBO.\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\n\fNo. 18-2327 7\n\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\nalcohol.\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\n\f8 No. 18-2327\n\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\n\n\n\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\n\fNo. 18-2327 9\n\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\nan consumers.\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\n\n\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\n¶ 108.\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\n\f10 No. 18-2327\n\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\nfaced later on.\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\n 15\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\n\n\n\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\n15\n See id. ¶ 102.\n\fNo. 18-2327 11\n\n 16\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\n 17\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\n\n\n16\n Id. ¶ 103.\n17\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\n19\n Id. ¶ 112.\n\f12 No. 18-2327\n\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\n 20\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\noverride any such a directive.”22\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\n\n20\n Id. ¶ 119.\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\nrangement.\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\n\fNo. 18-2327 13\n\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\n 23\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\n 24\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\n 25\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\nthe LCBO and BRI:\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\n\n23\n R.49-19 at 4.\n24\n R.49 ¶ 122.\n25\n Id.\n\f14 No. 18-2327\n\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\n to change this status quo, and the Government\n refused to grant such approval.\n\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\nrate combinations possible.\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\n\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\ner’s beer.\n\fNo. 18-2327 15\n\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\n\n\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\n29 Id.\n\f16 No. 18-2327\n\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\n\n\n\n\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\n\fNo. 18-2327 17\n\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\n\n\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\n\f18 No. 18-2327\n\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\ndomestic entities.”39\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\nunder international law or under any international trade\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\n\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\n\fNo. 18-2327 19\n\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\n 41\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\n 44\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\n\n\n41\n Id.\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\n44\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\nJune 6, 2019).\n\f20 No. 18-2327\n\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\nmenced.\n B.\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\n 45\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\n 46\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\n 47\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\n\n\n45\n R.49 ¶ 243.\n46\n Id. ¶ 244.\n47\n Id. ¶ 247.\n\fNo. 18-2327 21\n\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\n 49\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\n\n\n\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\n49\n Id. ¶ 253.\n50 Id.\n51 Id.\n\f22 No. 18-2327\n\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\n\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\n53 Id.\n\fNo. 18-2327 23\n\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\n\n54 R.60 at 13.\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\n56 Id. at 14.\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\n\f24 No. 18-2327\n\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\nthe agreement in 2015.58\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\nact in a certain way.”60\n\n\n\n58 Id. at 22.\n59 Id. at 20.\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\nrequire it)).\n\fNo. 18-2327 25\n\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\n\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\n2012).\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\n\f26 No. 18-2327\n\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\napply the doctrine to this case.\n A.\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\n\n\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 27\n\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\ntry.” Id. at 728.\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\n the independence of every other sovereign\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\n another done within its own territory. Redress\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\n obtained through the means open to be availed\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\n\n\n\n\n( … continued)\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\n398 (1964)).\n\f28 No. 18-2327\n\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\n303–04 (1918)).\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\n\n\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\n\fNo. 18-2327 29\n\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\n\n\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\n\f30 No. 18-2327\n\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\ntional law.”68 Id.\n\n\n\n\n67 In full, the Court stated:\n\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 31\n\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\n 69\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\n\n\n( … continued)\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\ndoctrine generally.\n69\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\n (continued … )\n\f32 No. 18-2327\n\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\n 70\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\n\n\n( … continued)\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\n70\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 33\n\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\n B.\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\n\n\n\n\n( … continued)\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\nhad been overthrown).\n\f34 No. 18-2327\n\n 71\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\n 72\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\n\n71\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\nthey are all official acts.”).\n72\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\n\fNo. 18-2327 35\n\n 73\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\nacts of the Ontario government.\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\n 74\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\n 75\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\n 76\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\n\n73\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\nacts).\n74\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\n75\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\nsold”).\n76\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\n (continued … )\n\f36 No. 18-2327\n\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\n 77\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\nof the doctrine.\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\n\n\n( … continued)\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\nStates and Canada”).\n77\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\n\fNo. 18-2327 37\n\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\ntain Crest’s allegations.\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\n 78\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\n 79\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\n\n\n78\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\nremand.\n79\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\n (continued … )\n\f38 No. 18-2327\n\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\nrecognized, applicable.\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\n\n( … continued)\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1963, 1964.\n\fNo. 18-2327 39\n\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\nregulatory scheme.\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\n 80\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\n\n\n\n80\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\n\f40 No. 18-2327\n\n 81\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\nraise these matters in the district court.\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\n\n\n81\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\n\fNo. 18-2327 41\n\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\nclaims in due course.\n Conclusion\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2327\\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\\nSA/NV, individually and as\\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2327\\n\\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\\nconsin law.\\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\\n\\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 3\\n\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\\nbeer.\\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\\n 4\\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\\n\\n\\n4\\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 5\\n\\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\\n 6\\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\\n 7\\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\\n\\n6\\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\\n7\\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\\n\\n\\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\\nand the LCBO.\\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 7\\n\\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\\nalcohol.\\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\\n\\f8 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\\n\\n\\n\\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 9\\n\\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\\nan consumers.\\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\\n\\n\\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\\n¶ 108.\\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2327\\n\\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\\nfaced later on.\\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\\n 15\\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\\n\\n\\n\\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\\n15\\n See id. ¶ 102.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 11\\n\\n 16\\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\\n 17\\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\\n\\n\\n16\\n Id. ¶ 103.\\n17\\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\\n19\\n Id. ¶ 112.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2327\\n\\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\\n 20\\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\\noverride any such a directive.”22\\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\\n\\n20\\n Id. ¶ 119.\\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\\nrangement.\\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 13\\n\\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\\n 23\\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\\n 24\\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\\n 25\\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\\nthe LCBO and BRI:\\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\\n\\n23\\n R.49-19 at 4.\\n24\\n R.49 ¶ 122.\\n25\\n Id.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2327\\n\\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\\n to change this status quo, and the Government\\n refused to grant such approval.\\n\\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\\nrate combinations possible.\\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\\n\\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\\ner’s beer.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 15\\n\\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\\n\\n\\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\\n29 Id.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2327\\n\\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 17\\n\\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\\n\\n\\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2327\\n\\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\\ndomestic entities.”39\\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\\nunder international law or under any international trade\\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\\n\\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 19\\n\\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\\n 41\\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\\n 44\\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\\n\\n\\n41\\n Id.\\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n44\\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\\nJune 6, 2019).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2327\\n\\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\\nmenced.\\n B.\\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\\n 45\\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\\n 46\\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\\n 47\\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\\n\\n\\n45\\n R.49 ¶ 243.\\n46\\n Id. ¶ 244.\\n47\\n Id. ¶ 247.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 21\\n\\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\\n 49\\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\\n\\n\\n\\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\\n49\\n Id. ¶ 253.\\n50 Id.\\n51 Id.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2327\\n\\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\\n\\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\\n53 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 23\\n\\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\\n\\n54 R.60 at 13.\\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\\n56 Id. at 14.\\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\\nthe agreement in 2015.58\\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\\nact in a certain way.”60\\n\\n\\n\\n58 Id. at 22.\\n59 Id. at 20.\\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\\nrequire it)).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 25\\n\\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\\n\\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\\n2012).\\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2327\\n\\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\\napply the doctrine to this case.\\n A.\\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\\n\\n\\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 27\\n\\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\\ntry.” Id. at 728.\\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\\n the independence of every other sovereign\\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\\n another done within its own territory. Redress\\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\\n obtained through the means open to be availed\\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\\n398 (1964)).\\n\\f28 No. 18-2327\\n\\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\\n303–04 (1918)).\\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\\n\\n\\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 29\\n\\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\\n\\n\\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\\ntional law.”68 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n67 In full, the Court stated:\\n\\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 31\\n\\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\\n 69\\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\\ndoctrine generally.\\n69\\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\\n (continued … )\\n\\f32 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\\n 70\\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\\n70\\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 33\\n\\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\\n B.\\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\\nhad been overthrown).\\n\\f34 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 71\\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\\n 72\\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\\n\\n71\\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\\nthey are all official acts.”).\\n72\\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 35\\n\\n 73\\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\\nacts of the Ontario government.\\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\\n 74\\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\\n 75\\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\\n 76\\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\\n\\n73\\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\\nacts).\\n74\\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\\n75\\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\\nsold”).\\n76\\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\\n (continued … )\\n\\f36 No. 18-2327\\n\\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\\n 77\\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\\nof the doctrine.\\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\\nStates and Canada”).\\n77\\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 37\\n\\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\\ntain Crest’s allegations.\\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\\n 78\\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\\n 79\\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\\n\\n\\n78\\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\\nremand.\\n79\\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\\n (continued … )\\n\\f38 No. 18-2327\\n\\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\\nrecognized, applicable.\\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\\n\\n( … continued)\\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1963, 1964.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 39\\n\\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\\nregulatory scheme.\\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\\n 80\\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\\n\\n\\n\\n80\\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 81\\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\\nraise these matters in the district court.\\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\\n\\n\\n81\\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 41\\n\\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\\nclaims in due course.\\n Conclusion\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4359,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658877,"string":"4,658,877"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2619"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2619\\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\\n\\f2 No. 18-2619\\n\\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\\ntion over the state-law claim.\\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\\ntrustees.\\n I. Background\\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 3\\n\\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\\nprovider at any one time.\\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\\n\\f4 No. 18-2619\\n\\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\\nsimilar system.\\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\\nestate’s account.\\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 5\\n\\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\\nis not a purchaser at all.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-2619\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2005).\\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 7\\n\\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\\nby a favorable judicial decision.\\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\\ning”).\\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\\n\\f8 No. 18-2619\\n\\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\\nment … .”).\\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 9\\n\\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\\nsoftware services at all.\\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\\n\\f10 No. 18-2619\\n\\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\\n (2) Improper motive;\\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\\n market restraint;\\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\\n [and]\\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\\n damages apportionment.\\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 11\\n\\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2619\\n\\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\\n(collecting cases).\\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 13\\n\\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\\nhave antitrust standing).\\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\\n\\f14 No. 18-2619\\n\\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\\nThe case was properly dismissed.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436130/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658877/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2619\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\n\f2 No. 18-2619\n\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\ntion over the state-law claim.\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\ntrustees.\n I. Background\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\n\fNo. 18-2619 3\n\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\nprovider at any one time.\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\n\f4 No. 18-2619\n\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\nsimilar system.\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\nestate’s account.\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\n\fNo. 18-2619 5\n\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\nis not a purchaser at all.”\n\f6 No. 18-2619\n\n II. Discussion\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\n2005).\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\n\fNo. 18-2619 7\n\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\nby a favorable judicial decision.\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\ning”).\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\n\f8 No. 18-2619\n\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\nment … .”).\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\n\fNo. 18-2619 9\n\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\nsoftware services at all.\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\n\f10 No. 18-2619\n\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\n (2) Improper motive;\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\n market restraint;\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\n [and]\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\n damages apportionment.\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\n\fNo. 18-2619 11\n\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\n\f12 No. 18-2619\n\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\n(collecting cases).\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\n\fNo. 18-2619 13\n\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\nhave antitrust standing).\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\n\f14 No. 18-2619\n\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\nThe case was properly dismissed.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2619\\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 CV 5779 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. McGarry & McGarry, LLC, a creditor\\nin a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, tried three times to\\nbring a price-fixing claim against Bankruptcy Management\\nSolutions, Inc. (“BMS”), the trustee’s software-services\\nprovider. In the first suit, McGarry alleged claims under the\\nSherman Act and the Illinois Antitrust Act. Because McGarry\\nis not a direct purchaser of bankruptcy software services, the\\ndistrict court dismissed the Sherman Act claim, see Ill. Brick\\n\\f2 No. 18-2619\\n\\nCo. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and relinquished jurisdic-\\ntion over the state-law claim.\\n McGarry tried a different tack and moved to reopen the\\nbankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court denied that\\nrequest because the case had been closed for more than three\\nyears. Undeterred, McGarry filed a new lawsuit in state\\ncourt alleging a stand-alone claim under the Illinois Anti-\\ntrust Act. The state statute has an “Illinois Brick repealer”\\nprovision that permits indirect purchasers to sue. BMS\\nremoved the case to federal court and moved to dismiss. The\\ndistrict judge granted the motion because McGarry is not\\neven an indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services; it\\ndoes not purchase these services at all. McGarry appealed.\\n We affirm. McGarry is a one-time creditor in a closed\\nChapter 7 bankruptcy case. It does not participate in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services in any way that\\nwould make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim\\nagainst a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy\\ntrustees.\\n I. Background\\n A Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy\\nestate, which becomes the temporary legal owner of the\\ndebtor’s property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). When a petition is filed,\\nthe Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (a division of the\\nU.S. Department of Justice) appoints a trustee to administer\\nthe estate. The trustee collects and liquidates nonexempt\\nestate assets to maximize the return to creditors. The trustee\\nalso files periodic reports with the bankruptcy court and the\\nU.S. Trustee. Id. § 704.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 3\\n\\n The reports are prepared on special software, and trus-\\ntees typically use one of three providers to supply these\\nservices. BMS is the largest supplier of bankruptcy software\\nservices. The complaint alleges that BMS has a market share\\nof approximately 50% as measured by the total number of\\nbankruptcy trustees in the country. Epiq Systems and\\nTrusteSolutions have 35% and 15%, respectively. A trustee\\nnormally does not use more than one software-services\\nprovider at any one time.\\n For many years BMS partnered with banks to jointly de-\\nliver services to the estate. Under this model BMS directed\\nthe trustee to deposit the estate’s funds into a partner bank,\\nand in return the trustee received integrated case-\\nmanagement and banking services. The bank earned money\\nfrom the deposit and paid interest to the estate and a fee to\\nBMS. This business model relied on the existence of a\\n“spread” between the interest the bank could charge its\\nborrowers and the interest it paid to its depositors. The\\nmodel worked well as long as interest rates remained high\\nenough to support the bank’s flexibility to work within the\\nspread, allowing all parties to prosper.\\n But the model collapsed with the economic downturn in\\n2008. Interest rates declined precipitously from more than\\n4% in late 2007 to near 0% one year later, so the spread\\nevaporated. BMS had to adapt to a new reality. It soon\\ndesigned a different business model: it would sell its soft-\\nware services in combination with banking services (as it\\nhad in the past), but the bank would charge a set percentage\\nof the estate’s funds as a fee for the combined services and\\npay a portion of that fee to BMS. For this new model to\\nwork, however, BMS had to overcome two obstacles. First, it\\n\\f4 No. 18-2619\\n\\nneeded its competitors to also adopt the new arrangement.\\nThe complaint alleges that sometime before 2011 BMS\\napproached Epiq Systems and TrusteSolutions and pro-\\nposed the new billing model. Both agreed to implement a\\nsimilar system.\\n Second, BMS needed the Executive Office of the U.S.\\nTrustee to suspend its rule prohibiting trustees from using\\nestate funds to pay bank fees. All three providers asked the\\nExecutive Office to do so. In April 2011 the agency suspend-\\ned the rule. All three providers then changed their billing\\nmodel. Now the standard agreement requires the estate to\\npay a combined fee for software and banking services based\\non a percentage of the funds in its bank account.\\n In May 2011 Integrated Genomics, Inc., a software devel-\\noper specializing in genome analysis, filed a Chapter 7\\npetition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois. The U.S. Trustee appointed Eugene Crane\\nas trustee. Crane contracted with BMS for software services\\nand deposited the estate’s funds with Rabobank, BMS’s\\npartner bank. Crane also contracted directly with Rabobank,\\nauthorizing it to automatically withdraw a fee from the\\nestate’s account.\\n McGarry & McGarry, a Chicago law firm and an unse-\\ncured creditor of Integrated Genomics, filed a claim in the\\nChapter 7 proceeding. On August 30, 2013, Crane filed his\\nfinal report listing a service-fee payment of $514.16 to\\nRabobank, which deducted that sum from the estate’s\\naccount. McGarry did not object to the fee. The estate’s\\nfunds were disbursed, and the case was closed in April 2014.\\nMcGarry received $12,472 of its allowed claim of $78,308.\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 5\\n\\n Two years later McGarry learned that most, if not all, of\\nthe $514.16 fee went to BMS. In September 2016 McGarry\\nfiled a class-action lawsuit against BMS in the Northern\\nDistrict of Illinois alleging violations of the Sherman Act,\\n15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/3 (2018). The district judge granted BMS’s motion to\\ndismiss, applying the “indirect purchaser” doctrine an-\\nnounced in Illinois Brick. There the Supreme Court explained\\nthat indirect purchasers are not proper parties to bring a\\nprice-fixing claim under the Sherman Act; the claim belongs\\nto the direct purchaser. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.\\nMcGarry was neither a direct nor an indirect purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, so the judge dismissed the\\nfederal claim with prejudice. She then relinquished supple-\\nmental jurisdiction over the state-law claim, dismissing it\\nwithout prejudice. McGarry did not appeal.\\n Instead, McGarry moved to reopen the Chapter 7 pro-\\nceeding with the aim of raising the issue there. Because the\\nmotion was not made within a reasonable time, the bank-\\nruptcy judge denied it. McGarry filed a new class-action\\ncomplaint against BMS, this time in Cook County Circuit\\nCourt. This second suit alleged a stand-alone price-fixing\\nclaim under the Illinois Antitrust Act. BMS removed the case\\nto federal court, where it was assigned to the judge who\\nhandled the first case. A motion to dismiss followed, see FED.\\nR. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), and the judge dismissed the case for\\nfailure to state a claim. Referring back to her earlier order,\\nthe judge reasoned that although the Illinois antitrust statute\\npermits indirect purchasers to sue, that feature of the law\\ndoes “nothing to help McGarry … for it has admitted that it\\nis not a purchaser at all.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-2619\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a dismissal order de novo. Deppe v. Nat’l Col-\\nlegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018). The\\nIllinois Antitrust Act prohibits any agreement to fix, main-\\ntain, or stabilize the price of any commodity or service.\\n740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3. The Act expressly requires harmo-\\nnization with federal antitrust law as interpreted by the\\nfederal courts, see id. § 10/11, so Illinois courts interpret the\\nstate antitrust law in harmony with “[f]ederal case law\\nconstruing analogous provisions of [f]ederal legislation”—\\nhere, Section 1 of the Sherman Act. People ex rel. Scott v. Coll.\\nHills Corp., 435 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ill. 1982). McGarry alleges a\\nconspiracy to fix the price of bankruptcy software services, a\\nper se violation of federal and Illinois antitrust law. See, e.g.,\\nCatalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980);\\nBaker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2005).\\n Both Article III and the Sherman Act impose threshold\\nbarriers on a party bringing an antitrust suit in federal court.\\nArticle III limits “the judicial power of the United States to\\nthe resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Hein v. Free-\\ndom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597 (2007). To\\nsatisfy the case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must\\nestablish standing to sue. Id. at 598. Three elements comprise\\nthe “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: (1) a\\nconcrete and particularized injury in fact that is (2) fairly\\ntraceable to the alleged action of the defendant and (3) likely\\nto be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of\\nWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).\\n McGarry has pleaded sufficient facts to support\\nArticle III standing, though just barely. The complaint\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 7\\n\\nalleges that the $514.16 fee Rabobank deducted from the\\nIntegrated Genomics Chapter 7 account and paid to BMS\\nwas greater than it would have been absent the price-fixing\\nconspiracy. The inflated fee reduced the pot of money from\\nwhich unsecured creditors were paid, and McGarry alleges\\nit received a smaller distribution as a result. If true, the\\ndifference is likely quite small given the modest amount of\\nthe fee. Still, “financial injuries are prototypical of\\n[Article III] injuries.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d\\n636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654,\\n667 (7th Cir. 2013). And there is a causal connection between\\nthe injury and the alleged conspiracy that can be remedied\\nby a favorable judicial decision.\\n But the “Sherman Act has additional rules for determin-\\ning ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a\\nprivate antitrust action.’” Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp.,\\n306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,\\n459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)). These requirements have been\\n“incautiously lumped together under the umbrella term of\\n‘antitrust standing.’” Id. at 480. But this nomenclature, like\\nthat of its cousins “prudential standing” and “statutory\\nstanding,” is a “misnomer.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static\\nControl Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014); see also id.\\nat 128 n.4 (describing “statutory standing” as “an improve-\\nment” over “prudential standing” because it “correctly\\nplaces the focus on the statute” but is nevertheless “mislead-\\ning”).\\n We’ve previously noted our concern with the term “anti-\\ntrust standing” because of its potential for confusion with\\nArticle III standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co.,\\n\\f8 No. 18-2619\\n\\n350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003). The latter, of course, is a\\nnecessary requirement for a justiciable case or controversy.\\nThe former, on the other hand, concerns a different issue:\\nwhich plaintiffs may bring the cause of action. See Hammes v.\\nAAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(“‘[A]ntitrust standing’ is not a jurisdictional require-\\nment … .”).\\n Federal antitrust law provides a treble-damages remedy\\nto “any person … injured in his business or property by\\nreason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Though broadly phrased, the Supreme\\nCourt has construed this language “to limit the parties who\\nmay bring an antitrust action to (1) those who have suffered\\nthe type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to\\nprevent and (2) those whose injuries are a result of the\\ndefendant’s unlawful conduct.” Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores,\\n67 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Brunswick Corp. v.\\nPueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Because\\nantitrust violations “may be expected to cause ripples of\\nharm to flow through the Nation’s economy,” the Court has\\nheld that “Congress did not intend to allow every person\\ntangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an\\naction to recover threefold damages for the injury to his\\nbusiness or property.” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S.\\n465, 476–77 (1982). Some injuries are “too remote from the\\nviolation and the purposes of the antitrust laws to form the\\npredicate for a suit.” Id. at 477.\\n For price-fixing claims in particular, the Supreme Court\\nlong ago held that persons downstream in the distribution\\nchain are not proper plaintiffs. The “indirect purchaser”\\ndoctrine announced in Illinois Brick “forbids a customer of\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 9\\n\\nthe purchaser who paid a cartel price to sue the cartelist,\\neven if his seller—the direct purchaser from the cartelist—\\npassed on to him some or even all of the cartel’s elevated\\nprice.” Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d\\n816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015). As we’ve noted, the district judge\\ninvoked the Illinois Brick principle in dismissing the Sherman\\nAct claim in McGarry’s first suit.\\n The analogous provision in the Illinois Antitrust Act is\\nphrased in terms similar to its federal counterpart, but there\\nis one notable difference: Illinois has adopted an “Illinois\\nBrick repealer” clause that permits indirect purchasers to\\nsue. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2). But that provision doesn’t\\napply here. As the district judge noted, McGarry isn’t even\\nan indirect purchaser of bankruptcy software services. The\\nlaw firm is just a former creditor of a Chapter 7 debtor in a\\nclosed bankruptcy case. It doesn’t purchase bankruptcy\\nsoftware services at all.\\n The inapplicability of the Illinois Brick repealer provision\\nin the state statute raises the possibility that the judgment in\\nMcGarry’s first case has preclusive effect in this second suit.\\n“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and de-\\ntermined by a valid and final judgment, and the determina-\\ntion is essential to the judgment, the determination is\\nconclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,\\nwhether on the same or a different claim.” RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: ISSUE PRECLUSION–GENERAL RULE\\n§ 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1980), quoted in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.\\nHargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015). The Illinois\\nAntitrust Act’s harmonization provision, 740 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 10/11, bolsters the case for preclusion. But BMS hasn’t\\n\\f10 No. 18-2619\\n\\ndeveloped a preclusion argument along these lines, so we\\nproceed to the main thrust of McGarry’s appeal.\\n McGarry argues that although it is not a purchaser of\\nbankruptcy software services, it is nonetheless a proper\\nplaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim under the multi-\\nfactor test derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in\\nAssociated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537–44. As we’ve\\nsynthesized it in earlier cases, the test examines several\\nfactors to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated\\nthe necessary “direct link” between the alleged antitrust\\nviolation and the claimed antitrust injury. Sanner v. Bd. of\\nTrade of Chi., 62 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n The Associated General Contractors factors include:\\n (1) The causal connection between the alleged\\n antitrust violation and the harm to the plaintiff;\\n (2) Improper motive;\\n (3) Whether the injury was of a type that Con-\\n gress sought to redress with the antitrust laws;\\n (4) The directness between the injury and the\\n market restraint;\\n (5) The speculative nature of the damages;\\n [and]\\n (6) The risk of duplicate recoveries or complex\\n damages apportionment.\\nId. at 927 (quotation marks omitted). Together, the first three\\nfactors relate to what courts commonly refer to as “antitrust\\ninjury.” Nelson v. Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555, 1563–\\n64 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,\\n505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007). The remaining factors\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 11\\n\\naddress whether the plaintiff is among those “who can most\\nefficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.”\\nSerfecz, 67 F.3d at 598 (quotation marks omitted).\\n The factors are neither strict requirements nor exclusive\\nanalytical tools. They simply illustrate the areas of inquiry\\nthat may be relevant to a case-specific evaluation of “the\\nplaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendant[],\\nand the relationship between them.” Associated Gen. Contrac-\\ntors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535.\\n To put the inquiry more generally, McGarry must\\ndemonstrate that its injury is “of the type the antitrust laws\\nwere intended to prevent.” Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.\\nIt’s not enough to allege that the injury is merely causally\\nlinked to the alleged anticompetitive behavior. Id. McGarry\\nmust also demonstrate that its injury “is attributable to an\\nanti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl.\\nRichfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). In\\nother words, the injury must flow directly “from higher\\nprices or lower output, the principal vices proscribed by the\\nantitrust laws.” Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,\\n1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (quotation marks omitted).\\n McGarry hasn’t alleged the type of injury the antitrust\\nlaws were meant to prevent. It claims that absent the con-\\nspiracy, BMS would not have been able to charge a percent-\\nage of the estate’s funds as a fee for its bankruptcy software\\nservices. But of course McGarry is not a participant in the\\nmarket for bankruptcy software services. Instead its alleged\\ninjury is quite attenuated from the claimed price-fixing\\nviolation. McGarry alleges that the conspiracy caused the\\nestate to pay a higher fee for the combined banking and\\nsoftware services, which reduced the funds available in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2619\\n\\nChapter 7 estate to pay claims (however modest the reduc-\\ntion), which caused unsecured creditors like McGarry to\\nreceive a smaller distribution. This alleged injury is too\\nremote to serve as the predicate for an antitrust suit.\\n But even if we concluded that McGarry had adequately\\npleaded an antitrust injury, the law firm must also demon-\\nstrate that it can “efficiently vindicate the purposes of the\\nantitrust laws.” Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc.,\\n463 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).\\nThe fourth Associated General Contractors factor—“the direct-\\nness between the injury and the market restraint”—weighs\\nparticularly heavily here. We usually presume that competi-\\ntors and consumers in the relevant market are the only\\nparties who suffer antitrust injuries and are in a position to\\nefficiently vindicate the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Con-\\ntractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 538; see also In re Aluminum Ware-\\nhousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016)\\n(collecting cases).\\n In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, the Supreme Court\\ncarved out a narrow exception. There the Court held that\\nCarol McCready, a patient treated by a clinical psychologist,\\nsuffered an antitrust injury when her insurer, allegedly in\\nconcert with a professional organization of psychiatrists,\\nrefused to reimburse her psychologist’s fees because the\\nhealth plan covered only psychiatrists. McCready, 457 U.S. at\\n480–81. The Court held that McCready’s injury was “inextri-\\ncably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to\\ninflict” on the market. Id. at 484. As the Court later described\\nits holding, what mattered was that the plaintiff was a\\nparticipant in the market targeted by the alleged conspiracy\\n\\fNo. 18-2619 13\\n\\nand was “directly harmed by the [insurer’s] unlawful con-\\nduct.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 529 n.19.\\n McGarry, however, is not a participant in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services. It is simply a creditor of a\\nChapter 7 debtor. McGarry’s alleged injury is thus entirely\\nderivative of the estate’s injury. We held decades ago that\\n“[m]erely derivative injuries sustained by employees, offic-\\ners, stockholders, and creditors of an injured company do not\\nconstitute ‘antitrust injury’ sufficient to confer antitrust\\nstanding.” Sw. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area\\nPlanning Ass’n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis\\nadded); see also Cong. Bldg. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 246 F.2d 587,\\n590 (7th Cir. 1957) (“The courts have uniformly denied\\nrecovery to … creditors … who claimed injury as the result\\nof alleged antitrust violations.”) (citations omitted). The\\nSupreme Court has agreed in dicta. See Associated Gen.\\nContractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 533–34 (citing with approval\\nLoeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910),\\nwhich held that a creditor of an injured company does not\\nhave antitrust standing).\\n There is, after all, a more appropriate person to pursue\\nthe claim should it be in the estate’s interest to do so: the\\ntrustee. Because a trustee in bankruptcy owes a fiduciary\\nduty to an estate’s creditors, In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th\\nCir. 1995), the trustee could “pursue the debtor’s claim\\nagainst [the alleged conspirators] on behalf of all the debtor’s\\ncreditors equally, without preference for any particular\\ncreditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on\\nbehalf of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous\\nsegments claimed by those creditors who happen to sue.”\\nIIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 353c, at 298–\\n\\f14 No. 18-2619\\n\\n99 (4th ed. 2014). “The existence of an identifiable class of\\npersons whose self-interest would normally motivate them\\nto vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement\\ndiminishes the justification for allowing a more remote\\nparty … to perform the office of a private attorney general.”\\nAssociated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 542.\\n Because McGarry does not participate in the market for\\nbankruptcy software services in any meaningful way, it is\\nnot an appropriate plaintiff to bring this price-fixing claim.\\nThe case was properly dismissed.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4360,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4658957,"string":"4,658,957"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2327"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2327\\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\\nSA/NV, individually and as\\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2327\\n\\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\\nconsin law.\\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\\n\\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 3\\n\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\\nbeer.\\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\\n 4\\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\\n\\n\\n4\\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 5\\n\\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\\n 6\\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\\n 7\\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\\n\\n6\\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\\n7\\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\\n\\n\\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\\nand the LCBO.\\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 7\\n\\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\\nalcohol.\\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\\n\\f8 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\\n\\n\\n\\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 9\\n\\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\\nan consumers.\\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\\n\\n\\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\\n¶ 108.\\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2327\\n\\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\\nfaced later on.\\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\\n 15\\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\\n\\n\\n\\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\\n15\\n See id. ¶ 102.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 11\\n\\n 16\\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\\n 17\\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\\n\\n\\n16\\n Id. ¶ 103.\\n17\\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\\n19\\n Id. ¶ 112.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2327\\n\\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\\n 20\\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\\noverride any such a directive.”22\\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\\n\\n20\\n Id. ¶ 119.\\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\\nrangement.\\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 13\\n\\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\\n 23\\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\\n 24\\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\\n 25\\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\\nthe LCBO and BRI:\\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\\n\\n23\\n R.49-19 at 4.\\n24\\n R.49 ¶ 122.\\n25\\n Id.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2327\\n\\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\\n to change this status quo, and the Government\\n refused to grant such approval.\\n\\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\\nrate combinations possible.\\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\\n\\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\\ner’s beer.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 15\\n\\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\\n\\n\\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\\n29 Id.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2327\\n\\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 17\\n\\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\\n\\n\\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2327\\n\\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\\ndomestic entities.”39\\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\\nunder international law or under any international trade\\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\\n\\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 19\\n\\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\\n 41\\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\\n 44\\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\\n\\n\\n41\\n Id.\\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n44\\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\\nJune 6, 2019).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2327\\n\\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\\nmenced.\\n B.\\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\\n 45\\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\\n 46\\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\\n 47\\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\\n\\n\\n45\\n R.49 ¶ 243.\\n46\\n Id. ¶ 244.\\n47\\n Id. ¶ 247.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 21\\n\\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\\n 49\\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\\n\\n\\n\\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\\n49\\n Id. ¶ 253.\\n50 Id.\\n51 Id.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2327\\n\\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\\n\\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\\n53 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 23\\n\\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\\n\\n54 R.60 at 13.\\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\\n56 Id. at 14.\\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\\nthe agreement in 2015.58\\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\\nact in a certain way.”60\\n\\n\\n\\n58 Id. at 22.\\n59 Id. at 20.\\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\\nrequire it)).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 25\\n\\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\\n\\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\\n2012).\\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2327\\n\\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\\napply the doctrine to this case.\\n A.\\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\\n\\n\\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 27\\n\\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\\ntry.” Id. at 728.\\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\\n the independence of every other sovereign\\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\\n another done within its own territory. Redress\\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\\n obtained through the means open to be availed\\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\\n398 (1964)).\\n\\f28 No. 18-2327\\n\\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\\n303–04 (1918)).\\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\\n\\n\\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 29\\n\\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\\n\\n\\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\\ntional law.”68 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n67 In full, the Court stated:\\n\\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 31\\n\\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\\n 69\\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\\ndoctrine generally.\\n69\\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\\n (continued … )\\n\\f32 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\\n 70\\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\\n70\\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 33\\n\\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\\n B.\\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\\nhad been overthrown).\\n\\f34 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 71\\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\\n 72\\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\\n\\n71\\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\\nthey are all official acts.”).\\n72\\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 35\\n\\n 73\\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\\nacts of the Ontario government.\\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\\n 74\\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\\n 75\\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\\n 76\\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\\n\\n73\\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\\nacts).\\n74\\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\\n75\\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\\nsold”).\\n76\\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\\n (continued … )\\n\\f36 No. 18-2327\\n\\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\\n 77\\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\\nof the doctrine.\\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\\nStates and Canada”).\\n77\\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 37\\n\\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\\ntain Crest’s allegations.\\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\\n 78\\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\\n 79\\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\\n\\n\\n78\\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\\nremand.\\n79\\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\\n (continued … )\\n\\f38 No. 18-2327\\n\\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\\nrecognized, applicable.\\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\\n\\n( … continued)\\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1963, 1964.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 39\\n\\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\\nregulatory scheme.\\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\\n 80\\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\\n\\n\\n\\n80\\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 81\\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\\nraise these matters in the district court.\\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\\n\\n\\n81\\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 41\\n\\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\\nclaims in due course.\\n Conclusion\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436210/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658957/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2327\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\nSA/NV, individually and as\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\n\f2 No. 18-2327\n\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\nconsin law.\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\n\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 3\n\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\nopinion.\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\n\n\n\n( … continued)\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\nbeer.\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\f4 No. 18-2327\n\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\n 4\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\n\n\n4\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\n\fNo. 18-2327 5\n\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\n 6\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\n 7\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\n\n6\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\n7\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\n\f6 No. 18-2327\n\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\n\n\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\nand the LCBO.\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\n\fNo. 18-2327 7\n\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\nalcohol.\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\n\f8 No. 18-2327\n\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\n\n\n\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\n\fNo. 18-2327 9\n\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\nan consumers.\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\n\n\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\n¶ 108.\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\n\f10 No. 18-2327\n\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\nfaced later on.\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\n 15\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\n\n\n\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\n15\n See id. ¶ 102.\n\fNo. 18-2327 11\n\n 16\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\n 17\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\n\n\n16\n Id. ¶ 103.\n17\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\n19\n Id. ¶ 112.\n\f12 No. 18-2327\n\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\n 20\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\noverride any such a directive.”22\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\n\n20\n Id. ¶ 119.\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\nrangement.\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\n\fNo. 18-2327 13\n\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\n 23\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\n 24\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\n 25\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\nthe LCBO and BRI:\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\n\n23\n R.49-19 at 4.\n24\n R.49 ¶ 122.\n25\n Id.\n\f14 No. 18-2327\n\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\n to change this status quo, and the Government\n refused to grant such approval.\n\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\nrate combinations possible.\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\n\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\ner’s beer.\n\fNo. 18-2327 15\n\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\n\n\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\n29 Id.\n\f16 No. 18-2327\n\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\n\n\n\n\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\n\fNo. 18-2327 17\n\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\n\n\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\n\f18 No. 18-2327\n\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\ndomestic entities.”39\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\nunder international law or under any international trade\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\n\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\n\fNo. 18-2327 19\n\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\n 41\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\n 44\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\n\n\n41\n Id.\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\n44\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\nJune 6, 2019).\n\f20 No. 18-2327\n\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\nmenced.\n B.\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\n 45\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\n 46\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\n 47\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\n\n\n45\n R.49 ¶ 243.\n46\n Id. ¶ 244.\n47\n Id. ¶ 247.\n\fNo. 18-2327 21\n\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\n 49\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\n\n\n\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\n49\n Id. ¶ 253.\n50 Id.\n51 Id.\n\f22 No. 18-2327\n\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\n\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\n53 Id.\n\fNo. 18-2327 23\n\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\n\n54 R.60 at 13.\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\n56 Id. at 14.\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\n\f24 No. 18-2327\n\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\nthe agreement in 2015.58\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\nact in a certain way.”60\n\n\n\n58 Id. at 22.\n59 Id. at 20.\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\nrequire it)).\n\fNo. 18-2327 25\n\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\n\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\n2012).\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\n\f26 No. 18-2327\n\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\napply the doctrine to this case.\n A.\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\n\n\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 27\n\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\ntry.” Id. at 728.\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\n the independence of every other sovereign\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\n another done within its own territory. Redress\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\n obtained through the means open to be availed\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\n\n\n\n\n( … continued)\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\n398 (1964)).\n\f28 No. 18-2327\n\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\n303–04 (1918)).\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\n\n\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\n\fNo. 18-2327 29\n\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\n\n\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\n\f30 No. 18-2327\n\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\ntional law.”68 Id.\n\n\n\n\n67 In full, the Court stated:\n\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 31\n\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\n 69\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\n\n\n( … continued)\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\ndoctrine generally.\n69\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\n (continued … )\n\f32 No. 18-2327\n\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\n 70\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\n\n\n( … continued)\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\n70\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\n (continued … )\n\fNo. 18-2327 33\n\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\n B.\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\n\n\n\n\n( … continued)\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\nhad been overthrown).\n\f34 No. 18-2327\n\n 71\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\n 72\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\n\n71\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\nthey are all official acts.”).\n72\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\n\fNo. 18-2327 35\n\n 73\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\nacts of the Ontario government.\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\n 74\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\n 75\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\n 76\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\n\n73\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\nacts).\n74\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\n75\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\nsold”).\n76\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\n (continued … )\n\f36 No. 18-2327\n\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\n 77\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\nof the doctrine.\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\n\n\n( … continued)\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\nStates and Canada”).\n77\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\n\fNo. 18-2327 37\n\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\ntain Crest’s allegations.\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\n 78\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\n 79\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\n\n\n78\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\nremand.\n79\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\n (continued … )\n\f38 No. 18-2327\n\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\nrecognized, applicable.\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\n\n( … continued)\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1963, 1964.\n\fNo. 18-2327 39\n\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\nregulatory scheme.\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\n 80\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\n\n\n\n80\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\n\f40 No. 18-2327\n\n 81\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\nraise these matters in the district court.\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\n\n\n81\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\n\fNo. 18-2327 41\n\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\nclaims in due course.\n Conclusion\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2327\\nMOUNTAIN CREST SRL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nANHEUSER-BUSCH INBEV\\nSA/NV, individually and as\\nsuccessor to InBev SA/NV and\\nInterbrew S.A., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-00595-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mountain Crest SRL, LLC (“Moun-\\ntain Crest”), brought this action, alleging that An-\\nheuser Busch InBev SA/NV (“Anheuser-Busch”) and Molson\\nCoors Brewing Company (“Molson Coors”) had conspired\\nto damage Mountain Crest’s beer exports to Ontario, Cana-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2327\\n\\nda, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–\\n2. Mountain Crest also alleged that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors were enriched unjustly in violation of Wis-\\nconsin law.\\n Much, although not all, of this dispute centers around\\ntwo agreements: an agreement in 2000 between two Canadi-\\nan entities, Brewers Retail, Inc. (“BRI”), and the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Board of Ontario (“LCBO”); and an agreement in 2015\\nbetween Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI, the LCBO and\\nthe government of Ontario. Mountain Crest alleged that An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to restrain\\ntrade in the Ontario beer market and had engaged in mo-\\nnopolistic behavior through the two agreements. Among\\nother things, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors carried on\\na group boycott to force the LCBO to enter the agreement in\\n2000 to ensure that BRI, an entity Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors control, was the only retailer in Ontario selling\\nbeer in packages larger than six containers. Mountain Crest\\nfurther claimed the conspiracy extended into 2014 and 2015\\nwhen Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors used a variety of\\ntactics to continue the retail arrangement between BRI and\\nthe LCBO, including a threat to bring expropriation litiga-\\ntion under the North American Free Trade Agreement\\n(“NAFTA”). Mountain Crest contends that these agree-\\nments, as well as BRI’s policy of promoting sales of An-\\nheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ products in its stores to\\nthe detriment of American competition, inhibited its ability\\nto compete in the Ontario beer market.1\\n\\n1Mountain Crest submitted that the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy\\nprevents it from competing in the Ontario market because its profits are\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 3\\n\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss the\\ncomplaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on\\nmultiple grounds. The district court ruled that the act of\\nstate doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and\\ngranted the motion; it did not address Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors’ other grounds for dismissal of the federal\\nclaims.2 The district court then relinquished supplemental\\njurisdiction over the state-law unjust enrichment claim and\\ndismissed the case without prejudice to Mountain Crest’s\\nbringing that claim in state court. Mountain Crest timely ap-\\npealed.3 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm\\nin part and vacate in part the judgment of the district court\\nand remand the case for proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n Mountain Crest is an independently owned brewery\\nbased in Monroe, Wisconsin. In 2009, Mountain Crest began\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\ndriven by economies of scale, achieved by distributing large packages of\\nbeer.\\n2 The district court’s jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,\\nand 1367. We note that, although Mountain Crest does not specifically\\ninvoke 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Com-\\nplaint appear to establish that the district court also had diversity juris-\\ndiction over Mountain Crest’s state-law claim.\\n3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexporting its beer to Ontario, Canada, seeking to compete in\\nthe low-value segment of the beer market there.\\n 4\\n The Second Amended Complaint alleges that An-\\nheuser-Busch is a corporation organized under the laws of\\nBelgium and headquartered there.5 Labatt, a Canadian\\nbrewery, is currently a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch, and\\nthrough Labatt, Anheuser-Busch has about a forty-three per-\\ncent market share in the Canadian beer market. Mountain\\nCrest claims that senior executives based out of St. Louis,\\nMissouri, manage Labatt through its “North America” zone\\nand that they and their predecessors oversaw and were in-\\nvolved intimately in the alleged antitrust conspiracy.\\n Molson Coors is a Delaware corporation with principal\\nplaces of business in Denver, Colorado, and Montreal, Que-\\nbec. Molson Coors is the product of a 2005 merger between\\nMolson, Inc. and the Adolph Coors Company. According to\\nMountain Crest, Molson Coors’ Canadian subsidiary, Mol-\\nson, controls roughly thirty-four percent of the Canadian\\nbeer market. Mountain Crest alleges that Molson Coors’ sen-\\nior executives participated in the alleged conspiracy with\\nAnheuser-Busch and its predecessors and acted to ensure\\nthe conspiracy’s continued operation.\\n\\n\\n4\\n This suit comes to us on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the events de-\\nscribed are as outlined in Mountain Crest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n5 Anheuser-Busch was formed when Belgian-based InBev SA/NV ac-\\nquired the St. Louis-based Anheuser-Busch Company in 2008. InBev was\\nthe product of a 2004 stock-for-stock merger between Belgian-based In-\\nterbrew S.A. and Brazilian-based AmBev. One of Interbrew’s subsidiar-\\nies was Labatt Breweries of Canada, which Interbrew acquired in 1995.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 5\\n\\n Under a Canadian law, the provinces regulate and con-\\n 6\\ntrol the sale of alcohol within their boundaries. Under this\\nscheme, the LCBO, a Crown agency wholly owned by the\\ngovernment of Ontario, has the authority to control the im-\\nportation of beer, wine, and spirits into Ontario, and to de-\\ntermine the “nature, form and capacity of all packages to be\\nused for containing liquor to be kept or sold.” Liquor Con-\\n 7\\ntrol Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 § 3(j) (Can.). It is further author-\\nized, by statute, to operate retail alcohol stores across the\\nprovince. Id. § 3(d).\\n At the time relevant to this suit, Ontario’s Minister of\\nConsumer and Commercial Relations had oversight of the\\nLCBO. As such, “[t]he LCBO was expected to implement\\nGovernmental policy with regard to the distribution and sale\\nof alcohol within the parameters set out by the Liquor Control\\nAct and related legislation.” Hughes v. Liquor Control Bd. of\\nOntario, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 84 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.)\\n(WL), aff’d 145 O.R.3d 401 (Can. Ont. C.A.). Thus, “[t]he gov-\\nernment exercised considerable control over the LCBO” and\\n“[c]omplex, high-level decisions were made from\\ntime-to-time by the senior Government officials or in some\\n\\n6\\n See, e.g., The Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3,\\n§ 3 (Can.) (federal statute that, with limited exceptions, bans any inter-\\nprovincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than as car-\\nried out by provincial liquor boards); R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960]\\nO.R. 601, para. 39 (Ont.) (“It requires no exhaustive analysis of the consti-\\ntutional authorities to state that each Province has jurisdiction to regulate\\nand control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix the prices\\nat which, and the conditions under which liquor may be sold.”).\\n7\\n See also R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3 § 3.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncases, through the enactment of legislation by the Legislative\\nAssembly that directed the activities of the LCBO.” Id.\\n BRI is a cooperative of Ontario brewers, authorized by\\nthe LCBO to serve as a beer distributor, wholesaler, and re-\\ntailer in Ontario. Under the Liquor Control Act, the LCBO\\ncontrols the sale and delivery of beer at BRI stores and estab-\\nlishes specific terms and conditions related to the operation\\nof such stores. See R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 §§ 3(1)(d), 3(1)(e.1),\\n3(1)(e); Sale of Liquor in Government Stores, O. Reg. 232/16\\n§ 6 (Can.). Mountain Crest alleges that Labatt and Molson\\ngained control of BRI over many years by acquiring original\\nmembers of the cooperative; that each now owns forty-nine\\npercent of BRI8; and that some of their employees serve as\\nBRI directors. BRI sells beer in stores known as The Beer\\nStore and allegedly enjoys a seventy-five percent market\\nshare of beer sales in the province.9\\n In sum, there are two places to buy beer in Ontario:\\nLCBO stores and The Beer Store. The LCBO operates three\\n\\n\\n8 Sleeman Breweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”), a subsidiary of the Japanese\\nbrewery Sapporo Ltd., also had an ownership stake in BRI for much of\\nthe relevant time. Sleeman, however, had minimal influence over BRI’s\\noperations and was not included in any BRI board proceedings or ac-\\ntions involving the negotiation of the agreement in 2000 between BRI\\nand the LCBO.\\n9 The Beer Store generally does not display its inventory on the open\\nfloor. Rather, customers place orders at the cashier, and the order is re-\\ntrieved from the back-of-house. The inventory is listed on a board behind\\nthe cashier, and brewers that are not part of BRI must pay an up-front\\nlisting fee to have their product identified on the board. Listings can be\\nremoved if the beer does not meet sales quotas established by BRI.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 7\\n\\ndifferent types of stores. “Ordinary” stores are in larger\\ncommunities where BRI operates The Beer Store. Consistent\\nwith historical practice, LCBO “ordinary” stores sell wine\\nand spirits as well as beer in packages of six or fewer, while\\nBRI is responsible for selling large packages of beer. LCBO\\n“combination” stores, by contrast, sell beer in packages larg-\\ner than six, as well as wine, spirits, and small packages of\\nbeer, because they are in smaller communities that do not\\nhave The Beer Store. Under this arrangement, as a communi-\\nty grows, BRI can request to open a store in the locality; if\\nthe LCBO grants that request, the LCBO combination store\\nreverts to an ordinary store. LCBO “agency” stores serve\\nOntario’s smallest communities; these stores are private\\nbusinesses such as grocery stores that are permitted to sell\\nalcohol.\\n Beyond selling different package sizes of beer, BRI and\\nthe LCBO traditionally sold different types of beer. LCBO\\nordinary stores sold imported beer and some beer brewed in\\nOntario; The Beer Store only sold beer brewed in Ontario.\\nAdditionally, LCBO ordinary stores did not distribute any\\nbeer brands sold by BRI to restaurants and bars holding al-\\ncohol licenses. Since The Beer Store allegedly had a seven-\\nty-five percent market share and only sold domestic prod-\\nucts, most of the beer sold in Ontario was brewed in Ontario.\\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States, invoking\\nthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),\\ncomplained that these practices were discriminatory and, as\\na result of the settlement in 1993, foreign brewers were per-\\nmitted to sell their beer in The Beer Store. Foreign brewers\\n\\f8 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncould also access BRI’s large beer distribution network.10 The\\nsettlement did not affect the LCBO’s practice of selling beer\\nin packages of six or fewer in its ordinary stores.\\n As the GATT challenge was settled, disputes began to\\nemerge between the LCBO and BRI. Pertinent to the present\\ncase, the LCBO expressed a desire to begin selling larger\\npackages of beer in its ordinary stores. BRI and Brewers of\\nOntario, an unincorporated trade association consisting sole-\\nly of Labatt and Molson, opposed this plan because such\\nsales would “cannibalize BRI’s volume.”11 This dispute and\\nits resolution is central to many of Mountain Crest’s claims;\\nthe events described here are as outlined in Mountain\\nCrest’s Second Amended Complaint.\\n Responding to the LCBO’s wish to sell larger packages of\\nbeer, the Executive Director of Brewers of Ontario noted in a\\n1992 letter to the President of BRI that the GATT settlement\\nrequired the LCBO to provide the same opportunities to for-\\neign brewers that it provided to domestic brewers. There-\\nfore, Labatt and Molson believed that they would not be able\\nto sell large packages of their own beer in LCBO ordinary\\nstores without opening those stores to large packages of for-\\neign beer. Accordingly, they refused to sell packages of\\ntwelve and twenty-four containers of beer at LCBO ordinary\\n\\n\\n\\n10Historically, the LCBO has taken first receipt of all foreign beer and\\nthen sells it to BRI for sale and distribution. Mountain Crest submits that,\\nthough the LCBO takes first receipt of all foreign beer for BRI, it is BRI\\nthat places the orders for imported beer.\\n11 R.49-2 at 1.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 9\\n\\nstores. Mountain Crest submits that this “group boycott”12\\nput LCBO “at the mercy of Labatt and Molson if it wished to\\nexpand its beer business” because the two brewers had a\\ndominant market share in Canada and exclusive distribution\\nagreements with the three major American beer companies.13\\nAt times, the LCBO’s internal documents reflected its view\\nthat BRI was monopolistic and its practices harmed Canadi-\\nan consumers.\\n According to the Second Amended Complaint, the LCBO\\nhad to negotiate with Labatt and Molson if it wanted to sell\\nlarger packages of beer. These negotiations, which involved\\nOntario’s Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations,\\noccurred over the next several years. In addition to what size\\npackages of beer could be sold, the parties also discussed\\ncost-of-service fees, minimum beer prices, additional loca-\\ntions of The Beer Store and LCBO stores, and BRI’s assump-\\ntion of the responsibility for directly importing the beer it\\nsells rather than using the LCBO as a go-between.\\n On December 9, 1998, officers of Molson and Interbrew\\n(which now owned Labatt) presented a template working\\n\\n\\n12 See R.49 ¶ 108. In their briefing before the district court, An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors note that any decision to not provide\\nlarge packages of beer to LCBO ordinary stores complied with the status\\nquo—the traditional practice of LCBO ordinary stores to only sell pack-\\nages of six or fewer. Mountain Crest submits, however, that the boycott\\nextended beyond not providing larger package sizes of domestic beers\\nbut also included “unwillingness to supply additional six-packs” and\\n“alternative packaging formats (e.g. cans).” R.49-16 at 1; see also R.49\\n¶ 108.\\n13 R.49 ¶ 77.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2327\\n\\nagreement addressing the points of contention. This tem-\\nplate included a provision prohibiting the LCBO from pur-\\nchasing twelve and twenty-four packages of beer from any\\nAmerican brewers, including those brewers who did not sell\\nthrough BRI. In a letter to the Deputy Minister of Consumer\\nand Commercial Relations, the LCBO opposed this provision\\nand others. Pertinently, it complained that the template\\nworking agreement did not address BRI’s practice of placing\\nfrequent small orders for imported beer. Mountain Crest\\nsuggests that this practice—in its words, “out-of-stocking”—\\ninhibited its ability to sell beer competitively in Ontario.14\\nRelatedly, the LCBO requested that BRI undertake importa-\\ntion and distribution operations for itself rather than relying\\non the LCBO to import and distribute beer to BRI in the first\\ninstance. Mountain Crest submits that making this change\\nwould have remedied the out-of-stocking issues it allegedly\\nfaced later on.\\n Following the initial template proposal, the LCBO and\\nthe breweries developed a document that would become a\\n 15\\nfinal agreement in 2000. This “Working Protocol” included\\nprovisions prohibiting the LCBO from selling twelve and\\ntwenty-four packages of beer and requiring BRI to take first\\nreceipt of the imported beer. Mountain Crest alleges that the\\nOntario government pressured the LCBO to “concede to\\ndemands from Molson and Labatt, although the Minister,\\nsensitive to international trade legal exposure, declined to do\\n\\n\\n\\n14 See id. ¶¶ 101–02.\\n15\\n See id. ¶ 102.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 11\\n\\n 16\\nso via any form of law or regulation.” According to Moun-\\ntain Crest, the breweries promised to make new investments\\nin manufacturing if the LCBO acceded to their demands. At\\none point, the LCBO officials expressed that the Working\\nProtocol “gives the Brewers [Molson, Inc. and Interbrew SA]\\nalmost a total monopoly over the beer market and effectively\\nsupersedes the Liquor Control Act and the powers it gives\\n 17\\nthe Board in relation to beer.”\\n As negotiations continued, the LCBO apparently still\\nsought to gain some flexibility in package sizes. During an\\nLCBO Board meeting on August 9, 1999, the LCBO dis-\\ncussed the possibility that Molson might be interested in\\nworking with them to improve the proposed agreements.\\nMolson, however, did not do so. The brewers allegedly con-\\ntinued what Mountain Crest terms as their “multi-year\\ngroup boycott”: Labatt and Molson refused to supply addi-\\ntional six packs of beer beyond what the LCBO already had,\\nto provide packages of their beer in cases larger than a six\\npack, or to provide any beer in cans.18\\n A final round of negotiations began on March 30, 2000.\\nMinutes from the meeting reflect that the brewers viewed\\nallowing larger package sizes in LCBO stores to be\\n“Non-Negotiable.”19 The minutes also indicate that the par-\\n\\n\\n16\\n Id. ¶ 103.\\n17\\n Id. ¶ 105 (alteration in original).\\n18 Id. ¶ 108.\\n19\\n Id. ¶ 112.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2327\\n\\nties decided to not include the provision from the Working\\nProtocol that would have required BRI to assume im-\\nport-distribution responsibilities. This provision, according\\nto Mountain Crest, would have fixed the out-of-stocking is-\\nsue it allegedly later faced when trying to sell its beer at The\\nBeer Store. Mountain Crest submits that, on May 18, 2000,\\nthe LCBO Board determined that, “as a practical matter,” it\\nwould have to concede to the brewers’ demands because\\n“the LCBO could not compel [BRI] to supply it with new\\n 20\\nbrands of beer for sale.” At the end of that month, the Min-\\nister for Commerce and Commercial Relations directed the\\nLCBO to sign the agreement proposed by BRI. BRI’s Chair-\\nman, also an officer of Molson, signed the contract on behalf\\nof BRI. According to Mountain Crest, the parties chose to\\nimplement the regulatory scheme through a contract be-\\ntween the LCBO and BRI because a contract would not be\\npublic.21 Further, Mountain Crest asserts that Labatt and\\nMolson’s lawyers believed that “the Cabinet or Ministerial\\ndirective approach” might not “prevent the LCBO from us-\\ning their regulatory power under the Liquor Control Act to\\noverride any such a directive.”22\\n On June 1, 2000, BRI and the LCBO entered into a final\\nagreement (the “2000 Agreement”) to resolve the outstand-\\n\\n20\\n Id. ¶ 119.\\n21Indeed, though Sleeman has a small ownership stake in BRI, it appar-\\nently was unaware of this agreement at the time it was signed. Similarly,\\nMountain Crest alleges that other brewers were unaware of the ar-\\nrangement.\\n22 Id. ¶ 111.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 13\\n\\ning issues of dispute between the two parties. Relevant to\\nthis suit, the 2000 Agreement outlined “Beer Selling Roles”\\nand provided that, “[c]onsistent with historical practice, the\\nLCBO will not sell beer [] in non-combination stores in pack-\\nages containing more than 6 containers and will not promote\\n 23\\nbeer at price points greater than 6 containers” (the “six-\\npack rule”). According to the Second Amended Complaint,\\n“[i]n one sentence, Molson Inc. and Interbrew SA managed\\nto implement not only their per se illegal horizontal market\\nallocation conspiracy regarding package sizes, but also their\\nper se illegal horizontal price fixing conspiracy by contractu-\\n 24\\nally prohibiting the LCBO from offering ‘Pack Up Pricing.’”\\nIn Mountain Crest’s view, a prohibition on promoting beer\\nat price points greater than six containers “meant that U.S.\\nbrewers who only sold to the LCBO were unable to encour-\\nage sales to the LCBO by offering promotional quantity-\\nbased pricing to match discounts Defendants made available\\n 25\\nat [The Beer Store].” A Canadian court has explained that\\nthe 2000 Agreement merely continued current practices of\\nthe LCBO and BRI:\\n The 2000 Beer Framework Agreement did not\\n change much in the way that the LCBO and\\n Brewers Retail each operated. … Both before\\n and after the Agreement was adopted, gov-\\n ernment policy precluded the LCBO from sell-\\n\\n23\\n R.49-19 at 4.\\n24\\n R.49 ¶ 122.\\n25\\n Id.\\n\\f14 No. 18-2327\\n\\n ing 12-packs and 24-packs at Ordinary\\n Stores and precluded the LCBO from selling to\\n licencees the beer that was exclusively distrib-\\n uted by Brewers Retail. The LCBO would have\\n needed the Provincial Government’s approval\\n to change this status quo, and the Government\\n refused to grant such approval.\\n\\nHughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 157.\\n Mountain Crest alleges that the LCBO made efforts to re-\\nnegotiate the 2000 Agreement over the next several years so\\nthat it could sell larger packages of beer. For example, the\\nLCBO offered to allow pack-up pricing for Labatt and Mol-\\nson products only, which presumably would benefit Labatt\\nand Molson at the expense of their competitors. The BRI,\\nhowever, rejected these entreaties and brewers allegedly\\ntook steps to ensure the status quo continued. During this\\ntime, both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors were formed\\nthrough a variety of acquisitions and mergers that included\\nLabatt and Molson respectively. Mountain Crest suggests\\nthat the profits Labatt and Molson enjoyed from their alleg-\\nedly anticompetitive and illegal scheme made such corpo-\\nrate combinations possible.\\n On October 20, 2009, Mountain Crest entered the Ontario\\nmarket and paid BRI to list its Boxer Lager brand in The Beer\\nStore. In total, Mountain Crest paid $701,797.08 CAD in list-\\ning fees from the date of that initial listing until the end of\\n2016.26 Mountain Crest, however, allegedly had difficulties\\n\\n26A listing fee refers to the price that brewer pays BRI to carry the brew-\\ner’s beer.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 15\\n\\nselling its beer in The Beer Store. In a February 22, 2010 press\\nrelease, Mountain Crest reported that its launch of Boxer La-\\nger was “severely hindered with rolling Out of Stocks.”27\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, BRI placed small orders for\\nBoxer Lager even though there was great demand for the\\nproduct due to an advertising campaign. And, since The\\nBeer Store was the only place that Mountain Crest could sell\\nits large packages of Boxer Lager, Mountain Crest claims\\nthat it lost export sales because it could not go to another re-\\ntailer and sell its beer in large packages there. Mountain\\nCrest alleges that the beneficiaries of these lost sales were\\nAnheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ value-segment beer\\nbrands that were prominently displayed in The Beer Store.\\nBRI responded to Mountain Crest’s press release, claiming\\nthat “[w]e’re not seeing that inventory arrive in stores. We’re\\nat the mercy of what the LCBO ships to us.”28 Mountain\\nCrest contends that this was misleading because BRI resisted\\nthe LCBO’s attempt to move import distribution to BRI and\\n“Molson and Labatt had used their market power to com-\\npletely dominate the LCBO.”29\\n Mountain Crest alleges other facts detailing anticompeti-\\ntive marketing and distribution practices at The Beer Store.\\nAllegedly, “the most significant consumer marketing vehicle\\n\\n\\n27Id. ¶ 174; see also id. ¶ 173 (“Plaintiff’s winter 2009-2010 advertising\\ncampaign and launch of Boxer was significantly undermined by\\nout-of-stock issues for Boxer Lager that on average affected a third of the\\n440 [The Beer Store’s] that were supposed to be carrying Boxer Lager.”).\\n28 Id. ¶ 176.\\n29 Id.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2327\\n\\nin” The Beer Store is the “Big Ten” wall, which prominently\\nlists “the top 10 selling beer brands” for customers to choose\\nwhen placing their orders.30 All but one of the brands listed\\non the “Big Ten” wall allegedly belonged to either An-\\nheuser-Busch or Molson Coors, which “reinforce[d] their ex-\\nisting volumes and market share while limiting the ability of\\nnew entrants to compete.”31 Additionally, The Beer Store op-\\nerated a “Brewer Poster Program”32 that brewers could join\\nto place large advertising posters inside The Beer Store, with\\nrelative positions selected by The Beer Store. Mountain Crest\\nalleges that it paid to participate in this program, but The\\nBeer Store discontinued the program summarily, without\\nrefund, to utilize the space for The Beer Store brand messag-\\ning. Last, Mountain Crest claims that The Beer Store’s listing\\nfees, which are charged to only brewers who are not mem-\\nbers of BRI, are discriminatory.33 The effect of these fees was\\napparently compounded by the alleged out-of-stocking\\nscheme because “Defendants’ employees, who take Director\\nroles at [BRI], decide amongst themselves” quotas that the\\nbrewer’s brands must meet for The Beer Store to retain in-\\nventory of that product “even if the reason it did not meet\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n30Id. ¶ 59. For a description of the typical layout of The Beer Store and\\nthe customer purchasing process, see supra note 9.\\n31 Id. ¶ 247.\\n32 Id. ¶ 169.\\n33Until 2015, BRI consisted only of Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, and\\nSleeman. Thus, all other brewers paid listing fees.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 17\\n\\nthe quota is because [BRI] did not use reasonable efforts to\\nensure sufficient inventory despite the paid-for listing.”34\\n In 2014, the Ontario Premier asked the Premier’s Adviso-\\nry Council on Government Assets to examine further ways\\nto monetize government assets such as the LCBO. The\\nCouncil determined that the LCBO should sell larger pack-\\nages of beer and that BRI needed to “treat both owners and\\nnon-owners fairly, including with respect to the display of\\ntheir products.”35 Around the same time, the Toronto Star\\npublished an article disclosing the previously non-public\\n2000 Agreement, sparking constituent outrage and leading\\nto a since-dismissed Canadian antitrust class action suit.36\\nBRI responded to this public criticism by offering ownership\\nstakes to all Ontario brewers. Though small, these owner-\\nship stakes allowed Ontario brewers special privileges such\\nas being exempt from paying listing fees. Mountain Crest\\nalleges this plan was “in effect an import-substitution\\nscheme … giving Ontario-based brewers better access to\\n[The Beer Store] while further damaging competition [from]\\nDefendants’ U.S. based competitors, and with the intent of\\nforestalling government mandated reforms [aimed] at end-\\ning Defendants’ ongoing restraints in trade.”37\\n\\n\\n34 Id. ¶ 62.\\n35 Id. ¶ 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n36See Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, para. 247 (determining that the\\n2000 Agreement did not violate Canada’s Competition Act because the\\nconduct alleged was regulated conduct).\\n37 R.49 ¶ 195.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2327\\n\\n At the same time, Anheuser-Busch, Molson Coors, BRI,\\nthe LCBO, and the government of Ontario entered into nego-\\ntiations to replace the 2000 Agreement. During these negoti-\\nations, Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors apparently\\nsought to maintain BRI’s exclusive position as the only seller\\nof large packages of beer. To this end, they allegedly threat-\\nened the Ontario government with NAFTA expropriation\\nlitigation if the government “took steps to undermine their\\ncartel or system of restraints on U.S. exports to Ontario.”38\\nAccording to Mountain Crest, these threats “were planned\\nand authorized by Defendants[’] respective U.S. offices in\\nSt. Louis and Denver” because “[n]o subsidiary entity of ei-\\nther Defendants located in Canada is capable of standing\\nunder NAFTA to bring an expropriation challenge, which is\\ndesigned to offer a remedy solely for foreign entities, not\\ndomestic entities.”39\\n The final 2015 Agreement continued the six-pack rule. It\\nalso included a provision wherein Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors “waive any right to bring any claim or to seek\\nor obtain any compensation or other remedy of any kind\\nunder international law or under any international trade\\nagreements to which Canada is a Party, including\\n[NAFTA].”40 The 2015 Agreement has a ten-year term and\\n\\n38Id. ¶ 200. NAFTA permits investors to submit claims that a NAFTA\\nparty has breached investment-related obligations, including obligations\\nto afford fair treatment to investments made by foreign parties. See\\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 11 § B, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 107\\nStat. 2061, 32 I.L.M. 605.\\n39 R.49 ¶ 200.\\n40 Id. ¶ 207.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 19\\n\\nprovides for early termination upon either written agree-\\nment by both BRI and the government of Ontario, the bank-\\nruptcy of BRI, or material breach by either party. Further, it\\ncontains a provision permitting severance of terms “restrict-\\n 41\\ned, prohibited or unenforceable” in any jurisdiction. The\\ngovernment of Ontario, BRI, Labatt, Molson, and Sleeman\\nBreweries, Ltd. (“Sleeman”)42 signed the 2015 Agreement.\\nAlong with the 2015 Agreement, the government of Ontario\\namended the Liquor Control Act. This amendment states\\nthat the LCBO “is deemed to have been directed, and Brew-\\ners Retail, Inc.[,] is deemed to have been authorized, to enter\\ninto the June 2000 framework in relation to the Crown’s or a\\nCrown agent’s regulation and control of the sale of beer in\\nOntario.” R.S.O 1990, c. L.18 § 10(3).\\n After the May 2018 elections, the Ontario PC party\\nformed a new parliamentary majority in the Ontario gov-\\nernment. As part of its campaign platform, it had said that it\\nwould “withdraw from the secret, backroom deal negotiated\\nbetween the Liberals and foreign multinational beer compa-\\nnies.”43 After oral argument in this case, the new Ontario\\ngovernment proposed and enacted an amendment to the\\n 44\\nLiquor Control Act terminating the 2015 Agreement. The\\n\\n\\n41\\n Id.\\n42 Sleeman was the other owner-member of BRI. See supra note 8.\\n43 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n44\\n See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness to the People Act (Beverage Alco-\\nhol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontario, 2019 (royal assent received\\nJune 6, 2019).\\n\\f20 No. 18-2327\\n\\neffective date of the termination is to be announced by the\\nprovince’s Lieutenant Governor; this date has not yet been\\nannounced. In a May 27, 2019 letter, counsel for Labatt and\\nMolson informed the Ontario Deputy Attorney General that\\nthe companies were reserving the right to commence litiga-\\ntion challenging the bill. No such litigation has yet com-\\nmenced.\\n B.\\n On August 17, 2017, Mountain Crest brought this action\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It alleged violations of\\nthe Sherman Antitrust Act as well as a claim for unjust en-\\nrichment under Wisconsin state law. Specifically, under § 1\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, Mountain Crest\\nalleges that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors engaged in a\\nhorizontal conspiracy to restrain competitors’ export of beer\\nto Ontario by “leverag[ing] their market power to insist …\\nthat LCBO not purchase 12s and 24s of beer from any brew-\\n 45\\neries” ; “agree[ing] to impose on the LCBO a contractual ob-\\nligation in the June 1st, 2000 agreement that the LCBO\\nwould not allow any brewery supplier to offer Pack-Up pric-\\n 46\\ning” ; “conspir[ing] to rig [The Beer Store] in-store market-\\ning schemes … to reinforce their existing volumes and mar-\\nket share while limiting the ability of new entrants to com-\\n 47\\npete” ; and “conspir[ing] to hold on to their restraints\\n\\n\\n45\\n R.49 ¶ 243.\\n46\\n Id. ¶ 244.\\n47\\n Id. ¶ 247.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 21\\n\\nagainst their U.S. domestic competitors’ ability to export to\\nOntario by launching their January 2015 Plan to extend cer-\\ntain cartel benefits to other Ontario brewers and threatening\\nthe government of Ontario with NAFTA litigation.”48 To\\nsupport its claim under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15\\nU.S.C. § 2, Mountain Crest contends that Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors “conspired with each other to monopo-\\nlize the sale of beer in Ontario, including the use of a group\\nboycott, to restrain the LCBO’s ability to buy beer from other\\n 49\\nbrewers.” They also “took overt and predatory acts in fur-\\ntherance of their conspiracy by developing a series of ever-\\nmore anticompetitive restraints on the LCBO’s ability to of-\\nfer American brewers a competitive route into the Ontario\\nbeer market.”50 These overt and predatory acts included “re-\\nbuffing LCBO attempts to engage competitively” and “op-\\nerat[ing] [The Beer Store] in a manner that constitutes an un-\\nlawful combination by discriminating against competing\\nbrewers” so that they cannot access “point-of-sale marketing\\nprograms in [The Beer Store].”51\\n For these alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Moun-\\ntain Crest sought a declaration that Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors engaged in an “ongoing per se unlawful mar-\\nket allocation and price fixing conspiracies to restrain export\\n\\n\\n\\n48 Id. ¶ 243.\\n49\\n Id. ¶ 253.\\n50 Id.\\n51 Id.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2327\\n\\nbeer trade to Ontario.”52 Further, it asked for a declaration\\nthat Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors sought to monopo-\\nlize illegally the sale of beer in Ontario by restraining the\\nability of the LCBO to purchase beer from competing brew-\\neries and by creating anticompetitive conditions in The Beer\\nStore. Mountain Crest also moved for injunctive relief order-\\ning Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors to terminate their\\nparticipation in the 2015 Agreement and to restrain any fur-\\nther efforts aimed at preventing “any third party Canadian\\nentity involved in the purchase and resale of beer” from\\npurchasing competing beer.53 Additionally, Mountain Crest\\nsought an order requiring Anheuser-Busch and Molson\\nCoors to divest their ownership in BRI. Last, Mountain Crest\\nrequested treble damages for its lost exports to Ontario.\\n Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors moved to dismiss\\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on multiple\\ngrounds: (1) that the claims are barred by the act of state\\ndoctrine; (2) that the claims are barred under\\nNoerr-Pennington; (3) that the Sherman Act does not reach\\nthe conduct at issue; (4) comity; (5) forum non conveniens; (6)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not state a plausible claim; and (7)\\nthat Mountain Crest did not plead facts to pierce the corpo-\\nrate veil of their subsidiaries to reach them.\\n Relying on the act of state doctrine, the district court\\ngranted Anheuser-Busch’s and Molson Coors’ motion. It\\nreasoned that “all of the conduct that allegedly violates the\\nSherman Act involves a public act by the Ontario govern-\\n\\n52 Id. ¶ 257.\\n53 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 23\\n\\nment and [that] a ruling in Mountain Crest’s favor would\\nrequire the court to determine that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Sherman Act as well.”54 The district court identi-\\nfied four such public acts that were “the official policy of the\\nOntario government”: (1) the 2000 Agreement between the\\nLCBO (as a government agency) and BRI formalizing the six-\\npack rule; (2) the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Com-\\nmercial Relations’ direction to the LCBO to sign the 2000\\nAgreement; (3) the 2015 Liquor Control Act amendments\\napproving of the 2000 Agreement; and (4) the 2015 Agree-\\nment between BRI and the government of Ontario reaffirm-\\ning the six-pack rule.55 In its view, “there is no way to find\\nthat [Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors] violated the Sher-\\nman Act without also finding that the Ontario government\\nviolated the Act by entering into the 2000 and 2015 agree-\\nments”56; ruling for Mountain Crest would “declare the On-\\ntario government’s policy choices invalid and require the\\ngovernment to dismantle its policy.”57 Moreover, allegations\\nof a “continued … conspirac[y]” were of no significance be-\\n\\n54 R.60 at 13.\\n55Id. at 13–14. The district court noted that the Ontario Superior Court’s\\ndecision in Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, confirmed that these actions\\nare public acts of the Ontario government and that the conduct did not\\nviolate Ontario law. R.60 at 16.\\n56 Id. at 14.\\n57Id. at 18. The district court found there was “no way that it could rem-\\nedy any alleged restraints on trade without enjoining the Ontario gov-\\nernment” because “it is the practices at LCBO stores, not BRI stores, that\\nMountain Crest is challenging” and “[t]hus, no injunction against de-\\nfendants could provide Mountain Crest any immediate relief.” Id. at 15.\\n\\f24 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncause, “[r]egardless of any conduct by [Anheuser-Busch and\\nMolson Coors], the source of the harm is still the agreement\\nwith the government” and the government’s endorsement of\\nthe agreement in 2015.58\\n The district court declined to determine whether there is\\na commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine\\nbecause, even if there were such an exception, it would not\\napply. The district court noted that the LCBO is a regulatory\\nagency that did not carry on its business as a prof-\\nit-maximizing commercial enterprise, and that the 2015\\namendment to the Liquor Control Act states the 2015\\nAgreement relates to the “regulation and control of the sale\\nof beer in Ontario.”59 The court also dismissed Mountain\\nCrest’s argument that the act of state doctrine should not\\napply because it was possible for Anheuser-Busch and Mol-\\nson Coors to comply with both Canadian and U.S. law be-\\nfore entering the 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement. It\\nfound that this argument was based on “international comi-\\nty, not the act of state doctrine, which on its face does not\\nrequire a private defendant to show that it was compelled to\\nact in a certain way.”60\\n\\n\\n\\n58 Id. at 22.\\n59 Id. at 20.\\n60Id. at 24 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794–97\\n(1993) (determining that international comity did not require a court to\\ndecline to adjudicate a Sherman Act claim involving foreign conduct\\nwhere foreign law permitted the anticompetitive conduct but did not\\nrequire it)).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 25\\n\\n The district court did not consider Anheuser-Busch’s and\\nMolson Coors’ other arguments. Because the federal claims\\nwere dismissed under the act of state doctrine, the district\\ncourt also dismissed Mountain Crest’s state-law claim with-\\nout prejudice. Mountain Crest timely appealed.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We now turn to the merits of the dispute before us.61 In\\naddition to the briefs and arguments of the parties, the De-\\npartment of Justice (“DOJ”) has submitted, at our invita-\\ntion,62 an amicus brief advising that the district court proper-\\nly applied the act of state doctrine and correctly dismissed\\nMountain Crest’s claims that the 2000 Agreement and 2015\\nAgreement containing the six-pack rule were per se viola-\\ntions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The DOJ\\nsuggests, however, that Mountain Crest made allegations of\\nanticompetitive behavior that must be considered independ-\\nent of the six-pack rule. In the DOJ’s view, these allegations\\nare not subject to the act of state doctrine and should not\\nhave been dismissed at this stage of the litigation. In re-\\n\\n61We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint\\nfor failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).\\nSee Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.\\n2012).\\n62We invited the United States to submit an amicus brief addressing the\\napplicability of the act of state doctrine. The Department of Justice ac-\\ncepted our invitation and submitted a brief on behalf of the United\\nStates. We thank the Department for having accepted our invitation. The\\nparties were given an opportunity to respond to the Department’s sub-\\nmission and have submitted briefs stating their positions.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2327\\n\\nsponse, Mountain Crest claims that the DOJ misinterprets\\nthe act of state doctrine and that the doctrine is not applica-\\nble. It agrees, however, that, in any event, it set forth a con-\\nspiracy that is not wholly dependent on the acts of the On-\\ntario government. It submits that these other acts, independ-\\nent of the actions of the Ontario government, are sufficient to\\nsupport its claim that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors\\nviolated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. An-\\nheuser-Busch and Molson Coors counter that, although the\\nDOJ correctly concludes that the act of state doctrine pre-\\ncludes consideration of Mountain Crest’s claims related to\\nthe 2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement, the DOJ suggests,\\nincorrectly, that we must vacate the remaining aspects of the\\ndistrict court’s judgment and remand to consider an inde-\\npendent conspiracy. We now evaluate these positions. We\\nfirst discuss the contours of the act of state doctrine and then\\napply the doctrine to this case.\\n A.\\n Unlike the political question doctrine or claims of sover-\\neign immunity, the act of state doctrine is not a jurisdictional\\nbar nor a theory of abstention; rather, it is a “substantive”\\ndoctrine considered “on the merits” of the case. Republic of\\nAustria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).63 We have not\\n\\n\\n63 In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), the Supreme\\nCourt, having resolved the question presented to it regarding jurisdic-\\ntion under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, said that the act of\\nstate doctrine “provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the\\nmerits.” Id. at 700 (emphasis added). The act of state doctrine, however,\\ncan be raised by the defendant as a defense or by the plaintiff as part of\\nits case. See Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.3\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 27\\n\\nhad occasion to address the doctrine in much detail but have\\ndescribed it as “a judicial rule that ‘generally forbids an\\nAmerican court to question the act of a foreign sovereign\\nthat is lawful under that sovereign’s laws.’” Nocula v. UGS\\nCorp., 520 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting F. & H.R.\\nFarman-Farmaian Consulting Eng’rs Firm v. Harza Eng’g Co.,\\n882 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1989)). There is a “presumption of\\nvalidity accorded to the official public acts of a foreign coun-\\ntry.” Id. at 728.\\n The act of state doctrine first appeared in Underhill v.\\nHernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), where the Supreme Court re-\\nfused to determine whether a Venezuelan military com-\\nmander, whose revolutionary government later was recog-\\nnized by the United States, had detained illegally a United\\nStates citizen. Id. at 254. The Court said that:\\n Every sovereign State is bound to respect\\n the independence of every other sovereign\\n State, and the courts of one country will not sit\\n in judgment on the acts of the government of\\n another done within its own territory. Redress\\n of grievances by reason of such acts must be\\n obtained through the means open to be availed\\n of by sovereign powers as between themselves.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.\\n398 (1964)).\\n\\f28 No. 18-2327\\n\\nId. at 252. Although some have regarded Underhill to be a\\nsovereign immunity case,64 the Supreme Court has character-\\nized the case as “[t]he classic American statement of the act\\nof state doctrine,” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376\\nU.S. 398, 416 (1964), because “holding the defendant’s deten-\\ntion of the plaintiff to be tortious would have required deny-\\ning legal effect” to the acts of the foreign official, W.S. Kirk-\\npatrick & Co., Inc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400,\\n405 (1990). In early act of state cases following Underhill, the\\nCourt employed the doctrine to refrain from adjudicating\\nproperty seizures by foreign governments.65 These early de-\\ncisions viewed the act of state doctrine “as an expression of\\ninternational law, resting upon ‘the highest considerations of\\ninternational comity and expediency.’” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493\\nU.S. at 404 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,\\n303–04 (1918)).\\n In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recast the traditional\\ndoctrinal foundation of the act of state doctrine, deciding\\nthat it was not compelled by either “the inherent nature of\\nsovereign authority” or by international law. 376 U.S. at 421–\\n22. Rather, the Court determined that there were “‘constitu-\\ntional’ underpinnings” to the doctrine derived from our sys-\\n\\n\\n64See Indus. Inv. Dev. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 594 F.2d 48, 51 n.6 (5th\\nCir. 1979); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 441 n.2\\n(Am. Law Inst. 2018); John Harrison, The American Act of State Doctrine,\\n47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 507, 526–33 (2016).\\n65 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1918) (declin-\\ning to examine property seizures because doing so would determine that\\nthe seizure within Mexico and by Mexico was legally ineffective); Ricaud\\nv. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918) (same).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 29\\n\\ntem of separation of powers.66 Id. at 423. Noting “the compe-\\ntency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-\\nticular kinds of decisions in the area of international rela-\\ntions,” the Court explained that the act of state doctrine “ex-\\npresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its en-\\ngagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign\\nacts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s\\npursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of na-\\ntions as a whole in the international sphere.” Id. at 424. Put\\nanother way, “juridical review of acts of state of a foreign\\npower could embarrass the conduct of foreign relations by\\nthe political branches of the government,” and “frustrate the\\nconduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.” First Nat’l City Bank\\nv. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765, 769 (1972).\\n Because the act of state doctrine’s “continuing vitality\\ndepends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of\\nfunctions between the judicial and political branches of the\\nGovernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs,” Sab-\\nbatino identified various factors for courts to consider before\\napplying the doctrine. 376 U.S. at 427–28. These include “the\\ndegree of codification or consensus concerning a particular\\narea of international law”; “the implications of an is-\\nsue … for our foreign relations”; and whether “the govern-\\nment which perpetrated the challenged act of state” is still in\\n\\n\\n66These constitutional underpinnings are structural considerations sug-\\ngesting the usefulness of the act of state doctrine in certain situations.\\nThe Court was clear that “[t]he text of the Constitution does not require\\nthe act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judici-\\nary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of the states.” Sab-\\nbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.\\n\\f30 No. 18-2327\\n\\nexistence.67 Id. at 428. In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court decid-\\ned that it would “not examine the validity of a taking of\\nproperty within its own territory by a foreign sovereign\\ngovernment”—there, an expropriation decree by the Cuban\\ngovernment—“in the absence of a treaty or other unambigu-\\nous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if\\nthe complaint alleges the taking violates customary interna-\\ntional law.”68 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n67 In full, the Court stated:\\n\\n It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification\\n or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,\\n the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions\\n regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of\\n an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the\\n sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with\\n the national interest or with international justice. It is also evi-\\n dent that some aspects of international law touch much more\\n sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the\\n implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker\\n the justification for exclusivity in the political branches. The bal-\\n ance of relevant consideration may also be shifted if the gov-\\n ernment which perpetrated the challenged act of the state is no\\n longer in existence … for the political interest of this country\\n may, as a result, be measurably altered.\\nSabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.\\n68The result of Sabbatino—a bar against claims based on the invalidity of\\nCuban expropriations—has been nullified by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.\\n§ 2370(e)(2) (the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment”). As evidenced by\\nthe Supreme Court’s discussion of Sabbatino in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.,\\nInc., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 404–06, 409–10, the Hick-\\nenlooper Amendment’s specific application to cases involving Cuban\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 31\\n\\n The Court’s most recent decision concerning the substan-\\ntive application of the act of state doctrine provides particu-\\nlarly valuable guidance for us in resolving the present case.\\nIn W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. 400, the Court was confronted\\nwith a situation where the plaintiffs, unsuccessful bidders\\nfor a Nigerian government construction contract, brought an\\naction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-\\nzations Act (“RICO”) alleging that the defendants had ob-\\ntained the bid by bribing Nigerian officials. Nigerian law\\nprohibited the payment and acceptance of bribes in connec-\\ntion with a government contract. Id. at 402. The district court\\nheld that the action was barred by the act of state doctrine\\nbecause proving that the bribes were paid, as required by\\nRICO, would necessarily involve an inquiry into the Nigeri-\\nan government’s motivations, unlawful in that country, that\\nmight embarrass the Nigerian government or interfere with\\nthe execution of American foreign policy. Id. at 403. Relying\\non the submission of the State Department that the judicial\\ninquiry would not embarrass the Executive Branch in the\\nconduct of our country’s foreign relations, the Third Circuit\\nreversed. Id. at 403–04.\\n The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different\\n 69\\ngrounds. It held that the act of state doctrine was inappli-\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nexpropriations does not diminish Sabbatino’s import to the act of state\\ndoctrine generally.\\n69\\n W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404–05, declined to determine whether\\nthere should be an exception to the act of state doctrine where the acts of\\nstate in question consist of commercial transactions, see Alfred Dunhill of\\nLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695–706 (1976) (plurality\\n (continued … )\\n\\f32 No. 18-2327\\n\\ncable to the case because neither the “relief sought” nor “the\\ndefense interposed” required a court to declare invalid the\\nNigerian government’s official act approving the contract. Id.\\nat 405. The Court readily admitted that, in the course of ad-\\njudicating the RICO claim, a United States court might well\\nmake factual findings that would establish the illegality of\\nthe contract under Nigerian law. Id. at 406. But this was, in\\neffect, no more than a collateral consequence of the court’s\\ntask in adjudicating the RICO action because the Nigerian\\ncontract’s “legality wa[s] simply not a question to be decid-\\ned” in the suit. Id. That such judicial fact-finding might em-\\nbarrass the Nigerian government was of no consequence. Id. at\\n409. The Court was clear that the act of state doctrine is\\nsimply—and only—a rule of decision that requires an Amer-\\nican court, in the process of deciding the case, to accept as\\nvalid the acts of another sovereign taken within that sover-\\neign’s own jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the act of state doctrine on-\\nly bars suit where “a court must decide—that is, when the\\noutcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action\\n 70\\nby a foreign sovereign.” Id. at 406.\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nopinion), or where the Executive Branch asserts that applying the act of\\nstate doctrine in a particular instance would not impair its foreign policy\\ninterest, see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,\\n768–70 (1972) (plurality opinion).\\n70\\n The Supreme Court also acknowledged that there may be occasions\\nwhere the policy considerations animating the act of state doctrine—\\ninternational comity, respect for foreign nations, and avoiding interfer-\\nence with the Executive Branch in the conduct of its foreign relations—\\nwould justify a court’s declining to apply the doctrine despite its “tech-\\nnical availability.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 409. The Court in W.S.\\n (continued … )\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 33\\n\\n From these holdings of the Supreme Court, we can plot\\nthe course that we must take in this case. First, we must de-\\ntermine whether the six-pack rule is attributable to the gov-\\nernment of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\ntrine. Second, we must determine whether a decision in\\nMountain Crest’s favor would invalidate those acts.\\n B.\\n The burden of establishing the applicability of the act of\\nstate doctrine rests on the party invoking the doctrine. See\\nAlfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,\\n694 (1976). In applying the analytical framework established\\nby the Supreme Court’s cases, we first examine whether the\\n2000 Agreement and 2015 Agreement constitute official acts\\nfor the purposes of the act of state doctrine.\\n Mountain Crest conceded, in its reply brief and at oral\\nargument, that both agreements were official acts of the\\nProvince of Ontario for the purposes of the act of state doc-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\nKirkpatrick had no occasion to elaborate further on such situations nor do\\nwe today. We note, however, that the change of majority party of the\\nOntario Legislative Assembly is hardly equivalent to the change in gov-\\nernment alluded to in Sabbatino. See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d\\n440, 453 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where\\nthe act in question occurred thirty-four years prior to the suit and under\\nthe government of a dictator who had been dead for thirty years); Repub-\\nlic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en\\nbanc) (declining to apply the act of state doctrine where the government\\nhad been overthrown).\\n\\f34 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 71\\ntrine. This concession is well-founded. The 2015 Amend-\\nment to the Liquor Control Act ratifying the 2000 Agreement\\nis an official legislative enactment of the Ontario govern-\\nment. Moreover, the LCBO, as the wholly owned Crown\\nagency responsible for the retail sale of alcohol in the prov-\\nince, “is required to abide by the policy decisions and direc-\\ntives of the Government,” and “[t]he government exercised\\nconsiderable control over the LCBO,” in which “[c]omplex,\\nhigh-level decisions were made from time-to-time by senior\\n 72\\nGovernment officials.” Hughes, 2018 CarswellOnt 3969, pa-\\nra. 82, 84. The LCBO’s actions entering the two agreements\\nregulating the sale of alcohol within Ontario are official acts\\n\\n71\\n Appellant’s Reply Br. 4 (“Mountain Crest is not challenging their offi-\\ncial status. Just as Kirkpatrick did not need to reach arguments about the\\nofficial status of the Nigerian government contract, the official status of\\nfour acts in the present case is irrelevant because their legal effectiveness\\nis not being challenged.”); Oral Argument at 15:33–16:00 (“We’re not\\nresting on the commercial exception. We don’t, we don’t need it. … We\\ncan accept them all as valid. None of the four acts are being declared …\\nnull and void. We are not seeking any kind of declaratory relief … that\\nwould seek to deny them legal effect. So … we are happy to accept that\\nthey are all official acts.”).\\n72\\n We note that the Canadian courts adjudicating antitrust claims arising\\nfrom the 2000 Agreement under Canadian law dismissed those claims\\npursuant to Canada’s “Regulated Conduct Defence.” Hughes, 2018 Car-\\nswellOnt 3969, para. 237–47; see also id. at para. 240 (“The 2000 Beer\\nFramework Agreement was in the wheelhouse … of the powers and\\nrights conferred on the LCBO and Brewers Retail under the Liquor Con-\\ntrol Act.”). At its most basic level, the Regulated Conduct Defence pro-\\nvides that “conduct authorized by valid provincial or federal legisla-\\ntion … deemed to be in the public interest … cannot constitute an ‘un-\\ndue’ limit on competition.” Id. at para. 221.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 35\\n\\n 73\\nof the Ontario government. Finally, with respect to the 2015\\nAgreement, the government of Ontario is an actual party to\\nthat agreement. Therefore, the acts in question are official\\nacts of the Ontario government.\\n The district court assumed, as do the parties, that the “act\\nof state doctrine applies the same way to a provincial gov-\\n 74\\nernment as to a national government.” This assumption is\\ncertainly correct in the circumstances presented here because\\n 75\\na national statute authorizes the acts of the LCBO. We also\\nnote that most other courts that have confronted this issue\\nhave determined that the act of state doctrine applies to acts\\n 76\\nof sub-national governments. Moreover, in construing the\\n\\n73\\n Cf. Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 899 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.\\n2018) (determining that the acts of a corporation that is majority-owned\\nand controlled by the Mexican government were official, sovereign\\nacts).\\n74\\n R.60 at 13 n.5.\\n75\\n R.S.C. 1985, c. I-3, § 3 (banning, with limited exceptions, any interpro-\\nvincial or international trade in alcoholic beverages other than that car-\\nried about by the provincial liquor boards); see also, Canadian Breweries,\\n[1960] O.R. 601, para. 39 (noting that “each Province has jurisdiction to\\nregulate and control the sale of liquor within its boundaries and to fix\\nthe prices at which, and the conditions under which liquor may be\\nsold”).\\n76\\n See In re Fresh & Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 834 F. Supp. 2d\\n1141, 1180 (D. Idaho 2011) (cooperative of Canadian provincial govern-\\nments acted in sovereign capacity for purposes of act of state doctrine);\\nOccidental Petroleum Corp v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113\\n(C.D. Cal. 1971) (sheikdoms of United Arab Emirates acted in sovereign\\ncapacity); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,\\n (continued … )\\n\\f36 No. 18-2327\\n\\nact of state doctrine and defining its terms, courts have\\n 77\\nsometimes looked to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ;\\nthat statute defines “foreign state” to include “a political\\nsubdivision of a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Finally,\\nturning to the policy concerns animating the act of state doc-\\ntrine, judicial questioning of the acts of a sub-national gov-\\nernment could interfere with the foreign relations efforts of\\nour political branches just as much as questioning the acts of\\na national government could. Therefore, the first prong of\\nthe act of state doctrine analysis is met: the agreements es-\\ntablishing the six-pack rule are acts of state for the purposes\\nof the doctrine.\\n Our next task is to examine whether, in adjudicating this\\ncase, the court “must decide … the effect of official action by a\\nforeign sovereign.” W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406. In short,\\nwe ask whether the Ontario legislation giving the six-pack\\nrule the force and effect of law determines the “outcome of\\nthe case.” Id. Put another way, does the “relief sought or the\\ndefense interposed” by Mountain Crest “require[] a court in\\nthe United States to declare invalid the official act[s]” of the\\n\\n\\n( … continued)\\n910 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (act of state doctrine applies to member states of\\nWest Germany), aff’d 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Am. Indus. Con-\\ntracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1971)\\n(determining that “[t]he province of Quebec is not a State within the\\nmeanings of the doctrines of international law” because “[t]hese doc-\\ntrines only apply to nations in the international sense such as the United\\nStates and Canada”).\\n77\\n See, e.g., World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d\\n1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 37\\n\\nOntario government, and thus render them “ineffective as ‘a\\nrule of decision for the courts of this country’”? Id. at 405\\n(quoting Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918)). To\\nanswer that question, we must return to the Second Amend-\\ned Complaint and determine precisely the nature of Moun-\\ntain Crest’s allegations.\\n As the case comes to us, it is clear, despite the operative\\ncomplaint’s prolixity and, at times, unartful language, that\\nMountain Crest is seeking, through injunctive and declarato-\\nry relief, an adjudication that the six-pack rule established by\\n 78\\nthe Ontario government is inoperative. First, it claims that\\nthe six-pack rule, contained in agreements entered into by\\nthe Ontario government and approved of in legislation, vio-\\nlates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it con-\\nstitutes a price-fixing and market allocation arrangement.\\nThese agreements are per se unlawful; the mere existence of\\nsuch an arrangement violates the statute. Leegin Creative\\nLeather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007).\\nMoreover, the existence of a per se unlawful agreement “jus-\\n 79\\ntifies [its] facial invalidation.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med.\\n\\n\\n78\\n Mountain Crest’s claims premised directly on the six-pack rule are\\nfurther complicated by the recent action of the Ontario government re-\\npudiating the 2015 Agreement. See Bill 115, Bringing Choice and Fairness\\nto the People Act (Beverage Alcohol Retail Sales), 1st Sess., 42nd Leg., Ontar-\\nio, 2019 (royal assent received June 6, 2019). This matter has not been\\nargued to us, and we believe that the most expeditious manner of eval-\\nuating this development is to permit the district court to address it on\\nremand.\\n79\\n The operation of the Sherman Antitrust Act here differs from the op-\\neration of RICO in W.S. Kirkpatrick. Determining an agreement is unlaw-\\n (continued … )\\n\\f38 No. 18-2327\\n\\nSoc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). Therefore, to the extent that\\nMountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule on this ground, the\\nact of state doctrine is, as our colleague in the district court\\nrecognized, applicable.\\n Mountain Crest also asks for declaratory and injunctive\\nrelief precluding the six-pack rule established by the Ontario\\ngovernment because it violated Section 2 of the Sherman An-\\ntitrust Act. This section makes it illegal to “monopolize, or\\nattempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any\\nperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or\\ncommerce among the several States, or with foreign na-\\ntions.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To the extent that Mountain Crest seeks\\nrelief under this section predicated solely on the six-pack\\nrule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action.\\nAdjudication of liability on this basis would have the effect\\nof invalidating the Ontario government’s choice to extend\\nmonopoly benefits to Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors.\\n Nevertheless, Mountain Crest’s operative complaint, fair-\\nly read, is not limited to the theories of recovery that we\\nhave just addressed. The Second Amended Complaint also\\nsets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors,\\nacting through their officers and employees, violated the\\nsame provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring\\nabout the Ontario government’s approval of the six-pack\\nrule. These allegations do not implicate the act of state doc-\\n\\n( … continued)\\nful under 15 U.S.C. § 1 necessarily invalidates that agreement; determin-\\ning an agreement was procured by bribery under RICO merely penaliz-\\nes the individual undertaking the racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1963, 1964.\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 39\\n\\ntrine. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407, indicated that, where\\nthe plaintiff is “not trying to undo or disregard governmen-\\ntal action,” it may “obtain damages from [the] private parties\\nthat procured it” illegally. In reaching its conclusion, the\\nCourt noted its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal Sales\\nCorp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 407. In\\nSisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 276, the Court did not bar an antitrust\\ncomplaint where defendants took “deliberate acts” to\\n“br[ing] about forbidden results” simply because the anti-\\ncompetitive conspiracy was aided by discriminatory legisla-\\ntion obtained from the Mexican government by the defend-\\nants. Mountain Crest sets forth facts that, if accepted by a\\ntrier of fact, might demonstrate that the defendants took\\nconcerted action to bring about the Ontario legislation.\\nHolding Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors liable for their\\nantecedent and allegedly deliberate acts to bring about the\\nsix-pack rule and requiring them to pay damages to Moun-\\ntain Crest would not, on its face, invalidate Ontario’s chosen\\nregulatory scheme.\\n The district court did not consider the Second Amended\\nComplaint from this perspective, and, upon examination of\\nthe record, we cannot say that Mountain Crest has waived\\nany reliance on these allegations. We are aware that such al-\\nlegations raise significant questions of causality. We also are\\naware that there may be other possible defenses, including\\n 80\\nbut not limited to the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington\\n\\n\\n\\n80\\n E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127\\n(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2327\\n\\n 81\\ndoctrine to the lobbying of foreign governments, that must\\nbe explored. These matters never have been addressed by\\nthe district court and have been addressed in only a tangen-\\ntial way during this appeal. If the parties wish, they may\\nraise these matters in the district court.\\n The Second Amended Complaint also addresses another\\narea that, so far, has not come under the district court’s scru-\\ntiny. It plainly sets forth other activities of Anheuser-Busch\\nand Molson Coors, perhaps independent of the six-pack\\nrule, that, in Mountain Crest’s view, implicate the strictures\\nof the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest has alleged a\\npattern of other marketing and distribution practices that it\\nclaims manipulated The Beer Store’s internal sales approach\\nto disfavor American products, including Mountain Crest’s\\nproduct. These practices, according to the operative com-\\nplaint, prevented Mountain Crest from achieving the econ-\\nomies of scale necessary to make its participation in the On-\\n\\n\\n81\\n Compare Coastal Sales Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364–67 (5th\\nCir. 1983) (extending Noerr-Pennington to petitioning of foreign govern-\\nments because “Noerr was based on a construction of the Sherman Act”\\nand there are “no reasons why acts that are legal and protected if done in\\nthe United States should in a United States court become evidence of\\nillegal conduct because performed abroad”), and Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Ori-\\nental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 249, 266 (D.N.J. 2003)\\n(agreeing with the Fifth Circuit), with Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes\\nGas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107–08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that\\nNoerr-Pennington does not extend to petitioning of foreign governments\\nbecause the doctrine was based on “avoid[ing] a construction of the anti-\\ntrust laws that might trespass upon the First Amendment right of peti-\\ntion” and that concept “carries limited if indeed any applicability to the\\npetitioning of foreign governments”), aff’d, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).\\n\\fNo. 18-2327 41\\n\\ntario market profitable. We cannot discern any basis for say-\\ning that Mountain Crest has waived these claims. Accord-\\ningly, on remand, the district court should address these\\nclaims in due course.\\n Conclusion\\n For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm in part\\nand vacate in part the judgment of the district court and re-\\nmand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nMountain Crest may recover the costs of this appeal.\\n AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4361,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659462,"string":"4,659,462"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3268"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3268\\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\\n Petitioner-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\\n Respondent-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\\n\\n2 No. 18-3268\\n\\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\\n(2015).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 3\\n\\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\\n\\n4 No. 18-3268\\n\\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\\n(8th Cir. 2012).\\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 5\\n\\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\\n§ 2255 petition.\\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\\n\\n6 No. 18-3268\\n\\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\\ncourt ordered resentencing.\\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 7\\n\\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\\nappeals.\\n II\\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\\ning.\\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\\n\\n8 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 9\\n\\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\\nquestions.\\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\\n\\n10 No. 18-3268\\n\\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 11\\n\\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\\nthat difference.”).\\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\\n\\n12 No. 18-3268\\n\\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\\nsame crime)”).\\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 13\\n\\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nSee id. at 2248.\\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\\n\\n14 No. 18-3268\\n\\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 15\\n\\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\\nsis in the original).\\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\\ning.\\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\\n\\n16 No. 18-3268\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\\nsimply on the merits”).\\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\\nzen’s claim.\\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 17\\n\\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\\narmed career criminal.\\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\\nadditional complexity.\\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\\n\\n18 No. 18-3268\\n\\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 19\\n\\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\\nin this context.\\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\\n1136).\\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\\n\\n20 No. 18-3268\\n\\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\\nony under the Act.\\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 21\\n\\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\\n\\n22 No. 18-3268\\n\\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\\n III\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 23\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436715/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the panel’s\\nopinion because it has support in our precedent. I write\\nseparately, though, to express concern about the state of our\\nprecedent. As the opinion observes, the complexity of our\\ncases in this area is “staggering.” We have stated the “saving\\nclause” test in so many different ways that it is hard to\\nidentify exactly what it requires. And the resulting confusion\\nhas caused our law to drift beyond the course we set in In re\\nDavenport. See 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). At this point,\\nour definition of “inadequacy” and “ineffectiveness” under\\n§ 2255(e) undermines the limits that § 2255(h) imposes on\\nsecond or successive motions. Our patch for statutory cases\\nhas grown larger than the hole we identified in the statute.\\n Davenport aims to fix a “glitch” in § 2255(h)(2). See Brown\\nv. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 587 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting\\nUnthank v. Jett, 549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008)). That\\nprovision permits a prisoner to bring a second or successive\\nchallenge to his detention if the motion is based on “a new\\nrule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on\\ncollateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously\\nunavailable.” This permission does not apply, however, to a\\nsecond or successive motion based on a new statutory\\ninterpretation—perhaps because of a congressional oversight.\\nAs one noted treatise explains, Congress appears to have\\nmodeled § 2255(h)(2) on § 2244(b), which governs second and\\nsuccessive collateral attacks by state prisoners. HART &\\nWECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM\\n1362 (Richard H. Fallon Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). But\\n“Congress seems to have lost sight of the fact that federal\\nconvicts more often can raise federal statutory claims in their\\ncollateral attacks—notably in cases in which the federal\\ncriminal statute under which a prisoner was convicted has\\n\\n24 No. 18-3268\\n\\nsince been authoritatively interpreted more narrowly.” Id.\\nDavenport holds that § 2255’s failure to provide a federal\\nprisoner “any opportunity for judicial rectification of so\\nfundamental a defect in his conviction as having been\\nimprisoned for a nonexistent offense” renders § 2255\\n“inadequate” or “ineffective” for purposes of § 2255(e)’s\\nsaving clause. 147 F.3d at 611. Thus, a prisoner in that\\nsituation can seek a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. Id.1\\n Davenport’s test for “inadequacy” and “ineffectiveness”\\nlargely tracks § 2255(h)(2). That makes sense. The “structural\\nproblem” in § 2255 is that § 2255(h)(2) doesn’t authorize\\nsecond or successive motions based on statutory claims. See\\nPoe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Where\\nDavenport recognized a structural problem in § 2255(h) is in\\nthe fact that it did not permit a successive petition for new\\nrules of statutory law made retroactive by the Supreme\\nCourt.”). Davenport fixes that problem by effectively giving\\nsuch prisoners the relief that they would have had if\\n§ 2255(h)(2) had included them.\\n\\n\\n1 There is a circuit split on whether the lack of relief for statutory claims is\\na feature or a bug of § 2255. Compare McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-\\nSuncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that\\na change in caselaw does not make a § 2255 motion to vacate a prisoner’s\\nsentence “inadequate or ineffective” under the saving clause), and Prost v.\\nAnderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a statutory\\ninterpretation challenge under § 2241 as barred by § 2255), with United\\nStates v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013) (authorizing saving-clause\\nrelief when an intervening statutory interpretation decision rendered the\\ndefendant’s conduct non-criminal), Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d\\n893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001) (same), In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir.\\n2000) (same), Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997)\\n(same), and In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 929–30 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 25\\n\\n Our cases, however, have phrased Davenport’s test\\ninconsistently, and little by little, they have stopped tracking\\n§ 2255(h)(2). Most significantly, we have moved away from\\nDavenport’s requirement that the change in law come from the\\nSupreme Court. 147 F.3d at 611. Sometimes we have included\\nthat requirement in our restatement of the test. See, e.g., Light\\nv. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2014) (allowing for “a\\n§ 2241 challenge based on a new statutory interpretation by\\nthe Supreme Court” (emphasis added)). Sometimes we have\\nnot. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nTo be sure, almost all of our post-Davenport cases have dealt\\nwith petitions based on Supreme Court decisions, so in the\\nmine-run of cases, nothing has turned on the source of the\\nrule.2 Still, we stopped explicitly saying that the rule must\\ncome from the Supreme Court, and recently, we allowed a\\npetitioner to obtain relief based on a circuit-level decision.\\nBeason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019). Under our\\ncircuit’s law, therefore, a prisoner with a second or successive\\nstatutory claim can secure relief based on a court of appeals\\ncase, while a prisoner with a second or successive\\nconstitutional claim can secure relief only when the Supreme\\nCourt acts. That is an odd state of affairs.\\n It also raises the stakes for the choice-of-law question that\\nwe do not resolve today: which circuit’s law applies to a\\n\\n2 The requirement that the new case be made retroactive by the Supreme\\nCourt—as opposed to the requirement that the case have been decided by\\nthe Supreme Court in the first place—is not a problem in Davenport cases.\\nStatutory interpretations that narrow the range of conduct made criminal\\nare always substantive and therefore retroactive. Because of that rule, a\\nSupreme Court decision narrowing a criminal statute applies retroactively\\neven if the Supreme Court doesn’t expressly say so. Prevatte v. Merlak, 865\\nF.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2017); Montana, 829 F.3d at 784.\\n\\n26 No. 18-3268\\n\\nDavenport petition. Chazen’s case illustrates the point. Chazen\\nwas convicted in the Eighth Circuit, so its law governed his\\ntrial, sentencing, direct appeal, and first § 2255 motion. Even\\nnow, there is no controlling law in the Eighth Circuit on which\\nChazen could base a claim for relief, so a collateral attack filed\\nthere would fail.3 But a § 2241 petition is filed in the circuit of\\nconfinement, and seeking the benefit of Van Cannon v. United\\nStates, 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2018), Chazen argues that we\\nshould apply Seventh Circuit law to resolve his petition.\\n We should be skeptical of this argument. Applying the\\nlaw of the circuit of confinement risks recreating some of the\\nproblems that § 2255 was designed to fix. See United States v.\\nHayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210–19 (1952) (explaining that § 2255\\ndirects post-conviction litigation to the district of conviction\\nto avoid the practical problems that existed before § 2255,\\nwhen all litigation was brought by a writ of habeas corpus in\\nthe district of confinement); see also HART & WECHSLER at 1356\\n(cataloguing the issues courts faced before § 2255’s\\nenactment). We have never decided the issue, but district\\ncourts confronting it have concluded that the law of the circuit\\nof conviction applies. As one court explained:\\n\\n\\n3 To be clear, while Chazen’s petition invokes Mathis v. United States as\\nwell as Van Cannon v. United States, Mathis is not the case that justifies\\ngranting him relief. See 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Van Cannon is the case that renders his burglary conviction\\ninsufficient to support the enhancement he received under the Armed\\nCareer Criminal Act. He invokes Mathis to justify his failure to raise this\\nissue in his first § 2255 motion. Mathis itself does not offer him relief,\\nbecause he does not complain that the sentencing court’s decision to count\\nhis burglary conviction was the result of the error Mathis identifies—\\nlooking at the facts underlying his crime to conclude that he committed it\\nby a violent means. Chazen needs both Mathis and Van Cannon to succeed.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 27\\n\\n The rule ensures that the law that prevails in the\\n judicial circuit of any federal prisoner's\\n conviction, or a substantially similar law, is the\\n law that will be applied to the prisoner’s § 2241\\n petition seeking vacation of a conviction.\\n Application of the law of the place of conviction\\n is a consistent, reasonable rule, as is evidenced\\n by the requirement that § 2255 motions be filed\\n in the district of conviction. The rule [petitioner]\\n believes appropriate—applying the substantive\\n law of the place of confinement—is actually far\\n more arbitrary. Such a rule would base the\\n choice of law decision on the fortuitous\\n placement of a prisoner by the Bureau of\\n Prisons, not the more rational factor of the place\\n of conviction.\\nHernandez v. Gilkey, 242 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (S.D. Ill. 2001); see\\nalso Cano v. Warden USP–Terre Haute, No. 2:17-cv-441, 2018\\nWL 3389746 (S.D. Ind. July 12, 2018); Roberts v. Watson, No. 16-\\ncv-541, 2017 WL 6375812 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2017); accord\\nBurgess v. Williams, No. 4:18-cv-2643, 2019 WL 2641902 (N.D.\\nOhio June 27, 2019); Eames v. Jones, 793 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749\\n(E.D.N.C. 2011). This position has force.\\n Today’s opinion avoids resolving the choice-of-law\\nproblem because the government conceded in the district\\ncourt that Seventh Circuit law applies.4 I have reservations\\n\\n\\n4 At the time the government took this position, Seventh and Eighth\\nCircuit law were identical on the relevant point. Compare United States v.\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2017), with Van Cannon, 890 F.3d\\nat 664–65. The ground shifted after the Supreme Court decided Quarles v.\\nUnited States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1875 (2019). At that point, McArthur was\\n\\n28 No. 18-3268\\n\\nabout whether we should accept this concession. While we\\nhave the discretion to accept a concession on a point of law,\\nwe are not obligated to do so. Krieger v. United States, 842 F.3d\\n490, 499 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Of course we are not bound to accept\\nthe government’s concession when the point at issue is a\\nquestion of law.”); see also Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d\\n1045, 1061 n.4 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a party’s concession on\\na question of law). Here, I worry that accepting the concession\\nrisks giving the impression that we settled the issue. Lest\\nthere be any confusion, we have not. In a later case, this is an\\nissue that deserves our careful consideration; it is not one that\\nwe should resolve for all cases based on the government’s\\nlitigating position in this one.\\n Chazen’s case implicates other issues that the full court\\nshould clarify at some point. For example, as today’s opinion\\nexplains, we have articulated at least three different standards\\nfor determining whether a recently decided case qualifies as\\none that the petitioner could not have raised in his initial\\n§ 2255 motion. Maj. Op. at 18–19. We need to pick one. And\\nwhen we do, we should focus on the fact that some of our\\nformulations specify that the recently decided case must\\nannounce a “new rule” without explaining what this means.\\nSee, e.g., Light, 761 F.3d at 812 (asserting that a § 2241 petition\\nmust be “based on a new statutory interpretation by the\\nSupreme Court” (emphasis added)). In particular, we have\\nnot discussed whether “newness” in the Davenport context\\nbears any relationship to the “newness” requirements in\\n§ 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3). A “new” rule for purposes of\\nthese subsections is one that “breaks new ground” rather than\\n\\nabrogated, the choice-of-law question became outcome-determinative,\\nand the government backtracked.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 29\\n\\nclarifying established law. Headbird v. United States, 813 F.3d\\n1092, 1095 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,\\n301 (1989)) (explaining that “newness” has the same meaning\\nin both § 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3)). Other circuits have held\\nthat Mathis, which the Supreme Court characterized as\\ndictated by Taylor, does not satisfy this test. See, e.g.,\\nWashington v. United States, 868 F.3d 64, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2017);\\nArazola-Gates v. United States, 876 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.\\n2017); In re Conzelman, 872 F.3d 375, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Taylor, 672 F. App’x 860, 863 (10th Cir. 2016).\\nThus, if the Davenport test uses “new” in the standard habeas\\nsense that it has in § 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3), Chazen’s\\nclaim presumably cannot succeed. See Guenther v. Williams,\\nNo. 17-cv-231, 2017 WL 5054731 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2017)\\n(holding that a Mathis claim is not cognizable under § 2241\\nbecause Mathis applied established law rather than\\nannouncing a “new” rule).\\n But as Chazen points out, we have not expressly embraced\\nthis definition of “new” for Davenport petitions—and we have\\nsometimes implied that a “new” case is nothing more than\\none that opens a previously foreclosed position. If that’s right,\\ncases like Mathis, which correct misapplications of “old”\\nrules, qualify. Maybe that is the position that we want to take,\\nbut if so, we should expressly adopt and defend it. Doing so\\nwould require us to think through the implications of\\nforgoing a “newness” requirement in this saving clause\\ncontext. For example, that position might mean that\\n§ 2255(f)’s statute of limitations renders § 2255 “inadequate\\nand ineffective” when it blocks even a first motion relying on\\nMathis. But see Boatwright v. Warden Fairton FCI, 742 F. App’x\\n701, 704 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting this position).\\n\\n30 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In sum, this body of law is plagued by numerous complex\\nissues. This might not be the case in which to untangle them,\\nbut at some point, we need to give litigants and district courts\\nbetter guidance.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436715/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659462/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3268\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\n Petitioner-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\n Respondent-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\n\n2 No. 18-3268\n\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\naffirm.\n I\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\nCriminal Act.\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\n(2015).\n\nNo. 18-3268 3\n\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\n\n4 No. 18-3268\n\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\n(8th Cir. 2012).\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\n\nNo. 18-3268 5\n\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\n§ 2255 petition.\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\n\n6 No. 18-3268\n\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\ncourt ordered resentencing.\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\n\nNo. 18-3268 7\n\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\nappeals.\n II\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\ning.\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\n\n8 No. 18-3268\n\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\n\nNo. 18-3268 9\n\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\nquestions.\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\n\n10 No. 18-3268\n\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\n\nNo. 18-3268 11\n\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\nthat difference.”).\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\n\n12 No. 18-3268\n\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\nsame crime)”).\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\n\nNo. 18-3268 13\n\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\nSee id. at 2248.\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\n\n14 No. 18-3268\n\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\n2018).\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\n\nNo. 18-3268 15\n\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\nsis in the original).\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\ning.\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\n\n16 No. 18-3268\n\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\nsimply on the merits”).\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\nzen’s claim.\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\n\nNo. 18-3268 17\n\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\narmed career criminal.\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\nadditional complexity.\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\n\n18 No. 18-3268\n\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\n\nNo. 18-3268 19\n\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\nin this context.\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\n1136).\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\n\n20 No. 18-3268\n\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\nony under the Act.\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\n\nNo. 18-3268 21\n\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\n\n22 No. 18-3268\n\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\n III\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\n\nNo. 18-3268 23\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3268\\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\\n Petitioner-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\\n Respondent-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\\n\\n2 No. 18-3268\\n\\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\\n(2015).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 3\\n\\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\\n\\n4 No. 18-3268\\n\\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\\n(8th Cir. 2012).\\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 5\\n\\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\\n§ 2255 petition.\\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\\n\\n6 No. 18-3268\\n\\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\\ncourt ordered resentencing.\\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 7\\n\\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\\nappeals.\\n II\\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\\ning.\\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\\n\\n8 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 9\\n\\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\\nquestions.\\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\\n\\n10 No. 18-3268\\n\\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 11\\n\\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\\nthat difference.”).\\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\\n\\n12 No. 18-3268\\n\\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\\nsame crime)”).\\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 13\\n\\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nSee id. at 2248.\\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\\n\\n14 No. 18-3268\\n\\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 15\\n\\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\\nsis in the original).\\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\\ning.\\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\\n\\n16 No. 18-3268\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\\nsimply on the merits”).\\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\\nzen’s claim.\\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 17\\n\\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\\narmed career criminal.\\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\\nadditional complexity.\\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\\n\\n18 No. 18-3268\\n\\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 19\\n\\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\\nin this context.\\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\\n1136).\\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\\n\\n20 No. 18-3268\\n\\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\\nony under the Act.\\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 21\\n\\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\\n\\n22 No. 18-3268\\n\\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\\n III\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 23\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4362,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659463,"string":"4,659,463"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-1501"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 15-1501\\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\\n\\f2 No. 15-1501\\n\\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 3\\n\\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\\ntitle shall not apply to— …\\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\\n rests for violations of Federal law.\\n\\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\\n\\f4 No. 15-1501\\n\\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\\nthe other circuits have this right.\\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 5\\n\\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\\nminimum of internal discord.\\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\\n\\f6 No. 15-1501\\n\\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 7\\n\\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\\nthat’s what this suit is.\\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\\n\\f8 No. 15-1501\\n\\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\\n(7th Cir. 1972).\\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 9\\n\\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\\nnot be repeated.)\\n\\f10 No. 15-1501\\n\\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\\ntherefore\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436716/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659463/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 15-1501\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\n\f2 No. 15-1501\n\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\n\fNo. 15-1501 3\n\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\ntitle shall not apply to— …\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\n rests for violations of Federal law.\n\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\n\f4 No. 15-1501\n\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\nthe other circuits have this right.\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\n\fNo. 15-1501 5\n\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\nminimum of internal discord.\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\n\f6 No. 15-1501\n\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\n\fNo. 15-1501 7\n\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\nthat’s what this suit is.\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\n\f8 No. 15-1501\n\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\n(7th Cir. 1972).\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\n\fNo. 15-1501 9\n\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\nnot be repeated.)\n\f10 No. 15-1501\n\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\ntherefore\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 15-1501\\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\\n\\f2 No. 15-1501\\n\\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 3\\n\\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\\ntitle shall not apply to— …\\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\\n rests for violations of Federal law.\\n\\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\\n\\f4 No. 15-1501\\n\\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\\nthe other circuits have this right.\\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 5\\n\\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\\nminimum of internal discord.\\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\\n\\f6 No. 15-1501\\n\\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 7\\n\\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\\nthat’s what this suit is.\\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\\n\\f8 No. 15-1501\\n\\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\\n(7th Cir. 1972).\\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 9\\n\\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\\nnot be repeated.)\\n\\f10 No. 15-1501\\n\\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\\ntherefore\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4363,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659477,"string":"4,659,477"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3268"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3268\\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\\n Petitioner-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\\n Respondent-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\\n\\n2 No. 18-3268\\n\\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\\n(2015).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 3\\n\\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\\n\\n4 No. 18-3268\\n\\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\\n(8th Cir. 2012).\\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 5\\n\\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\\n§ 2255 petition.\\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\\n\\n6 No. 18-3268\\n\\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\\ncourt ordered resentencing.\\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 7\\n\\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\\nappeals.\\n II\\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\\ning.\\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\\n\\n8 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 9\\n\\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\\nquestions.\\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\\n\\n10 No. 18-3268\\n\\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 11\\n\\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\\nthat difference.”).\\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\\n\\n12 No. 18-3268\\n\\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\\nsame crime)”).\\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 13\\n\\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nSee id. at 2248.\\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\\n\\n14 No. 18-3268\\n\\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 15\\n\\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\\nsis in the original).\\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\\ning.\\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\\n\\n16 No. 18-3268\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\\nsimply on the merits”).\\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\\nzen’s claim.\\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 17\\n\\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\\narmed career criminal.\\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\\nadditional complexity.\\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\\n\\n18 No. 18-3268\\n\\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 19\\n\\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\\nin this context.\\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\\n1136).\\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\\n\\n20 No. 18-3268\\n\\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\\nony under the Act.\\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 21\\n\\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\\n\\n22 No. 18-3268\\n\\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\\n III\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 23\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436730/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join the panel’s\\nopinion because it has support in our precedent. I write\\nseparately, though, to express concern about the state of our\\nprecedent. As the opinion observes, the complexity of our\\ncases in this area is “staggering.” We have stated the “saving\\nclause” test in so many different ways that it is hard to\\nidentify exactly what it requires. And the resulting confusion\\nhas caused our law to drift beyond the course we set in In re\\nDavenport. See 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998). At this point,\\nour definition of “inadequacy” and “ineffectiveness” under\\n§ 2255(e) undermines the limits that § 2255(h) imposes on\\nsecond or successive motions. Our patch for statutory cases\\nhas grown larger than the hole we identified in the statute.\\n Davenport aims to fix a “glitch” in § 2255(h)(2). See Brown\\nv. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 587 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting\\nUnthank v. Jett, 549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2008)). That\\nprovision permits a prisoner to bring a second or successive\\nchallenge to his detention if the motion is based on “a new\\nrule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on\\ncollateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously\\nunavailable.” This permission does not apply, however, to a\\nsecond or successive motion based on a new statutory\\ninterpretation—perhaps because of a congressional oversight.\\nAs one noted treatise explains, Congress appears to have\\nmodeled § 2255(h)(2) on § 2244(b), which governs second and\\nsuccessive collateral attacks by state prisoners. HART &\\nWECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM\\n1362 (Richard H. Fallon Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). But\\n“Congress seems to have lost sight of the fact that federal\\nconvicts more often can raise federal statutory claims in their\\ncollateral attacks—notably in cases in which the federal\\ncriminal statute under which a prisoner was convicted has\\n\\n24 No. 18-3268\\n\\nsince been authoritatively interpreted more narrowly.” Id.\\nDavenport holds that § 2255’s failure to provide a federal\\nprisoner “any opportunity for judicial rectification of so\\nfundamental a defect in his conviction as having been\\nimprisoned for a nonexistent offense” renders § 2255\\n“inadequate” or “ineffective” for purposes of § 2255(e)’s\\nsaving clause. 147 F.3d at 611. Thus, a prisoner in that\\nsituation can seek a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. Id.1\\n Davenport’s test for “inadequacy” and “ineffectiveness”\\nlargely tracks § 2255(h)(2). That makes sense. The “structural\\nproblem” in § 2255 is that § 2255(h)(2) doesn’t authorize\\nsecond or successive motions based on statutory claims. See\\nPoe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Where\\nDavenport recognized a structural problem in § 2255(h) is in\\nthe fact that it did not permit a successive petition for new\\nrules of statutory law made retroactive by the Supreme\\nCourt.”). Davenport fixes that problem by effectively giving\\nsuch prisoners the relief that they would have had if\\n§ 2255(h)(2) had included them.\\n\\n\\n1 There is a circuit split on whether the lack of relief for statutory claims is\\na feature or a bug of § 2255. Compare McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-\\nSuncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that\\na change in caselaw does not make a § 2255 motion to vacate a prisoner’s\\nsentence “inadequate or ineffective” under the saving clause), and Prost v.\\nAnderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a statutory\\ninterpretation challenge under § 2241 as barred by § 2255), with United\\nStates v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013) (authorizing saving-clause\\nrelief when an intervening statutory interpretation decision rendered the\\ndefendant’s conduct non-criminal), Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d\\n893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001) (same), In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir.\\n2000) (same), Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997)\\n(same), and In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 929–30 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 25\\n\\n Our cases, however, have phrased Davenport’s test\\ninconsistently, and little by little, they have stopped tracking\\n§ 2255(h)(2). Most significantly, we have moved away from\\nDavenport’s requirement that the change in law come from the\\nSupreme Court. 147 F.3d at 611. Sometimes we have included\\nthat requirement in our restatement of the test. See, e.g., Light\\nv. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 2014) (allowing for “a\\n§ 2241 challenge based on a new statutory interpretation by\\nthe Supreme Court” (emphasis added)). Sometimes we have\\nnot. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nTo be sure, almost all of our post-Davenport cases have dealt\\nwith petitions based on Supreme Court decisions, so in the\\nmine-run of cases, nothing has turned on the source of the\\nrule.2 Still, we stopped explicitly saying that the rule must\\ncome from the Supreme Court, and recently, we allowed a\\npetitioner to obtain relief based on a circuit-level decision.\\nBeason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019). Under our\\ncircuit’s law, therefore, a prisoner with a second or successive\\nstatutory claim can secure relief based on a court of appeals\\ncase, while a prisoner with a second or successive\\nconstitutional claim can secure relief only when the Supreme\\nCourt acts. That is an odd state of affairs.\\n It also raises the stakes for the choice-of-law question that\\nwe do not resolve today: which circuit’s law applies to a\\n\\n2 The requirement that the new case be made retroactive by the Supreme\\nCourt—as opposed to the requirement that the case have been decided by\\nthe Supreme Court in the first place—is not a problem in Davenport cases.\\nStatutory interpretations that narrow the range of conduct made criminal\\nare always substantive and therefore retroactive. Because of that rule, a\\nSupreme Court decision narrowing a criminal statute applies retroactively\\neven if the Supreme Court doesn’t expressly say so. Prevatte v. Merlak, 865\\nF.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2017); Montana, 829 F.3d at 784.\\n\\n26 No. 18-3268\\n\\nDavenport petition. Chazen’s case illustrates the point. Chazen\\nwas convicted in the Eighth Circuit, so its law governed his\\ntrial, sentencing, direct appeal, and first § 2255 motion. Even\\nnow, there is no controlling law in the Eighth Circuit on which\\nChazen could base a claim for relief, so a collateral attack filed\\nthere would fail.3 But a § 2241 petition is filed in the circuit of\\nconfinement, and seeking the benefit of Van Cannon v. United\\nStates, 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2018), Chazen argues that we\\nshould apply Seventh Circuit law to resolve his petition.\\n We should be skeptical of this argument. Applying the\\nlaw of the circuit of confinement risks recreating some of the\\nproblems that § 2255 was designed to fix. See United States v.\\nHayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210–19 (1952) (explaining that § 2255\\ndirects post-conviction litigation to the district of conviction\\nto avoid the practical problems that existed before § 2255,\\nwhen all litigation was brought by a writ of habeas corpus in\\nthe district of confinement); see also HART & WECHSLER at 1356\\n(cataloguing the issues courts faced before § 2255’s\\nenactment). We have never decided the issue, but district\\ncourts confronting it have concluded that the law of the circuit\\nof conviction applies. As one court explained:\\n\\n\\n3 To be clear, while Chazen’s petition invokes Mathis v. United States as\\nwell as Van Cannon v. United States, Mathis is not the case that justifies\\ngranting him relief. See 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.\\n2018). Van Cannon is the case that renders his burglary conviction\\ninsufficient to support the enhancement he received under the Armed\\nCareer Criminal Act. He invokes Mathis to justify his failure to raise this\\nissue in his first § 2255 motion. Mathis itself does not offer him relief,\\nbecause he does not complain that the sentencing court’s decision to count\\nhis burglary conviction was the result of the error Mathis identifies—\\nlooking at the facts underlying his crime to conclude that he committed it\\nby a violent means. Chazen needs both Mathis and Van Cannon to succeed.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 27\\n\\n The rule ensures that the law that prevails in the\\n judicial circuit of any federal prisoner's\\n conviction, or a substantially similar law, is the\\n law that will be applied to the prisoner’s § 2241\\n petition seeking vacation of a conviction.\\n Application of the law of the place of conviction\\n is a consistent, reasonable rule, as is evidenced\\n by the requirement that § 2255 motions be filed\\n in the district of conviction. The rule [petitioner]\\n believes appropriate—applying the substantive\\n law of the place of confinement—is actually far\\n more arbitrary. Such a rule would base the\\n choice of law decision on the fortuitous\\n placement of a prisoner by the Bureau of\\n Prisons, not the more rational factor of the place\\n of conviction.\\nHernandez v. Gilkey, 242 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (S.D. Ill. 2001); see\\nalso Cano v. Warden USP–Terre Haute, No. 2:17-cv-441, 2018\\nWL 3389746 (S.D. Ind. July 12, 2018); Roberts v. Watson, No. 16-\\ncv-541, 2017 WL 6375812 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2017); accord\\nBurgess v. Williams, No. 4:18-cv-2643, 2019 WL 2641902 (N.D.\\nOhio June 27, 2019); Eames v. Jones, 793 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749\\n(E.D.N.C. 2011). This position has force.\\n Today’s opinion avoids resolving the choice-of-law\\nproblem because the government conceded in the district\\ncourt that Seventh Circuit law applies.4 I have reservations\\n\\n\\n4 At the time the government took this position, Seventh and Eighth\\nCircuit law were identical on the relevant point. Compare United States v.\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2017), with Van Cannon, 890 F.3d\\nat 664–65. The ground shifted after the Supreme Court decided Quarles v.\\nUnited States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1875 (2019). At that point, McArthur was\\n\\n28 No. 18-3268\\n\\nabout whether we should accept this concession. While we\\nhave the discretion to accept a concession on a point of law,\\nwe are not obligated to do so. Krieger v. United States, 842 F.3d\\n490, 499 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Of course we are not bound to accept\\nthe government’s concession when the point at issue is a\\nquestion of law.”); see also Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d\\n1045, 1061 n.4 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a party’s concession on\\na question of law). Here, I worry that accepting the concession\\nrisks giving the impression that we settled the issue. Lest\\nthere be any confusion, we have not. In a later case, this is an\\nissue that deserves our careful consideration; it is not one that\\nwe should resolve for all cases based on the government’s\\nlitigating position in this one.\\n Chazen’s case implicates other issues that the full court\\nshould clarify at some point. For example, as today’s opinion\\nexplains, we have articulated at least three different standards\\nfor determining whether a recently decided case qualifies as\\none that the petitioner could not have raised in his initial\\n§ 2255 motion. Maj. Op. at 18–19. We need to pick one. And\\nwhen we do, we should focus on the fact that some of our\\nformulations specify that the recently decided case must\\nannounce a “new rule” without explaining what this means.\\nSee, e.g., Light, 761 F.3d at 812 (asserting that a § 2241 petition\\nmust be “based on a new statutory interpretation by the\\nSupreme Court” (emphasis added)). In particular, we have\\nnot discussed whether “newness” in the Davenport context\\nbears any relationship to the “newness” requirements in\\n§ 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3). A “new” rule for purposes of\\nthese subsections is one that “breaks new ground” rather than\\n\\nabrogated, the choice-of-law question became outcome-determinative,\\nand the government backtracked.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 29\\n\\nclarifying established law. Headbird v. United States, 813 F.3d\\n1092, 1095 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,\\n301 (1989)) (explaining that “newness” has the same meaning\\nin both § 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3)). Other circuits have held\\nthat Mathis, which the Supreme Court characterized as\\ndictated by Taylor, does not satisfy this test. See, e.g.,\\nWashington v. United States, 868 F.3d 64, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2017);\\nArazola-Gates v. United States, 876 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.\\n2017); In re Conzelman, 872 F.3d 375, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Taylor, 672 F. App’x 860, 863 (10th Cir. 2016).\\nThus, if the Davenport test uses “new” in the standard habeas\\nsense that it has in § 2255(h)(2) and § 2255(f)(3), Chazen’s\\nclaim presumably cannot succeed. See Guenther v. Williams,\\nNo. 17-cv-231, 2017 WL 5054731 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2017)\\n(holding that a Mathis claim is not cognizable under § 2241\\nbecause Mathis applied established law rather than\\nannouncing a “new” rule).\\n But as Chazen points out, we have not expressly embraced\\nthis definition of “new” for Davenport petitions—and we have\\nsometimes implied that a “new” case is nothing more than\\none that opens a previously foreclosed position. If that’s right,\\ncases like Mathis, which correct misapplications of “old”\\nrules, qualify. Maybe that is the position that we want to take,\\nbut if so, we should expressly adopt and defend it. Doing so\\nwould require us to think through the implications of\\nforgoing a “newness” requirement in this saving clause\\ncontext. For example, that position might mean that\\n§ 2255(f)’s statute of limitations renders § 2255 “inadequate\\nand ineffective” when it blocks even a first motion relying on\\nMathis. But see Boatwright v. Warden Fairton FCI, 742 F. App’x\\n701, 704 (3d Cir. 2018) (rejecting this position).\\n\\n30 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In sum, this body of law is plagued by numerous complex\\nissues. This might not be the case in which to untangle them,\\nbut at some point, we need to give litigants and district courts\\nbetter guidance.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436730/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659477/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3268\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\n Petitioner-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\n Respondent-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\n\n2 No. 18-3268\n\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\naffirm.\n I\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\nCriminal Act.\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\n(2015).\n\nNo. 18-3268 3\n\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\n\n4 No. 18-3268\n\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\n(8th Cir. 2012).\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\n\nNo. 18-3268 5\n\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\n§ 2255 petition.\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\n\n6 No. 18-3268\n\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\ncourt ordered resentencing.\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\n\nNo. 18-3268 7\n\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\nappeals.\n II\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\ning.\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\n\n8 No. 18-3268\n\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\n\nNo. 18-3268 9\n\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\nquestions.\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\n\n10 No. 18-3268\n\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\n\nNo. 18-3268 11\n\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\nthat difference.”).\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\n\n12 No. 18-3268\n\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\nsame crime)”).\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\n\nNo. 18-3268 13\n\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\nSee id. at 2248.\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\n\n14 No. 18-3268\n\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\n2018).\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\n\nNo. 18-3268 15\n\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\nsis in the original).\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\ning.\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\n\n16 No. 18-3268\n\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\nsimply on the merits”).\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\nzen’s claim.\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\n\nNo. 18-3268 17\n\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\narmed career criminal.\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\nadditional complexity.\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\n\n18 No. 18-3268\n\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\n\nNo. 18-3268 19\n\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\nin this context.\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\n1136).\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\n\n20 No. 18-3268\n\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\nony under the Act.\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\n\nNo. 18-3268 21\n\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\n\n22 No. 18-3268\n\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\n III\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\n\nNo. 18-3268 23\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3268\\nTODD R. CHAZEN,\\n Petitioner-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW MARSKE,\\n Respondent-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cv-447 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. A federal jury in Minnesota con-\\nvicted Todd Chazen of possessing a firearm following a prior\\nfelony conviction. The district court then sentenced Chazen\\npursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which mandates\\na minimum 15-year sentence for a defendant who unlawfully\\npossesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a seri-\\nous drug offense or violent felony. After an unsuccessful di-\\nrect appeal and petition for post-conviction relief under\\n\\n2 No. 18-3268\\n\\n28 U.S.C. § 2255, Chazen turned to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and\\nsought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the application\\nof a recent Supreme Court decision shows he no longer qual-\\nifies as an armed career criminal and is entitled to a lesser sen-\\ntence. The district court agreed and granted habeas relief. We\\naffirm.\\n I\\n A. Chazen’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal\\n Following a 2011 trial in the District of Minnesota, a jury\\nconvicted Todd Chazen of being a felon in possession of a fire-\\narm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). While this offense\\nordinarily carries a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(a)(2), the district court considered whether Chazen\\nqualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career\\nCriminal Act.\\n The Act mandates a 15-year minimum sentence if a de-\\nfendant has three or more prior convictions for a “violent fel-\\nony” or “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act\\ndefines violent felony as any federal or state felony that “has\\nas an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\nphysical force against the person of another” (the elements\\nclause) or is “burglary, arson, or extortion” (the enumerated\\noffenses clause). Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). At the time of Chazen’s sen-\\ntencing, the definition also included a residual clause, which\\nencompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct\\nthat presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.” Id. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held\\nthe residual clause void for vagueness. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557\\n(2015).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 3\\n\\n Chazen has five felony convictions under Minnesota law:\\nsecond-degree assault; second-degree manufacture of a con-\\ntrolled substance; escape from custody; and two convictions\\nfor second-degree burglary. At sentencing the government\\nconceded that because Chazen’s two burglary convictions oc-\\ncurred on the same day and involved the same course of con-\\nduct, they should not be counted as separate predicate con-\\nvictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The govern-\\nment further conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances\\nconviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense within the\\nmeaning of the Act. But it nonetheless advocated for an en-\\nhanced sentence on the basis of Chazen’s three remaining\\nconvictions—for assault, escape, and burglary. For his part,\\nChazen agreed that one of his burglary convictions and his\\nassault conviction were qualifying felonies, but argued that\\nhe was not an armed career criminal because his escape con-\\nviction did not count as a violent felony predicate.\\n The district court in Minnesota sided with the government\\nand sentenced Chazen to 21 years’ imprisonment. In doing so,\\nthe court did not specify which convictions qualified Chazen\\nas an armed career criminal, noting only that “there [were] a\\nnumber of possibilities” and finding (without further elabo-\\nration) that Chazen had “at least four” predicates.\\n On direct appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Chazen challenged\\nhis enhanced sentence, arguing that the district court erred by\\nconcluding that his Minnesota escape conviction was a quali-\\nfying felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual\\nclause. Relying on the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning, he maintained that without the improper consideration\\nof his escape conviction, he no longer had three qualifying of-\\nfenses. The government responded by withdrawing its\\n\\n4 No. 18-3268\\n\\nconcessions about Chazen’s burglary convictions and his\\ndrug conviction, asserting that any error with his escape con-\\nviction was harmless because, even without it, at least three\\nqualifying convictions remained. It also contended that Cha-\\nzen’s escape argument was directly foreclosed by Eighth Cir-\\ncuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the govern-\\nment and affirmed Chazen’s sentence, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a predicate under the Act’s resid-\\nual clause. See United States v. Chazen, 469 F. App’x 508, 509\\n(8th Cir. 2012).\\n B. Chazen’s § 2255 Petitions\\n In 2013, Chazen invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and petitioned\\nfor post-conviction relief in the District of Minnesota, again\\nchallenging his classification as an armed career criminal.\\nChazen persisted in his contention that the sentencing court\\nerred in determining that his escape conviction qualified as a\\nviolent felony predicate. He also argued that the court was\\nunable to rely on his drug conviction or one of his burglary\\nconvictions given the government’s concessions at sentenc-\\ning. The district court denied relief, concluding that the es-\\ncape conviction qualified as a violent felony and finding Cha-\\nzen’s other arguments procedurally defaulted.\\n Two years after Chazen’s unsuccessful § 2255 petition, the\\nlegal landscape shifted. First, the Supreme Court held that the\\nAct’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. See John-\\nson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Because Chazen’s escape conviction\\nwas a residual-clause offense, he sought authorization from\\nthe Eighth Circuit to file a second § 2255 petition for post-con-\\nviction relief. He simultaneously proceeded to file a second\\n§ 2255 petition in the sentencing court (the District of Minne-\\nsota), arguing that because Johnson knocked out his escape\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 5\\n\\nconviction, he no longer qualified as an armed career crimi-\\nnal. The government agreed that Chazen’s escape conviction\\nno longer qualified as a predicate following Johnson. But the\\ngovernment maintained that Chazen still had the three strikes\\nrequisite to qualify as an armed career criminal owing to his\\nMinnesota assault conviction and two burglary convictions.\\nIn May 2016, the Eighth Circuit summarily denied Chazen’s\\napplication to file a second § 2255 petition. The Minnesota dis-\\ntrict court then concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider his\\n§ 2255 petition.\\n C. Chazen’s § 2241 Petition\\n The landscape shifted a second time in June 2016, when\\nthe Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.\\n2243. Mathis was meaningful because it narrowed the range\\nof state statutes that qualify as violent felony predicates under\\nthe Armed Career Criminal Act. Seeing this development,\\nChazen again pursued post-conviction relief, this time by fil-\\ning a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of\\nWisconsin, where he is serving his sentence.\\n In response to this new petition, the parties agreed that,\\ndue to intervening changes in the law, only three of Chazen’s\\nprior Minnesota convictions potentially qualified him as an\\narmed career criminal: his second-degree assault conviction\\nand his two second-degree burglary convictions. Relying on\\nMathis, Chazen argued that his burglary convictions no\\nlonger counted as violent felonies under the Act’s enumerated\\noffense clause. He also pointed to the Eighth Circuit’s decision\\nin United States v. McArthur, 850 F.3d 925, 940 (8th Cir. 2017),\\nwhich held that the Minnesota crime of third-degree burglary\\nno longer qualifies as a predicate under the Act after the Su-\\npreme Court’s decision in Mathis.\\n\\n6 No. 18-3268\\n\\n Another legal development occurred in 2018. While Cha-\\nzen’s § 2241 petition was pending in the district court (in the\\nWestern District of Wisconsin, where he is confined), this\\ncourt joined the Eighth Circuit in holding that because the\\nMinnesota burglary statute covers more conduct than generic\\nburglary, it does not qualify as a predicate violent felony un-\\nder the Act. See Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656, 665\\n(7th Cir. 2018). We reached this conclusion with respect to sec-\\nond-degree burglary, but the parties agree that for purposes\\nof this appeal, there is no meaningful distinction between sec-\\nond- and third-degree burglary under Minnesota law.\\n Relying on both Mathis and Van Cannon, the district court\\ngranted Chazen’s § 2241 petition, concluding that his bur-\\nglary convictions no longer qualified as violent felony predi-\\ncates. This left Chazen with only one qualifying predicate (his\\nMinnesota assault conviction), which was not enough for an\\nenhanced sentence under the Act. Accordingly, the district\\ncourt ordered resentencing.\\n As part of affording Chazen habeas relief under § 2241, the\\ndistrict court took care to address a procedural point that de-\\nfines much of the battleground in this appeal. The court de-\\ntermined that relief was available to Chazen under § 2241 be-\\ncause, at the time of his original § 2255 petition in 2013, Eighth\\nCircuit precedent foreclosed any contention that his two prior\\nMinnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent fel-\\nony predicates under the Act. Being foreclosed like this meant\\nthat, following Mathis, Chazen was able through the so-called\\nsavings clause in § 2255(e) to pursue relief pursuant to § 2241.\\n In granting relief, the district court (in Wisconsin) trans-\\nferred Chazen’s case back to the District of Minnesota (the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 7\\n\\ndistrict of conviction) for resentencing. The government now\\nappeals.\\n II\\n At this point, all agree that the validity of Chazen’s sen-\\ntence under the Armed Career Criminal Act depends on\\nwhether his two prior Minnesota burglary convictions qualify\\nas generic burglary under the Act’s enumerated offense\\nclause. They take different positions on the merits of that\\nquestion while also spilling substantial ink on the very knotty\\nprocedural issue of whether Chazen can pursue relief under\\n§ 2241. The complexity of the procedural question is stagger-\\ning.\\n A. The Savings Clause and § 2241\\n As a general rule, a federal prisoner wishing to collaterally\\nattack his conviction or sentence must do so under § 2255 in\\nthe district of conviction. See Light v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 809,\\n812 (7th Cir. 2014). If, however, § 2255 is “inadequate or inef-\\nfective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention,” relief\\nmay be granted under § 2241, the general federal habeas cor-\\npus statute, in the district of incarceration. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);\\nsee also Light, 761 F.3d at 812. In In re Davenport, we examined\\nthe scope of this provision, known as the “savings clause,”\\nand concluded that whether § 2255 was “inadequate or inef-\\nfective” turns on whether a petitioner had “a reasonable op-\\nportunity [in a prior § 2255 proceeding] to obtain a reliable\\njudicial determination of the fundamental legality of his con-\\nviction and sentence.” 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998); see\\nalso Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (en\\nbanc) (reiterating that Davenport is the law of this circuit). In\\nconsidering Chazen’s appeal, we are bound by Davenport.\\n\\n8 No. 18-3268\\n\\n In Davenport’s wake, we have established a three-part test\\nto determine whether a petitioner satisfies § 2255(e)’s savings\\nclause. See, e.g., Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.\\n2016). To pursue relief under § 2241, a petitioner must estab-\\nlish that “(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case,\\nnot a constitutional case, and thus could not have been in-\\nvoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could\\nnot have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and\\nthe decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave\\nenough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.” Beason v. Mar-\\nske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n Everyone agrees that Chazen satisfies the first and third\\nrequirements. On the first prong, Chazen argues that the di-\\nrection recently provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis—a\\ndecision interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act—means\\nthat his Minnesota burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\nviolent felonies. And, as to the third prong for pursuing relief\\nunder § 2241, we have held that a defendant sentenced in er-\\nror as an armed career criminal satisfies the “miscarriage of\\njustice” requirement. See Light, 761 F.3d at 813.\\n The disagreement comes on the middle prong of the sav-\\nings clause test and whether Chazen was foreclosed in his\\nprior § 2255 petition from asserting the claim he now raises.\\nThis question cannot be answered without evaluating the\\nstate of the law at that time and how it has changed. In this\\nway, then, substance and process bleed together. Our analysis\\nproceeds in two steps. First, we assess whether his second-\\ndegree burglary convictions under Minnesota law no longer\\nqualify as violent felonies in light of Mathis. Second, we con-\\nsider whether the law in place at the time of his prior § 2255\\npetition foreclosed the Mathis-based argument he now\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 9\\n\\nadvances to challenge his enhanced sentence. Chazen is enti-\\ntled to relief under § 2241 only if he can get to yes on both\\nquestions.\\n B. “Violent Felony” Under the Act\\n Recall that the Armed Career Criminal Act includes “bur-\\nglary” in its list of enumerated violent felonies. See\\n§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the statute does not define the offense,\\nthe Supreme Court has held that Congress used “burglary” to\\nrefer to the generic version of the crime, meaning “an unlaw-\\nful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or\\nother structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v.\\nUnited States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).\\n To determine whether a prior conviction meets this defi-\\nnition, Taylor instructed courts to use what is known as the\\n“categorical approach” by “look[ing] only to the statutory\\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\\nunderlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. If the statute under\\nwhich a defendant was previously convicted “substantially\\ncorresponds” to or is narrower than Taylor’s generic defini-\\ntion, the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Act.\\nId. at 602. Put another way, “[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ un-\\nder the Act if its elements are the same as, or narrower than,\\nthose of the generic offense.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. But if\\n“the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic crime, a\\nconviction under that law cannot count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate, even if the defendant actually com-\\nmitted the offense in its generic form.” Descamps v. United\\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).\\n In so interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court has recog-\\nnized a “narrow range of cases” in which sentencing courts\\n\\n10 No. 18-3268\\n\\nare permitted to look beyond the statute of conviction to de-\\ntermine whether a prior conviction meets Taylor’s generic def-\\ninition of burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. If a statute is divisi-\\nble—meaning it “sets out one or more elements of the offense\\nin the alternative”—courts may apply the so-called “modified\\ncategorical approach.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this\\napproach, a sentencing court may “consult a limited class of\\ndocuments, such as indictments or jury instructions, to deter-\\nmine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s\\nprior conviction,” id., “but only for the limited purpose of de-\\ntermining whether the elements of the crime of conviction\\nmatch (or are narrower than) the elements of the generic of-\\nfense.” Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663.\\n The Supreme Court has underscored an important quali-\\nfier: the modified categorical approach applies only to divisi-\\nble statutes. The approach does not apply if a statute is indi-\\nvisible—where the statute of conviction does not contain al-\\nternative elements, but rather “a single, ‘indivisible’ set of el-\\nements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding ge-\\nneric offense.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 260. When faced with a\\nstatute that “defines a single offense, albeit one with multiple\\nmodes of conviction,” a sentencing court is confined to the\\nstatutory elements and therefore cannot rely on any docu-\\nments from a defendant’s criminal case or otherwise embark\\non fact finding to discern the defendant’s actual offense con-\\nduct. Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 663. If the analysis shows that\\n“the alternative means listed in an indivisible statute cover a\\nbroader swath of conduct than the generic offense, then a con-\\nviction under the statute doesn’t count as an [Armed Career\\nCriminal Act] predicate.” Id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 11\\n\\n The legal upshot, then, is that the question of whether a\\ncourt may employ the modified categorical approach to an\\noverbroad statute turns on the issue of divisibility. In the af-\\ntermath of Taylor and Descamps, lower courts grappled with\\nhow to determine whether a statute is divisible, a distinction\\nthat hinges on the often subtle and hairline difference be-\\ntween elements and means. See Najera-Rodriguez v. Barr,\\n926 F.3d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The difference between ‘el-\\nements’ and ‘means’ can seem slippery, sometimes almost\\nmetaphysical, but significant legal consequences flow from\\nthat difference.”).\\n Adding to the ambiguity, some circuits interpreted a foot-\\nnote in Descamps to permit sentencing courts to continue to\\napply the modified categorical approach—by reviewing the\\nrecord of conviction—whenever a statute lists alternative\\nways to commit a crime, even if the alternatives were means\\nrather than elements. See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 264 n.2 (noting\\nthat “[w]hatever a statute lists (whether elements or means),\\nthe documents we approved in Taylor and Shepard—i.e., in-\\ndictment, jury instructions, plea colloquy, and plea agree-\\nment—would reflect the crime’s elements”). The Eighth Cir-\\ncuit, for example, read Descamps as “explicitly reject[ing]” any\\n“means/elements distinction,” and cited footnote 2 for the\\nproposition that courts “must apply the modified categorical\\napproach” whether a statute listed alternative elements or al-\\nternative means. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074,\\n1075 (8th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). While the\\nSixth and Tenth Circuits adopted the same approach, see, e.g.,\\nUnited States v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2015); United\\nStates v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1057 (10th Cir. 2014), other cir-\\ncuits reached a contrary conclusion. See, e.g., Rendon v. Holder,\\n764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps for the\\n\\n12 No. 18-3268\\n\\nprecept that “it is black-letter law that a statute is divisible\\nonly if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to\\nmultiple alternative means”); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d\\n192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a crime is divisible\\nunder Descamps only if it is defined to include multiple alter-\\nnative elements (thus creating multiple versions of a crime), as\\nopposed to multiple alternative means (of committing the\\nsame crime)”).\\n None of this is surprising. The law in this area is complex\\nin the extreme; unexpected difficulties and nuances surface in\\nnew cases; and it often takes the Supreme Court deciding ad-\\nditional cases for clarity and stability to begin to emerge. Law\\ndevelops iteratively like this in many areas, which is exactly\\nwhat Chazen saw happen here.\\n To that end, in Mathis v. United States, the Supreme Court\\ngranted review to clarify when a statute qualifies as “divisi-\\nble” and to resolve the circuit split that had developed over\\nthe “elements” versus “means” distinction in the context of\\npredicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See\\n136 S. Ct. at 2251.\\n At issue in Mathis was whether Iowa’s burglary statute\\nqualified as a violent felony predicate. See id. at 2250. The par-\\nties agreed that the statute extended to conduct beyond ge-\\nneric burglary because it criminalized unlawful entry into a\\nbroader range of places, including “any building, structure,\\n[or] land, water, or air vehicle.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code\\n§ 702.12 (2013)). The debate centered on whether the sentenc-\\ning court erred in consulting Mathis’s conviction records to\\ndetermine which type of burglary he committed and, relat-\\nedly, whether the different locations in the Iowa statute\\namounted to alternative means or alternative elements. See id.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 13\\n\\nOn this latter question, the Eighth Circuit had concluded this\\nwas a distinction without a difference, explaining that\\n“[w]hether [the different locations] amount[ed] to alternative\\nelements or merely alternative means to fulfilling an element,\\nthe statute is divisible, and [the court] must apply the modi-\\nfied categorical approach.” Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. In so\\nholding, the Eighth Circuit added to the circuit split rooted in\\nconfusion about what makes a statute divisible for purposes\\nof applying the modified categorical approach.\\n The Supreme Court resolved the split by rejecting the\\nEighth Circuit’s approach—which other courts had also\\nadopted—and held that the modified categorical approach is\\nunavailable when, as with the Iowa law, a statute lists multi-\\nple “means” to satisfy just one element. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at\\n2253. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that\\n“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is … central to\\n[the Act’s] operation,” id. at 2248, because if a statute lists al-\\nternative means (rather than elements) it is not divisible, and,\\nas a consequence, a court may not rely on the modified cate-\\ngorical approach to determine which of the alternatives\\nformed the basis of a defendant’s conviction. See id. at 2257.\\nInstead, the Court explained, the sentencing court is confined\\nto the text of the statute and if, as with burglary under Iowa\\nlaw, any of the alternative means of satisfying a statutory ele-\\nment is broader than generic burglary, the conviction cannot\\nqualify as a predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nSee id. at 2248.\\n The Court also provided guidance for distinguishing be-\\ntween elements and means, explaining that “elements” are a\\ncrime’s “constituent parts,” which a jury must find beyond a\\nreasonable doubt or a defendant must admit if he pleads\\n\\n14 No. 18-3268\\n\\nguilty. Id. at 2248. “Means,” on the other hand, are merely\\n“various factual ways of committing some component of the\\noffense—a jury need not find (or a defendant admit)” them.\\nId. at 2249. A prior conviction counts as generic burglary un-\\nder the Act only if its elements—not the means of satisfying\\nthe elements—are the same as or narrower than the generic\\ndefinition of burglary. See id. at 2256.\\n C. Chazen’s Minnesota Burglary Convictions\\n Returning to the facts here, Chazen argues that his Minne-\\nsota second-degree burglary convictions no longer qualify as\\n“violent felonies” in light of Mathis. We recently considered\\nthe Minnesota burglary statute in Van Cannon v. United States\\nand reached this exact conclusion. 890 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n Our analysis proceeded within the framework the Su-\\npreme Court supplied in Mathis. We first considered whether\\nthe statute contained alternative elements—in which case the\\nstatute is divisible, and the modified categorical approach is\\navailable—or alternative means of committing a single ele-\\nment—which ends the inquiry. The Minnesota legislature de-\\nfined second-degree burglary this way: “Whoever enters a\\nbuilding without consent and with intent to commit a crime,\\nor enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in\\nthe building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits bur-\\nglary in the second degree” if certain aggravating factors are\\npresent. Minn. Stat. § 609.582(2)(a) (emphasis added). We con-\\ncluded that “[t]he disjunctive phrasing describes two differ-\\nent factual ways”—or means—“of committing a single\\ncrime,” meaning the statute is indivisible. Van Cannon, 890\\nF.3d at 664. “Because the statute is indivisible,” we explained,\\n“a conviction under it does not count as an [Armed Career\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 15\\n\\nCriminal Act] predicate if one of the listed alternatives is\\nbroader than generic burglary.” Id.\\n We concluded that the Minnesota statute contained such\\noverbreadth. Specifically, we determined that while the first\\nalternative qualifies as generic burglary—a person commits\\nsecond-degree burglary if he “enters a building without con-\\nsent and with intent to commit a crime,” Minn. Stat.\\n§ 609.582(2)(a)—the second alternative criminalizes conduct\\nthat is broader than Taylor’s definition of generic burglary be-\\ncause it “doesn’t require proof of intent to commit a crime at\\nall—not at any point during the offense conduct.” Id. (empha-\\nsis in the original).\\n After Van Cannon, then, our law is clear that a conviction\\nfor Minnesota second-degree burglary does not qualify as a\\npredicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct. Nothing about this appeal requires us to revisit that hold-\\ning.\\n But we do need to take a breath and address a procedural\\npoint. Remember that Chazen committed his felon-in-posses-\\nsion offense and was convicted and sentenced in the District\\nof Minnesota—in other words, within the Eighth Circuit. But\\nhe is currently incarcerated in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin—in our circuit. These locations matter, for it is well-estab-\\nlished that if relief under § 2241 is available at all, it must be\\nsought in the district of incarceration. See Light, 761 F.3d at\\n812. Here, then, that means Chazen had to file his § 2241 peti-\\ntion in a district court in this circuit, which he did by going to\\nthe Western District of Wisconsin. What is less clear, however,\\nis whether, in evaluating the merits of Chazen’s petition, we\\nshould apply our own precedent or the precedent of the cir-\\ncuit of conviction. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 863\\n\\n16 No. 18-3268\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the parties debate “whether\\n§ 2241 should be available to [petitioner] at all, and if so\\nwhether this court should apply our own precedent or Sixth\\nCircuit precedent,” but “elect[ing] to bypass these procedural\\nhurdles for relief because this case can be resolved most\\nsimply on the merits”).\\n We need not decide this issue here because the govern-\\nment took the position in the district court that the law of this\\ncircuit governs the merits of Chazen’s claim. See, e.g., Prevatte\\nv. Merlak, 865 F.3d 894, 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (accepting the\\ngovernment’s concession on an element of the savings clause-\\ntest and explaining that § 2241 and § 2255 address remedies,\\nnot jurisdiction). Given this concession, we see no reason why\\nour holding in Van Cannon does not resolve the merits of Cha-\\nzen’s claim.\\n Our course of analysis is unaffected by the Supreme\\nCourt’s most recent decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S.\\nCt. 1872 (2019). In Quarles, the Court considered the “exceed-\\ningly narrow question” whether Taylor’s definition of generic\\nburglary requires proof that a defendant intended to commit\\na crime at the time he unlawfully entered, or instead whether\\nit is sufficient that he formed the intent to commit a crime at\\nsome point while unlawfully “remaining in” the building or\\nstructure. Id. at 1875. The Court held that “generic remaining-\\nin burglary occurs under § 924(e) when the defendant forms\\nthe intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully re-\\nmaining in a building or structure.” Id. at 1880. As the govern-\\nment has pointed out in its supplemental briefing, this hold-\\ning may well abrogate the Eighth Circuit’s decision in McAr-\\nthur, which rested on the “contemporaneous intent” reason-\\ning rejected in Quarles. See McArthur, 850 F.3d at 939. But the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 17\\n\\nEighth Circuit has not resolved this question. See Raymond v.\\nUnited States, No. 18-2349, 2019 WL 3783103, at *3 (8th Cir.\\nAug. 13, 2019) (observing without deciding that the Supreme\\nCourt’s decision in Quarles may have abrogated McArthur).\\n What we can say with confidence is that Quarles did not\\nabrogate Van Cannon’s conclusion that Minnesota burglary is\\nbroader than generic burglary because the state statute does\\nnot require proof of any intent at any point. Indeed, the Court\\nexpressly declined to address this issue in Quarles. See 139 S.\\nCt. at 1880 n.2.\\n What all of this means, then, is that Chazen’s Minnesota\\nburglary convictions no longer qualify as violent felony pred-\\nicates under the reasoning of Van Cannon. And with there be-\\ning no contrary law in the Eighth Circuit, we believe Chazen\\nhas done enough to show that he no longer qualifies as an\\narmed career criminal.\\n D. Chazen’s Eligibility for § 2241 Relief\\n Reaching this conclusion on the merits of Chazen’s claim,\\nhowever, is not the end of the inquiry. The reason is because\\nChazen is pursuing relief under § 2241 and his ability to do so\\ndepends on establishing that he was unable in his prior § 2255\\nproceedings to advance the arguments he now raises to chal-\\nlenge his sentence. See Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (explaining the\\nrequirements for pursuing relief under § 2241 via the savings\\nclause in § 2255(e)). On this point, the analysis encounters yet\\nadditional complexity.\\n The government insists that Chazen cannot rely on the\\nsavings clause to pursue relief under § 2241 because his claim\\ndoes not rely on a “new, retroactive rule.” Gov’t Br. at 16. In\\nits view, because Mathis did not announce a substantive\\n\\n18 No. 18-3268\\n\\nchange in the law, but rather clarified the circumstances un-\\nder the Armed Career Criminal Act in which a sentencing\\ncourt may apply the modified categorical approach, Chazen\\ncould have raised his arguments about Minnesota’s burglary\\nstatute in his initial § 2255 petition by relying on pre-Mathis\\nSupreme Court decisions like Taylor and Descamps. As the\\ngovernment sees it, then, because Chazen was not foreclosed\\nfrom raising these arguments in his initial collateral attack, he\\ncannot now bring his claims under § 2241.\\n As an initial matter, the government conceded in the dis-\\ntrict court that Mathis is retroactive. We have likewise sug-\\ngested (without deciding) that Mathis is retroactive. See Holt\\nv. United States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (observing\\nthat “substantive decisions such as Mathis presumptively ap-\\nply retroactively on collateral review”). But assessing the re-\\nmainder of the government’s position—that Chazen may not\\nrely on Mathis because it did not announce a “new rule”—is\\ncomplicated by the fact that we have not been consistent in\\nour articulation of the second requirement of the savings-\\nclause test. While we have repeatedly stressed that a peti-\\ntioner seeking to invoke the savings clause must establish that\\nhe was unable to raise his statutory claim at the time of his\\noriginal § 2255 petition—thus showing that § 2255 was “inad-\\nequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] de-\\ntention”—we have “employed various formulations of this\\ninquiry.” Montana, 829 F.3d at 784. In some instances, we have\\nsaid that satisfying this condition requires a petitioner to\\nshow that he is relying on a “new rule” that applies “retroac-\\ntively to cases on collateral review and could not have been\\ninvoked in his earlier proceeding.” Camacho v. English, 872\\nF.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d\\n962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Prevatte, 865 F.3d at 897 (same).\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 19\\n\\nYet we have never explained what “new” means or requires\\nin this context.\\n In other instances, we have articulated the requirement for\\nsatisfying the savings clause, not in terms of a “new rule,” but\\nrather in terms of whether the petitioner “relies on a retroac-\\ntive decision that he could not have invoked in his first § 2255\\nmotion.” Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013);\\nsee also Beason, 926 F.3d at 935 (same); Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d\\n770, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Light, 761 F.3d at 812–13;\\nBrown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). More to it, we\\nhave held that a petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 need\\nonly show that the case on which he relies had not yet been\\ndecided at the time of his § 2255 petition. See, e.g., Rios, 696\\nF.3d at 640. Under this formulation, Chazen would meet the\\nsecond criteria because the Supreme Court decided Mathis\\ntwo years after his initial § 2255 petition.\\n In still other cases, we have employed a “slightly higher\\nstandard,” requiring a petitioner to show not only that he re-\\nlies on a newly decided case of statutory interpretation, but\\nalso that, at the time of his initial § 2255 petition, his claim was\\n“foreclosed by binding precedent” in the circuit of his convic-\\ntion. Brown, 719 F.3d at 595 (quoting Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d\\n644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)). And most recently we have explained\\nthat “if it ‘would have been futile’ for a petitioner to raise\\nthese arguments in his § 2255 motion because the ‘law was\\nsquarely against him,’ then the savings clause applies and [a\\npetitioner] may proceed and pursue resentencing under\\n§ 2241.” Beason, 926 F.3d at 936 (quoting Webster, 784 F.3d at\\n1136).\\n Stepping back, we can plant our feet in this appeal on eas-\\nier ground. There is no doubt that at the time of Chazen’s\\n\\n20 No. 18-3268\\n\\n§ 2255 motion in 2013, his claim for relief was foreclosed by\\nEighth Circuit precedent concluding that Minnesota burglary\\nqualified as a violent felony for federal sentencing purposes.\\nSee United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2006). In\\nLeGrand the Eighth Circuit had held that the Minnesota bur-\\nglary statute “includes the elements of a generic burglary as\\noutlined in Taylor.” Id. at 1081–82. LeGrand also held that the\\nstatute fit within the Act’s residual clause because “burglary\\nalways has a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury to an-\\nother.’” Id. at 1082 (quoting United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d 898,\\n901 (8th Cir. 2005)). While LeGrand assessed the statute in the\\ncontext of the Sentencing Guidelines definition of a “crime of\\nviolence,” the Eighth Circuit treated cases on one as binding\\non the other. See United States v. Sonczalla, 561 F.3d 842, 846\\n(8th Cir. 2009) (applying LeGrand’s analysis of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s language).\\nAnd in 2012, the Eighth Circuit reiterated its conclusion that\\nMinnesota burglary qualifies as a “violent felony” for pur-\\nposes of the Act. See United States v. Constantine, 674 F.3d 985,\\n990 (8th Cir. 2012). In short, in 2013—at the time Chazen first\\nmoved for post-conviction relief under § 2255—“the law was\\nsquarely against” him in that it foreclosed the position he cur-\\nrently advances—that Minnesota burglary is not a violent fel-\\nony under the Act.\\n We also conclude that Mathis can provide the basis for\\nChazen’s § 2241 petition. While our caselaw is not a model of\\nclarity with respect to whether a petitioner must rely on a\\n“new rule,” the thrust of our precedent has focused on\\nwhether an intervening case of statutory interpretation opens\\nthe door to a previously foreclosed claim. Mathis fits the bill.\\nMathis injected much-needed clarity and direction into the\\nlaw under the Armed Career Criminal Act: before Mathis, the\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 21\\n\\nEighth Circuit had held that Minnesota burglary was a violent\\nfelony and it applied the modified categorical approach re-\\ngardless of whether a statute listed distinct elements or alter-\\nnative means. See, e.g., Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1075. It is only after\\nMathis—a case decided after Chazen’s § 2255 petition that the\\ngovernment concedes is retroactive—that courts, including\\nour court and the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that Minne-\\nsota burglary is indivisible because it lists alternative means\\nof committing a single crime. See Van Cannon, 890 F.3d at 664;\\nMcArthur, 850 F.3d at 938.\\n In this way, Mathis is “new” as a functional and practical\\nmatter for federal inmates seeking relief from a mandatory\\nminimum sentence under the Act. This is particularly true for\\nthose petitioners, like Chazen, who were convicted in the\\nEighth Circuit, whose interpretation of “divisibility” was\\noverruled by Mathis. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 929 F.3d\\n554, 559 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that pre-Mathis cases hold-\\ning that a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act\\nqualifies as a violent felony are no longer controlling because\\n“[c]ontrary to the approach [the Eighth Circuit] took in those\\ndecisions, Mathis clarified that if any of the means by which a\\ndefendant can commit a crime fall outside the definition of the\\ngeneric offense, then it is not a violent felony, even if the de-\\nfendant actually committed the generic crime”).\\n Before Mathis it would have been futile for Chazen to ar-\\ngue that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify\\nas violent felonies. It was only after the Supreme Court de-\\ncided Mathis that Chazen had any daylight to seek relief by\\nraising the claim embodied in his § 2241 petition. In these cir-\\ncumstances, where the government has conceded that Mathis\\nis retroactive and Chazen was so clearly foreclosed by the law\\n\\n22 No. 18-3268\\n\\nof his circuit of conviction at the time of his original § 2255\\npetition, we conclude that Chazen has done enough to satisfy\\nthe savings clause requirements. This conclusion finds sup-\\nport in our prior observation that “[a]n independent claim\\nbased on Mathis must be brought, if at all, in a petition under\\n28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551\\n(7th Cir. 2016). And in light of our prior decision in Van Can-\\nnon, it is clear that Chazen’s two Minnesota burglary convic-\\ntions no longer qualify as predicates under § 924(e).\\n III\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judg-\\nment awarding Chazen habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.\\n\\nNo. 18-3268 23\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4364,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659478,"string":"4,659,478"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-1501"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 15-1501\\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\\n\\f2 No. 15-1501\\n\\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 3\\n\\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\\ntitle shall not apply to— …\\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\\n rests for violations of Federal law.\\n\\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\\n\\f4 No. 15-1501\\n\\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\\nthe other circuits have this right.\\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 5\\n\\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\\nminimum of internal discord.\\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\\n\\f6 No. 15-1501\\n\\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 7\\n\\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\\nthat’s what this suit is.\\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\\n\\f8 No. 15-1501\\n\\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\\n(7th Cir. 1972).\\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 9\\n\\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\\nnot be repeated.)\\n\\f10 No. 15-1501\\n\\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\\ntherefore\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436731/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659478/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 15-1501\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\n\f2 No. 15-1501\n\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\n\fNo. 15-1501 3\n\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\ntitle shall not apply to— …\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\n rests for violations of Federal law.\n\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\n\f4 No. 15-1501\n\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\nthe other circuits have this right.\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\n\fNo. 15-1501 5\n\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\nminimum of internal discord.\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\n\f6 No. 15-1501\n\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\n\fNo. 15-1501 7\n\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\nthat’s what this suit is.\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\n\f8 No. 15-1501\n\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\n(7th Cir. 1972).\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\n\fNo. 15-1501 9\n\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\nnot be repeated.)\n\f10 No. 15-1501\n\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\ntherefore\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 15-1501\\nSTEPHEN LINDER,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14-cv-2714 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While tracking down a fugi-\\ntive, Deputy Marshal Stephen Linder interrogated the fugi-\\ntive’s father. Another deputy marshal later stated that he\\nhad seen Linder punch the father in the face. After an inves-\\ntigation by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of\\nthe Department of Justice, Linder was indicted for federal\\nfelonies (witness tampering and using excessive force in vio-\\nlation of the father’s civil rights). The Service put Linder on\\n\\f2 No. 15-1501\\n\\nleave, and Darryl McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to\\ncommunicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval.\\nFrustrated by this barrier to ge^ing information from poten-\\ntial witnesses, Linder’s lawyers asked the district court to\\ndismiss the indictment as a sanction. That was done, see\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013), the United\\nStates did not appeal, and Linder returned to work. He re-\\nmains employed as a deputy marshal.\\n Linder then filed a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Un-\\nknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.\\n388 (1971), against Marshal McPherson and three other per-\\nsons. Later he added a suit against the United States under\\nthe Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671–\\n80. The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. Those\\nunder Bivens have been abandoned on appeal, and we have\\nchanged the caption to show that the litigation is now\\nagainst the United States alone. The statutory claim failed,\\nthe district court held, because §2680(a) provides that the Act\\ndoes not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omis-\\nsion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care,\\nin the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not\\nsuch statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exer-\\ncise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a\\ndiscretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agen-\\ncy or an employee of the Government, whether or not the\\ndiscretion involved be abused.” The judge concluded that,\\nwhen deciding when federal employees must seek permis-\\nsion to talk with Linder or his lawyer before trial, Marshal\\nMcPherson had exercised a discretionary function.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 3\\n\\n Linder’s suit accuses the United States of two torts: mali-\\ncious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional dis-\\ntress. His principal argument is that the discretionary-\\nfunction exemption of §2680(a) does not apply to suits for\\nmalicious prosecution. He relies on §2680(h), which says that\\n“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this\\ntitle shall not apply to— …\\n Any claim arising out of assault, ba^ery, false imprisonment,\\n false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slan-\\n der, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract\\n rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investi-\\n gative or law enforcement officers of the United States Govern-\\n ment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this ti-\\n tle shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the en-\\n actment of this proviso, out of assault, ba^ery, false imprison-\\n ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For\\n the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement\\n officer” means any officer of the United States who is empow-\\n ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make ar-\\n rests for violations of Federal law.\\n\\nThe first clause of §2680(h) takes malicious prosecution out-\\nside the scope of the FTCA, and the proviso puts it right\\nback in again if an “investigative or law enforcement officer”\\nis at fault. Marshal McPherson was a law enforcement\\nofficer, and it follows, Linder contends, that his claim is cov-\\nered by the Act whether or not McPherson was exercising a\\ndiscretionary function. This contention has the support of\\nNguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2009), which\\nholds that the proviso overrides the rest of §2680.\\n Nguyen observes that §2680(h) tells us that “[t]he provi-\\nsions of this chapter”—which is to say, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–\\n80—do not apply to malicious-prosecution suits, except to\\nthe extent saved by the proviso. It follows, Nguyen con-\\n\\f4 No. 15-1501\\n\\ncludes, that the exceptions elsewhere in §2680, such as the\\ndiscretionary-function exception, do not apply to the suits\\nsaved by the proviso. But that’s just not what the proviso\\nsays, and we have it on the highest authority that we must\\napply this subsection to mean neither more nor less than\\nwhat the language tells us. See Millbrook v. United States, 569\\nU.S. 50, 56 (2013).\\n The proviso says that “the provisions of this chapter and\\nsection 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim” (empha-\\nsis added) for malicious prosecution arising out of a law en-\\nforcement officer’s acts. “[T]his chapter” includes §2680(a),\\nthe discretionary-function exemption. This means that discre-\\ntionary acts by law-enforcement personnel remain outside\\nthe FTCA by virtue of §2680(a), even though the proviso al-\\nlows other malicious-prosecution suits. And so multiple\\ncourts of appeals have held. See Medina v. United States, 259\\nF.3d 220, 224–26 (4th Cir. 2001); Campos v. United States, 888\\nF.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018); Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d\\n1420, 1434–35 (9th Cir. 1994); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 507–\\n08 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Nguyen stands alone, and we think that\\nthe other circuits have this right.\\n It isn’t possible to read §2680(h) as making all of the Fed-\\neral Tort Claims Act inapplicable to malicious-prosecution\\nsuits arising from law-enforcement activity. The proviso\\nbrings back what the opening clause knocks out—and what\\nit brings back is §1346(b) plus all of Chapter 171, which in-\\ncludes §§ 2671 through 2680. Any other reading would make\\na hash of the statute. Section 1346(b) is the jurisdictional\\nfooting of the suit; if it is really knocked out and not brought\\nback by the proviso, there would not be a basis for subject-\\nma^er jurisdiction. If §2675 is knocked out and not brought\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 5\\n\\nback by the proviso, the administrative-claim requirement of\\nthe FTCA, see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993),\\nwould vanish. The statute of limitations that makes this ad-\\nministrative-claim requirement work, see 28 U.S.C. §2401(b);\\nUnited States v. Kawi Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), would\\nvanish. None of these consequences—and there would be\\nmore—could be imputed to §2680(h) with a straight face. We\\ntherefore read the proviso to mean what it says: When mali-\\ncious-prosecution claims arise from law-enforcement activi-\\nty, the proviso applies the whole of the FTCA, except for the\\npart of §2680(h) that precedes the proviso.\\n This brings us to the question whether, as the district\\njudge held, Marshal McPherson was exercising a discretion-\\nary function within the scope of §2680(a). The discretionary-\\nfunction exemption under that subsection has two compo-\\nnents: first, the assertedly wrongful conduct must entail an\\nelement of judgment or choice; second, that discretion must\\nbe based on considerations of public policy. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991); BerkoviI v.\\nUnited States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988); Reynolds v. United\\nStates, 549 F.3d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir. 2008). The district judge\\nfound that Marshal McPherson’s instruction satisfies both\\ncomponents. A U.S. Marshal has discretion to decide how\\npersonnel under his command interact with suspended\\nofficers (including those facing criminal charges); second,\\nthat discretion rests on judgments about how best to operate\\nthe Marshals Service so that it achieves its functions with a\\nminimum of internal discord.\\n Marshal McPherson did not make things up on the spur\\nof the moment; he consulted and a^empted to follow the\\nrules (found in USMS Directive 2.2, covering “Misconduct\\n\\f6 No. 15-1501\\n\\nInvestigations”, which refers in turn to still other regulations\\nand procedures) specifying how to conduct internal investi-\\ngations. Many of the steps that Marshal McPherson took\\nwere performed under the direction of the Marshals Ser-\\nvice’s General Counsel, and §2.2.F.1.c requires these instruc-\\ntions to be implemented. Section 2680(a) tells us that there is\\nno liability even if a regulation or directive is invalid, and\\neven if the discretion conferred under it has been abused.\\nWhen dismissing Linder’s indictment in 2013, the district\\ncourt suggested in some places that the Directive is invalid\\nand in others that the discretion it confers had been abused\\nby the General Counsel or the U.S. Marshal, but neither of\\nthese considerations permits tort liability given §2680(a).\\n Still, Linder asserts, no one has discretion to violate the\\nConstitution—and, when dismissing the indictment, the dis-\\ntrict court stated that the no-contact-without-approval order\\nviolated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.\\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29641 at *175. This is problematic.\\nCompulsory process is a trial right; the Constitution does not\\nentitle a criminal defendant to interview potential witnesses\\nor take their depositions before trial. See, e.g., Weatherford v.\\nBursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–61 (1976); United States v. Ruiz, 536\\nU.S. 622, 629 (2002). The district judge believed that the no-\\ncontact-without-approval order “intimidated” other Deputy\\nU.S. Marshals, reducing the probability that they would be\\nforthcoming at trial, but that belief was never put to the test\\nby holding a trial to see what evidence Linder could obtain.\\nThe district court’s order dismissing the indictment did not\\nmention Weatherford or Ruiz. We do not decide whether the\\ndistrict court’s order in 2013 was correct, but it did not rest\\non a conclusion that the Marshals Service had violated any\\nstatute or a discovery order under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 or 16.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 7\\n\\n What’s more, the theme that “no one has discretion to vi-\\nolate the Constitution” has nothing to do with the Federal\\nTort Claims Act, which does not apply to constitutional vio-\\nlations. It applies to torts, as defined by state law—that is to\\nsay, “circumstances where the United States, if a private per-\\nson, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the\\nlaw of the place where the act or omission occurred” (28\\nU.S.C. §1346(b)(1); emphasis added). The Constitution gov-\\nerns the conduct of public officials, not private ones.\\n The limited coverage of the FTCA, and its inapplicability\\nto constitutional torts, is why the Supreme Court created the\\nBivens remedy against individual federal employees. And\\nwhen, in the wake of Bivens, Congress adopted the Westfall\\nAct to permit the A^orney General to substitute the United\\nStates as a defendant in lieu of a federal employee, it prohib-\\nited this step when the plaintiff’s claim rests on the Constitu-\\ntion. 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(2)(A). This leaves the FTCA as a\\nmeans to seek damages for common-law torts, without re-\\ngard to constitutional theories. And, now that all claims\\nagainst the individual defendants have been abandoned,\\nthat’s what this suit is.\\n Still, Linder insists, just as no one has discretion to vio-\\nlate the Constitution, no one has discretion to commit a tort\\nsuch as malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of\\nemotional distress. That’s true, in the sense that a tort is a\\ncivil wrong. No one should commit a civil wrong. But unless\\n§2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to discre-\\ntionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:\\nIt forecloses an award of damages that otherwise would be\\njustified by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that\\nsome discretionary but tortious acts are outside the FTCA\\n\\f8 No. 15-1501\\n\\nwhile others aren’t. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626\\n(7th Cir. 1972).\\n The upshot of §2680(a) is that, when some legal doctrine\\ncreates discretion, the fact that the discretion was misused\\nand a tort ensued does not lead to liability for the Treasury.\\nNo one can doubt that the investigation of (potential) crimes,\\nand the management of a federal workforce in which one\\nemployee is a (potential) criminal, are discretion-laden sub-\\njects. There is no one right way to investigate an allegation of\\ncrime, no one right way for federal employees to relate to\\ntheir colleagues who have been suspended pending the reso-\\nlution of criminal charges. Our opinion in Reynolds shows\\nthat criminal investigation and prosecution are rife with le-\\ngitimate discretion, and that how discretion is exercised rests\\non potentially contestable visions of wise policy. Other cir-\\ncuits agree with that view. See, e.g., O’Ferrell v. United States,\\n253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To say that criminal investigation and prosecution are\\nsuffused with discretion does not imply that every possible\\nstep must be within the scope of §2680(a). Reynolds makes\\nthis point in holding that although many prosecutorial steps\\nare discretionary, knowingly providing false information\\n(i.e., perjury) is not. A step “sufficiently separable” from le-\\ngitimate discretion can be actionable, Reynolds concludes\\n(549 F.3d at 1113), even though bona fide discretion is not.\\nLinder wants us to use this exception to swallow the rule,\\nwith the theme that no one has discretion to commit a tort.\\nBut there is a blanket rule against perjury, in a way that there\\nis not a mechanical rule about how a federal workforce\\nshould be run while one employee is under indictment.\\n\\fNo. 15-1501 9\\n\\n When dismissing the indictment the district court did not\\nfind the violation of a rule such as “don’t lie under oath.”\\nInstead it found that management’s instructions to the work-\\nforce unduly undermined Linder’s ability to gather evi-\\ndence. Perhaps a different way of limiting contact with other\\ndeputies would have been proper. Perhaps a different judge\\nwould have denied the motion to dismiss the indictment,\\nobserving that the Marshals Service had not violated any\\ndiscovery order. Because Linder does not contend that the\\nUnited States violated any firm rule limiting the scope of\\ndiscretion, the sort of “sufficiently separable” civil wrong\\ndiscussed in Reynolds has not been made out.\\n We have so far not mentioned Linder’s contention that\\nSpecial Agent Kevin Shirley, who led the criminal investiga-\\ntion on behalf of the Inspector General and the Civil Rights\\nDivision of the Department of Justice, commi^ed perjury in\\naffidavits he submi^ed to the district court in connection\\nwith Linder’s motion to dismiss the indictment. We must as-\\nsume that Linder is correct in labeling some statements “per-\\njury,” though that characterization has not been tested;\\nJudge Kendall did not find, when dismissing the indictment,\\nthat Shirley had lied under oath. Perjury is not a discretion-\\nary act, as we have explained, and is not covered by\\n§2680(a). But it is also not a tort when it is harmless. Linder\\nprevailed in his effort to have the indictment dismissed. No\\nharm, no tort. See, e.g., Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556,\\n561 (7th Cir. 2015). (To the extent that Linder’s claim rests on\\nany of Shirley’s investigatory actions, our discussion of the\\ndiscretionary-function exemption applies to him and need\\nnot be repeated.)\\n\\f10 No. 15-1501\\n\\n Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to\\nall persons who are charged with crime but never convicted.\\nThe Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this, however, and\\nLinder has not claimed that he is entitled to relief under 28\\nU.S.C. §§ 2513 and 1495, which apply to persons able to\\nprove their innocence. The judgment of the district court is\\ntherefore\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4365,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659659,"string":"4,659,659"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ernest Odei v. DHS"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3105"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3105\\nERNEST A. ODEI and\\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\\n\\f2 No. 18-3105\\n\\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\\n I. Background\\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\\nGhana approved.\\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 3\\n\\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\\n\\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3105\\n\\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 5\\n\\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\\nal.”\\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3105\\n\\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 7\\n\\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\\njudicial review all the same.\\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\\nThuraissigiam.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436912/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659659/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ernest Odei v. DHS\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3105\nERNEST A. ODEI and\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\n\f2 No. 18-3105\n\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\n I. Background\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\nGhana approved.\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\n\fNo. 18-3105 3\n\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\n II. Discussion\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\n\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\n\f4 No. 18-3105\n\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\n\fNo. 18-3105 5\n\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\nal.”\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\n\f6 No. 18-3105\n\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\n\fNo. 18-3105 7\n\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\njudicial review all the same.\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\nThuraissigiam.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ernest Odei v. DHS\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3105\\nERNEST A. ODEI and\\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\\n\\f2 No. 18-3105\\n\\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\\n I. Background\\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\\nGhana approved.\\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 3\\n\\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\\n\\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3105\\n\\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 5\\n\\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\\nal.”\\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3105\\n\\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 7\\n\\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\\njudicial review all the same.\\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\\nThuraissigiam.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4366,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659701,"string":"4,659,701"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ernest Odei v. DHS"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3105"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3105\\nERNEST A. ODEI and\\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\\n\\f2 No. 18-3105\\n\\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\\n I. Background\\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\\nGhana approved.\\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 3\\n\\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\\n\\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3105\\n\\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 5\\n\\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\\nal.”\\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3105\\n\\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 7\\n\\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\\njudicial review all the same.\\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\\nThuraissigiam.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436954/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659701/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ernest Odei v. DHS\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3105\nERNEST A. ODEI and\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\n\f2 No. 18-3105\n\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\n I. Background\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\nGhana approved.\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\n\fNo. 18-3105 3\n\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\n II. Discussion\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\n\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\n\f4 No. 18-3105\n\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\n\fNo. 18-3105 5\n\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\nal.”\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\n\f6 No. 18-3105\n\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\n\fNo. 18-3105 7\n\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\njudicial review all the same.\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\nThuraissigiam.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ernest Odei v. DHS\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3105\\nERNEST A. ODEI and\\nSPIRIT OF GRACE OUTREACH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF\\nHOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-06019 — Andrea R. Wood, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ernest Odei traveled from his native\\nGhana to the United States in 2017 to meet with academic\\nadvisors and to perform missionary work. When he arrived\\nin Chicago, border patrol agents barred his entry because he\\ndid not have the proper visa. After a short detention, immi-\\ngration authorities gave Odei the option to withdraw his\\n\\f2 No. 18-3105\\n\\napplication for admission and return to Ghana. He chose to\\ndo so, but several months later he brought this lawsuit\\nchallenging the inadmissibility determination.\\n The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdic-\\ntion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial\\nreview of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited\\nremoval procedure in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Odei argues\\nthat the jurisdictional bar does not apply because it refers\\nonly to “order[s] of removal” and there was no order of\\nremoval here because he withdrew his application for\\nadmission. Under the relevant statutory definitions, howev-\\ner, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove as\\nwell as an order that an alien is removable. Odei is challeng-\\ning the latter, so the jurisdictional bar applies.\\n I. Background\\n Odei is a pastor of a Christian church in Ghana and a\\nfounding board member of the Spirit of Grace Outreach, a\\nnonprofit religious group in the United States. He is also a\\nPh.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored\\nby a Christian university in Tennessee. In 2017 Spirit of\\nGrace invited him to visit the United States to participate in\\nits religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at church-\\nes and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet\\nwith his academic advisors at the university. Before his trip\\nOdei applied for a B-1/B-2 visa, which the U.S. Consulate in\\nGhana approved.\\n When Odei arrived at Chicago’s O’Hare International\\nAirport, agents of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection\\nagency questioned him about his trip. They eventually\\ndetermined that his visa was invalid for his intended mis-\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 3\\n\\nsionary and academic purposes, which meant he was inad-\\nmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). They found him inad-\\nmissible and canceled the visa. They did not immediately\\nremove him, however, because he answered “yes” when\\nasked if he feared returning to Ghana. They transferred him\\nto the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,\\nand he was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later\\nOdei dropped his asylum claim. That would normally\\nrequire immediate removal under § 1225(b)(1), but the\\nDepartment of Homeland Security gave Odei the opportuni-\\nty to withdraw his application for admission and return to\\nGhana immediately. He did just that.\\n This lawsuit came a few months later. Odei and Spirit of\\nGrace sued the Department of Homeland Security and\\nCustoms and Border Protection challenging the decision not\\nto admit him. He raised claims under the Immigration and\\nNationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedure Act,\\nand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 1 The district\\njudge dismissed the suit based on the INA’s jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision. This appeal followed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We start with a brief overview of the statutory scheme.\\nWhen an immigration officer concludes that an immigrant\\nlacks a valid visa and thus is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7),\\n\\n1 The complaint also named Immigration and Customs Enforcement and\\nthe McHenry County Sheriff as defendants, alleging that Odei was\\ndenied access to a Bible during his detention and that no one told him of\\nhis rights under the Vienna Convention to contact consular officials and\\nhave the Ghanaian consulate notified of his detention. Finally, the\\ncomplaint alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act. These\\nclaims were either dropped or dismissed and are no longer at issue.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3105\\n\\nthe officer “shall order the alien removed from the United\\nStates without further hearing or review.” § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).\\nThis is commonly called “expedited removal,” but there are\\ntwo exceptions. The officer may not order immediate re-\\nmoval if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for\\nasylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. And the officer need\\nnot order removal if the alien withdraws his application:\\n“An alien applying for admission may, in the discretion of\\nthe Attorney General and at any time, be permitted to\\nwithdraw the application for admission and depart immedi-\\nately from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(4). Because\\nOdei initially claimed that he feared persecution but then\\nwithdrew his application for admission and left the country\\nvoluntarily, there was no expedited removal.\\n As relevant here, the INA provides that “no court shall\\nhave jurisdiction to review … any individual determination\\nor to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or\\nrelating to the implementation or operation of an order of\\nremoval pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i);\\nsee also Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329–30 (7th Cir. 2010)\\n(explaining the operation of the jurisdictional bar). Odei\\nargues that there was no “order of removal” because he\\nwithdrew his application and voluntarily left the county, so\\n§ 1252(a)(2)(A) does not apply.\\n This argument misreads the INA. The term “order of re-\\nmoval” is synonymous with the term “order of deportation.”\\nMejia Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018);\\nGuevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972, 796 (7th Cir. 2007). The\\nterm “order of deportation” refers not only to a decision\\n“ordering deportation” but also to an order “concluding that\\nthe alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A).\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 5\\n\\n That means courts lack jurisdiction to review orders to\\nremove and also orders that an alien is removable. This case\\nfalls in the latter category. Border patrol agents determined\\nthat Odei was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) and cancelled\\nhis visa. Under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), the Department of Home-\\nland Security was required to remove him once he dropped\\nhis asylum claim. Though that never happened because\\nOdei withdrew his application for admission, the initial\\ndetermination that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(7)\\nand § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) was nonetheless an “order of remov-\\nal.”\\n Compare Odei’s case to the circumstances at issue in\\nGuevara. Eusebio Guevara, a Honduran native and lawful\\npermanent resident, was placed in removal proceedings\\nbased on convictions for retail theft and two counts of\\nfourth-degree sexual assault. Guevara, 472 F.3d at 973. An\\nimmigration judge found him removable after classifying\\nthe sexual-assault convictions as crimes of moral turpitude.\\nBut the judge granted discretionary relief in the form of a\\nwaiver of removal. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals\\nreversed the latter determination and ordered Guevara\\nremoved. Id. Guevara argued that the Board cannot issue a\\nremoval order in the first instance, and because the immigra-\\ntion judge had granted a waiver, there was no removal\\norder. Id. at 975–76. We disagreed, explaining that “if an\\n[immigration judge] decides that an alien is removable but\\ndoes not ultimately order removal due to a grant of a waiv-\\ner, cancellation, or the like, the decision that the alien is\\nremovable is nonetheless an ‘order of deportation’” that can\\nbe given effect by the Board if it reverses the judge’s decision\\nregarding discretionary relief. Id. at 976.\\n\\f6 No. 18-3105\\n\\n Odei’s case is similar. Indeed, it involves application of a\\nparallel provision of the same statute: Odei was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(7) while Guevara was found\\ninadmissible under § 1182(a)(2).\\n Odei argues in the alternative that the jurisdiction-\\nstripping provision should have no effect when an alien\\nchallenges the admissibility decision under the Religious\\nFreedom Restoration Act. He first notes that the Act has its\\nown right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (“A person\\nwhose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of\\nthis section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in\\na judicial proceeding … .”). He then points to 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 2000bb-3, which says that all federal statutory law is\\nsubject to the Act “unless such law explicitly excludes such\\napplication by reference to this chapter.” He emphasizes that\\nthe INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision never specifically\\nrefers to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act—though we\\nnote that it does expressly say that it applies\\n“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or\\nnonstatutory).” § 1252(a)(2)(A).\\n Nothing in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act over-\\nrides § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar. The mere existence\\nof a private right of action under a federal statute does not\\neliminate jurisdictional obstacles. See Harris County v.\\nMERSCORP Inc., 791 F.3d 545, 552 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate both that a federal court will\\nhave jurisdiction over their claim, and also that they (the\\nplaintiffs) have a right of action to initiate that claim. In other\\nwords, establishing the court’s jurisdiction and the litigants’\\nright of action are two requirements that must be satisfied\\nindependently.”) (emphasis added); see also FDIC v. Meyer,\\n\\fNo. 18-3105 7\\n\\n510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (explaining that the questions of\\nsovereign immunity and the existence of a right of action are\\n“analytically distinct”); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l\\nAss'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456 (1974) (same, with\\nstanding). Whether or not the inadmissibility order bur-\\ndened Odei’s religious practice, § 1252(a)(2)(A) precludes\\njudicial review all the same.\\n We’ve explained that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) “a court has\\njurisdiction to inquire only ‘whether such an order in fact\\nwas issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There\\nshall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissi-\\nble or entitled to any relief from removal.’” Khan, 608 F.3d at\\n330 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5)). In other words, in decid-\\ning whether § 1252(a)(2)(A)’s jurisdictional bar applies, the\\nspecific nature of a claimant’s statutory challenge simply\\ndoesn’t matter. To the contrary, the jurisdictional bar is\\ndesigned to preclude courts from examining those specifics\\nin the first place. This case was properly dismissed. 2\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a related review-preclusion clause in\\n8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of\\nhabeas corpus. Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097,\\n1119 (9th Cir. 2019). The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari.\\nOur case does not involve habeas corpus, so we do not need to address\\nThuraissigiam.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4367,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659702,"string":"4,659,702"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"David Camm v. Stanley Faith"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1440"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1440\\nDAVID R. CAMM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\\ncustody.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1440\\n\\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 3\\n\\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\\nble jury to credit it.\\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\\n\\f4 No. 18-1440\\n\\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\\nT-shirt.\\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\\nscientific background of any kind.\\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 5\\n\\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\\nHVIS finding.\\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\\nfamily.\\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\\n\\f6 No. 18-1440\\n\\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\\nenough to run through their system for a match.\\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\\nnever ran the test at all.\\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 7\\n\\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\\n\\f8 No. 18-1440\\n\\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\\ninformant.\\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\\nmatched Boney’s.\\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 9\\n\\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\\nted the murders.\\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1440\\n\\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\\ncustody.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 11\\n\\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\\nneed say no more about them.\\n\\n\\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1440\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\\nthe murders.\\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\\ncontrolled their actions.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 13\\n\\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\\n\\f14 No. 18-1440\\n\\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\\ngive way.\\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 15\\n\\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\\ngard for the truth.\\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\\n\\f16 No. 18-1440\\n\\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\\nscientific”).\\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\\ntheir reports.\\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 17\\n\\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\\n\\f18 No. 18-1440\\n\\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\\nthe first time on appeal.”).\\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 19\\n\\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\\nB. Brady Claim\\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\\n\\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\\n\\f20 No. 18-1440\\n\\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\\nthree things:\\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\\n must have been material, meaning there is a\\n reasonable probability that the result of the\\n proceeding would have been different.\\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\\n not otherwise available to the defendant\\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 21\\n\\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\\ncantly damaged.\\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\\n\\f22 No. 18-1440\\n\\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\\nviolation of Brady.\\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\\nthe test at all.\\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 23\\n\\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\\ntestimony.\\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\\n\\f24 No. 18-1440\\n\\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 25\\n\\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\\nBrady context.\\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\\n\\f26 No. 18-1440\\n\\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\\nC. Evidence Fabrication\\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\\n\\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 27\\n\\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\\n * * *\\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\\nwe affirm the judgment.\\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4436955/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659702/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: David Camm v. Stanley Faith\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1440\nDAVID R. CAMM,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\ncustody.\n\f2 No. 18-1440\n\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n\fNo. 18-1440 3\n\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\nble jury to credit it.\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\n\f4 No. 18-1440\n\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\nT-shirt.\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\nscientific background of any kind.\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\n\fNo. 18-1440 5\n\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\nHVIS finding.\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\nfamily.\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\n\f6 No. 18-1440\n\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\nenough to run through their system for a match.\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\nnever ran the test at all.\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\n\fNo. 18-1440 7\n\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\n\f8 No. 18-1440\n\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\ninformant.\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\nmatched Boney’s.\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\n\fNo. 18-1440 9\n\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\nted the murders.\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\n\f10 No. 18-1440\n\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\ncustody.\n\fNo. 18-1440 11\n\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\nneed say no more about them.\n\n\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\n\f12 No. 18-1440\n\n II. Discussion\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\nthe murders.\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\ncontrolled their actions.\n\fNo. 18-1440 13\n\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\nAmendment.\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\n\f14 No. 18-1440\n\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\ngive way.\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\n\fNo. 18-1440 15\n\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\ngard for the truth.\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\n\f16 No. 18-1440\n\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\nscientific”).\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\ntheir reports.\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\n\fNo. 18-1440 17\n\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\n\f18 No. 18-1440\n\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\nthe first time on appeal.”).\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\n\fNo. 18-1440 19\n\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\nB. Brady Claim\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\n\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\n\f20 No. 18-1440\n\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\nthree things:\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\n must have been material, meaning there is a\n reasonable probability that the result of the\n proceeding would have been different.\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\n not otherwise available to the defendant\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\n\fNo. 18-1440 21\n\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\ncantly damaged.\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\n\f22 No. 18-1440\n\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\nviolation of Brady.\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\nthe test at all.\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\n\fNo. 18-1440 23\n\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\ntestimony.\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\n\f24 No. 18-1440\n\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\n\fNo. 18-1440 25\n\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\nBrady context.\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\n\f26 No. 18-1440\n\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\nC. Evidence Fabrication\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\n\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\n2014).\n\fNo. 18-1440 27\n\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\n * * *\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\nwe affirm the judgment.\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: David Camm v. Stanley Faith\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1440\\nDAVID R. CAMM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\\ncustody.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1440\\n\\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 3\\n\\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\\nble jury to credit it.\\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\\n\\f4 No. 18-1440\\n\\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\\nT-shirt.\\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\\nscientific background of any kind.\\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 5\\n\\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\\nHVIS finding.\\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\\nfamily.\\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\\n\\f6 No. 18-1440\\n\\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\\nenough to run through their system for a match.\\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\\nnever ran the test at all.\\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 7\\n\\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\\n\\f8 No. 18-1440\\n\\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\\ninformant.\\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\\nmatched Boney’s.\\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 9\\n\\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\\nted the murders.\\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1440\\n\\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\\ncustody.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 11\\n\\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\\nneed say no more about them.\\n\\n\\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1440\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\\nthe murders.\\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\\ncontrolled their actions.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 13\\n\\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\\n\\f14 No. 18-1440\\n\\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\\ngive way.\\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 15\\n\\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\\ngard for the truth.\\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\\n\\f16 No. 18-1440\\n\\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\\nscientific”).\\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\\ntheir reports.\\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 17\\n\\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\\n\\f18 No. 18-1440\\n\\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\\nthe first time on appeal.”).\\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 19\\n\\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\\nB. Brady Claim\\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\\n\\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\\n\\f20 No. 18-1440\\n\\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\\nthree things:\\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\\n must have been material, meaning there is a\\n reasonable probability that the result of the\\n proceeding would have been different.\\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\\n not otherwise available to the defendant\\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 21\\n\\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\\ncantly damaged.\\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\\n\\f22 No. 18-1440\\n\\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\\nviolation of Brady.\\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\\nthe test at all.\\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 23\\n\\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\\ntestimony.\\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\\n\\f24 No. 18-1440\\n\\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 25\\n\\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\\nBrady context.\\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\\n\\f26 No. 18-1440\\n\\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\\nC. Evidence Fabrication\\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\\n\\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 27\\n\\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\\n * * *\\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\\nwe affirm the judgment.\\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4368,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4659792,"string":"4,659,792"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"David Camm v. Stanley Faith"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-10"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1440"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1440\\nDAVID R. CAMM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\\ncustody.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1440\\n\\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 3\\n\\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\\nble jury to credit it.\\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\\n\\f4 No. 18-1440\\n\\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\\nT-shirt.\\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\\nscientific background of any kind.\\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 5\\n\\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\\nHVIS finding.\\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\\nfamily.\\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\\n\\f6 No. 18-1440\\n\\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\\nenough to run through their system for a match.\\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\\nnever ran the test at all.\\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 7\\n\\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\\n\\f8 No. 18-1440\\n\\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\\ninformant.\\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\\nmatched Boney’s.\\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 9\\n\\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\\nted the murders.\\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1440\\n\\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\\ncustody.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 11\\n\\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\\nneed say no more about them.\\n\\n\\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1440\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\\nthe murders.\\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\\ncontrolled their actions.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 13\\n\\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\\n\\f14 No. 18-1440\\n\\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\\ngive way.\\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 15\\n\\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\\ngard for the truth.\\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\\n\\f16 No. 18-1440\\n\\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\\nscientific”).\\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\\ntheir reports.\\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 17\\n\\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\\n\\f18 No. 18-1440\\n\\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\\nthe first time on appeal.”).\\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 19\\n\\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\\nB. Brady Claim\\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\\n\\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\\n\\f20 No. 18-1440\\n\\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\\nthree things:\\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\\n must have been material, meaning there is a\\n reasonable probability that the result of the\\n proceeding would have been different.\\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\\n not otherwise available to the defendant\\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 21\\n\\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\\ncantly damaged.\\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\\n\\f22 No. 18-1440\\n\\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\\nviolation of Brady.\\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\\nthe test at all.\\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 23\\n\\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\\ntestimony.\\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\\n\\f24 No. 18-1440\\n\\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 25\\n\\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\\nBrady context.\\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\\n\\f26 No. 18-1440\\n\\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\\nC. Evidence Fabrication\\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\\n\\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 27\\n\\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\\n * * *\\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\\nwe affirm the judgment.\\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437045/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659792/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: David Camm v. Stanley Faith\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1440\nDAVID R. CAMM,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\ncustody.\n\f2 No. 18-1440\n\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n\fNo. 18-1440 3\n\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\nble jury to credit it.\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\n\f4 No. 18-1440\n\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\nT-shirt.\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\nscientific background of any kind.\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\n\fNo. 18-1440 5\n\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\nHVIS finding.\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\nfamily.\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\n\f6 No. 18-1440\n\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\nenough to run through their system for a match.\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\nnever ran the test at all.\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\n\fNo. 18-1440 7\n\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\n\f8 No. 18-1440\n\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\ninformant.\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\nmatched Boney’s.\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\n\fNo. 18-1440 9\n\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\nted the murders.\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\n\f10 No. 18-1440\n\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\ncustody.\n\fNo. 18-1440 11\n\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\nneed say no more about them.\n\n\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\n\f12 No. 18-1440\n\n II. Discussion\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\nthe murders.\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\ncontrolled their actions.\n\fNo. 18-1440 13\n\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\nAmendment.\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\n\f14 No. 18-1440\n\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\ngive way.\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\n\fNo. 18-1440 15\n\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\ngard for the truth.\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\n\f16 No. 18-1440\n\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\nscientific”).\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\ntheir reports.\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\n\fNo. 18-1440 17\n\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\n\f18 No. 18-1440\n\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\nthe first time on appeal.”).\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\n\fNo. 18-1440 19\n\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\nB. Brady Claim\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\n\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\n\f20 No. 18-1440\n\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\nthree things:\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\n must have been material, meaning there is a\n reasonable probability that the result of the\n proceeding would have been different.\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\n not otherwise available to the defendant\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\n\fNo. 18-1440 21\n\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\ncantly damaged.\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\n\f22 No. 18-1440\n\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\nviolation of Brady.\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\nthe test at all.\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\n\fNo. 18-1440 23\n\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\ntestimony.\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\n\f24 No. 18-1440\n\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\n\fNo. 18-1440 25\n\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\nBrady context.\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\n\f26 No. 18-1440\n\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\nC. Evidence Fabrication\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\n\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\n2014).\n\fNo. 18-1440 27\n\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\n * * *\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\nwe affirm the judgment.\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: David Camm v. Stanley Faith\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-10\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1440\\nDAVID R. CAMM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nSTANLEY O. FAITH, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.\\n No. 4:14-cv-00123 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a heinous triple\\nmurder that occurred almost 19 years ago in Georgetown,\\nIndiana, a small town near the Kentucky border. The plain-\\ntiff is David Camm, a former state trooper who was twice\\nconvicted of the crimes but was acquitted after a third trial.\\nHe then filed this suit for damages for the years he spent in\\ncustody.\\n\\f2 No. 18-1440\\n\\n There are many factual disputes. Construing the evi-\\ndence in Camm’s favor, as we must at this stage, the claims\\ncenter on the following version of events. Camm came home\\non the night in question and found his wife and two young\\nchildren shot to death in the garage. Two days later law-\\nenforcement officers obtained a warrant for his arrest,\\nrelying almost exclusively on the observations of Robert\\nStites—a plainly unqualified forensic assistant who was not\\ntrained to do anything more than photograph evidence.\\nTaking a far more active role in the investigation, Stites told\\nthe investigators that several bloodstains on Camm’s T-shirt\\nwere “high velocity impact spatter,” indicating that Camm\\nwas present and in close proximity when one or more of the\\nvictims was struck by a bullet. Investigators and prosecutors\\nexaggerated Stites’s qualifications in a probable-cause\\naffidavit and at trial, and a jury found Camm guilty. The\\njudgment was reversed on unrelated grounds, and on retrial\\nCamm was again convicted. That judgment too was re-\\nversed. A jury found him not guilty the third time around.\\nHe was released after 13 years in custody.\\n This lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed. The de-\\nfendants are several investigators, two prosecutors, and\\nStites and his boss, who backed up his assistant’s opinions.\\nCamm alleges that the defendants willfully or recklessly\\nmade false statements in three probable-cause affidavits that\\nled to his arrest and continued custody while he awaited\\ntrial and retrial. Though the parties and the district judge\\nreferred to this as a claim for malicious prosecution, we’ve\\nsince explained that “malicious prosecution” is the wrong\\nlabel. It’s a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful arrest\\nand detention. The suit also raises a claim of evidence sup-\\npression in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 3\\n\\nFinally, Camm alleges that the defendants deprived him of a\\nfair trial by inducing the real killer Charles Boney to give a\\nfalse account implicating him in the murders. The judge\\nentered summary judgment for the defendants.\\n We reverse in part. Camm presented enough evidence to\\nproceed to trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, but only as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also\\nwarranted on the following aspects of the Brady claim:\\nwhether some of the defendants suppressed evidence of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow\\nthrough on a promise to run a DNA profile through a law-\\nenforcement database to check for a match. In all other\\nrespects, we affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n Camm appeals from a summary judgment, so our ac-\\ncount of the facts considers the evidence and draws all\\nreasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him.\\nLeaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2016). In other\\nwords, our factual narrative reflects Camm’s theory of the\\ncase to the extent that the evidence would permit a reasona-\\nble jury to credit it.\\n In the fall of 2000, Camm had recently resigned his job as\\nan Indiana State Trooper to pursue another line of work. On\\nthe evening of September 28, he went to his church to play\\nbasketball. Ten other players can attest that he was at the\\ngym from around 7 to 9:25 p.m. On arriving home Camm\\ndiscovered his wife, Kimberly, lying in a pool of blood on\\nthe garage floor. She had been shot in the head. He then\\nfound his two children—seven-year-old Bradley and five-\\nyear-old Jill—in the backseat of his wife’s Bronco. Brad had a\\n\\f4 No. 18-1440\\n\\ngunshot wound to the chest; Jill was shot in the head. All\\nthree were dead. Camm thought Brad might still be alive, so\\nhe reached over Jill’s body, pulled his son from the Bronco,\\nand began performing CPR. As he removed Brad’s body\\nfrom the car, some of Jill’s blood ended up on the front of his\\nT-shirt.\\n After a futile attempt to resuscitate his son, Camm called\\nthe Indiana State Police. Stan Faith, the elected Floyd County\\nprosecutor, arrived at about 10 p.m., and he soon took\\ncontrol of the investigation. Faith made an immediate deci-\\nsion to hire Rodney Englert, a private forensics analyst based\\nin Oregon. Englert specializes in blood-spatter analysis, a\\nsubjective field he now admits is only partly scientific.\\n Englert wasn’t able to travel to Indiana right away, so he\\nsent his assistant Robert Stites. Englert told Faith that Stites\\nwould be there only to document evidence and take photos.\\nThat limitation was well-founded: Stites has since admitted\\nthat he is not a crime-scene reconstructionist, has never\\ntaken a basic bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no\\nscientific background of any kind.\\n Nonetheless, Stites did far more than photograph. He\\ntold the investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was\\n“high velocity impact spatter” (“HVIS”), which occurs only\\nin the presence of a gunshot. Rather than wait for Englert to\\nanalyze the pattern in person, Stites called his boss and\\ndescribed the spots of blood over the phone. The parties\\ndispute what Englert said in response: Englert testified in\\ndeposition that he never would have confirmed Stites’s\\nfinding over the phone. Stites, however, testified that after\\nhe described the spots, Englert agreed that it met the criteria\\nfor HVIS. Either way, Stites returned from the phone call\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 5\\n\\nand told the investigators that he was 100% certain about his\\nHVIS finding.\\n He then went further, finding HVIS bloodstains on the\\ngarage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and\\na jacket. In hindsight only the stain on the T-shirt turned out\\nto be blood, much less HVIS. Stites also told the officers that\\ngiven its viscosity, he could tell that the blood was manipu-\\nlated by a high pH cleaning substance. He said this even\\nthough he had never been to a crime scene where fresh\\nblood was present. Nor had he ever seen serum separation,\\nthe natural and innocent phenomenon that actually ex-\\nplained the blood’s viscosity. Jim Niemeyer, the most expe-\\nrienced detective on the case, quickly realized that Stites was\\nnot qualified and did not belong at the crime scene. But\\nwhen Niemeyer ran his concerns up the chain of command,\\nhe was told that Stan Faith wanted Stites to be involved.\\n Meanwhile, lead case officer Sean Clemons was inter-\\nviewing Camm’s aunt and neighbor, Mrs. Ter Vree. She told\\nhim that between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m.—roughly the time\\nCamm returned from playing basketball—she heard three\\nloud noises that sounded like someone pounding a fist on a\\ncar. She did not tell Clemons that the noises sounded like\\ngunfire, nor did she ever think they did. Soon after Camm’s\\narrest, Clemons became aware that Camm had punched his\\ntailgate several times when he discovered his murdered\\nfamily.\\n Crucially, Faith and the investigators also found a prison-\\nissue sweatshirt in the garage. A nickname was written on\\nthe collar. Most people involved in the case agree that it said\\n“Backbone,” but Clemons and Faith insist it could have said\\n“Rack One.” The Indiana Department of Corrections has a\\n\\f6 No. 18-1440\\n\\ndatabase of inmate nicknames, but Faith claims he was not\\naware of it at the time. Regardless, no one checked with the\\nDepartment to try to match the nickname to a former pris-\\noner. The final important piece of evidence at the scene was\\na palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car. At the time the\\ninvestigators did not think the fingerprints were clear\\nenough to run through their system for a match.\\n Faith wrote a probable-cause affidavit for Camm’s arrest,\\nwhich Clemons signed. The facts recounted in the affidavit\\nwere largely drawn from Stites’s unqualified observations.\\nIn addition, the affidavit stated that Mrs. Ter Vree heard\\n“three distinct sounds that can be interpreted as gunshots”\\naround the time Camm returned home from the church. But\\nshe never said that. A judge approved the warrant, and\\nCamm was arrested and charged with murdering his wife\\nand children. The investigation continued, and Faith con-\\nsulted with other blood-spatter analysts regarding the blood\\non Camm’s shirt. All agreed with the initial HVIS finding.\\n Before trial Michael McDaniel, Camm’s attorney, had the\\n“Backbone” sweatshirt tested by an independent lab in\\nMinnesota. The lab discovered a DNA profile on the shirt.\\nThe Indiana State Police maintains a DNA identification\\ndatabase called CODIS, but defense attorneys cannot access\\nit. McDaniel took the DNA profile to Faith and asked him to\\nrun it through the database. Faith agreed to do so. After\\nMcDaniel called back several times to get the results, Faith\\ntold him that nothing came up. In reality Faith and Clemons\\nnever ran the test at all.\\n In January 2002 Faith tried the triple-murder case to a ju-\\nry, though the jurors were selected from Johnson County\\nbecause of extensive pretrial publicity. Stites and Englert\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 7\\n\\nwere among his key witnesses. Stites testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist and was working on his\\nmaster’s degree and Ph.D. in fluid dynamics. Throughout\\nthe trial Faith repeatedly referred to Stites as “professor.”\\nStites also told the jury that he had investigated homicides\\nfor the Army, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI.\\n Those statements were indisputably false. To start, Stites\\nis not a crime-scene reconstructionist. He has never pursued\\na degree in fluid dynamics. In fact, he has never taken a\\nsingle course in the field. His only degree is in economics,\\nand while he did take a single chemistry course in college,\\nhe flunked it. His education and training are so thin that\\nFaith had to talk him through the scientific method (such as\\nit was) prior to trial. Moreover, while Stites claimed to have\\nadvised the nation’s top intelligence agencies, he had never\\nprocessed a single homicide scene before this one.\\n Nonetheless, Camm’s counsel chose not to seek exclusion\\nof Stites’s testimony because he thought the jury would\\nrecognize his ineptitude and discredit the prosecution’s case\\naccordingly. Still, Camm and his counsel were unaware of\\nthe true extent of Stites’s lies. Camm now argues that he\\nwould have objected to Stites’s testimony had he known.\\n The jury found Camm guilty. Two years later the Indiana\\nCourt of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial,\\nruling that evidence of Camm’s marital infidelity had been\\nimproperly admitted and the error was not harmless. Camm\\nv. State, 812 N.E.2d 1127, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Addi-\\ntional investigation ensued. By then Floyd County voters\\nhad ousted Stan Faith as county prosecutor, electing Keith\\nHenderson instead. Henderson assumed responsibility for\\nthe Camm case, and Gary Gilbert replaced Clemons as lead\\n\\f8 No. 18-1440\\n\\ncase investigator. Henderson and Gilbert prepared and\\nsubmitted a second probable-cause affidavit, which included\\nmany of the same details as the first with two notable addi-\\ntions. Gilbert wrote that Clemons told him that Camm\\nconfessed on the night of the murders as investigators\\ncollected evidence. According to Gilbert, Clemons told him\\nthat Camm said, “This is what they do to you when you kill\\nyour wife and kids.” There is a sharp dispute about what\\nCamm actually said to Clemons, but one thing is certain: if\\nthis statement was made, it was exceedingly odd that\\nClemons did not think it significant enough to include in the\\nfirst probable-cause affidavit. The second important addition\\nwas information that Camm had confessed to a jailhouse\\ninformant.\\n Several months after Henderson and Gilbert submitted\\nthe second affidavit, Gilbert made the most important\\ndiscovery of the case: the identity of the real killer. Gilbert\\nfound the old DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nand finally had it tested. The DNA matched that of Charles\\nBoney, a repeat violent offender with a history of attacking\\nwomen at gunpoint. Further investigation revealed that\\nBoney’s nickname was indeed Backbone, which a simple\\nphone call to the Department of Corrections would have\\nshown. Moreover, the fingerprints on Kimberly Camm’s car\\nmatched Boney’s.\\n When investigators first questioned Boney about the\\nmurders, he demanded to speak to counsel. In a bizarre\\ntwist, he named Stan Faith, the original prosecutor, as his\\nattorney. Faith went into private practice after losing his\\nreelection bid to Henderson. In his new role, he had repre-\\nsented Boney in at least one case. The two were put in touch\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 9\\n\\nthrough Boney’s mother, whom Faith has known since 1986\\nwhen he first ran for county prosecutor. Faith has testified\\nthat while he knew Boney’s mother, he did not meet Boney\\nin person or learn his nickname until long after he investi-\\ngated and prosecuted the Camm case.\\n Alas, the discovery of the real killer did Camm more\\nharm than good. Investigators aggressively pursued a theory\\nthat Boney merely helped Camm commit the murders; they\\napparently never once considered the possibility that Boney\\ncommitted the murders alone. They interviewed Boney three\\ntimes covering more than 20 hours of interrogation, pressur-\\ning him to implicate Camm. They suggested various connec-\\ntions between the two and proposed scenarios in which\\nBoney might have witnessed Camm shoot his family. They\\nalso told him that he had to tell the whole story—translation:\\nimplicate Camm—in order to avoid the death penalty.\\nBoney initially denied any involvement, and his story shift-\\ned wildly during the interrogations. Eventually he took the\\nhint. He told the investigators that he brought the murder\\nweapon to the scene and was present when Camm commit-\\nted the murders.\\n Gilbert then prepared a third probable-cause affidavit.\\nThe most important additions were Boney’s statements.\\nWith the inclusion of a second suspect, the prosecution’s\\ncase now included a charge of conspiracy. Gilbert also\\nincluded information that a second jailhouse informant had\\ncome forward and reported that Camm had confessed to the\\ncrimes. The third affidavit also said that Camm called his\\nwife’s employer early the morning after the murders asking\\nabout the details of collecting on her life-insurance policy.\\n\\f10 No. 18-1440\\n\\n Boney was charged with three counts of murder and one\\ncount of conspiracy to commit murder. The case against him\\nwas tried separately in December 2005, and the court in-\\nstructed the jury on Indiana’s law of aiding a criminal\\noffense. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2008). The jury found him guilty as charged. Id.\\n In January 2006 the case against Camm was tried again,\\nthis time in Warrick County. Boney’s presence at the murder\\nscene was undisputed, and Camm’s theory of defense was\\nthat Boney committed the crimes alone. Camm v. State,\\n908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009). Camm was again convicted.\\nThis time the Indiana Supreme Court reversed because\\nHenderson introduced speculative and highly prejudicial\\nevidence that Camm molested his daughter. Id. at 228.\\n At some point after the second conviction, Henderson\\naccepted a contract to write a book about the case. He re-\\nceived an advance check—though he never cashed it—and\\nwrote much of the manuscript. When Camm’s attorney\\nfound out, he moved to have Henderson removed as prose-\\ncutor. Henderson fought the removal for more than two\\nyears, leaving Camm in custody all the while. Eventually the\\nIndiana Court of Appeals removed Henderson and ordered\\nthe appointment of a special prosecutor. See Camm v. State,\\n957 N.E.2d 205, 210–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana\\nSupreme Court later imposed a public reprimand for\\nHenderson’s professional misconduct. In re Henderson,\\n78 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 2017).\\n The case against Camm was tried a third time, again in\\nWarrick County. On October 24, 2013, the jury found him\\nnot guilty. He was released the same day, after 13 years in\\ncustody.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 11\\n\\n One year after his acquittal, Camm filed suit under § 1983\\nagainst Clemons, Gilbert, and several other investigators;\\nprosecutors Faith and Henderson; and Stites and Englert.1\\nThe complaint raised a host of claims: “malicious prosecu-\\ntion” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-\\nments, a due-process claim based on Brady violations and\\n“evidence fabrication,” a claim for violation of substantive\\ndue process, a claim for conspiracy to violate Camm’s civil\\nrights, and various state-law claims. After lengthy discovery\\nthe defendants moved for summary judgment. The judge\\ngranted the motion in its entirety.\\n After briefly addressing principles of qualified and abso-\\nlute immunity, the judge took up the merits of the malicious-\\nprosecution claim. She held that probable cause existed\\nwhen all three probable-cause affidavits were written, so the\\nclaim necessarily failed. Turning to the Brady claim, the\\njudge concluded that no material exculpatory evidence was\\nsuppressed. Next up was the claim that investigators fabri-\\ncated Boney’s testimony by using coercive and suggestive\\ntactics to obtain it. The judge noted that coercive interroga-\\ntion tactics do not necessarily result in false statements, so\\nthe alleged coercion did not alone establish a due-process\\nviolation. Because no other evidence supported the allega-\\ntion of evidence fabrication, the judge ruled for the defend-\\nants on this claim. The judge rejected the remaining claims\\nas well, but Camm does not seek their reinstatement so we\\nneed say no more about them.\\n\\n\\n1 Camm also sued Floyd County under Monell v. Department of Social\\nServices of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The judge dismissed this claim\\nand Camm has not challenged that ruling.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1440\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Three claims are at issue on appeal. The first is that the\\ndefendants violated Camm’s Fourth Amendment rights by\\nincluding false statements in the probable-cause affidavits.\\nThe second is that they violated Brady by suppressing three\\ncategories of evidence: the extent of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions, the fact that the DNA on Boney’s sweatshirt was never\\ntested, and Henderson’s book deal. The final claim is that the\\ninvestigators “fabricated” Boney’s statement that he merely\\nsupplied the gun and was present when Camm committed\\nthe murders.\\n As a threshold matter, Stites and Englert argue that they\\ncannot be liable under § 1983 because they are private actors.\\nPrivate persons are considered state actors—that is, they are\\ndeemed to have acted under color of state law and thus face\\n§ 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances. “The first\\nis where the [S]tate effectively directs or controls the actions\\nof the private party such that the [S]tate can be held respon-\\nsible for the private party’s decision. … The second situation\\nis when the [S]tate delegates a public function to a private\\nentity.” Payton v. Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,\\n184 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1999); see also L.P. v. Marian Catho-\\nlic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that\\na private person acts under color of state law when he is “a\\nwillful participant in joint action with the State or its\\nagents”) (quotation marks omitted). Stites and Englert easily\\nqualify as state actors under these principles. Faith delegated\\na public function when he hired them to investigate the\\ncrime scene on behalf of Indiana law enforcement. And\\nthroughout the relevant time period, Faith and Henderson\\ncontrolled their actions.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 13\\n\\nA. Fourth Amendment Claim\\n Before turning to the merits of Camm’s first claim, we\\npause to clarify which constitutional right is at issue. Camm\\nhas characterized this as a freestanding constitutional claim\\nfor “malicious prosecution”; the district judge also used the\\nterm “malicious prosecution” and situated the claim under\\nthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As\\nwe explained in Manuel v. City of Joliet, however, when a\\nplaintiff alleges that officials held him in custody before trial\\nwithout justification, “[m]alicious prosecution is the wrong\\ncharacterization. There is only a Fourth Amendment claim—\\nthe absence of probable cause that would justify the deten-\\ntion.” 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). And we recently reiterated “that the Fourth\\nAmendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim\\nfor wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago,\\n914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019). Camm’s complaint cited\\nboth the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but properly\\nconstrued, the malicious-prosecution claim is really one for\\nwrongful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth\\nAmendment.\\n “Probable cause exists to arrest a suspect if at the time of\\narrest the facts and circumstances within the arresting\\nofficer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trust-\\nworthy information would warrant a prudent person in\\nbelieving that the suspect had committed or was committing\\nan offense.” Gower v. Vercler, 377 F.3d 661, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)\\n(quotation marks and alteration omitted). When an arrest is\\njudicially authorized, as it was in this case, “we presume the\\nvalidity of [the] warrant and the information offered to\\nsupport it.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.\\n\\f14 No. 18-1440\\n\\n2010). But “the presumption may give way on a showing\\nthat the officer who sought the warrant knowingly or inten-\\ntionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth[] made\\nfalse statements to the judicial officer and that the false\\nstatements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determina-\\ntion.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).\\n Faith wrote the first probable-cause affidavit and\\nClemons signed it. The affidavit contained just two facts\\nspecifically pointing to Camm. The first was that “[t]he tee\\nshirt worn by David R. Camm … had high velocity blood\\nmist[,] which occurs in the presence of gunshot at the time of\\nthe shooting.” This assertion, of course, came from Stites.\\nThe second was that around the time Camm returned home,\\nhis neighbor Mrs. Ter Vree heard “three distinct sounds that\\ncan be interpreted as gunshots.” The remaining facts—for\\ninstance, that the scene was manipulated by a high pH\\nsubstance—say no more about Camm than any other person.\\n While an identical warrant might suffice in a different\\ncase, there is a wealth of evidence here that Stites, Englert,\\nFaith, and Clemons contributed false statements and with-\\nheld crucial information, either intentionally or with reckless\\ndisregard for the truth. So the presumption of validity must\\ngive way.\\n Start with Stites. He, more than anyone, was aware of his\\nown lack of qualifications. He not only withheld that infor-\\nmation but went further, claiming that he could make com-\\nplex scientific conclusions at the scene of the crime with\\n100% certainty. He said this even though he had no relevant\\neducation or training, had never been to a crime scene where\\nfresh blood was present, and had never processed a homi-\\ncide scene. A reasonable jury could find that his state-\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 15\\n\\nments—which formed the core of the affidavit’s inculpatory\\ninformation against Camm—were made intentionally or\\nwith a reckless disregard for the truth.\\n The same is true of Englert. He was also aware that Stites,\\nhis own assistant, was not qualified to give these opinions.\\nAfter all, Englert told Faith that Stites was there just to\\nphotograph the scene. But after that initial phone conversa-\\ntion, Englert too withheld Stites’s lack of qualifications. Once\\nhe became aware that Stites had done much more than take\\nphotographs, he chose not to correct the false information.\\nNot only that, there is a material factual dispute about\\nwhether Englert contributed to the problem by confirming\\nStites’s HVIS conclusion over the phone without ever seeing\\nthe T-shirt blood pattern in person. Englert—who once\\nattempted to justify his unscientific methods by insisting, “I\\njust know it when I see it”—knew that he could not identify\\nHVIS by verbal description alone. Yet Stites testified that he\\ndid just that. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could\\nfind that Englert acted intentionally or with reckless disre-\\ngard for the truth.\\n The record also contains ample evidence that Faith acted\\nunlawfully. Based on his initial conversation with Englert,\\nFaith was aware that Stites was unqualified, yet he apparent-\\nly told no one, including the judge who issued the warrant.\\nInstead, Faith wrote in the affidavit that Stites was a “crime\\nscene re-constructionist,” which he was not. More im-\\nportantly, Faith included in the affidavit Stites’s conclusion\\nregarding the HVIS pattern on Camm’s T-shirt when Englert\\ntold Faith that Stites was just a photographer. Despite that\\nwarning, Faith did nothing to confirm Stites’s opinions\\nbefore including them in the affidavit. The most charitable\\n\\f16 No. 18-1440\\n\\nspin on the evidence from Faith’s perspective is that he\\naccepted Stites’s representation that Englert verified the\\nHVIS finding over the phone without having seen the blood\\npattern. But no reasonable investigator would think that a\\nverbal description of blood would be a sufficient basis to\\nmake a reliable HVIS finding. After all, blood-spatter science\\nis notoriously unreliable even under the most optimal of\\ncircumstances. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE\\nFORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,\\nSTRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A\\nPATH FORWARD 177–79 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/\\npdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (explaining that the “uncer-\\ntainties associated with bloodstain pattern analysis are\\nenormous” and calling the practice “more subjective than\\nscientific”).\\n Finally, we turn to Clemons. Like the other three, there is\\na material factual dispute about whether he too was aware\\nof Stites’s lack of qualifications yet withheld that information\\nfrom the affidavit. Not only that, Clemons admitted that he\\nsigned the probable-cause affidavit without reviewing all of\\nthe evidence supporting it. This admission could support a\\nfinding that he proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth.\\nIn addition, Clemons admits that he knowingly included at\\nleast one false statement in the affidavit: he wrote that he\\nwas relying on certain statements made to him by two\\npathologists, Dr. Tracy Corey Handy and Dr. Dora\\nHunsaker, even though he had not spoken to either nor read\\ntheir reports.\\n In sum, a reasonable jury could find that these four de-\\nfendants either knowingly or recklessly made false state-\\nments or withheld information in procuring the first\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 17\\n\\nwarrant. That leaves the question whether “the false state-\\nments were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination\\nthat probable cause existed.” Whitlock, 596 F.3d at 410 (al-\\nterations omitted). We have no difficulty concluding that the\\nfalse statements and omissions were material. To start, it is\\ninconceivable that a state-court judge would have reached\\nthe same conclusion had he known that Clemons and Faith\\nrelied so heavily on a rookie forensics assistant with no\\nrelevant education, training, or experience. Moreover,\\nwithout the HVIS conclusion, the only fact tying Camm to\\nthe murders was Mrs. Ter Vree’s statement. But she never\\ncharacterized the sounds she heard as possible gunshots; she\\nsaid they sounded like someone banging on a car. Regard-\\nless, her statement standing alone would not be enough to\\nsupport a warrant. That’s especially true given the weakness\\nof the timeline based on her statement. The first affidavit\\ndescribes extensive manipulation of the scene. If Camm had\\nkilled his family around the time Mrs. Ter Vree heard the\\nnoises—that is, between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m., minutes before\\nhe called the police—it would have been nearly impossible\\nto clean up the crime scene as the affidavit describes. Given\\nthe weakness of the remaining information in the warrant,\\nthe false statements and omissions were clearly material.\\n One problem remains. The defendants argue for the first\\ntime on appeal that this claim is barred by the two-year\\nstatute of limitations applicable to § 1983 suits in Indiana.\\nWe held in Manuel that a Fourth Amendment claim for\\nwrongful detention accrues when the detention ends. Camm\\nsued one year after his acquittal and release. But there was\\none time period between 2000 and 2013 in which Camm was\\narguably free of custody: he was released on bail for six\\nweeks in 2005. At oral argument Camm’s counsel told us\\n\\f18 No. 18-1440\\n\\nthat he continued to be under restraints during that time—\\nan ankle bracelet and house arrest—which for our purposes\\narguably would be enough to constitute “custody.” Cf.\\nCochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that\\nindividuals released on bail are “in custody” in the habeas\\ncontext). On closer examination, however, the state-court\\nrecords indicate that the restraints were perhaps less strin-\\ngent than counsel suggested: Camm did wear an electronic-\\nmonitoring device, but he was only confined to his house\\nfrom the hours of 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. Otherwise, he was free to\\nmove about, but only within a two-county area.\\n We have no need to resolve questions about bail condi-\\ntions or decide the legal significance of this brief break in\\nphysical custody. In the district court, the defendants did not\\nmount a limitations defense to the Fourth Amendment claim\\n(or, as everyone characterized it then, the malicious-\\nprosecution claim); they only challenged the timeliness of\\nthe Brady claim and the state-law claims. The limitations\\nargument is therefore waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d\\n957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A] party may not raise an issue for\\nthe first time on appeal.”).\\n So the Fourth Amendment claim may proceed to trial as\\nit relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. The second and\\nthird affidavits, however, are a different matter. By the time\\nGilbert wrote the second affidavit, several forensic experts\\nhad offered opinions confirming the blood-spatter conclu-\\nsion. With this additional information in hand, it was not\\nreckless to include this information in the affidavit. The\\nsecond affidavit also included information that a confiden-\\ntial jailhouse informant had reported that Camm had con-\\nfessed. Finally, Gilbert added information about Camm’s\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 19\\n\\nstatement to Clemons the night of the killing, “This is what\\nthey do to you when you kill your wife and kids.” As we’ve\\nnoted, if Camm actually said this, it’s hard to understand\\nwhy Faith and Clemons did not include it in the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. But there is no evidence that\\nGilbert acted recklessly by including it in the second.\\n The third affidavit contained even more incriminating\\nevidence against Camm. Charles Boney told investigators\\nthat he provided the murder weapon and was present when\\nCamm killed his family. In addition, Gilbert learned that\\nCamm called his wife’s employer early in the morning\\nfollowing the murder to calmly inquire about collecting on\\nher life-insurance policy. And a second jailhouse informant\\nhad come forward claiming that Camm confessed to the\\nkillings. No evidence suggests that Gilbert acted recklessly\\nby including this information in the third affidavit.\\n In sum, the Fourth Amendment claim against four de-\\nfendants—Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons—may proceed\\nto trial as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. 2\\nB. Brady Claim\\n Camm also claims that the defendants suppressed evi-\\ndence in violation of Brady. Three categories of evidence are\\nat issue: the true extent of Stites’s lack of qualifications, the\\nfact that the DNA profile on the “Backbone” sweatshirt was\\nnot tested, and Henderson’s book deal.\\n\\n2 Stites and Englert make a passing reference to qualified immunity, but\\nit has long been clear that “falsifying the factual basis for a judicial\\nprobable-cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v.\\nCity of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware,\\n438 U.S. 154 (1978)).\\n\\f20 No. 18-1440\\n\\n To prevail on a claim for violation of the due-process dis-\\nclosure duty announced in Brady, a plaintiff must establish\\nthree things:\\n (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the\\n accused, either because it is exculpatory or be-\\n cause it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must\\n have been suppressed by the [S]tate, either\\n willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence\\n must have been material, meaning there is a\\n reasonable probability that the result of the\\n proceeding would have been different.\\nBeaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes on-\\n ly if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose evi-\\n dence that it or law enforcement was aware of\\n before it was too late for the defendant to make\\n use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was\\n not otherwise available to the defendant\\n through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\\nBoss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n It’s worth noting that while the parties sometimes refer to\\nthree “Brady claims,” it’s more accurate to say that Camm\\nhas a single Brady claim alleging the suppression of three\\nbaskets of evidence. See Goudy v. Cummings, 922 F.3d 834,\\n838 (7th Cir. 2019). For this reason, we normally evaluate the\\nmateriality of suppressed evidence cumulatively. See id.\\n(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995)).\\n We begin with the evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifica-\\ntions. There’s no need to belabor the details of his woefully\\ninadequate education, training, and experience; Stites was\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 21\\n\\nplainly unqualified to give expert opinions. Yet Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons never disclosed these facts to\\nCamm in time to use the information. To the contrary, Stites\\nlied about his qualifications, Faith led him through his false\\ntestimony, and Englert and Clemons knew about and did\\nnothing to correct the falsehoods. The true facts about Stites\\nwould have had unquestionable impeachment value. And\\nthis evidence was clearly material, even when viewed in\\nisolation. Stites was one of the prosecution’s primary foren-\\nsic experts at trial. Had the jury known that he was utterly\\nunqualified, the prosecution’s case would have been signifi-\\ncantly damaged.\\n None of this is seriously disputed. What the parties do\\nquibble about is whether Camm could have discovered this\\ninformation on his own through reasonable diligence. The\\nrecord shows that McDaniel, Camm’s counsel, did just about\\nall that could be expected of him. After receiving Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, Camm deposed Stites. At that deposition\\nStites lied about his qualifications. He testified that he was a\\ncrime-scene reconstructionist, a title he has since disavowed.\\nHe also claimed that he was not just Englert’s assistant but\\nthat he was his partner. Most importantly, he continued to\\nhold himself out as qualified to make expert conclusions\\nabout blood-spatter evidence. While McDaniel arguably\\ncould have done more to probe specific claims in Stites’s\\ncurriculum vitae, it was not incumbent on him to intuit that\\nStites was being untruthful. Nor is there any reason to think\\nStites would have admitted to lying had he been asked more\\npointed questions. “Because mind-reading is beyond the\\nabilities of even the most diligent attorney,” we are often\\nhesitant to say that “material contained in a witness’s head”\\nis available to a criminal defendant for Brady purposes. Boss,\\n\\f22 No. 18-1440\\n\\n263 F.3d at 741. On this record we cannot say that Camm\\ncould have discovered the true facts about Stites with rea-\\nsonable diligence. A jury must decide whether Stites,\\nEnglert, Faith, and Clemons suppressed this evidence in\\nviolation of Brady.\\n Camm also contends that the defendants suppressed ev-\\nidence related to Boney’s sweatshirt. Recall that after\\nMcDaniel discovered the DNA profile on the “Backbone”\\nsweatshirt, he asked Faith to run it through Indiana’s CODIS\\ndatabase, which only law enforcement can access. Faith\\nagreed but never did so. McDaniel followed up several times\\nuntil Faith finally told him that there were no matches,\\nfalsely implying that the test was in fact run.\\n Camm has not been as clear as he could be about exactly\\nwhat should have been disclosed under Brady. His argument\\nappears to rest on two potential theories: (1) that by never\\nrunning the test, Faith and Clemons suppressed the ultimate\\nfact that the DNA was Boney’s, and (2) that Brady required\\nFaith and Clemons to disclose the fact that they never ran\\nthe test at all.\\n The first theory fails because Faith and Clemons had no\\nobligation to disclose a DNA match they were not yet aware\\nof. As we explained in United States v. Gray, there is no\\nobligation to disclose latent evidence that is discoverable\\nonly through further testing. 648 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n(holding that Brady does not extend to “latent exculpatory\\nevidence,” which is defined as “evidence that requires\\nprocessing or supplementation to be recognized as exculpa-\\ntory”). Until Gilbert discovered much later that the profile\\nbelonged to Boney, the DNA match remained latent. As a\\nresult, it was not “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady.\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 23\\n\\nPerhaps the case would be different if, as Camm has sug-\\ngested, there were reason to think that Faith already knew\\nthe DNA profile would match Boney’s because he recog-\\nnized the nickname “Backbone” on the sweatshirt. But Faith\\ntestified in deposition that he did not learn that nickname—\\nor even meet Boney—until after he left the prosecutor’s\\noffice. Camm has pointed to no evidence rebutting that\\ntestimony.\\n The second theory finds more fertile ground. There is in-\\ndeed substantial evidence that Faith and Clemons failed to\\ndisclose the fact that they never ran the test at all. Nothing\\nrequired them to run the DNA profile through the law-\\nenforcement database. But the fact that they promised to do\\nso and failed to follow through would have been useful to\\nthe defense in its cross-examination of Clemons. At the very\\nleast, it would support an argument that this investigation\\nwas so shoddy that a simple test on a highly important piece\\nof physical evidence—indeed, a test that could in theory\\nidentify a different suspect—was overlooked. More nefari-\\nously, exposing the lie—the false representation that the test\\nwas in fact done and nothing came up—would have eroded\\nthe jury’s trust in both the prosecutor and the lead case\\ninvestigator. More substantively, it would have set up an\\nargument that they were hiding crucial evidence because\\nthey thought it might undermine their case against Camm\\nby identifying an alternative suspect. Arguments like these\\ncan help create reasonable doubt.\\n Faith and Clemons say the failure to run the test was the\\nresult of a simple miscommunication. But that doesn’t\\nexplain the phony cover story to McDaniel. On its own, and\\nespecially when considered in tandem with the undisclosed\\n\\f24 No. 18-1440\\n\\nfacts about Stites, this evidence too crosses the materiality\\nthreshold for Brady purposes.\\n The third component of Camm’s Brady claim focuses on\\nHenderson’s book deal. But “evidence cannot be said to\\nhave been suppressed in violation of Brady if it was already\\nknown to the defendant.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d\\n433, 443 (7th Cir. 2017). Henderson did not sign his book\\ndeal until after the second trial, and Camm learned of it long\\nbefore the third. Whatever else might be said of Henderson’s\\nconduct, he cannot be held liable for violating Brady.\\n Our conclusion that the Brady claim may proceed in part\\nrequires us to address the defendants’ argument that the\\nclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Unlike the\\nFourth Amendment limitations issue, the defendants pre-\\nserved an untimeliness defense below in opposition to the\\nBrady claim. Nonetheless, it’s a nonstarter under circuit\\nprecedent. In Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.\\n2008), we held that a similar Brady claim accrued when the\\ndefendant was finally acquitted. We relied heavily on the\\nSupreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477\\n(1994), which bars a criminal defendant from seeking dam-\\nages for an allegedly unlawful conviction unless and until\\nthe criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. See\\nJohnson, 515 F.3d at 782 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87).\\n The Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion\\nin a closely related context. In McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.\\n2149 (2019), a special prosecutor was accused of fabricating\\nevidence and using it against a criminal defendant at two\\ntrials. The first ended in a mistrial; the second ended with an\\nacquittal. The Court held that the limitations period for a\\nclaim of that nature does not begin to run until the criminal\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 25\\n\\nproceedings against the defendant have terminated in his\\nfavor with a final acquittal. Id. at 2161. To be clear, no Brady\\nclaims were at issue, and the Court emphasized that it was\\nnot expressing any opinion about the accrual of anything but\\nthe claim before it. Id. at 2155 n.2. But much of the Court’s\\nreasoning lends support to what we held in Johnson. Most\\nimportantly, the Court emphasized Heck’s “pragmatic\\nconcerns with avoiding parallel criminal and civil litigation\\nover the same subject matter and the related possibility of\\nconflicting civil and criminal judgments.” Id. at 2157. In the\\nsame vein, the Court stressed that “[t]here is not a complete\\nand present cause of action to bring a fabricated-evidence\\nchallenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal\\nproceedings are ongoing.” Id. at 2158 (quotation marks\\nomitted). Both considerations have just as much force in the\\nBrady context.\\n We therefore reiterate once more that the statute of limi-\\ntations for a Brady claim does not accrue until the criminal\\nproceedings terminate in the defendant’s favor. Here, as in\\nJohnson, the proceedings did not terminate until Camm was\\nfinally acquitted. He filed his complaint just one year after\\nthat, so his Brady claim is timely. See Behavioral Inst. of Ind.,\\nLLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th\\nCir. 2005) (explaining that the statute of limitations for\\n§ 1983 claims arising in Indiana is two years).\\n To recap, Camm has enough evidence to proceed to trial\\non his Brady claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and Clemons\\nfor suppression of Stites’s lack of qualifications, and against\\nFaith and Clemons for suppression of the fact that they\\n\\f26 No. 18-1440\\n\\nnever ran the DNA profile from the “Backbone” sweatshirt\\nthrough the CODIS system and lied about it to McDaniel. 3\\nC. Evidence Fabrication\\n Camm’s remaining claim is that the defendants fabricat-\\ned Boney’s confession by using coercive interrogation tech-\\nniques to obtain it. Rather than situate this claim within the\\nrubric of Brady, Camm argues that the use of this evidence at\\ntrial violated his right to due process in a broader sense.\\n But we have consistently drawn a distinction between\\ncoerced and fabricated testimony: “Coerced testimony is\\ntestimony that a witness is forced by improper means to\\ngive; the testimony may be true or false. Fabricated testimo-\\nny is testimony that is made up; it is invariably false.” Fields\\nv. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014). The distinction\\nis crucial because “a claim that an officer coerced a witness\\n\\n3 Stites and Englert again raise a cursory argument about qualified\\nimmunity. But by 2000 it had been clear for decades that the govern-\\nment’s Brady obligations include a duty to disclose impeachment\\nevidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Likewise, it\\nhas long been clearly established that Brady obligations extend not just to\\nprosecutors but also to investigators. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d\\n500, 509 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he idea that police officers must turn over\\nmaterially exculpatory evidence has been on the books since 1963.”).\\n One final immunity issue remains. In a single sentence, Stites and\\nEnglert mention the possibility that as witnesses they enjoy absolute\\nimmunity and cannot be held liable on this claim. That’s not enough to\\ndevelop an immunity claim. In any event, although prosecutors and\\nwitnesses have absolute immunity from tort liability for conduct under-\\ntaken as prosecutors and witnesses, the defendants here have been sued for\\nwrongdoing committed in the course of the investigation that led to the\\nBrady violation. See Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1111–14 (7th Cir.\\n2014).\\n\\fNo. 18-1440 27\\n\\nto give incriminating evidence does not, at least standing\\nalone, violate the wrongly convicted person’s due-process\\nrights.” Avery, 847 F.3d at 439. Camm does not contend that\\nthe investigators fed Boney a story they knew was false. He\\nargues instead that the investigators used suggestive inter-\\nrogation methods to elicit a story they should have known\\nwas unreliable. Without more, however, the claim for evi-\\ndence fabrication cannot succeed.\\n * * *\\n In sum, we reverse and remand for trial on Camm’s\\nFourth Amendment claim against Stites, Englert, Faith, and\\nClemons to the extent that the claim rests on the first\\nprobable-cause affidavit. Trial is also warranted on the Brady\\nclaim against the same four defendants for suppression of\\nStites’s lack of qualifications and against Faith and Clemons\\nfor suppression of the facts surrounding their handling of\\nthe DNA profile on Boney’s sweatshirt. In all other respects,\\nwe affirm the judgment.\\n AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4369,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660196,"string":"4,660,196"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3291"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3291\\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\\n Debtor,\\n\\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\\n\\f2 No. 18-3291\\n\\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\\n I\\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\\n\\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\\nof collateral in the security agreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 3\\n\\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\\npleadings.\\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\\ntion.\\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\\n\\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3291\\n\\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\\n II\\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\\n\\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\\n\\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\\n\\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 5\\n\\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\\npretation to the statutes in this case.\\n A\\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\\n\\f6 No. 18-3291\\n\\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\\nstatement (emphasis added).\\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\\nnable” (emphasis added).\\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\\n“indicates” the collateral.\\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 7\\n\\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\\n fairs.\\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\\n\\n\\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3291\\n\\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\\n\\n\\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 9\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\\n(citation omitted).\\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\\nagreement).\\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\\n\\f10 No. 18-3291\\n\\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\\n tention of the parties and is the document which\\n creates the security interest. … The financing\\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\\n security agreement because in accordance with\\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\\n security interest in the collateral and that further\\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\\n of affairs.\\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\\n While financing statements and security agreements both\\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\\nterest.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 11\\n\\n B\\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\\n\\f12 No. 18-3291\\n\\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 13\\n\\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\\n(quotations omitted).\\n III\\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\\nbankruptcy court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437449/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660196/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3291\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\n Debtor,\n\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\n\f2 No. 18-3291\n\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\n I\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\n\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\nof collateral in the security agreement).\n\fNo. 18-3291 3\n\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\npleadings.\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\ntion.\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\n\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\n\f4 No. 18-3291\n\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\n II\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\n\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\n\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\n\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\n\fNo. 18-3291 5\n\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\npretation to the statutes in this case.\n A\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\n\f6 No. 18-3291\n\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\nstatement (emphasis added).\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\nnable” (emphasis added).\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\n“indicates” the collateral.\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\n\fNo. 18-3291 7\n\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\n fairs.\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\n\n\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\n\f8 No. 18-3291\n\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\n\n\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\n\fNo. 18-3291 9\n\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\n(citation omitted).\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\nagreement).\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\n\f10 No. 18-3291\n\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\n tention of the parties and is the document which\n creates the security interest. … The financing\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\n security agreement because in accordance with\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\n security interest in the collateral and that further\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\n of affairs.\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\n While financing statements and security agreements both\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\nterest.\n\fNo. 18-3291 11\n\n B\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\n\f12 No. 18-3291\n\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\n\fNo. 18-3291 13\n\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\n(quotations omitted).\n III\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\nbankruptcy court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3291\\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\\n Debtor,\\n\\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\\n\\f2 No. 18-3291\\n\\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\\n I\\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\\n\\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\\nof collateral in the security agreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 3\\n\\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\\npleadings.\\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\\ntion.\\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\\n\\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3291\\n\\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\\n II\\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\\n\\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\\n\\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\\n\\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 5\\n\\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\\npretation to the statutes in this case.\\n A\\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\\n\\f6 No. 18-3291\\n\\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\\nstatement (emphasis added).\\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\\nnable” (emphasis added).\\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\\n“indicates” the collateral.\\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 7\\n\\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\\n fairs.\\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\\n\\n\\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3291\\n\\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\\n\\n\\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 9\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\\n(citation omitted).\\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\\nagreement).\\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\\n\\f10 No. 18-3291\\n\\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\\n tention of the parties and is the document which\\n creates the security interest. … The financing\\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\\n security agreement because in accordance with\\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\\n security interest in the collateral and that further\\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\\n of affairs.\\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\\n While financing statements and security agreements both\\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\\nterest.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 11\\n\\n B\\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\\n\\f12 No. 18-3291\\n\\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 13\\n\\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\\n(quotations omitted).\\n III\\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\\nbankruptcy court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4370,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660253,"string":"4,660,253"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3291"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3291\\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\\n Debtor,\\n\\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\\n\\f2 No. 18-3291\\n\\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\\n I\\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\\n\\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\\nof collateral in the security agreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 3\\n\\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\\npleadings.\\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\\ntion.\\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\\n\\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3291\\n\\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\\n II\\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\\n\\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\\n\\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\\n\\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 5\\n\\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\\npretation to the statutes in this case.\\n A\\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\\n\\f6 No. 18-3291\\n\\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\\nstatement (emphasis added).\\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\\nnable” (emphasis added).\\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\\n“indicates” the collateral.\\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 7\\n\\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\\n fairs.\\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\\n\\n\\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3291\\n\\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\\n\\n\\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 9\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\\n(citation omitted).\\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\\nagreement).\\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\\n\\f10 No. 18-3291\\n\\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\\n tention of the parties and is the document which\\n creates the security interest. … The financing\\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\\n security agreement because in accordance with\\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\\n security interest in the collateral and that further\\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\\n of affairs.\\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\\n While financing statements and security agreements both\\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\\nterest.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 11\\n\\n B\\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\\n\\f12 No. 18-3291\\n\\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 13\\n\\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\\n(quotations omitted).\\n III\\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\\nbankruptcy court.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437506/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660253/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3291\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\n Debtor,\n\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\n\f2 No. 18-3291\n\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\n I\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\n\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\nof collateral in the security agreement).\n\fNo. 18-3291 3\n\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\npleadings.\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\ntion.\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\n\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\n\f4 No. 18-3291\n\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\n II\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\n\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\n\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\n\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\n\fNo. 18-3291 5\n\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\npretation to the statutes in this case.\n A\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\n\f6 No. 18-3291\n\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\nstatement (emphasis added).\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\nnable” (emphasis added).\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\n“indicates” the collateral.\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\n\fNo. 18-3291 7\n\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\n fairs.\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\n\n\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\n\f8 No. 18-3291\n\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\n\n\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\n\fNo. 18-3291 9\n\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\n(citation omitted).\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\nagreement).\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\n\f10 No. 18-3291\n\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\n tention of the parties and is the document which\n creates the security interest. … The financing\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\n security agreement because in accordance with\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\n security interest in the collateral and that further\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\n of affairs.\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\n While financing statements and security agreements both\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\nterest.\n\fNo. 18-3291 11\n\n B\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\n\f12 No. 18-3291\n\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\n\fNo. 18-3291 13\n\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\n(quotations omitted).\n III\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\nbankruptcy court.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3291\\nIN RE: I80 EQUIPMENT, LLC,\\n Debtor,\\n\\nFIRST MIDWEST BANK,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJEANA K. REINBOLD, not individually but solely in her capacity\\nas Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of I80 Equipment, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\nNos. 18-08003 & 17-81749 — Thomas L. Perkins, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This interlocutory bankruptcy ap-\\npeal presents a matter of first impression for our court:\\nwhether Illinois’s version of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-\\nmercial Code requires a financing statement to contain within\\n\\f2 No. 18-3291\\n\\nits four corners a specific description of secured collateral, or\\nif incorporating a description by reference to an unattached\\nsecurity agreement sufficiently “indicates” the collateral. The\\nbankruptcy court ruled that a financing statement fails to\\nperfect a security interest unless it “contains” a separate and\\nadditional description of the collateral. Given the plain and\\nordinary meaning of the Illinois statute, and how courts typi-\\ncally treat financing statements, we disagree and reverse.\\n I\\n The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are straightfor-\\nward. The debtor, I80 Equipment, LLC, is a business in Illinois\\nthat purchased and refurbished trucks for resale. I80 Equip-\\nment obtained a commercial loan from First Midwest Bank.\\nTo ensure repayment, the parties executed an agreement on\\nMarch 9, 2015, which granted First Midwest a security interest\\nin substantially all of I80 Equipment’s assets. These were de-\\nscribed in twenty-six listed categories of collateral, such as ac-\\ncounts, cash, equipment, instruments, goods, inventory, and\\nall proceeds of any assets.1 To perfect its interest in I80 Equip-\\nment’s assets, First Midwest timely filed a financing statement\\nwith the Illinois Secretary of State. The financing statement\\npurported to cover “[a]ll Collateral described in First\\nAmended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9,\\n2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”\\n Two years later, I80 Equipment defaulted on the loan and\\nfiled a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The\\ncourt appointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy assets.\\n\\n 1 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Exh. B at 2–4, In re I80\\nEquipment, No. 17-81749 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018), ECF No. 1 (full description\\nof collateral in the security agreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 3\\n\\nFirst Midwest sued the trustee, seeking to recover $7.6 million\\non the loan. It also filed a declaration that its security interest\\nin I80 Equipment’s assets was properly perfected and senior\\nto the interests of all other claimants, including the trustee.\\nThe trustee countered that First Midwest’s security interest\\nwas not properly perfected because its financing statement\\ndid not independently describe the underlying collateral, but\\ninstead incorporated the list of assets by reference to the par-\\nties’ security agreement. The trustee also asserted a counter-\\nclaim to avoid First Midwest’s lien pursuant to § 544(a) of the\\nBankruptcy Code.2 Both parties moved for judgment on the\\npleadings.\\n The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and ruled\\nthat ”[a] financing statement that fails to contain any descrip-\\ntion of collateral fails to give the particularized kind of notice”\\nrequired by Article 9 of the UCC. With First Midwest’s con-\\nsent, the trustee sold the estate’s assets for approximately $1.9\\nmillion and holds the net proceeds pending resolution of this\\ndispute. The parties jointly certified under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 158(d)(2)(A) that an immediate appeal of the bankruptcy\\ncourt’s decision to this court would materially advance the\\nprogress of the case, and this court granted the parties’ peti-\\ntion.\\n On appeal, neither the validity of the loan nor the legiti-\\nmacy of First Midwest’s security interest is in question. The\\n\\n 2 Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code empowers a trustee to avoid\\ninterests in the debtor’s property that are unperfected as of the petition\\ndate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); see also 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON\\nBANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 63:2 (3d ed. 2019). This is commonly re-\\nferred to as the trustee’s “strong-arm power,” which a debtor in posses-\\nsion can exercise under § 1107(a). See NORTON, supra, at § 63:4.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3291\\n\\ntrustee maintains only that First Midwest’s lien is avoidable\\nbecause the financing statement failed to properly indicate the\\nsecured collateral, and First Midwest disagrees.\\n II\\n We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d 267, 269 (7th Cir. 2016); United States\\nv. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). When answering a\\nnovel question of state law, we look to “relevant state prece-\\ndents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly\\nworks, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to\\nshow how the highest court in the state would decide the is-\\nsue at hand.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635\\n(7th Cir. 2007). Here, we apply the UCC as interpreted by\\nIllinois courts and governed by Illinois law. See In re Blanchard,\\n819 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Helms v. Certified\\nPackaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2008).\\n In Illinois courts, statutory construction starts with the\\nstatutory language itself. People v. Grant, 52 N.E.3d 308, 313\\n(Ill. 2016). If that language—given its plain and ordinary\\nmeaning3—is clear and unambiguous,4 “the court must give\\nit effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.”\\nIn re Robinson, 811 F.3d at 269; see also Home Star Bank & Fin.\\n\\n 3 We assume a word carries its everyday meaning, “unless the context\\n\\ncounsels otherwise.” See Webber, 536 F.3d at 593; see also ANTONIN SCALIA\\n& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS\\n69–70 (2012). Sometimes a word may require a more technical or rare un-\\nderstanding, but more frequently a term takes on its natural and obvious\\nuse. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 70.\\n 4 When interpreting the text of a statute, we start with the premise that\\n\\nlaws generally are clear and unambiguous. See generally SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra note 3, at 29–40.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 5\\n\\nServs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., 6 N.E.3d 128, 135 (Ill.\\n2014) (when construing a statute, “[i]t is improper for a court\\nto depart from the plain statutory language by reading into\\nthe statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict”\\nwith the expressed text); LaSalle Bank Nat’l v. Cypress Creek 1,\\nLP, 950 N.E.2d 1109, 1113 (Ill. 2011) (when plain language is\\n“clear and unambiguous, we will apply it as written”); Webber,\\n536 F.3d at 593 (“When the plain wording of the statute is\\nclear, that is the end of the matter.”).\\n We can give statutes their plain and ordinary meaning by\\napplying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, Landis v.\\nMarc Realty, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ill. 2009), and by read-\\ning the statutes in their entirety. Home Star Bank, 6 N.E.3d at\\n135 (statutory “[w]ords and phrases should not be viewed in\\nisolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant\\nprovisions of the statute”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has\\nexplained: “A court must view the statute as a whole, constru-\\ning words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory pro-\\nvisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence\\nof a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible,\\nand should not be rendered superfluous.” People v. Perez, 18\\nN.E.3d 41, 44 (Ill. 2014) (citation omitted); see also In re\\nMelching, 589 B.R. 846, 848–52 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018) (court\\nconsidered “the entire statutory scheme” when interpreting\\nIllinois exemption statute). We apply these principles of inter-\\npretation to the statutes in this case.\\n A\\n At issue here is the text of Article 9 of the UCC, 810 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 5/9-101, et seq. (2001). In relevant part, § 9-502 re-\\nquires that a financing statement: (1) provide the name of the\\n\\f6 No. 18-3291\\n\\ndebtor; (2) provide the name of the secured party or its repre-\\nsentative; and (3) indicate the collateral covered by the financing\\nstatement (emphasis added).\\n According to § 9-504, “[a] financing statement sufficiently\\nindicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement\\nprovides: (1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section\\n9-108; or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers\\nall assets or all personal property.” Section 9-108 further ex-\\nplains that a description of the secured property does not\\nneed to be specific but must “reasonably identif[y]” what is\\ndescribed. Section 9-108 gives six distinct methods by which\\na description of collateral reasonably identifies the secured\\nproperty: (1) specific listing; (2) category; (3) type; (4) quan-\\ntity; (5) mathematical computation or allocation; or (6) “any\\nother method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determi-\\nnable” (emphasis added).\\n A financing statement that substantially satisfies these\\nrequirements is effective, even if it has minor errors or omis-\\nsions that are not “seriously misleading.” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.\\n5/9-506(a). But if a financing statement fails these basic\\nrequirements, the lender’s interests are subject to avoidance\\nunder § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We must decide whether the statutory language of Article\\n9 requires that the four corners of the financing statement in-\\nclude a specific description of the secured collateral (either by\\ntype, category, quantity, etc.), or if incorporating such a\\ndescription by reference to a security agreement sufficiently\\n“indicates” the collateral.\\n The text of § 9-108 provides six ways to indicate collateral\\nin a financing statement—including by “any other method”—\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 7\\n\\nso long as the identity of the collateral is “objectively determi-\\nnable.” This expands the pre-2001 Article 9 requirements un-\\nder which a financing statement must: (1) give the name of the\\ndebtor or the secured party; (2) be signed by the debtor; (3)\\ninclude the secured party’s address; and (4) contain a statement\\nindicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. See 810\\nILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-402(1) (2001) (emphasis added).\\n In 2001, the Illinois version of the UCC was revised to no\\nlonger require that the financing statement “contain” a de-\\nscription of the collateral; after revision the statement must\\nonly “indicate” collateral. Under the revisions, “[a]n indica-\\ntion may satisfy the requirements of Section 9-502(a), even if\\nit would not have satisfied the requirements of former Section\\n9-402(1).” 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-504 cmt. 2. This pared-\\ndown approach reflects the notice function of Article 9:\\n This section adopts the system of “notice filing.”\\n What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-\\n UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales\\n acts, the security agreement itself, but only a\\n simple record providing a limited amount of in-\\n formation (financing statement). … The notice\\n itself indicates merely that a person may have a\\n security interest in the collateral indicated. Fur-\\n ther inquiry from the parties concerned will be\\n necessary to disclose the complete state of af-\\n fairs.\\n810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-502 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).5\\nWith this context, the ordinary meaning of “indicate” is to\\n\\n\\n 5 This comment sheds light on the scope of the statute: to provide no-\\ntice to third parties of any security interest that exists, or may exist in the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3291\\n\\nserve as a “signal” that “point[s] out” or “direct[s] attention\\nto” an underlying security interest.6 That plain reading of the\\ntext allows a party to “indicate” collateral in a financing state-\\nment by pointing or directing attention to a description of that\\ncollateral in the parties’ security agreement.\\n This interpretation reflects how we and other courts have\\nunderstood the UCC’s notice function. For example, we have\\nrecognized that Article 9 ensures “adequate public notice” of\\nliens and security interests, In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d 981, 988\\n\\n\\nfuture, in the described collateral. The statute does not state whether a se-\\ncurity agreement should be attached to a filed financing statement, but it\\ndoes note that the security agreement itself need not be filed, and that the\\nfinancing statement is only a simple record of the security agreement with\\na limited amount of information. Under § 9-210(a)(3), the debtor may pro-\\nvide its lender with a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral\\nsecuring the lender’s interest and request that the lender approve or cor-\\nrect it within 14 days. The lender is neither required nor precluded from\\nsending the underlying security agreement, as the purpose of the request\\nis merely to provide “information” to the debtor about his secured obliga-\\ntions. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. 5/9-210 cmt. 2.\\n 6 Webster’s defines indicate as: (1) “to direct attention to; point to or\\npoint out; show”; (2) “to be or give a sign, token, or indication of; signify;\\nbetoken”; (3) “to show the need for; call for; make necessary”; (4) “to point\\nto as the required treatment”; (5) “to express briefly or generally.” Indicate,\\nWEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001). American\\nHeritage Dictionary defines the term as: (1) “[t]o show the way to or the\\ndirection of; point out”; (2) “[t]o serve as a sign, symptom, or token of;\\nsignify”; (3) “[t]o suggest or demonstrate the necessity, expedience, or ad-\\nvisability of”; (4) “[t]o state or express briefly.” Indicate, THE AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000). And Merriam-Webster’s defines in-\\ndicate as: (a) “to point out or point to”; (b) “to be a sign, symptom, or index\\nof”; (c) “to demonstrate or suggest the necessity or advisability of”; (d) “to\\nstate or express briefly.” Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE\\nDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 9\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2016), and that “the goal of the filing system is to\\nmake known to the public whatever outstanding security in-\\nterests exist in the property of debtors.” Id. at 986 (citing In re\\nHoeppner, 49 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985)); see also Helms v.\\nCertified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The\\npurpose of the financing statement is to put third parties on\\nnotice that the secured party who filed it may have a perfected\\nsecurity interest in the collateral described, and that further\\ninquiry into the extent of the security interest is prudent.”)\\n(citations and quotations omitted); In re Grabowski, 277 B.R.\\n388, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002) (holding the same). This is so\\nArticle 9 does not “create a windfall for a bankruptcy estate\\nor a minefield for lenders.” In re Blanchard, 819 F.3d at 988–89\\n(citation omitted).\\n The financing statement itself is an “abbreviation of the se-\\ncurity agreement.” Helms, 551 F.3d at 679. “It is a streamlined\\npaper to be filed for the purpose of giving notice to third par-\\nties of the essential contents of the security agreement.” Id. (ci-\\ntation omitted); see also Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 391 (financing\\nstatement not required to share same level of detail as security\\nagreement).\\n The security agreement defines and limits the collateral,\\nwhile the financing statement puts third parties on notice that\\na creditor may have an existing security interest in the prop-\\nerty and further inquiry may be necessary. In re Grabowski, 277\\nB.R. at 391. In recognizing this distinction between financing\\nstatements and security agreements, this court has said:\\n The purpose of the financing statement is to\\n place would-be subsequent creditors on notice\\n that a creditor has a security interest in the\\n debtor’s property; it is the security agreement …\\n\\f10 No. 18-3291\\n\\n that defines that interest and by defining limits\\n it. … The security agreement embodies the in-\\n tention of the parties and is the document which\\n creates the security interest. … The financing\\n statement on the other hand need not particu-\\n larize in detail the collateral secured under the\\n security agreement because in accordance with\\n the “notice filing” concept adopted under the\\n [UCC] a financing statement serves to give no-\\n tice that the secured party who filed may have a\\n security interest in the collateral and that further\\n inquiry with respect to the security agreement\\n will be necessary to disclose the complete state\\n of affairs.\\nHelms, 551 F.3d at 680 (citations and quotations omitted).\\n“Hence less detail is required in the financing statement.” Id.\\n While financing statements and security agreements both\\nmust describe the collateral, “the degree of specificity\\nrequired of such description depends on the nature of the doc-\\nument involved—whether it is a security agreement or a fi-\\nnancing statement … .” In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 390–91. The\\n“prudent potential creditor would [] request[] a copy of the\\nsecurity agreement,” Helms, 551 F.3d at 680, and “need look\\nno further than the security agreement” to resolve questions\\nabout the adequacy of the collateral description. Id. at 681. The\\ndifferent treatment of these two documents highlights the dis-\\ntinct function each serves under Article 9: the financing state-\\nment provides notice of an underlying security interest, while\\nthe security agreement creates and specifically defines that in-\\nterest.\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 11\\n\\n B\\n Bankruptcy courts for all three districts in Illinois have rec-\\nognized this distinction and have noted that incorporation by\\nreference is an available method for describing collateral. The\\nSouthern District of Illinois bankruptcy court has held that a\\nfinancing statement was sufficient to perfect a bank lender’s\\ninterest “[d]espite the generality of the Bank’s description” of\\ncollateral. In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392. In Grabowski, Bank\\nof America filed a financing statement indicating it had a lien\\non the debtor’s property consisting of “all inventory, chattel\\npaper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles.” Id. at\\n391-92. The court rejected the subsequent creditor’s argument\\nthat the description was “too general,” finding it still “ful-\\nfill[ed] the notice function of a financing statement under the\\nUCC,” even though the financing statement misstated the\\ndebtor’s property address and did not otherwise specifically\\nidentify the security interest. Id. at 392. The court noted that\\n“only a super-generic” description—such as “all the debtor’s\\nassets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” without any\\nlimiting factor—is insufficient under the reasonable identifi-\\ncation standard of § 9-108. Id. at 391. The court found “[t]his\\nexceedingly general standard for describing collateral in a fi-\\nnancing statement” reflects the traditional notice function a\\nfinancing statement was designed to serve. Id.\\n The Central District of Illinois bankruptcy court in In re\\nDuesterhaus Fertilizer ruled that a financing statement with a\\ncollateral description incorporated by reference to the previ-\\nous financing statement was insufficient under Article 9 be-\\ncause the previous statement had lapsed. 347 B.R. 646 (Bankr.\\nC.D. Ill. 2006). The new financing statement included “no in-\\ndication of collateral whatsoever,” and even the reference to\\n\\f12 No. 18-3291\\n\\nthe previous, lapsed statement did not specify that a descrip-\\ntion of the collateral subject to the security interest could be\\nfound there. Id. at 650. Even so, the court embraced incorpo-\\nration by reference as an available method for indicating col-\\nlateral, at least in new or “continuing” financing statements:\\n“Absent an express state law requirement that the continua-\\ntion statement contain a description of collateral, reference to\\nanother document in the same public record would appear to\\nmeet the notice requirements.” Id. at 651.\\n Two years before In re Duesterhaus, the bankruptcy court\\nfor the Northern District of Illinois suggested incorporation\\nby reference may satisfy the UCC’s collateral description re-\\nquirements for financing statements. In re Macronet Group,\\nLtd., 2004 WL 2958447 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). Ultimately the\\ncourt held that the lender’s security interest failed to attach to\\nthe debtor’s collateral. Id. at *5. But that decision was based on\\nthe absence of an authenticated underlying security\\nagreement from which the identity of the collateral could be\\nobjectively determined, not the lender’s choice to indicate the\\ncollateral by reference to the agreement. Id. (“[I]t may be true\\nthat incorporating a collateral description in a separate docu-\\nment, such as a form financing statement, by reference into a\\nsecurity agreement could qualify as ‘any other method’ of\\nidentification pursuant to UCC section 9-108 … .”).\\n The approach of these courts to financing statements sup-\\nports the conclusion that incorporation by reference is per-\\nmissible in Illinois as “any other method” under § 9-108, so\\nlong as the identity of the collateral is objectively determina-\\nble. That requirement is met here by the security agreement’s\\ndetailed list of the collateral. The financing statement covers:\\n\\fNo. 18-3291 13\\n\\n“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Se-\\ncurity Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and\\nSecured Party.” There is no dispute that the financing state-\\nment names (as terms defined earlier in the document) both\\nthe debtor (I80 Equipment) and the secured party (First\\nMidwest). The statement has not lapsed and includes the date\\nand precise title of the underlying document. It describes the\\nsecurity interest by referencing “[a]ll [c]ollateral” as described\\nin the underlying security agreement between the parties. For\\nits part, the security agreement references twenty-six inde-\\npendent categories of collateral covered by the agreement, in-\\ncluding accounts, cash, equipment, goods, financial assets,\\ndeposits, investments, instruments, inventory, and all\\nproceeds of any assets. Although a subsequent creditor is not\\nexpected to be a “super-detective” while investigating prior\\nsecured transactions, In re Grabowski, 277 B.R. at 392, the\\nfinancing statement in this case “notif[ied] subsequent\\ncreditors that a lien may exist and that further inquiry [was]\\nnecessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.” Id. at 391\\n(quotations omitted).\\n III\\n The plain and ordinary meaning of Illinois’s revised\\nversion of the UCC allows a financing statement to indicate\\ncollateral by reference to the description in the underlying se-\\ncurity agreement. This interpretation is reinforced by how\\nIllinois bankruptcy courts construe these statutes. For these\\nreasons, we hold that the trustee is not entitled to avoid First\\nMidwest’s lien under the Bankruptcy Code.\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the\\nbankruptcy court.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4371,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660478,"string":"4,660,478"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1141"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437731/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660478/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\n\f2 No. 18-1141\n\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\nof the case.\n I.\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\n\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\n\fNo. 18-1141 3\n\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\nese court.\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\n\n\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\n\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\n\f4 No. 18-1141\n\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\nowed Trek.\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\n II.\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\n\fNo. 18-1141 5\n\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\nProcess Clause.\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\n\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\nto arise occurred.”\n\f6 No. 18-1141\n\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\n\fNo. 18-1141 7\n\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\nlationship with Wisconsin.\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\n\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\n\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\n\f8 No. 18-1141\n\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\ngeted Wisconsin.\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\n\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\n\fNo. 18-1141 9\n\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\n\f10 No. 18-1141\n\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\nwithin Wisconsin.\n\n\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\npromulgate.”).\n\fNo. 18-1141 11\n\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\n This argument seems to make the point that the\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\n cognizable contact with the State.\n\f12 No. 18-1141\n\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\nin the covered territory. It did not.\n\fNo. 18-1141 13\n\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\nof payment.\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\n\f14 No. 18-1141\n\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\n\fNo. 18-1141 15\n\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\nId. at 1290.\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\nand lose the war.\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\n\f16 No. 18-1141\n\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\n\n\n\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\n\fNo. 18-1141 17\n\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\nanywhere in the world.\n\n\n\n\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\n\f18 No. 18-1141\n\n ***\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4372,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660525,"string":"4,660,525"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Cathy Truitt"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2324"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2324\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\\n\\f2 No. 18-2324\\n\\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\\nEvidence.\\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 3\\n\\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\\nnotice.\\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\\n\\f4 No. 18-2324\\n\\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\\nBox as the account holder’s address.\\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\\naccount held only about $200.\\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 5\\n\\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\\nit.\\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\\nmate way to access it.\\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\\nphysical coercion.\\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\\n\\f6 No. 18-2324\\n\\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\\nwouldn’t.\\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\\nconfusion.\\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\\non all counts. This appeal followed.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 7\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\\nthe matter.” Id.\\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2324\\n\\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\\nmony on that subject.\\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\\nproposed testimony.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 9\\n\\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\\nchecklist or test.”).\\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\\nher into filing false claims.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2324\\n\\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\\ndown version of his methodology.\\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\\nthe field would have done so. 1\\n\\n\\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 11\\n\\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\\nappropriate.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437778/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660525/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Cathy Truitt\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2324\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\n\f2 No. 18-2324\n\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\nEvidence.\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\n\fNo. 18-2324 3\n\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\nnotice.\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\n\f4 No. 18-2324\n\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\nBox as the account holder’s address.\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\naccount held only about $200.\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\n\fNo. 18-2324 5\n\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\nit.\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\nmate way to access it.\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\nphysical coercion.\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\n\f6 No. 18-2324\n\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\nwouldn’t.\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\nconfusion.\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\non all counts. This appeal followed.\n\fNo. 18-2324 7\n\n II. Discussion\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\nthe matter.” Id.\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\n\f8 No. 18-2324\n\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\nmony on that subject.\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\nproposed testimony.\n\fNo. 18-2324 9\n\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\nchecklist or test.”).\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\nher into filing false claims.\n\f10 No. 18-2324\n\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\ndown version of his methodology.\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\nthe field would have done so. 1\n\n\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\n\fNo. 18-2324 11\n\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\ntestimony.\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\nappropriate.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Cathy Truitt\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2324\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\\n\\f2 No. 18-2324\\n\\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\\nEvidence.\\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 3\\n\\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\\nnotice.\\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\\n\\f4 No. 18-2324\\n\\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\\nBox as the account holder’s address.\\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\\naccount held only about $200.\\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 5\\n\\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\\nit.\\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\\nmate way to access it.\\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\\nphysical coercion.\\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\\n\\f6 No. 18-2324\\n\\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\\nwouldn’t.\\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\\nconfusion.\\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\\non all counts. This appeal followed.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 7\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\\nthe matter.” Id.\\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2324\\n\\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\\nmony on that subject.\\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\\nproposed testimony.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 9\\n\\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\\nchecklist or test.”).\\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\\nher into filing false claims.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2324\\n\\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\\ndown version of his methodology.\\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\\nthe field would have done so. 1\\n\\n\\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 11\\n\\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\\nappropriate.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4373,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660526,"string":"4,660,526"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1141"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437779/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660526/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\n\f2 No. 18-1141\n\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\nof the case.\n I.\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\n\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\n\fNo. 18-1141 3\n\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\nese court.\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\n\n\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\n\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\n\f4 No. 18-1141\n\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\nowed Trek.\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\n II.\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\n\fNo. 18-1141 5\n\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\nProcess Clause.\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\n\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\nto arise occurred.”\n\f6 No. 18-1141\n\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\n\fNo. 18-1141 7\n\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\nlationship with Wisconsin.\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\n\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\n\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\n\f8 No. 18-1141\n\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\ngeted Wisconsin.\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\n\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\n\fNo. 18-1141 9\n\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\n\f10 No. 18-1141\n\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\nwithin Wisconsin.\n\n\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\npromulgate.”).\n\fNo. 18-1141 11\n\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\n This argument seems to make the point that the\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\n cognizable contact with the State.\n\f12 No. 18-1141\n\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\nin the covered territory. It did not.\n\fNo. 18-1141 13\n\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\nof payment.\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\n\f14 No. 18-1141\n\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\n\fNo. 18-1141 15\n\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\nId. at 1290.\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\nand lose the war.\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\n\f16 No. 18-1141\n\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\n\n\n\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\n\fNo. 18-1141 17\n\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\nanywhere in the world.\n\n\n\n\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\n\f18 No. 18-1141\n\n ***\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4374,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660593,"string":"4,660,593"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Dino Greco"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3496"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3496\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDINO GRECO,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3496\\n\\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\\n I. Background\\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 3\\n\\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\\nted the report at the appropriate time.\\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\\nsupervised release would have expired.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3496\\n\\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\\n24 months of supervised release.\\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\\n(including an organization or members of the community),\\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 5\\n\\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\\n release and to impose additional prison time.\\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\\ncircumstances:\\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\\n tion of such a violation.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\\n\\f6 No. 18-3496\\n\\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\\nthe report in the first place.\\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 7\\n\\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3496\\n\\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 9\\n\\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\\n conditions at issue.\\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\\n\\f10 No. 18-3496\\n\\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\\non other grounds.\\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\\ncondition.\\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\\nthat was an error.\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 11\\n\\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\\ngirlfriend.\\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\\nhis reasons for doing so.\\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437846/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660593/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Dino Greco\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3496\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDINO GRECO,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\n\f2 No. 18-3496\n\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\nestablish probable cause.\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\n I. Background\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\n\fNo. 18-3496 3\n\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\nted the report at the appropriate time.\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\nsupervised release would have expired.\n\f4 No. 18-3496\n\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\n24 months of supervised release.\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\n(including an organization or members of the community),\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\n II. Discussion\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\n\fNo. 18-3496 5\n\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\nCir. 2016).\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\n release and to impose additional prison time.\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\ncircumstances:\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\n tion of such a violation.\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\n\f6 No. 18-3496\n\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\nthe report in the first place.\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\n\fNo. 18-3496 7\n\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\n\f8 No. 18-3496\n\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\n\fNo. 18-3496 9\n\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\n conditions at issue.\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\n\f10 No. 18-3496\n\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\non other grounds.\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\ncondition.\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\nthat was an error.\n\fNo. 18-3496 11\n\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\ngirlfriend.\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\nhis reasons for doing so.\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Dino Greco\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3496\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDINO GRECO,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3496\\n\\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\\n I. Background\\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 3\\n\\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\\nted the report at the appropriate time.\\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\\nsupervised release would have expired.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3496\\n\\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\\n24 months of supervised release.\\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\\n(including an organization or members of the community),\\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 5\\n\\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\\n release and to impose additional prison time.\\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\\ncircumstances:\\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\\n tion of such a violation.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\\n\\f6 No. 18-3496\\n\\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\\nthe report in the first place.\\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 7\\n\\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3496\\n\\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 9\\n\\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\\n conditions at issue.\\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\\n\\f10 No. 18-3496\\n\\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\\non other grounds.\\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\\ncondition.\\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\\nthat was an error.\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 11\\n\\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\\ngirlfriend.\\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\\nhis reasons for doing so.\\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4375,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660594,"string":"4,660,594"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Cathy Truitt"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2324"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2324\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\\n\\f2 No. 18-2324\\n\\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\\nEvidence.\\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 3\\n\\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\\nnotice.\\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\\n\\f4 No. 18-2324\\n\\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\\nBox as the account holder’s address.\\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\\naccount held only about $200.\\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 5\\n\\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\\nit.\\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\\nmate way to access it.\\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\\nphysical coercion.\\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\\n\\f6 No. 18-2324\\n\\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\\nwouldn’t.\\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\\nconfusion.\\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\\non all counts. This appeal followed.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 7\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\\nthe matter.” Id.\\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2324\\n\\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\\nmony on that subject.\\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\\nproposed testimony.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 9\\n\\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\\nchecklist or test.”).\\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\\nher into filing false claims.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2324\\n\\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\\ndown version of his methodology.\\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\\nthe field would have done so. 1\\n\\n\\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 11\\n\\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\\nappropriate.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437847/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660594/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Cathy Truitt\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2324\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\n\f2 No. 18-2324\n\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\nEvidence.\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\n I. Background\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\n\fNo. 18-2324 3\n\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\nnotice.\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\n\f4 No. 18-2324\n\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\nBox as the account holder’s address.\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\naccount held only about $200.\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\n\fNo. 18-2324 5\n\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\nit.\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\nmate way to access it.\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\nphysical coercion.\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\n\f6 No. 18-2324\n\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\nwouldn’t.\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\nconfusion.\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\non all counts. This appeal followed.\n\fNo. 18-2324 7\n\n II. Discussion\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\nthe matter.” Id.\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\n\f8 No. 18-2324\n\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\nmony on that subject.\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\nproposed testimony.\n\fNo. 18-2324 9\n\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\nchecklist or test.”).\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\nher into filing false claims.\n\f10 No. 18-2324\n\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\ndown version of his methodology.\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\nthe field would have done so. 1\n\n\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\n\fNo. 18-2324 11\n\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\ntestimony.\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\nappropriate.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Cathy Truitt\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2324\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCATHY NICOLE TRUITT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 718 — John Z. Lee, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. In late 2009 Cathy Truitt filed seven\\nnearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she\\nwas entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six of\\nthe seven as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons it ap-\\nproved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within\\nweeks the IRS recognized the error and demanded that she\\nreturn the funds. She did not respond. Instead, she spent the\\nmoney on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting\\n\\f2 No. 18-2324\\n\\nevents, and a business investment. The IRS launched an\\ninvestigation, and eventually she was indicted for making\\nfalse claims against the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 287 and theft of government funds in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. A jury found her guilty as charged.\\n Truitt’s appeal is limited to a single issue. She challenges\\nthe exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Michael\\nFogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a\\n“charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctri-\\nnates its members. Truitt intended to offer this testimony to\\nbolster an argument that she lacked the requisite mens rea for\\nthe crimes. The district judge excluded the testimony under\\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579\\n(1993), and Rules 702 and 704(b) of the Federal Rules of\\nEvidence.\\n That ruling was sound. The judge reasonably concluded\\nthat Dr. Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods\\nwere not reliable. We affirm the judgment.\\n I. Background\\n In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple\\nof America, which views itself as a sovereign “ecclesiastical\\ngovernment.” The Moorish Temple teaches that neither the\\nstates nor the federal government have any authority over\\nits members, who instead purport to hold something akin to\\ndiplomatic immunity. Before initiation into the Temple,\\nmembers fill out a series of forms designed to put the gov-\\nernment on notice of their new nationality. After a ceremo-\\nny, the Temple provides members with Moorish\\nidentification cards, license plates, and other documents\\nbacking up their purported change in citizenship.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 3\\n\\n Truitt quickly became an active member of a Moorish\\ntemple on Chicago’s west side. The group was small—at\\nmost about 25 members—and Truitt spent as many as\\n40 hours a week on church-related activities. She also devel-\\noped a close relationship with the local leader, Queen Akefe\\nMuzari El (“Queen”). Three months after Truitt joined,\\nQueen told her congregants that the Temple’s founding\\nprophet had established a trust funded by the United States\\ngovernment and designed to benefit Moorish nationals. To\\nprepare her members to collect funds from the trust, Queen\\nled them through a variety of rituals and ceremonies. She\\nthen instructed them to use symbolic numbers to claim a\\nrefund on a series of IRS Form 1041s—the tax return used by\\ntrusts and estates. Some of the numbers were provided by a\\nchurch elder; others came from numerology. Queen told\\nTruitt and other Moors that if the government sent them\\nmoney in response to the tax returns, they were to tithe 25%\\nback to the Temple. Queen also warned her followers to\\nexpect “pushback” from the government—attempts to block\\nthe Moors from collecting despite their legitimate entitle-\\nment. This resistance, Queen said, signified nothing about\\nthe legitimacy of their right to payment. She instructed them\\nto refile the 1041 forms if they received a frivolous-filing\\nnotice.\\n In August 2009 Truitt filed three identical 1041 forms for\\nthe years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Each one claimed entitlement\\nto a refund because an excess of $304,204.30 in taxes had\\nbeen withheld from the income of a trust in her name. In\\ntruth, there was no trust and no taxes were withheld at all.\\n As Queen predicted, the IRS pushed back. It sent Truitt\\nletters informing her that each of the three 1041 forms was\\n\\f4 No. 18-2324\\n\\nfrivolous. In the back-and-forth that followed, Truitt filed\\nfour more identical 1041 forms, while the IRS responded\\nwith more notifications that the forms were meaningless. But\\nin the midst of this flurry of filings and responses, on\\nJanuary 5, 2010, the IRS issued a refund check for the full\\n$304,204.30 refund Truitt claimed for one of the tax years.\\nOn January 19 she opened a Post Office Box in the name of\\n“Maji Atarah El,” and the next day she deposited the\\nTreasury check into a new account at Wachovia Bank in the\\nname of the “Maji Atarah El Trust.” She listed the Post Office\\nBox as the account holder’s address.\\n The IRS noticed the error almost immediately, and within\\nfive weeks Truitt received notice that she was required to\\nreturn the money. She instead rapidly depleted the funds. By\\nthis time she was less involved with the Temple, and Queen\\nexcommunicated her for lack of attendance. So rather than\\ntithe 25% of the sum back to the Temple, Truitt gave roughly\\n$75,000 of her refund to several Moors she was still in touch\\nwith. She then placed $200,000 in several accounts in her\\nfather’s name. Those funds quickly disappeared. They paid\\nfor, among other things, jewelry, a down payment on a\\nMichigan Avenue condominium, Chicago White Sox and\\nBulls tickets, and an investment in a diamond business.\\nNotably, almost all of this activity occurred after the IRS\\nnotified her of the mistake. By April 2010 the Wachovia\\naccount held only about $200.\\n Throughout this period the IRS continued to send Truitt\\nnotices that it had mistakenly sent the refund check. When\\ntwo agents later visited her Michigan Avenue home, she\\nrefused to acknowledge herself by name. When they showed\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 5\\n\\nher a copy of the refund check, she denied ever having seen\\nit.\\n In 2014 a grand jury indicted Truitt on four counts of\\nsubmitting false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and\\none count of theft from the United States in violation of\\n18 U.S.C. § 641. Truitt’s primary defense was that she lacked\\nthe requisite mens rea because she truly believed that the\\nMoorish trust existed and that the 1041 forms were a legiti-\\nmate way to access it.\\n To support this defense, she intended to offer the testi-\\nmony of Dr. Michael Fogel, a forensic psychologist.\\nDr. Fogel has extensive experience evaluating criminal\\ndefendants, generally focusing on issues like insanity,\\ncompetence to stand trial, and risk of violence. In his report\\nsummarizing his expertise and proposed testimony,\\nDr. Fogel claimed to be an expert on “charismatic groups,”\\nwhich he defined as a “type of cultic group” that influences\\nits members through “a shared belief system, a high level of\\nsocial cohesiveness, a strong influence to comply with the\\ngroup’s behavioral norms, and assigning charismatic and\\nsometimes divine power to the group or its leadership.” He\\ndistinguished this from other types of cultic groups that use\\nphysical coercion.\\n The government moved in limine to exclude Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony. The judge granted the motion. His first concern\\nwas that Dr. Fogel might try to testify directly that Truitt\\ntruly believed the 1041 forms she filed were legitimate.\\nRule 704(b) forbids that kind of expert testimony: “In a\\ncriminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion\\nabout whether the defendant did or did not have a mental\\nstate or condition that constitutes an element of the crime\\n\\f6 No. 18-2324\\n\\ncharged or of a defense.” So the judge narrowly construed\\nDr. Fogel’s proposed opinion to say only that Truitt is the\\ntype of person who is susceptible to indoctrination. Even as\\nnarrowed, however, the judge ruled that Dr. Fogel failed to\\nidentify the scientific basis he used to reach his conclusions.\\n The judge gave the defense an opportunity to address\\nthese concerns in an amended submission. In an addendum\\nto his report, Dr. Fogel proposed to give two opinions:\\n(1) that the Moorish Temple is a charismatic group under his\\ndefinition and (2) that charismatic groups can cause a person\\nto ignore his moral compass and do things he otherwise\\nwouldn’t.\\n The judge rejected the reformulated opinions for three\\nreasons. First, he found that Dr. Fogel lacked the expertise\\nneeded to speak authoritatively about charismatic groups.\\nAmong other things, Dr. Fogel had worked on only a single\\ncase involving religious themes of any kind. His expertise is\\ninstead in psychological diagnosis, but Rule 704(b) would\\nblock any direct testimony about Truitt’s mental condition.\\nSecond, the judge held that Dr. Fogel’s methods were unreli-\\nable. Most concerning, Dr. Fogel deviated dramatically from\\nthe methods of other experts in the field—indeed, of the very\\nexpert whose work he used to educate himself on charis-\\nmatic groups. Third, and as an independent ground of\\ndecision, the judge excluded Dr. Fogel’s testimony under\\nRule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its proba-\\ntive value was slight compared to the substantial risk of jury\\nconfusion.\\n The case proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted Truitt\\non all counts. This appeal followed.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 7\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n Truitt’s sole argument on appeal is a challenge to the ex-\\nclusion of Dr. Fogel’s testimony. A split standard of review\\napplies. We review de novo whether the judge applied the\\nproper legal framework for determining the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony. United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536\\n(7th Cir. 2017). If the judge applied the proper legal frame-\\nwork, then we review the decision to exclude evidence for\\nabuse of discretion. Id. “District judges have wide discretion\\nover decisions to admit or exclude evidence; we will reverse\\nonly if no reasonable person would take the judge’s view of\\nthe matter.” Id.\\n Rule 702 entrusts trial judges with a gatekeeping role de-\\nsigned “to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and\\nreliable.” Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 893\\n(7th Cir. 2011). To that end, the judge must determine\\nwhether the expert is qualified, whether his methodology is\\nscientifically reliable, and whether the proposed testimony\\n“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to\\ndetermine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Daubert,\\n509 U.S. at 592 (explaining that the latitude given to experts\\nunder the Rules of Evidence “is premised on an assumption\\nthat the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the\\nknowledge and experience of his discipline”).\\n The judge properly applied this legal framework, so our\\nreview of his decision to exclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony is\\ndeferential. Turning first to the question of qualifications,\\nDr. Fogel is a forensic psychologist with some specialization\\nin certain group dynamics—for instance, he has expertise in\\nthe effect of peer pressure on juveniles serving probation—\\nbut he has no relevant experience with charismatic groups.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2324\\n\\nBecause we ask not whether an expert “is qualified in gen-\\neral” but whether he is qualified “to answer a specific ques-\\ntion,” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010), that\\nlimitation is all but dispositive: Dr. Fogel lacks experience\\nwith charismatic groups, so he shouldn’t give expert testi-\\nmony on that subject.\\n To be sure, nothing in Rule 702 or Daubert categorically\\nbars a generalist like Dr. Fogel from opining on more spe-\\ncialized topics. Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (“Ordinarily, courts impose no requirement that an\\nexpert be a specialist in a given field.” (quoting Gayton,\\n593 F.3d at 617)). To give an example, a general physician\\nmay, depending on his experience, be qualified to testify\\nabout heart conditions regardless of whether he is a licensed\\ncardiologist. But that doesn’t mean a generalist is necessarily\\nqualified to speak on specialized subjects: “[W]e must look\\nat each of the conclusions he draws individually to see if he\\nhas the adequate education, skill, and training to reach\\nthem.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617.\\n So Truitt is correct when she says that Dr. Fogel should\\nnot be excluded merely because he is a generalist. But that’s\\nnot why the judge excluded his testimony. He did so be-\\ncause Dr. Fogel’s experience as a general psychologist in no\\nway qualified him to answer specific questions about the\\nreligious themes at play in this case. Nor did his experience\\nwith other kinds of group dynamics prepare him for the\\nquestion at hand. Everyone agrees that Dr. Fogel had no\\nexperience with charismatic groups, so the judge quite\\nreasonably concluded that he was not qualified to give this\\nproposed testimony.\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 9\\n\\n The judge also ruled that Dr. Fogel’s methodology was\\ninadequate and thus not scientifically reliable. This ruling\\ntoo lies well within the judge’s discretion. The “overarching\\nsubject” of Rule 702 analysis “is the scientific validity—and\\nthus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the princi-\\nples that underlie a proposed [expert] submission. The focus,\\nof course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not\\non the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at\\n594–95. Daubert identifies a number of factors a court might\\nconsider, including whether the methods have been tested or\\nsubjected to peer review and whether they are generally\\naccepted in the field. See id. at 593–94. But the list is not\\nexhaustive. See id. at 593 (“Many factors will bear on the\\ninquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive\\nchecklist or test.”).\\n Here the judge was concerned that Dr. Fogel did little to\\nlearn about the Moorish Temple other than interviewing\\nTruitt herself. That’s a fairly significant shortcoming in a\\ncase about group dynamics: Dr. Fogel’s definition of a\\n“charismatic group” requires evaluating whether there was\\na “shared belief system,” a “high level of social cohesive-\\nness,” and “a strong influence to comply with the group’s\\nbehavioral norms.” The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nevaluation of those three factors required at least a minimal\\ninquiry into the experiences of other group members. Yet\\nDr. Fogel spoke to Truitt alone. Granted, he attempted to\\ncontact Queen and one other elder. But he made no effort to\\ncontact anyone else associated with the Moorish Temple.\\nCompounding the problem, Truitt had a strong self-interest\\nin convincing Dr. Fogel that the church could and did trick\\nher into filing false claims.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2324\\n\\n Curiously, Dr. Fogel omitted these steps in the analysis\\neven though Dr. Marc Galanter—the expert in charismatic\\ngroups whose work Dr. Fogel relied on most to learn about\\nthe subject—would have done far more. When Dr. Galanter\\nidentifies charismatic groups in his own work, he first\\ncirculates written surveys, then conducts extensive inter-\\nviews with a large number of members, and finally spends\\nsignificant time observing the group in action. The judge\\nwas justifiably concerned that Dr. Fogel relied so heavily on\\nDr. Galanter’s work but inexplicably applied a watered-\\ndown version of his methodology.\\n Truitt responds that experts often rely on interviews with\\ndefendants, sometimes exclusively so. That may be appro-\\npriate when a doctor makes a medical diagnosis. See Walker\\nv. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). But\\nDr. Fogel’s amended report disavowed any intention to\\nmake a medical diagnosis in light of the Rule 704(b) bar to\\nthat kind of expert testimony. And Daubert calls for case-\\nspecific analysis. The judge reasonably concluded that an\\nexpert who purports to give an opinion about group dynam-\\nics should have interviewed more than a single self-\\ninterested group member, especially when other experts in\\nthe field would have done so. 1\\n\\n\\n1 The judge also held that Dr. Fogel’s reliance on Dr. Todd DuBose,\\nanother expert, conflicted with our decisions in Dura Automotive Systems\\nof Indiana, Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002), and In re James\\nWilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1992). Those cases hold that while\\none expert may rely on another expert’s work, he cannot serve as a mere\\nmouthpiece in order to circumvent the Rules of Evidence. See Dura Auto.\\nSys. of Ind., Inc., 285 F.3d at 611–14; In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d at\\n172–73. We don’t need to address the application of Dura and Wilson\\nAssociates here: regardless of whether Dr. Fogel leaned too heavily on\\n\\fNo. 18-2324 11\\n\\n In short, the judge was well within his discretion to ex-\\nclude Dr. Fogel’s testimony—both because the witness had\\nlimited experience with the specific topic at hand and be-\\ncause he used questionable methods. The judge’s Rule 702\\nanalysis was on solid ground, so we have no need to address\\nhis alternative Rule 403 ruling that the risk of jury confusion\\nsubstantially outweighed the probative value of Dr. Fogel’s\\ntestimony.\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nDr. DuBose, the methods he used were unreliable, so exclusion was\\nappropriate.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4376,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660595,"string":"4,660,595"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1141"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437848/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660595/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\n\f2 No. 18-1141\n\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\nof the case.\n I.\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\n\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\n\fNo. 18-1141 3\n\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\nese court.\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\n\n\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\n\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\n\f4 No. 18-1141\n\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\nowed Trek.\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\n II.\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\n\fNo. 18-1141 5\n\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\nProcess Clause.\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\n\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\nto arise occurred.”\n\f6 No. 18-1141\n\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\n\fNo. 18-1141 7\n\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\nlationship with Wisconsin.\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\n\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\n\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\n\f8 No. 18-1141\n\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\ngeted Wisconsin.\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\n\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\n\fNo. 18-1141 9\n\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\n\f10 No. 18-1141\n\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\nwithin Wisconsin.\n\n\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\npromulgate.”).\n\fNo. 18-1141 11\n\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\n This argument seems to make the point that the\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\n cognizable contact with the State.\n\f12 No. 18-1141\n\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\nin the covered territory. It did not.\n\fNo. 18-1141 13\n\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\nof payment.\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\n\f14 No. 18-1141\n\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\n\fNo. 18-1141 15\n\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\nId. at 1290.\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\nand lose the war.\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\n\f16 No. 18-1141\n\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\n\n\n\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\n\fNo. 18-1141 17\n\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\nanywhere in the world.\n\n\n\n\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\n\f18 No. 18-1141\n\n ***\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-1141\\nLEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nHOTAI INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and\\nTAIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin, Madison Division.\\n No. 3:16-cv-740 — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Zurich Insurance (Taiwan), Ltd.,\\nand Taian Insurance Company, Ltd., are insurance companies\\n\\f2 No. 18-1141\\n\\nbased in Taiwan. 1 Each provided worldwide products-liabil-\\nity insurance coverage to two Taiwanese companies that sup-\\nplied parts and inventory to Trek Bicycle Corporation, which\\nis based in Wisconsin. As part of their agreements with the\\nTaiwanese companies, Zurich and Taian both recognized Trek\\nas an additional insured covered by their policies.\\n On the basis of that additional-insured status, Trek’s pri-\\nmary insurer, Lexington Insurance Company, which is based\\nin Massachusetts, sued Zurich and Taian in Wisconsin seek-\\ning indemnification for a products-liability settlement paid on\\nTrek’s behalf involving an accident that took place in Texas.\\nThe district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal\\njurisdiction over Zurich and Taian, so we affirm its dismissal\\nof the case.\\n I.\\n Trek, a bicycle manufacturer, maintains its corporate of-\\nfices in Waterloo, Wisconsin. It is party to two purchase order\\nagreements, both with Taiwanese companies, that are relevant\\nto this appeal. One is an agreement with Giant Manufacturing\\nCompany to purchase bicycles that Trek markets and sells un-\\nder its own brand name. The other is an agreement to pur-\\nchase bicycle parts from Formula Hubs, Inc.\\n Giant’s purchase order agreement with Trek required it to\\nhave Trek named as an additional insured in its products-lia-\\nbility insurance policy with Zurich, a Taiwanese insurer. Un-\\nder that policy, Zurich agreed to indemnify Giant and its\\n\\n 1 Both companies are organized under the laws of the Republic of\\nChina, and each has its principal place of business in Taipei, Taiwan. Zur-\\nich now operates under the name “Hotai Insurance Co., Ltd.,” but we refer\\nto it as Zurich for clarity and consistency with the record.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 3\\n\\nlisted vendors, including Trek, for judgments, expenses, and\\nlegal costs incurred “worldwide.” In addition, the Zurich pol-\\nicy (1) allowed Zurich to control the litigation or settlement of\\na covered claim but did not require it to do so; (2) included a\\nTaiwanese choice of law provision; and (3) required disputes\\nbetween Zurich and its insureds regarding the policy to be re-\\nsolved by arbitration in Taiwan. 2\\n Trek’s purchase order with Formula involved a similar in-\\nsurance arrangement. In it, Formula agreed to have Trek in-\\ncluded as an additional insured in its products-liability insur-\\nance policy with Taian, another Taiwanese insurer. Under the\\npolicy, Taian agreed to indemnify Formula and its vendors,\\nincluding Trek, for liability and defense costs incurred\\n“worldwide.” Like the Zurich policy, the Taian policy gave\\nTaian the right but not the obligation to control the litigation\\nof a covered claim against an insured. Finally, it dictated that\\ndisputes concerning the policy would be subject to Taiwanese\\nlaw and would have to submit to the jurisdiction of a Taiwan-\\nese court.\\n In 2012, John Giessler, a Louisiana resident, was seriously\\ninjured while riding a rented Trek bicycle in Travis County,\\nTexas. During his ride, the front wheel detached from the\\nframe of the bicycle, Giessler fell, and the resulting injuries\\nrendered him a quadriplegic. Giessler, his wife, and his son\\nsued Trek, among others, in Texas. Although Giant had man-\\nufactured the bicycle that Giessler was riding, and Formula\\nhad manufactured the front-wheel release, neither was a\\nparty to Giessler’s lawsuit.\\n\\n\\n 2 Lexington participated in arbitration proceedings with Zurich in Tai-\\n\\nwan, but the arbitrator ultimately decided that its claim was time-barred.\\n\\f4 No. 18-1141\\n\\n Lexington Insurance Company, which insures Trek\\nthrough comprehensive general liability and commercial um-\\nbrella policies, defended Trek in the Giessler suit. Trek and\\nLexington attempted to notify Giant and Formula—and their\\nrespective insurers, Zurich and Taian—of Giessler’s lawsuit.\\nIn the end, though, the case settled, and Lexington paid\\nGiessler on Trek’s behalf. Lexington sought reimbursement\\nfrom Zurich and Taian; after they refused to pay, it sued them\\nin the Western District of Wisconsin. It argued that both were\\nobligated to indemnify Trek under their respective insurance\\npolicies with Giant and Formula. And presenting theories of\\ncontribution and equitable subrogation, Lexington contended\\nthat the Taiwanese insurers must pay it the money that they\\nowed Trek.\\n Both Zurich and Taian moved to dismiss the case for lack\\nof personal jurisdiction and improper venue. With respect to\\nthe former, the insurers argued, among other things, that they\\nlacked the necessary minimum contacts with Wisconsin to\\njustify the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them—\\nthese policies were contracts between Taiwanese companies,\\ndrafted and signed in Taiwan, and governed by Taiwanese\\nlaw. In response, Lexington contended that the worldwide\\ncoverage provisions and the inclusion of Trek as an additional\\ninsured in each policy constituted sufficient contacts with the\\nstate of Wisconsin to satisfy due process. The district court\\nheld that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Taiwanese\\ninsurers, and Lexington appeals.\\n II.\\n A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a\\nforeign defendant only to the extent permitted by the forum\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 5\\n\\nstate’s long-arm statute and by the Due Process Clause. Fel-\\nland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties\\nagree that Wisconsin’s long-arm statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05,\\nreaches Zurich and Taian. 3 The only question is whether the\\nexercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfies the Due\\nProcess Clause.\\n To satisfy due process, a defendant’s physical presence\\nwithin the state is not required. Walden v Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,\\n283 (2014). But a foreign defendant “generally must have ‘cer-\\ntain minimum contacts … such that the maintenance of the\\nsuit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-\\nstantial justice.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Int’l Shoe\\nCo. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In other words, the\\ndefendant’s relationship with the forum state must be such\\nthat the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled\\ninto court there.” Felland, 682 F.3d at 673 (citation omitted).\\n Personal jurisdiction takes two forms—general and spe-\\ncific. General jurisdiction is all-purpose; it permits a defend-\\nant to be sued in a forum for any claim, regardless of whether\\nthe claim has any connection to the forum state. Goodyear\\nDunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For\\na state to have such extensive jurisdiction over a defendant,\\nhowever, the defendant’s contacts must be “so ‘continuous\\nand systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the fo-\\nrum state.” Id. (citation omitted). Lexington does not contend\\n\\n 3 Wis. Stat. § 801.05(10) grants personal jurisdiction over a defendant\\n“[i]n any action which arises out of a promise made anywhere to the plain-\\ntiff or some third party by the defendant to insure upon or against the\\nhappening of an event and in addition … the person insured was a resi-\\ndent of this state when the event out of which the cause of action is claimed\\nto arise occurred.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthat either Zurich or Taian is “at home” in Wisconsin. Instead,\\nit argues that the federal district court in Wisconsin has spe-\\ncific jurisdiction over the insurers. Specific jurisdiction “is\\nconfined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or con-\\nnected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdic-\\ntion.’” Id. (citation omitted).\\n Specific jurisdiction has three “essential requirements.”\\nFelland, 682 F.3d at 673. First, the defendant’s contacts with\\nthe forum state must show that it “purposefully availed [it-\\nself] of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state\\nor purposefully directed [its] activities at the state.” Id. Sec-\\nond, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the\\ndefendant’s forum-related activities. Id. And finally, any ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional\\nnotions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.\\n We begin with whether Zurich and Taian “purposefully\\navailed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business\\nin the forum state or purposefully directed [their] activities\\nat” Wisconsin. See id. To answer this question, we look to see\\nif there are “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and\\nthe forum State.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444\\nU.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). The Su-\\npreme Court has emphasized that this analysis focuses on\\n“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the\\ndefendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden,\\n571 U.S. at 285. The Due Process Clause protects a defendant\\nfrom being forced to submit to the adjudicatory authority of a\\nstate with which it has not purposefully established a suffi-\\ncient connection—and deliberate contact with the resident of\\na state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state\\nitself. Id. at 285–86; see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys.,\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 7\\n\\nLLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir.\\n2014). While the merits of this case turn on Zurich and Taian’s\\nrelationship with Trek, personal jurisdiction turns on their re-\\nlationship with Wisconsin.\\n Lexington has failed to demonstrate that either Zurich or\\nTaian made any purposeful contact with Wisconsin before,\\nduring, or after the formation of the insurance contracts. They\\ndid not solicit Trek’s business or target the Wisconsin market.\\nSee Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 314 (defendant had salesmen in the\\nforum exhibiting samples and soliciting orders from potential\\nbuyers); see also Daniel J. Hartwig Assocs. v. Kanner, 913 F.2d\\n1213, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1990) (whether the defendant solicited\\nthe plaintiff’s services is “significant” in the minimum-con-\\ntacts analysis). They negotiated and drafted these contracts in\\nTaiwan with Taiwanese companies. Cf. Burger King Corp. v.\\nRudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 467 (1985) (defendants negotiated\\nwith Burger King’s headquarters, which were located in the\\nforum state). Both policies required disputes to be resolved in\\nTaiwan according to the laws of Taiwan. Cf. id. at 465–66 (con-\\ntract dictated that the relationship between the parties be gov-\\nerned by the law in the forum state). Zurich and Taian did not\\nvisit Wisconsin or contact anyone residing there. Cf. id. at 466,\\n468 (defendant attended management courses in the forum\\nstate in addition to communicating with headquarters in the\\nforum state by mail and telephone). Indeed, Lexington points\\nto no evidence that Zurich or Taian ever sent anything—even\\na copy of either insurance policy—to Wisconsin. 4 Cf. Walden,\\n\\n 4 While the record contains a certificate reflecting Taian’s insurance of\\n\\nTrek under the Formula policy, Lexington is conspicuously quiet about\\nhow and from whom Trek obtained this certificate. Lexington had to make\\nout a prima facie showing of the court’s jurisdiction over the defendants,\\nsee Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782–83\\n\\f8 No. 18-1141\\n\\n571 U.S. at 289 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted ac-\\ntivities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or any-\\none to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the proper\\nlens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him to the fo-\\nrum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts\\nwith Nevada.”). For personal jurisdiction to exist, “[t]he rec-\\nord must show that the defendants targeted the forum state.”\\nMatlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nThe record in this case does not show that either insurer tar-\\ngeted Wisconsin.\\n Notwithstanding all of this, Lexington contends that two\\nprovisions in the insurance policies constitute sufficient con-\\ntacts with the state of Wisconsin to satisfy the demands of due\\nprocess. Both contracts acknowledged Trek as an additional\\ninsured and extended coverage for liabilities incurred\\n“worldwide.” But neither of these provisions constitutes a\\ncontact with the state of Wisconsin, so they do not singly or\\ntogether provide a basis for personal jurisdiction.\\n We can easily dispose of the first argument because it\\nflatly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. The fact that Zur-\\nich and Taian may be liable to Trek does not give Wisconsin\\njurisdiction over them. As we have already explained, it is a\\n\\n(7th Cir. 2003), so this lack of proof means that we cannot treat the certifi-\\ncate as evidence of Taian’s purposeful contact with Wisconsin. That said,\\nthe result would not change even if we assume that Taian (rather than, for\\nexample, Formula) sent the certificate to Trek in Wisconsin. One mailing\\nto an in-state resident is not enough to submit the sender to the jurisdiction\\nof the state. Cf. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957) (hold-\\ning that a California court had jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurer\\nwhen the insurer delivered the offer of life insurance and the insurance\\ncontract itself to California and the insured had sent his premium pay-\\nments from California to the insurer for two years).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 9\\n\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum state, not with the plain-\\ntiff, that count. Even if Zurich and Taian had contracts with\\nTrek—as opposed to contracts with Giant and Formula—a\\ncontract with a forum resident is not enough, standing alone,\\nto establish jurisdiction in that forum. See Burger King, 471 U.S.\\nat 478 (“If the question is whether an individual’s contract\\nwith an out-of-state party alone can automatically establish\\nsufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum,\\nwe believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”); see also Wal-\\nden, 571 U.S. at 286 (“[A] defendant’s relationship with a\\nplaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis\\nfor jurisdiction.”). To conclude that personal jurisdiction ex-\\nists, we need to see evidence that Zurich and Taian reached\\nout to Wisconsin during the formation and execution of these\\ncontracts. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (“It is these factors—\\nprior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,\\nalong with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual\\ncourse of dealing—that must be evaluated in determining\\nwhether the defendant purposefully established minimum\\ncontacts with the forum.”). There is no such evidence. In fact,\\nthe insurers never had any communication with Trek during\\nthe formation and execution of these contracts, much less any\\npurposeful contact that touched the state of Wisconsin. A\\nstraightforward application of Burger King and Walden fore-\\ncloses Lexington’s argument.\\n Lexington’s second contention—that personal jurisdiction\\nexists because the policies contained worldwide coverage\\nprovisions—also fails. The thrust of the argument is that Zur-\\nich and Taian derived financial benefit from affirmatively in-\\ncluding Wisconsin (and Texas, and the rest of the world) in\\ntheir territory of coverage—because the more extensive the\\ngeographic coverage, the higher the premium. The fact that\\n\\f10 No. 18-1141\\n\\nthe insurers generated income by including Wisconsin, Lex-\\nington says, means that the insurers did business in the state\\nand can be sued there. And it argues that by agreeing to cover\\nTrek for liabilities and defense costs incurred “worldwide,”\\nZurich and Taian bargained for the expectation of being sued\\nanywhere, including Wisconsin. 5\\n As an initial matter, gaining a financial benefit by includ-\\ning Wisconsin in a territory of coverage is not the equivalent\\nof “doing business in” Wisconsin. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at\\n924; Felland, 682 F.3d at 673. If a parent bets her fifth grader\\nfifty dollars that it will rain in every single state during the\\nmonth of June, she hasn’t “done business” in all fifty states\\neven though her profit will increase or decrease based on\\nwhat happens in each—and even though her risk and poten-\\ntial profit would have been less if she had limited the territory\\nto twenty-five states. A defendant does business in a forum\\nstate when it “purposefully avail[s] itself of the privilege of\\nconducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the\\nbenefits and protections of its laws.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924\\n(emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,\\n253 (1958)). Neither Zurich nor Taian “conducted activities”\\nwithin Wisconsin.\\n\\n\\n 5 To be clear, Lexington does not contend that the “worldwide cover-\\nage” clause constituted consent to be sued in any jurisdiction in the world.\\nIf that’s what the clause provided, this would be an open-and-shut case.\\nSee Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703\\n(1982); see also RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir.\\n1997) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction is waivable and [the] parties can, through\\nforum selection clauses and the like, easily contract around any rule we\\npromulgate.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 11\\n\\n In fact, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the prop-\\nosition that such collateral financial benefits are purposeful\\ncontacts. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298–99. In\\nWorld-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle in\\nNew York but later sustained personal injuries when they got\\ninto an accident while driving through Oklahoma. Id. at 288.\\nThey brought a products-liability action against the automo-\\nbile retailer and wholesaler (both New York corporations that\\ndid no business in Oklahoma) in Oklahoma. Id. at 288, 295.\\nThe plaintiffs argued that because the automobile’s “design\\nand purpose” made it foreseeable that it would cause an in-\\njury in Oklahoma, id. at 295, and because the automobile com-\\npanies received a financial benefit from selling a product with\\nthe ability to travel to across vast geographic areas (including\\nthe distance between New York and Oklahoma), they were\\nsubject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma, id. at 298. But\\nthe Supreme Court concluded that all of that added up to “no\\nactivity whatsoever in Oklahoma,” id. at 295:\\n [I]t is contended that jurisdiction can be sup-\\n ported by the fact that petitioners earn substan-\\n tial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.…\\n This argument seems to make the point that the\\n purchase of automobiles in New York, from\\n which the petitioners earn substantial revenue,\\n would not occur but for the fact that the automo-\\n biles are capable of use in distant States like Ok-\\n lahoma.… [T]he very purpose of an automobile\\n is to travel …. However, financial benefits ac-\\n cruing to the defendant from a collateral rela-\\n tion to the forum State will not support jurisdic-\\n tion if they do not stem from a constitutionally\\n cognizable contact with the State.\\n\\f12 No. 18-1141\\n\\nId. at 298–99. Just as the financial benefit gained by selling a\\nproduct with the purpose and ability to travel to a vast num-\\nber of distant forums is not itself business activity within\\nthose forums, so too here the financial benefit gained from\\nbroad geographic insurance coverage does not constitute “do-\\ning business” within the entire covered territory.\\n World-Wide Volkswagen also forecloses Lexington’s argu-\\nment that Zurich and Taian are subject to Wisconsin’s juris-\\ndiction because the “worldwide coverage” clause made it\\nforeseeable that Trek might sue them anywhere in the world\\nwhere Trek incurred liability. “‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has\\nnever been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction\\nunder the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 295; see also Burger King,\\n471 U.S. at 474–75; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254; Advanced Tac-\\ntical, 751 F.3d at 802. On the contrary, permitting jurisdiction\\n“based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability [] is\\ninconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J.\\nMcIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (plu-\\nrality opinion). Only a defendant’s actions can empower a\\nstate to exercise jurisdiction over him. Id.; see also World-Wide\\nVolkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical\\nto due process analysis … is that the defendant’s conduct and\\nconnection with the forum State are such that he should reason-\\nably anticipate being haled into court there.” (emphasis\\nadded)). Given this principle, the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause cannot justify Wisconsin’s—or any other state’s—exer-\\ncise of jurisdiction over Zurich and Taian simply because the\\nclause made suit in that state foreseeable. The clause can sup-\\nport jurisdiction only if the act of granting Trek “worldwide\\ncoverage” established a purposeful connection between the\\ninsurers and every American state, all of which are included\\nin the covered territory. It did not.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 13\\n\\n The “worldwide coverage” clause defined the territorial\\nscope of the insurers’ obligation to Trek. But the presence of a\\nstate within the scope of coverage creates no purposeful con-\\nnection between the insurers and that state. Consider Texas,\\nwhich was the location of the accident, the suit, and the set-\\ntlement. Zurich and Taian could have covered Trek’s claim\\nfor this liability without ever touching Texas—for example,\\nthey could have mailed a check to Trek’s headquarters in Wis-\\nconsin or sent the money electronically to an account located\\nin another state or even another country. Indeed, if the cov-\\nered territory had been limited, Zurich and Taian could have\\ndischarged their obligation by sending funds to an account\\nlocated outside the covered territory. Jurisdiction depends on\\nthe defendant’s actions, and payment of a covered claim is the\\nonly act that these policies required the insurers to perform.\\nIt is doubtful that the act of sending payment to an account\\nlocated within a state is a contact sufficient to support per-\\nsonal jurisdiction. But even if it were, there is no necessary\\nconnection between the territory of coverage and the location\\nof payment.\\n Lexington claims that “myriad cases around the country”\\nhave recognized personal jurisdiction under these same cir-\\ncumstances. Yet almost every case that it cites involves an in-\\nsurance policy with a duty-to-defend clause—and if Zurich\\nand Taian had assumed a duty to defend Trek in any jurisdic-\\ntion in which it incurred liability and structured their finan-\\ncial benefits on that obligation, this might be a different case.\\nIn that situation, courts have described the “expectation of be-\\ning haled into court in a foreign state [a]s an express feature\\nof [the] policy.” Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832\\nF.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Por-\\ntage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n\\f14 No. 18-1141\\n\\n(“[When] automobile liability insurers contract to indemnify\\nand defend the insured for claims that will foreseeably result\\nin litigation in foreign states … litigation requiring the pres-\\nence of the insurer is not only foreseeable, but it was purpose-\\nfully contracted for by the insurer.”); see also, e.g., Ferrell v.\\nWest Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005);\\nPayne v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 454–57 (6th Cir.\\n1993). But see Hunt v. Erie Ins. Grp., 728 F.2d 1244, 1247 (9th\\nCir. 1984) (“Erie’s failure to structure its policy to exclude the\\npossibility of defending a suit wherever an injured claimant\\nrequires medical care cannot, in our view, fairly be character-\\nized as an act by which Erie has purposefully availed itself of\\nthe privilege of conducting activities in California.”). Here,\\nthough, Zurich and Taian contracted for the right, not the ob-\\nligation, to control litigation against their insureds. Thus, “the\\nexpectation of being haled into court in a foreign state” was\\nnot “an express feature” of either policy. Rossman, 832 F.2d at\\n286. Preserving the right to defend Trek—as opposed to as-\\nsuming a duty to do so—gave Zurich and Taian the option of\\ndeciding whether to avail themselves of the benefits and pro-\\ntections of the forum’s laws and courts. They promised to in-\\ndemnify Trek no matter where it incurred liability, but as we\\nhave already said, paying Trek did not require them to make\\nany purposeful contact with a state in which Trek was sued.\\nThe absence of a duty-to-defend clause is decisive.\\n Lexington has one case that is partly on its side: TH Agri-\\nculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd. In that case,\\nthe Tenth Circuit said that “the issuance of an insurance pol-\\nicy that contains a worldwide territory-of-coverage clause\\nand an option to defend the insured is sufficient to establish\\nminimum contacts with the forum state.” 488 F.3d 1282, 1288\\n(10th Cir. 2007). Its “minimum contacts” analysis rests on the\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 15\\n\\nvery premises that Lexington invokes to support jurisdiction\\nhere: “the foreseeability of litigation in foreign states … based\\non the insurer’s own actions” of including those states within\\nthe coverage area and the resulting financial benefits to the\\ninsurance company from offering broad geographic coverage.\\nId. at 1290.\\n TH Agriculture offers Lexington very little help, because\\ndespite what it said about minimum contacts, the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit concluded that the forum state lacked personal jurisdic-\\ntion over the insurers in that case. The presence of minimum\\ncontacts does not justify personal jurisdiction when haling a\\ndefendant into court in the forum state would violate tradi-\\ntional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 488 F.3d at\\n1292 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78). This factor was\\ndispositive in TH Agriculture. Id. (“[We] conclude that the ex-\\nercise of personal jurisdiction over the Insurers in Kansas\\nwould be unreasonable.”). Thus, TH Agriculture extends Lex-\\nington nothing more than an opportunity to win the battle\\nand lose the war.\\n But in any event, we are unpersuaded by the Tenth Cir-\\ncuit’s treatment of minimum contacts in TH Agriculture. Its\\ndiscussion is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court prec-\\nedent; it is also in significant tension with the Tenth Circuit’s\\nown precedent. In OMI Holdings, a duty-to-defend case de-\\ncided almost a decade before TH Agriculture, the Tenth Circuit\\ncriticized the decisions of other circuits in duty-to-defend\\ncases for relying heavily on “foreseeability—a position at\\nodds with the Supreme Court’s directive that foreseeability\\nalone is an insufficient basis on which to establish minimum\\ncontacts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149\\nF.3d 1086, 1094 (10th Cir. 1998). It also expressed skepticism\\n\\f16 No. 18-1141\\n\\nat the willingness of other circuits to assume “that by agreeing\\nto defend its insured in any forum, an insurer foresees being\\nsued by its own insured in any forum when a coverage dis-\\npute arises.” Id. at 1095. While it ultimately concluded that\\n“contracting to defend the insured in the forum state” is a suf-\\nficient minimum contact with the forum, it stressed that this\\nkind of contact is “qualitatively low on the due process scale.”\\nId. 6 Notwithstanding these concerns, the Tenth Circuit inex-\\nplicably went even further in TH Agriculture by characterizing\\na territory-of-coverage clause as a sufficient contact with the\\nforum state not only when an insurer assumes the duty to de-\\nfend the insured, but also when it merely preserves the right\\nto do so. 488 F.3d at 1291.\\n In the years since the Tenth Circuit decided TH Agricul-\\nture, the Supreme Court has continued to stress that the fore-\\nseeability of suit in a forum is not enough to justify a state’s\\nexercise of jurisdiction over a defendant. See Walden, 571 U.S.\\nat 284–86; Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 882–83 (plurality opinion).\\nGiven these cases, the Tenth Circuit might come out differ-\\nently if it were presented with the “minimum contacts” ques-\\ntion today. Regardless, we must follow the Court’s admoni-\\ntion that the predictability of a plaintiff’s action is not itself\\nenough to justify a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a de-\\nfendant. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Zurich and Taian had a rela-\\ntionship with Trek, not Wisconsin. That relationship may\\nhave made it foreseeable that Trek would sue them in Trek’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 As in TH Agriculture, the court held that the forum state nonetheless\\nlacked personal jurisdiction over the insurers because exercising it would\\nviolate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. OMI Hold-\\nings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1098.\\n\\fNo. 18-1141 17\\n\\nhome state or another forum it found convenient. 7 But “it is\\nthe defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a\\n[foreign state] to subject him to judgment.” Nicastro, 564 U.S.\\nat 883 (plurality opinion). And Zurich and Taian did not make\\nany purposeful contact with Wisconsin by promising to in-\\ndemnify Trek for liability and defense costs that it incurred\\nanywhere in the world.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 We note that Lexington would run into trouble even if we agreed\\nthat the “worldwide coverage” clause constituted a sufficient “minimum\\ncontact” with Wisconsin. To establish specific personal jurisdiction, Lex-\\nington’s action must “directly arise out of the specific contacts between the\\ndefendant[s] and the forum state.” GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp.,\\n565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In other words, “a\\ndefendant’s contacts with the forum State [must] be directly related to the\\nconduct pertaining to the claims asserted.” Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d\\n549, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). Because Lexington’s harm stems from the insurers’\\nfailure to reimburse it for defense and settlement costs in a Texas lawsuit\\nabout a Texas accident, it is not “directly related” to Zurich and Taian’s\\nalleged contacts with Wisconsin—unless Lexington’s theory is that the\\n“worldwide coverage” clause opens the possibility of a suit in Wisconsin\\nfor liability and defense costs that Trek incurs anywhere in the world. Cf.\\nTH Agric., 488 F.3d at 1291–92 (“[The plaintiff] is seeking coverage under\\nthe policy for judgments entered against it and costs incurred in litigating\\nasbestos claims, at least one of which was filed in Kansas. Consequently,\\n[the plaintiff]’s claims arise out of the Insurers’ contact with Kansas.”).\\nAnd even if Lexington could successfully show that its suit directly relates\\nto the insurers’ contact with Wisconsin via the “worldwide coverage”\\nclause, it would still have to show that Wisconsin’s exercise of jurisdiction\\nover the insurers would be reasonable. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup.\\nCt. of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). Lexington would have\\ndifficulty clearing that hurdle too. Cf. TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292–98.\\n\\f18 No. 18-1141\\n\\n ***\\n Because Lexington failed to show that Zurich and Taian\\nhave sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Wisconsin,\\nwe agree with the district court that exercising jurisdiction\\nover the insurance companies would violate due process. The\\ndistrict court’s dismissal of the case for lack of personal juris-\\ndiction is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4377,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4660703,"string":"4,660,703"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Dino Greco"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3496"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3496\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDINO GRECO,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3496\\n\\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\\n I. Background\\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 3\\n\\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\\nted the report at the appropriate time.\\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\\nsupervised release would have expired.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3496\\n\\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\\n24 months of supervised release.\\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\\n(including an organization or members of the community),\\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 5\\n\\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\\n release and to impose additional prison time.\\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\\ncircumstances:\\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\\n tion of such a violation.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\\n\\f6 No. 18-3496\\n\\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\\nthe report in the first place.\\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 7\\n\\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3496\\n\\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 9\\n\\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\\n conditions at issue.\\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\\n\\f10 No. 18-3496\\n\\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\\non other grounds.\\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\\ncondition.\\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\\nthat was an error.\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 11\\n\\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\\ngirlfriend.\\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\\nhis reasons for doing so.\\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4437956/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660703/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Dino Greco\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3496\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nDINO GRECO,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\n\f2 No. 18-3496\n\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\nestablish probable cause.\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\n I. Background\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\n\fNo. 18-3496 3\n\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\nted the report at the appropriate time.\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\nsupervised release would have expired.\n\f4 No. 18-3496\n\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\n24 months of supervised release.\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\n(including an organization or members of the community),\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\n II. Discussion\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\n\fNo. 18-3496 5\n\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\nCir. 2016).\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\n release and to impose additional prison time.\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\ncircumstances:\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\n tion of such a violation.\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\n\f6 No. 18-3496\n\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\nthe report in the first place.\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\n\fNo. 18-3496 7\n\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\n\f8 No. 18-3496\n\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\n\fNo. 18-3496 9\n\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\n conditions at issue.\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\n\f10 No. 18-3496\n\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\non other grounds.\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\ncondition.\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\nthat was an error.\n\fNo. 18-3496 11\n\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\ngirlfriend.\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\nhis reasons for doing so.\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Dino Greco\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3496\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nDINO GRECO,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 02 CR 126 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 29, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dino Greco spent more than a dec-\\nade in prison for blowing up his ex-girlfriend’s car with a\\npipe bomb. In 2015 he began a term of supervised release,\\nand one of the conditions was that he not break federal,\\nstate, or local law. He violated that condition three years\\nlater when he posted threatening Facebook messages about a\\nsecond ex-girlfriend despite a court order not to contact her.\\nA federal judge approved a warrant for Greco’s arrest, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3496\\n\\nseven months later a second judge revoked his supervised\\nrelease and ordered a new term of imprisonment, to be\\nfollowed by a new term of supervised release.\\n On appeal Greco argues that the court lacked jurisdiction\\nto revoke his supervised release because the warrant wasn’t\\nsupported by probable cause. We disagree. The judge re-\\nceived a report explaining how Greco had broken the terms\\nof his release by violating state law, and that was enough to\\nestablish probable cause.\\n Greco also challenges two of the conditions the court im-\\nposed for his second term of supervised release. We remand\\nwith respect to both so that the lower court can clarify\\nseveral terms and further explain its reasoning.\\n I. Background\\n In 2001 Greco threatened to put a pipe bomb in his ex-\\ngirlfriend’s car if she didn’t pay back a debt she owed him.\\nShe obtained a protective order, but he put the bomb in her\\ncar anyway. The bomb exploded when she opened her\\ndriver’s side door, injuring her and destroying her car.\\n Greco pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing\\nan unregistered pipe bomb in violation of 26 U.S.C.\\n§§ 5861(d) and 5861(f). At sentencing the government in-\\nformed the court that this was the third time in ten years\\nGreco had detonated a pipe bomb to intimidate someone\\nwho crossed him. The court then sentenced Greco to\\n180 months in prison. After that term ended on April 13,\\n2015, Greco was to remain on supervised release until\\nApril 12, 2018. One condition of that release was that he\\nwould “not commit another federal, state or local crime.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 3\\n\\n Greco began dating a different woman during his super-\\nvised release, but they soon broke up. When Greco started\\nsending her threatening messages, she too obtained a protec-\\ntive order, which prohibited him from contacting her, direct-\\nly or indirectly. Rather than stop, he created a Facebook\\naccount under a fake name and continued to post threaten-\\ning messages. Although he didn’t send the messages directly\\nto the ex-girlfriend, he did notify two of her friends to make\\nsure she got the message. The posts included graphic sexual\\nreferences and threats of violence against the ex-girlfriend\\nand her family. The most concerning were several thinly\\nveiled threats to blow up her house.\\n On March 8, 2018, the U.S. Probation Office submitted a\\nreport to the district court informing it of the ex-girlfriend’s\\nprotective order. Later that same day, the Schaumburg\\nPolice Department arrested Greco for violating the order.\\nThe Probation Office says it submitted another report the\\nfollowing day, March 9, telling the court about the arrest and\\nrequesting a warrant to transfer Greco to federal custody\\nafter his release by state officials. But this second report\\nnever appeared in the district court’s docket until the Proba-\\ntion Office tried to add it during the course of this appeal.\\nGreco insists that the Probation Office never actually submit-\\nted the report at the appropriate time.\\n Judge Pallmeyer was serving as the emergency district\\njudge. She approved the warrant on March 9, the same day\\nthe Probation Office says it submitted the second report.\\nThat was a Friday. But because of a clerical mistake, the\\nwarrant didn’t issue until March 12, the following\\nMonday—a month to the day before Greco’s first term of\\nsupervised release would have expired.\\n\\f4 No. 18-3496\\n\\n Because of several delays, the court did not hold a revo-\\ncation hearing until November. By that point Judge Leinen-\\nweber was presiding, and he found that Greco had broken a\\nterm of his supervised release by violating the protective\\norder. The judge imposed 16 months of imprisonment plus\\n24 months of supervised release.\\n The judge also added several new conditions to the sec-\\nond term of supervised release, two of which are at issue\\nhere. The first condition says: “[I]f the probation officer\\ndetermines that [Greco] pose[s] a risk to another person\\n(including an organization or members of the community),\\nthe probation officer may require [him] to tell the person\\nabout the risk.” Greco argues on appeal that this condition is\\nunconstitutionally vague, that it unlawfully delegates judi-\\ncial sentencing authority to someone other than an Article III\\njudge, and that it violates his First Amendment rights. The\\ngovernment agrees that at least some of the language is\\nimpermissibly vague and we should remand for clarifica-\\ntion. The second condition bars Greco from contacting five\\nindividuals: the second ex-girlfriend, the two people she\\nlived with, and the two friends Greco notified about the\\nthreatening messages. Greco didn’t object to this condition\\nbelow, but on appeal he argues that the judge failed to\\nexplain why he barred him from contacting four individuals\\nin addition to the ex-girlfriend.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review de novo whether the district court had juris-\\ndiction to hold a revocation hearing. See United States v.\\nMaranda, 761 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2014). We also review de\\nnovo the adequacy of a district court’s explanation for a\\ncondition of supervised release. See United States v. Poulin,\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 5\\n\\n809 F.3d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 2016). When a defendant challeng-\\nes the substance of the condition, we review for abuse of\\ndiscretion. See United States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 858 (7th\\nCir. 2016).\\nA. The district court had jurisdiction to revoke Greco’s\\n release and to impose additional prison time.\\n By the time the district court revoked Greco’s supervised\\nrelease and imposed a new term of imprisonment, seven\\nmonths had passed since the expiration of his original term\\nof supervised release. The supervised-release statute allows\\ndistrict courts to hold delayed hearings, but only in limited\\ncircumstances:\\n The power of the court to revoke a term of su-\\n pervised release for violation of a condition of\\n supervised release, and to order the defendant\\n to serve a term of imprisonment and … a fur-\\n ther term of supervised release, extends be-\\n yond the expiration of the term of supervised\\n release for any period reasonably necessary for\\n the adjudication of matters arising before its\\n expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or\\n summons has been issued on the basis of an allega-\\n tion of such a violation.\\n18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (emphasis added). We have held that\\n§ 3583(i)’s warrant requirement “goes to the district court’s\\nsubject-matter jurisdiction.” Maranda, 761 F.3d at 693.\\n No one disputes that the court issued a warrant on\\nMarch 12, exactly one month prior to the expiration of\\nGreco’s term of supervised release. Nonetheless, Greco\\n\\f6 No. 18-3496\\n\\nargues that the court lacked jurisdiction because that war-\\nrant was not supported by probable cause.\\n As we said in United States v. Block a few weeks after oral\\nargument in this case, “we and other courts have at least\\nsuggested there is no need” in the § 3583(i) context “for strict\\ncompliance with the … constitutional requirements for arrest\\nwarrants.” 927 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2019) (collecting\\nsources). There we didn’t have to articulate exactly what the\\nstatute does require because the government never obtained\\nany formal court order. See id. at 984 (holding only that the\\nstatute at the very least requires “formal documents notify-\\ning the releasee of the proceedings and requiring him to\\nappear, either under threat of contempt with a summons or\\nby force with a warrant”). While the exact requirements\\nremain unsettled, we have no need to go further here. Even\\nif we assume probable cause is a jurisdictional requirement\\nunder § 3583(i), the warrant was still perfectly valid.\\n According to the government, the Probation Office in-\\nformed the court on March 9 that Greco had been arrested\\nfor violating a protective order. That, in turn, meant he had\\nviolated a term of his supervised release—which everyone\\nagrees is enough to establish probable cause for his arrest.\\nThe only question is whether the Probation Office submitted\\nthe report in the first place.\\n As Greco has observed, the March 9 report wasn’t added\\nto the lower court’s docket until this appeal was already\\npending. Prior to oral argument, we issued an order constru-\\ning the government’s brief as a motion to correct the record\\non appeal under Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate\\nProcedure. We simultaneously granted that motion and\\nordered the district court to certify and forward a supple-\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 7\\n\\nmental record that included the March 9 report. But we\\nasked the parties to be prepared to discuss at oral argument\\nwhether we should reconsider that order.\\n After full review of the matter, we see no reason to re-\\nverse course from our preliminary ruling. To start,\\nRule 10(e)(1) says: “If any difference arises about whether\\nthe record truly discloses what occurred in the district court,\\nthe difference must be submitted to and settled by that court\\nand the record conformed accordingly.” After the Probation\\nOffice’s belated addition of the March 9 report to the lower\\ncourt’s docket, Greco moved to strike the document from the\\nrecord. Judge Leinenweber held a hearing in which the\\nparties discussed whether the report was in fact submitted to\\nthe court on March 9. At the end of that hearing, the judge\\ndenied the motion. Because the matter was “settled by that\\ncourt,” we may consider the report on appeal.\\n Even if the district court hadn’t already considered the\\nissue, we have the authority to independently correct the\\nrecord in cases like this. Rule 10(e)(2) says: “If anything\\nmaterial to either party is omitted from or misstated in the\\nrecord by error or accident, the omission or misstatement\\nmay be corrected and a supplemental record may be certi-\\nfied and forwarded … by the court of appeals.” That square-\\nly applies here. The record is clear—even despite the\\ndocketing confusion—that Judge Pallmeyer did in fact\\nconsider the March 9 report when approving the warrant.\\nDuring a detention hearing the following week, she and a\\nprobation officer referred to an “arrest report” that was filed\\nthe previous week that had notified the court of Greco’s\\nthreatening messages. That was an unmistakable reference\\nto the March 9 report, the only report to actually mention the\\n\\f8 No. 18-3496\\n\\nFacebook posts. Moments later Judge Pallmeyer explained\\nthat on March 9 she had “been asked … to issue a warrant to\\nbe lodged as a detainer.” That too was clearly a reference to\\nthe March 9 report, the only report to actually request a\\nwarrant. Because Judge Pallmeyer considered the report, it is\\nplainly material. The remaining question is whether the\\nreport was omitted by error or accident. The government\\nsays that the Probation Office’s failure to docket the report\\nwas purely inadvertent, and Greco has never seriously\\ndisputed that point. Because the report is material and was\\nomitted by accident, our preliminary decision to correct the\\nrecord under Rule 10(e)(2) was sound. And with the com-\\nplete record before us, there is no question that the facts\\nconsidered by Judge Pallmeyer established probable cause.\\n At this point Greco shifts gears and argues that we\\nshould ignore Judge Pallmeyer’s order altogether. He starts\\nby noting that only a warrant or a summons can extend a\\ncourt’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). And because no warrant\\nor summons was issued on March 9, Greco argues that Judge\\nPallmeyer’s March 9 order did nothing, standing alone, to\\nextend the timeframe in which the court could hold a revo-\\ncation hearing. He says the order is therefore irrelevant. The\\nproblem with that argument is that the clerk’s office issued\\nthe warrant only three days later—a full month before\\nGreco’s term of supervised release would have ended.\\nWhether or not Judge Pallmeyer’s order extended the\\ntimeframe, the warrant pursuant to that order was still timely.\\n In response Greco insists the warrant wasn’t issued pur-\\nsuant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order. He says that Judge\\nLeinenweber made an independent decision to issue the\\nwarrant the following Monday. And according to Greco, that\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 9\\n\\nmeans Judge Leinenweber was required to make an inde-\\npendent probable-cause finding. But Judge Pallmeyer’s\\norder, and hers alone, is attached to the warrant, and noth-\\ning in the record suggests that Judge Leinenweber played\\nanything more than an administrative role in approving it.\\nAt oral argument Greco assured us that we would find\\nJudge Leinenweber’s signature on the copy of the warrant\\ndocketed on March 12, 2018. But the only signature we\\nfound is that of a clerk’s office representative. Judge Leinen-\\nweber’s name appears nowhere on that document, nor on\\nany of its attachments. Judge Leinenweber was, of course,\\nthe presiding judge for most of the proceedings in this case,\\nand it may be true that he played an administrative role in\\nissuing this warrant. But because the warrant issued pursu-\\nant to Judge Pallmeyer’s order, it is her reasoning that mat-\\nters. And because the March 9 report was before her, the\\nwarrant she issued was clearly supported by probable cause.\\nThe court therefore had jurisdiction.\\nB. The judge should clarify the two supervised-release\\n conditions at issue.\\n Greco challenges two of the new conditions Judge\\nLeinenweber imposed on the second term of supervised\\nrelease. The first authorizes the Probation Office to require\\nthat Greco notify third parties of any risks it finds he might\\npose. Both parties agree that this condition is likely unconsti-\\ntutionally vague under circuit precedent. In particular they\\npoint to United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir.\\n2016), where we held that a similar condition was impermis-\\nsibly vague because, among other things, it did not define\\nthe term “risks.” Because all parties agree, we remand so the\\njudge can recast the condition in more concrete terms. More\\n\\f10 No. 18-3496\\n\\nspecifically, the judge should provide more guidance on\\nwhat types of risk trigger the notification requirement.\\n Greco also argues that this condition violates his First\\nAmendment rights and delegates judicial sentencing author-\\nity to someone other than a judge. Because we’re remanding\\nfor the judge to rewrite the condition in more specific terms,\\nwe need not address whether the original version was infirm\\non other grounds.\\n Next, Greco challenges the condition barring him from\\ncontacting five individuals. He concedes that it was appro-\\npriate to prohibit contact with the ex-girlfriend, but he\\nmaintains there was no basis to include the two members of\\nher household and the two friends. He focuses on the ade-\\nquacy of the judge’s explanation for imposing the broader\\ncondition.\\n When a district court imposes a term of supervised re-\\nlease, it “must justify the conditions … by an adequate\\nstatement of reasons, reasonably related to the” factors listed\\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828,\\n845 (7th Cir. 2015). Still, the judge “need not address every\\nfactor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating [his] conclu-\\nsions regarding each one,” nor does he need to “give a\\nspeech about each condition.” Id. at 845–46 (quotation marks\\nomitted). But “rarely, if ever, should [he] list a multitude of\\nconditions without discussion.” Id. at 846.\\n Here, the judge gave no explanation for expanding the\\nno-contact condition beyond the ex-girlfriend. The govern-\\nment asked that he include all five; the judge did no more\\nthan say he agreed. At least some explanation is required, so\\nthat was an error.\\n\\fNo. 18-3496 11\\n\\n That said, Greco failed to timely object to this condition.\\nThe government does not argue waiver, see United States v.\\nFlores, 929 F.3d 443, 447–50 (7th Cir. 2019), so the objection\\nwas merely forfeited and we review for plain error, United\\nStates v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nThat’s a difficult standard for Greco to meet. Not only does\\nhe have to show that the judge clearly erred, he must also\\nshow that “the error affected his substantial rights” and\\n“seriously impugned the judicial proceeding’s fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation.” United States v. Turner,\\n651 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the inadequate expla-\\nnation likely did nothing to affect Greco’s substantial rights\\nor impugn the integrity of the proceedings. After all, the\\nexplanation is relatively clear: Greco threatened to blow up\\nthe house where two of the individuals lived, and he used\\nthe other two as intermediaries to convey threats to his ex-\\ngirlfriend.\\n Nonetheless, because the judge did not make his reasons\\nexplicit and the government has already asked for a partial\\nremand, we also vacate and remand this second condition. If\\nthe judge reimposes the same condition, he should explain\\nhis reasons for doing so.\\n We AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for pro-\\nceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4378,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661215,"string":"4,661,215"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Segal"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3317"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\\n Proposed Intervenor.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\\ntions).\\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\\n\\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\\n6, 2017.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\\ntimely.\\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\\nprocessing rule.\\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\\n\\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\\ncase.\\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\\nsentence).\\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\\n\\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\\n\\n\\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\\nishment of the defendant.\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\\nare groundless.\\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\\n\\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\\napproach to the deadline.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\\n\\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\\n\\n\\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\\nStipulation.”).\\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\\nment ¶ 10.4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\\n\\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\\nture obligation).\\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\\nordered to pay.”\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\\n\\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\\nsettlement agreement.\\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\\n\\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\\n\\n\\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\\ning).\\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\\n\\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\\nCir. 2013).\\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\\n third party may have a claim to or against any\\n such property under applicable law, claimants\\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\\n the remaining property so that the property can\\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\\n\\n\\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\\ntion of any third-party claims.\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\\n that the remaining property is released at any\\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\\n not barred by the terms of this document from\\n asserting an interest in that property if the\\n United States asserts no further interest in or\\n claim to the property.\\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\\nproperty.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\\n\\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\\nid., she must wait.\\n ***\\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\\non this point.\\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\\n\\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\\nable multiplication of proceedings.\\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438468/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661215/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael Segal\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\n Defendant-Appellant,\n\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\n Proposed Intervenor.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\n\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\ntions).\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\n\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\n6, 2017.\n\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\ntimely.\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\nprocessing rule.\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\n\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\ncase.\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\n\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\nsentence).\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\n\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\n\n\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\nishment of the defendant.\n\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\nare groundless.\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\n\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\napproach to the deadline.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\n\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\n\n\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\nStipulation.”).\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\nment ¶ 10.4\n\n\n\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\n\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\nture obligation).\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\n\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\nordered to pay.”\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\n\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\nsettlement agreement.\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\n\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\n\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\n\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\n\n\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\ning).\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\n\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\nCir. 2013).\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\n third party may have a claim to or against any\n such property under applicable law, claimants\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\n the remaining property so that the property can\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\n\n\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\ntion of any third-party claims.\n\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\n that the remaining property is released at any\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\n not barred by the terms of this document from\n asserting an interest in that property if the\n United States asserts no further interest in or\n claim to the property.\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\nproperty.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\n\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\n\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\nid., she must wait.\n ***\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\non this point.\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\n\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\nable multiplication of proceedings.\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael Segal\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\\n Proposed Intervenor.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\\ntions).\\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\\n\\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\\n6, 2017.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\\ntimely.\\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\\nprocessing rule.\\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\\n\\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\\ncase.\\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\\nsentence).\\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\\n\\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\\n\\n\\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\\nishment of the defendant.\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\\nare groundless.\\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\\n\\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\\napproach to the deadline.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\\n\\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\\n\\n\\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\\nStipulation.”).\\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\\nment ¶ 10.4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\\n\\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\\nture obligation).\\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\\nordered to pay.”\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\\n\\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\\nsettlement agreement.\\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\\n\\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\\n\\n\\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\\ning).\\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\\n\\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\\nCir. 2013).\\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\\n third party may have a claim to or against any\\n such property under applicable law, claimants\\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\\n the remaining property so that the property can\\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\\n\\n\\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\\ntion of any third-party claims.\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\\n that the remaining property is released at any\\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\\n not barred by the terms of this document from\\n asserting an interest in that property if the\\n United States asserts no further interest in or\\n claim to the property.\\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\\nproperty.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\\n\\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\\nid., she must wait.\\n ***\\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\\non this point.\\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\\n\\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\\nable multiplication of proceedings.\\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4379,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661326,"string":"4,661,326"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Segal"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3317"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\\n Proposed Intervenor.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\\ntions).\\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\\n\\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\\n6, 2017.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\\ntimely.\\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\\nprocessing rule.\\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\\n\\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\\ncase.\\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\\nsentence).\\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\\n\\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\\n\\n\\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\\nishment of the defendant.\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\\nare groundless.\\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\\n\\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\\napproach to the deadline.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\\n\\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\\n\\n\\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\\nStipulation.”).\\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\\nment ¶ 10.4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\\n\\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\\nture obligation).\\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\\nordered to pay.”\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\\n\\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\\nsettlement agreement.\\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\\n\\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\\n\\n\\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\\ning).\\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\\n\\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\\nCir. 2013).\\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\\n third party may have a claim to or against any\\n such property under applicable law, claimants\\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\\n the remaining property so that the property can\\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\\n\\n\\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\\ntion of any third-party claims.\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\\n that the remaining property is released at any\\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\\n not barred by the terms of this document from\\n asserting an interest in that property if the\\n United States asserts no further interest in or\\n claim to the property.\\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\\nproperty.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\\n\\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\\nid., she must wait.\\n ***\\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\\non this point.\\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\\n\\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\\nable multiplication of proceedings.\\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438579/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661326/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael Segal\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\n Defendant-Appellant,\n\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\n Proposed Intervenor.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\n\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\ntions).\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\n\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\n6, 2017.\n\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\ntimely.\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\nprocessing rule.\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\n\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\ncase.\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\n\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\nsentence).\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\n\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\n\n\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\nishment of the defendant.\n\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\nare groundless.\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\n\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\napproach to the deadline.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\n\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\n\n\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\nStipulation.”).\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\nment ¶ 10.4\n\n\n\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\n\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\nture obligation).\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\n\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\nordered to pay.”\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\n\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\nsettlement agreement.\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\n\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\n\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\n\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\n\n\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\ning).\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\n\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\nCir. 2013).\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\n third party may have a claim to or against any\n such property under applicable law, claimants\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\n the remaining property so that the property can\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\n\n\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\ntion of any third-party claims.\n\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\n that the remaining property is released at any\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\n not barred by the terms of this document from\n asserting an interest in that property if the\n United States asserts no further interest in or\n claim to the property.\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\nproperty.\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\n\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\n\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\n\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\nid., she must wait.\n ***\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\non this point.\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\n\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\n\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\nable multiplication of proceedings.\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael Segal\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL SEGAL,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: JOY SEGAL,\\n Proposed Intervenor.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:02-CR-00112-1 — Rubén Castillo, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These two appeals present\\nstraightforward issues of contract law, but with some proce-\\ndural complications. Appellant Michael Segal was convicted\\nin 2004 of racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false\\nstatements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\noperations of the Internal Revenue Service. The company he\\nowned, Near North Insurance Brokerage (NNIB), was con-\\nvicted of mail fraud, making false statements, and embezzle-\\nment. The history of Mr. Segal’s prosecution is detailed in\\nUnited States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming\\nconvictions and all aspects of sentence except forfeiture or-\\nder); United States v. Segal, 644 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirm-\\ning in part and remanding for discretionary re-sentencing);\\nand United States v. Segal, 811 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 2016) (ad-\\ndressing several issues under settlement of forfeiture obliga-\\ntions).\\n After Mr. Segal served time in prison, see 811 F.3d at 259,\\nand after further sentencing proceedings, see 644 F.3d at 366–\\n68, he was ordered to forfeit to the government $15 million\\nand his entire interest in NNIB. The company itself was or-\\ndered to pay restitution and a fine. 495 F.3d at 830. The gov-\\nernment initially restrained approximately $47 million worth\\nof assets of both Segal and NNIB. Liquidation proceedings\\nhave continued well into the case’s second decade.\\n Mr. Segal’s forfeiture obligations have been disputed for\\nyears. See, e.g., 811 F.3d 257. In early 2013, on the eve of what\\npromised to be a complex and contentious hearing over\\nwhich assets should be forfeited and how much they were\\nworth, Mr. Segal and the government agreed on a court-ap-\\nproved settlement that fulfilled Mr. Segal’s $15 million per-\\nsonal forfeiture obligation. Mr. Segal now seeks to rescind or\\nmodify that agreement. The district court denied his attempt,\\nand he now appeals. The 2013 settlement, which Mr. Segal has\\nsucceeded in enforcing strictly against the government, see id.\\nat 261–62, is the first of the two contracts we address here.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 3\\n\\n The second contract is a related settlement between Mr.\\nSegal’s ex-wife, Joy Segal, and the United States government.\\nThe Segals divorced in June 2005, after Mr. Segal’s conviction.\\nIn February 2006, Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under\\n18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) to intervene in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture pro-\\nceedings. In November 2010, Ms. Segal, too, settled her claims\\nwith the government. Under that deal, the government re-\\nleased to her about $7.7 million in restrained assets. In ex-\\nchange, she relinquished all further claims—save one contin-\\ngent future interest, at issue here. She now seeks to intervene\\nin the ongoing liquidation proceedings that the district court\\nis administering pursuant to Mr. Segal’s forfeiture settlement.\\nThe district court denied her attempt at intervention because\\nher contingent future interest is not yet ripe. She also appeals.\\n We have jurisdiction over both appeals, and we affirm in\\nall respects the district court’s challenged orders. Because Ms.\\nSegal’s claims depend on Mr. Segal’s—jurisdictionally, proce-\\ndurally, and substantively—we address his first.\\nI. Michael Segal’s Challenge to his Settlement Agreement\\n A. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n We begin with appellate jurisdiction, which the govern-\\nment challenges on the ground that Mr. Segal filed his notice\\nof appeal too late. See, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 206 F.3d 756,\\n760 (7th Cir. 2000) (timely notice of appeal is prerequisite for\\nappellate jurisdiction). Mr. Segal appeals from two orders: the\\ndistrict court’s denial of his motion to modify his forfeiture\\norder, entered on July 12, 2017, and its denial of his motion to\\namend that order, entered on August 16, 2017. R. 2100, 2107.\\nHe filed his notice of appeal in the district court on September\\n6, 2017.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n The notice of appeal was too late if we apply the 14-day\\ndeadline for a defendant’s criminal appeal in Federal Rule of\\nAppellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A), but it was timely if we apply\\nthe 60-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Rule 4(a)(1)(B)\\nfor civil appeals where the United States is a party. Counting\\non the civil appeal deadline for an appeal of such ancillary\\norders in a criminal case is risky, but we find that this appeal\\nis civil in substance and that Mr. Segal’s notice was therefore\\ntimely.\\n Strictly speaking, the time limit in a criminal case is not\\njurisdictional, in the sense that a failure to comply may not be\\noverlooked or waived, because the time limit appears in a\\nFederal Rule rather than in a statute. United States v. Neff, 598\\nF.3d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Hamer v. Neighbor-\\nhood Housing Svcs. of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (distin-\\nguishing between jurisdictional and mandatory claims-pro-\\ncessing rules); United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 501 (7th\\nCir. 2010) (same). The 60-day civil deadline where the United\\nStates is a party is statutory, however, established by 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 2107(b), so it is jurisdictional. The government has raised the\\ntimeliness issue properly, so we must decide the issue,\\nwhether as a matter of appellate jurisdiction or the claims-\\nprocessing rule.\\n Under the 2013 settlement agreement, the district court re-\\ntained jurisdiction “in order to implement and enforce” the\\nsettlement of the forfeiture issues. 2013 Settlement Agreement\\n¶ 22. Though Mr. Segal himself titled the motion at issue as\\none to modify the underlying forfeiture order, the district\\ncourt focused on the real substance of the relief sought, which\\nwas rescission or modification of the settlement agreement.\\nThat was the correct focus. The court’s order resolved what\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 5\\n\\nwas in essence a civil dispute embedded within a criminal\\ncase.\\n Defendants’ appeals from decisions modifying or refusing\\nto modify forfeiture orders in criminal cases are ordinarily\\ngoverned by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) be-\\ncause criminal forfeitures are “punishment” and therefore\\npart of a criminal sentence. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29,\\n39 (1995) (“Congress conceived of forfeiture as punishment\\nfor the commission of various drug and racketeering\\ncrimes.”); United States v. Infelise, 159 F.3d 300, 302 (7th Cir.\\n1998) (“There is no question that, in general, forfeiture is part\\nof the sentence and is appealable.”); United States v. Apampa,\\n179 F.3d 555, 556–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he core of a ‘criminal\\ncase’ to which Rule 4(b) applies is the sentence…. A forfeiture\\nthat constitutes part of the punishment in a criminal prosecu-\\ntion is governed by Rule 4(b).”).\\n Appellants in criminal cases do not often attempt to rely\\non the longer appeal deadlines for civil cases, but in several\\nsuch appeals filed under the umbrella of criminal cases, we\\nhave applied a pragmatic approach that looks to the “sub-\\nstance and context, and not the label, of the proceeding ap-\\npealed from [to] determine its civil or criminal character.”\\nBetts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1993) (apply-\\ning civil deadline to appeal from denial of certificate of inno-\\ncence). We have taken this approach because “many appeala-\\nble orders technically ‘in’ criminal cases look more civil than\\ncriminal,” especially when they pertain to “postjudgment\\nremedies … collateral to criminal punishment.” United States\\nv. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying civil dead-\\nline to appeal of denial of order for return of seized property);\\nUnited States v. Lee, 659 F.3d 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2011)\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n(applying civil deadline to appeal of order to defendant to\\nturn over funds in retirement accounts), citing United States v.\\nKollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007) (allowing gov-\\nernment to pursue garnishment and other civil debt collection\\ntechniques under umbrella of criminal case); United States v.\\nSantiago, 826 F.2d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying civil dead-\\nline to surety’s appeal of forfeiture of bail bond: “a bail bond\\nis a civil contractual agreement between the government and\\nthe surety on behalf of the criminal defendant”); cf. Lilly, 206\\nF.3d at 760 (applying criminal deadline where defendant\\nsought declaration that he had satisfied his forfeiture obliga-\\ntion, which was a condition of ongoing supervised release\\nportion of sentence); Apampa, 179 F.3d at 556 (applying crim-\\ninal deadline to defendant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of\\nsentence).\\n We apply that pragmatic approach here. To do so, we must\\noverlook the unfortunate title of Mr. Segal’s filing in the dis-\\ntrict court: “Motion to Modify Forfeiture Order.” Under\\nApampa, 179 F.3d at 556, a true request to modify a criminal\\nforfeiture order would be subject to the deadline for criminal\\nappeals, which Mr. Segal missed. In this case, however, there\\nhas been no forfeiture order in effect against Mr. Segal since\\nthe 2013 settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement\\nwould satisfy his forfeiture obligations. The district court thus\\nproperly focused on the substance of the motion, which\\nsought to set aside and/or modify the settlement agreement.\\n Consistent with Betts, Taylor, and Lee, in Mr. Segal’s appeal\\nwe too treat that settlement as a contract and treat the dispute\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 7\\n\\nabout it as a civil matter. Mr. Segal presents a civil appeal, so\\nhis notice of appeal was timely under Rule 4(a).1\\n We also find that the order from which Mr. Segal appeals\\nwas appealable even though liquidation proceedings con-\\ntinue in the district court. He sought what amounts to injunc-\\ntive relief—the immediate transfer of property—by either\\n\\n\\n 1 Our approach is consistent with decisions from other circuits apply-\\ning the civil deadline of Rule 4(a) to similar, essentially civil, proceedings\\nwithin criminal cases. E.g., Palma v. United States Dep’t of Alcohol, Tobacco,\\nand Firearms, 228 F.3d 323, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline\\nto government’s appeal from decision granting defendant relief from ban\\non possessing firearms: “A proceeding can not be defined as criminal\\nmerely because it arises from, or pertains to, a prior criminal proceed-\\ning.”); United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying\\ncivil deadline to government’s appeal from order awarding attorney fees\\nto acquitted defendants under Hyde Amendment: “Ancillary motions in\\na criminal case are not necessarily criminal…. [A] proceeding that is basi-\\ncally civil should be considered a civil action even if it stems from a prior\\ncriminal prosecution.”); United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772 n.4\\n(9th Cir. 1996) (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of\\npetition to amend forfeiture claim); United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898,\\n902–03 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying civil deadline to acquitted defendants’ ap-\\npeal of denial of attorney fees under Hyde Amendment); United States v.\\nLavin, 942 F.2d 177, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying civil deadline to third\\nparty’s appeal of denial of its petition for property seized in criminal for-\\nfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415\\n(10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (applying civil deadline to appeal from order\\nrelating to forfeiture of bail bond). For a collection of cases addressing the\\nboundary between civil and criminal appeals, see 20 James Wm. Moore,\\nMoore’s Federal Practice §§ 304.10 and 304.20 (3d ed. 2019). Specific statu-\\ntory language may offer guidance in classifying particular matters, but in\\nthe absence of such specific guidance for this dispute over a settlement\\nagreement, we apply our pragmatic approach based on the nature of the\\nproceeding and how closely it was tied to the actual conviction and pun-\\nishment of the defendant.\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nrescinding or interpreting the 2013 settlement agreement. See\\nR. 2065 (prayer for relief); United States v. Kovich, 201 F.2d 470\\n(7th Cir. 1953) (order directing landlord to restore personal\\nproperty to tenants was an appealable injunction); see also\\nSegal, 811 F.3d at 259 (resolving appeals of similar disputes\\nunder same settlement agreement). The district court’s denial\\nof Mr. Segal’s motion was thus appealable under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(a)(1).2\\n B. Merits of Mr. Segal’s Appeal\\n With jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Segal’s ap-\\npeal, we find that his challenges to the district court’s orders\\nare groundless.\\n 1. The Unconscionability Challenge\\n Mr. Segal reprises longstanding complaints about the sup-\\nposed unfairness of the forfeiture order against him. See, e.g.,\\n644 F.3d at 365. In his motion to modify and this appeal, he\\nargues more specifically—and for the first time—that the 2013\\nsettlement agreement is unenforceable because it is both pro-\\ncedurally and substantively unconscionable. We review de\\nnovo a district court’s interpretation of a written settlement\\nagreement, United States v. Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th\\nCir. 2002), although we recognize and benefit from Judge\\n\\n 2 Mr. Segal’s choice to file his notice of appeal after the criminal dead-\\nline was a high-risk litigation strategy. Compare, e.g., Lavin, 942 F.2d at\\n181–82 (applying civil deadline to third party’s appeal of denial of its pe-\\ntition for property seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings), with Apampa,\\n179 F.3d at 556–57 (applying criminal deadline to dismiss criminal defend-\\nant’s appeal of forfeiture portion of sentence, distinguishing between civil\\nand criminal forfeiture). Future appellants bringing quasi-civil appeals\\nunder the umbrella of a criminal case might consider a more conservative\\napproach to the deadline.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 9\\n\\nCastillo’s long and patient work in this case. Applying Illinois\\nlaw to interpret the contract and the circumstances of its for-\\nmation without apparent objection from the government, the\\ndistrict court found “Segal’s effort to paint himself as a pow-\\nerless victim of an overzealous government entirely unper-\\nsuasive” and concluded there was “nothing inherently unfair\\nabout the Settlement Stipulation or the process used to nego-\\ntiate it.” R. 2100 at 5. For several reasons, we agree.3\\n The 2013 settlement agreement was the product of intense\\nnegotiations between the government and a well-counseled\\ndefendant. The heart of that agreement is its division of prop-\\nerty. During their negotiations, Mr. Segal and the government\\ndrew up two lists of assets that became Exhibits A and B to\\nthe settlement agreement. Exhibit A listed all of the assets then\\nrestrained by the government. Exhibit B listed which of those\\nassets would be released to Mr. Segal pursuant to the\\n\\n\\n 3 Strictly speaking, the federal common law of contracts should apply\\nto this contract with the United States government. See United States v.\\nSeckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970); Rand Motors, 305 F.3d at 774. Under\\nClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, “the rule of Erie … does not apply to\\nthis action” because applying state law to contracts with the United States\\ngovernment “would lead to great diversity in results by making identical\\ntransactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The\\ndesirability of a uniform rule is plain.” 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see also\\nHenry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39\\nN.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964) (in rejecting a “general federal common\\nlaw,” Erie Railroad “opened the way to what, for want of a better term, we\\nmay call specialized federal common law”); 19 Charles Alan Wright & Ar-\\nthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4515, Areas of Competence for\\nthe Formulation of Federal Common Law—Conflicts Between State Law and Fed-\\neral Interests (3d ed.). Here, both Illinois and federal common law lead to\\nthe same conclusion: the 2013 settlement agreement is neither procedur-\\nally nor substantively unconscionable.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nsettlement agreement. Mr. Segal disclaimed any interest in the\\nassets listed on Exhibit A but not on Exhibit B. 2013 Settlement\\nAgreement ¶ 10 (“It is further agreed that defendant Michael\\nSegal shall release any and all claims to any and all remaining\\nreal or personal property, proceeds from the sale of any prop-\\nerties, real or personal, and corporate assets, identified on Ex-\\nhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B attached to the Settlement\\nStipulation.”).\\n Mr. Segal’s unconscionability argument rests on the con-\\ntention that the government has improperly retained assets\\nthat belong to him because they were previously titled in his\\nname, not NNIB’s. This contention is now beside the point for\\ntwo independent reasons. First, this court and the district\\ncourt have repeatedly noted that the commingling of Mr.\\nSegal’s and NNIB’s finances was integral to the fraud Mr.\\nSegal committed, making nominal ownership of assets only a\\nstarting point in, not a definitive guide to, determining prop-\\nerty rights. See, e.g., 495 F.3d at 830–31; 644 F.3d at 367; R. 2100\\nat 6. The confusion over ownership was an important consid-\\neration underlying both sides’ agreement to the settlement.\\nSecond, and more critical at this late stage, Mr. Segal had the\\nright to test ownership of the contested assets by evidentiary\\nhearing scheduled for early 2013. Instead, he chose to settle,\\naccepting the terms of that agreement in lieu of any prior\\nclaims he might have asserted. See 2013 Settlement Agree-\\nment ¶ 10.4\\n\\n\\n\\n 4As part of the settlement, the government released a number of val-\\nuable assets to Mr. Segal free and clear of any forfeiture claims, including\\n$2.15 million in liquid accounts, ownership interests in at least six pri-\\nvately held companies, and several insurance policies.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 11\\n\\n Mr. Segal also argues that the agreement is substantively\\nunconscionable because, in his estimation, the government\\ngot the better end of the deal—that is, he believes the govern-\\nment may ultimately net more than $15 million. The agree-\\nment contains no such cap. Mr. Segal’s original personal for-\\nfeiture obligation was $15 million, and he was also ordered to\\nforfeit his entire interest in NNIB. The settlement agreement\\nreplaced that personal $15 million obligation and the obliga-\\ntion to forfeit his interest in NNIB by ceding the assets “iden-\\ntified on Exhibit A and not listed on Exhibit B” to the govern-\\nment. 2013 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 10. As the district court\\nexplained: “Part of accepting the settlement was accepting the\\nasset valuations the parties estimated at that time…. The fact\\nthat the valuations may have turned out differently than Segal\\npredicted does not give him carte blanche to rewrite the par-\\nties’ agreement.” R. 2100 at 8, quoting United States v. Bownes,\\n405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In a contract … one binds\\noneself to do something that someone else wants, in exchange\\nfor some benefit to oneself. By binding oneself one assumes\\nthe risk of future changes in circumstances in light of which\\none’s bargain may prove to have been a bad one. That is the\\nrisk inherent in all contracts; they limit the parties’ ability to\\ntake advantage of what may happen over the period in which\\nthe contract is in effect.”); see also United States v. Paccione, 948\\nF.2d 851, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1991) (strictly enforcing against the\\ngovernment a settlement agreement in fulfillment of a forfei-\\nture obligation).\\n The unconscionability argument also fails for another rea-\\nson. In Mr. Segal’s 2016 appearance before this court, he\\nsought and won strict enforcement of the settlement agree-\\nment, resulting in a favorable order preserving Mr. Segal’s\\nright to repurchase a valuable interest in the Chicago Bulls.\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n811 F.3d 257. The doctrine of judicial estoppel “protects the\\ncourts from being manipulated by chameleonic litigants who\\nseek to prevail, twice, on opposite theories.” Grochocinski v.\\nMayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 795 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr.\\nSegal is now attempting just such a manipulation, arguing\\nthat the same contract he previously succeeded in enforcing\\nfor his benefit should now be set aside as unconscionable. He\\nis judicially estopped from pursuing this challenge.\\n 2. The “Windfall” Theory\\nMr. Segal also contends that the government has received an\\nimproper “windfall” of assets in excess of his $15 million for-\\nfeiture obligation. This assertion has no merit. As noted, the\\nsettlement agreement contains no $15 million cap on the as-\\nsets the government was entitled to receive. Such a cap would\\nhave made little sense, moreover, because the settlement\\nagreement applied to assets of both Mr. Segal and NNIB.\\n As part of this challenge, Mr. Segal also contends the dis-\\ntrict court erred back in 2013 when it approved the settlement\\nagreement without independently confirming the factual ba-\\nsis of the settlement agreement. He contends the court had\\nsuch a duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\\n32.2(b)(1)(A). That rule provides in relevant part: “If the gov-\\nernment seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must\\ndetermine whether the government has established the requi-\\nsite nexus between the property and the offense. If the gov-\\nernment seeks a personal money judgment, the court must\\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be\\nordered to pay.”\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 13\\n\\n Under the rule’s language, the court is obliged to deter-\\nmine “the requisite nexus” only when a forfeiture of “specific\\nproperty” is at stake, and only in the context of the original\\nforfeiture order itself, not a settlement agreement. Here, the\\nitems of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s assorted property were of-\\nfered as substitute assets to fulfill a money judgment against\\nhim personally. He challenges here not a forfeiture order but\\nthe settlement agreement that the parties agreed would fulfill\\nthe underlying forfeiture order. The district court therefore\\ndid not have, and in 2013 did not fail in the exercise of, any\\nindependent duty under Rule 32.2. Mr. Segal’s attempt to\\nraise this issue years after the entry of the forfeiture order is\\nalso untimely at best. Nor will we apply this rule of criminal\\nprocedure in an appeal that we are otherwise treating as\\ncivil—at Mr. Segal’s request.\\n Since signing the settlement agreement in 2013, Mr.\\nSegal’s only remaining interest has been to ensure that he in\\nfact received the assets listed on Exhibit B. He has no legally\\ncognizable interest in what the government does with the re-\\nmaining Exhibit A assets or in what they are worth. We agree\\nwith the district court that the four corners of the 2013 agree-\\nment control Mr. Segal’s rights and interests.The district court\\ncorrectly denied Mr. Segal’s effort to modify or rescind the\\nsettlement agreement.\\nII. Joy Segal’s Attempts to Intervene\\n We now turn to Joy Segal’s appeal, which also presents\\nboth jurisdictional and contractual issues. In her case, the two\\nare intertwined to an unusual degree. Joy Segal has her own\\nsettlement agreement with the government. The Segals di-\\nvorced in June 2005, not long after Mr. Segal’s June 2004 con-\\nviction. Based in part on property rights purportedly granted\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nto her by the Segals’ marital property settlement, in February\\n2006 Ms. Segal filed a third-party claim under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 1963(l) to some of the assets at issue in Mr. Segal’s forfeiture\\nproceedings. She settled this claim with the government in\\nNovember 2010, and was well represented by able counsel.\\nUnder her settlement agreement, the government released to\\nMs. Segal about $7.7 million in assets, including two resi-\\ndences, a restaurant, jewelry, financial accounts, retirement\\naccounts, and life insurance policies.\\n As we read the record, it appears that Ms. Segal has two\\nobjectives, one long-term and one near-term. For the long\\nterm, Ms. Segal claims that she is entitled to return of the as-\\nsets of hers the government allegedly collected as substitute\\nassets in fulfillment of her ex-husband’s $15 million forfeiture\\njudgment. Endorsing Mr. Segal’s “windfall” arguments, she\\nsays that the government has collected all that it is entitled to\\nand that she is now entitled to much of the rest, including as-\\nsets that she claims as her personal property and marital share\\npursuant to the divorce settlement. And in the short term, she\\nsays, she is entitled to an accounting from the government to\\nensure that her assets are not being used improperly—for ex-\\nample, to satisfy creditors of Mr. Segal or NNIB. Accordingly,\\nin September 2017 Ms. Segal moved to intervene under Fed-\\neral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b). This was her fifth\\nsimilar attempt. The district court denied her motion on the\\nrecord at a hearing on October 4, 2017. R. 2122. Ms. Segal filed\\nher notice of appeal on November 7, 2017.\\n The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) provides\\nthe exclusive means by which a third party may assert a claim\\nto property subject to forfeiture under RICO. That is true\\nwhen a party seeks to “intervene in a trial or appeal of a\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 15\\n\\ncriminal case involving the forfeiture of such property under\\nthis section.” § 1963(i)(1). But we are treating the underlying\\nproceeding in which Ms. Segal seeks intervention—supervi-\\nsion of Mr. Segal’s settlement agreement—as in essence a civil\\ncase embedded in the larger criminal case. The government is\\nnot pursuing any further forfeiture under § 1963. Its rights,\\nlike those of Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal, have been defined for\\nyears by the respective settlement agreements. Subsections\\n1963(i) and (l) no longer apply.\\n In fact, Ms. Segal exercised her § 1963(l) right of interven-\\ntion back in 2006, leading toward her 2010 settlement, from\\nwhich she obtained $7.7 million in property. That agreement\\nprovides the only potential basis for her to assert a right to\\nintervene. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 therefore pro-\\nvides the proper framework for analysis, and for reasons that\\nparallel our discussion of appellate jurisdiction of Mr. Segal’s\\nappeal, we find that Ms. Segal’s appeal is timely under the 60-\\nday deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\\n4(a)(1)(B). In addition, in civil cases, courts of appeals apply a\\n“special rule” of finality under which “a party whose motion\\nto intervene has been denied may take an immediate appeal.”\\nUnited States v. City of Milwaukee, 144 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.\\n1998). (In City of Milwaukee itself, we dismissed an appeal from\\nan order denying intervention without prejudice for failure to\\ncomply with the procedural requirements of Civil Rule 24(c)\\nbecause the movant could have cured the defect by refiling.\\nSee id. at 527–28. That reason for dismissal does not apply\\nhere.) We thus have jurisdiction over Ms. Segal’s appeal from\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nthe district court’s denial of her motion to intervene under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1291.5\\n\\n\\n 5 Appellate jurisdiction for both of these appeals is based on the exist-\\nence of the settlement agreements, separate and distinct from Mr. Segal’s\\nforfeiture order. If Ms. Segal’s appeal were considered an appeal from her\\n§ 1963(l) claim, it would be years late. More generally, we must caution\\nthat parties seeking to appeal orders in RICO or other criminal forfeiture\\nproceedings may find only limited guidance from this opinion. Such pro-\\nceedings are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. Rule\\n32.2(c) governs ancillary forfeiture proceedings and provides for a unique\\nblend of civil and criminal procedures: “After disposing of any motion\\nfiled under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) and before conducting a hearing on the pe-\\ntition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery in accordance\\nwith the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that dis-\\ncovery is necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery\\nends, a party may move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of\\nCivil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B). The advisory commit-\\ntee’s notes to Rule 32.2 clarify that the civil appeal deadline of Federal Rule\\nof Appellate Procedure 4(a) applies to motions filed under 32.2(c): “Be-\\ncause an ancillary hearing is connected to a criminal case, it would not be\\nappropriate to make the Civil Rules applicable in all respects. The amend-\\nment, however, describes several fundamental areas in which procedures\\nanalogous to those in the Civil Rules may be followed. These include the\\nfiling of a motion to dismiss a claim, conducting discovery, disposing of a\\nclaim on a motion for summary judgment, and appealing a final disposition\\nof a claim. Where applicable, the amendment follows the prevailing case\\nlaw on the issue.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000\\nadoption (collecting cases; emphasis added); see also, e.g., United States v.\\nButt, 930 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying civil deadline to appeal\\nfrom denial of criminal defendant’s sister’s petition for an ancillary hear-\\ning).\\n However, “[w]hen the ancillary proceeding ends, the court must enter\\na final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary\\nto account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). Under\\nRule 32.2(b)(4)(C), any appeals from a final order of forfeiture or an order\\namending it, or orders denying forfeiture or amendment, are governed by\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 17\\n\\n Reaching the merits of Ms. Segal’s appeal, we agree with\\nthe district court that Ms. Segal has no right to intervene at\\nthis time. In relevant part, Civil Rule 24(a)(2) grants a right of\\nintervention to anyone who “claims an interest relating to the\\nproperty or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is\\nso situated that disposing of the action may as a practical mat-\\nter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its inter-\\nest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”\\nA party may intervene as of right when “(1) the motion to in-\\ntervene is timely filed; (2) the proposed intervenors possess\\nan interest related to the subject matter of the action; (3) dis-\\nposition of the action threatens to impair that interest; and (4)\\nthe named parties inadequately represent that interest.” Wis-\\nconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 657–58 (7th\\nCir. 2013).\\n The second factor is dispositive: Ms. Segal has no cogniza-\\nble interest at this time. Paragraph 15 of her settlement agree-\\nment provides the only basis for her claimed interest:\\n Upon entry of an order approving this Settle-\\n ment Stipulation and notice to ensure that no\\n third party may have a claim to or against any\\n such property under applicable law, claimants\\n Joy Segal and [Joy and Michael’s son] Jonathan\\n Segal shall disclaim any right, title, or owner-\\n ship interest that they may have had in any of\\n the remaining property so that the property can\\n be forfeit and disposed of according to law.\\n\\n\\nthe criminal appeal deadline of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b).\\nThis rule applies to the extent that the final order encompasses the resolu-\\ntion of any third-party claims.\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\n Further, they are unaware of any third party\\n who has a claim cognizable under Title 18,\\n United States Code, Section 1963 to the remain-\\n ing property subject to forfeiture. In the event\\n that the remaining property is released at any\\n time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at the\\n completion of all proceedings, including by any\\n modifications to or revocation of the forfeiture\\n judgment by the Court or any reviewing court,\\n the claimants, Joy Segal and Jonathan Segal, are\\n not barred by the terms of this document from\\n asserting an interest in that property if the\\n United States asserts no further interest in or\\n claim to the property.\\n The first and last sentences hold the keys. Under the first\\nsentence of paragraph 15, Ms. Segal no longer has a claim to\\nany property the government has restrained pending Mr.\\nSegal’s forfeiture proceedings (save, of course, the property\\nspecifically transferred to her pursuant to paragraph 11 of her\\nsettlement agreement). And under the last sentence, Ms. Segal\\ncan assert no further claims to forfeited property until forfei-\\nture proceedings are completed—if any property remains.\\n(The government believes it is unlikely any property will re-\\nmain because of Mr. Segal’s and NNIB’s outstanding debts\\nand tax liens. R. 2078 at 4.) In other words, in the 2010 settle-\\nment agreement, Ms. Segal expressly disclaimed any right to\\nrestrained and/or forfeited property during the time between\\nthe agreement’s effective date and the “completion of all [for-\\nfeiture] proceedings.” 2010 Settlement Agreement, ¶ 15.\\nThose proceedings are ongoing, so she has no right to that\\nproperty.\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 19\\n\\n Nor does Ms. Segal’s 2005 divorce grant her any addi-\\ntional claim to the restrained assets, nor a right to an account-\\ning while forfeiture proceedings continue, as she claims in the\\nproposed complaint for declaratory judgment attached to her\\nmotion to intervene. The Segals’ marital settlement gave her\\nproperty rights as against Mr. Segal, but it did not (and could\\nnot) thereby allow her to remove assets from the pool of prop-\\nerty restrained by the government before the divorce. Ms.\\nSegal properly pursued her claim to restrained assets in the\\n§ 1963(l) proceedings of 2006–10, resulting in the settlement\\nagreement we interpret and enforce here. That agreement en-\\ncompasses all of her remaining rights to the property at issue\\nvis-à-vis the government. It controls here.\\n Ms. Segal’s potential claim to remaining restrained prop-\\nerty will not come to life unless and until that property “is\\nreleased at any time and/or not otherwise ordered forfeit at\\nthe completion of all proceedings … if the United States as-\\nserts no interest or further claim to the property.” 2010 Settle-\\nment Agreement ¶ 15. That has not happened yet, and it may\\nnever happen. She has no interest to assert at this time and\\nmay not intervene as of right. For this same reason, the district\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by denying permissive in-\\ntervention. See Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d\\n941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (orders denying permissive interven-\\ntion are reviewed for abuse of discretion).\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ms.\\nSegal’s motion to intervene. Any right of intervention she\\nmight have is not yet ripe and may never be, so we agree with\\nthe district judge that she had no standing to bring the motion\\nin the district court in the first place. See R. 2123 at 10 (“mere\\nspeculation is not a case or controversy”). As the district court\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\\n\\nhas repeatedly ruled, at the conclusion of forfeiture proceed-\\nings, Ms. Segal will be notified of her right to participate and\\nmay choose to try to intervene at that time. R. 2123 at 9. But\\nuntil “the entire premise of that intervention” materializes,\\nid., she must wait.\\n ***\\n We conclude by addressing appellants’ litigation behav-\\nior. The motion to intervene that Ms. Segal appeals here is her\\nfifth nearly identical attempt with at least as many attorneys,\\ndespite having been told by the district court clearly and cor-\\nrectly that she has no standing to bring any such claims until\\nthe close of forfeiture proceedings. The settlement agree-\\nment—from which she has already benefitted—is crystal clear\\non this point.\\n Mr. Segal’s tactics are more egregious. His 68-page reply\\nin the district court relied mostly on “gratuitous attacks on\\ncounsel,” with “page after page of vitriol against one of the\\nprosecutors,” a brief which that court “would have been jus-\\ntified as striking as overlength and improper.” R. 2100 at 5. In\\nhis brief on appeal, Mr. Segal accuses the government of all\\nsorts of serious wrongdoing—such as that it outright “fabri-\\ncated the record”—without offering any evidence. The legal\\narguments that Mr. Segal raised in the district court and in\\nthis court are baseless, hyperbolic, and conspiratorial. And\\nthey are diametrically opposed to arguments he has made\\nsuccessfully earlier in the case.\\n Mr. Segal and Ms. Segal have asked us to treat these ap-\\npeals and the post-settlement portions of the case as proce-\\ndurally civil, and we have done so. But civil procedure giveth\\nand civil procedure taketh away. By now the saga of United\\n\\fNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317 21\\n\\nStates v. Segal should be over, except insofar as the parties\\nmake objectively reasonable and good-faith attempts to en-\\nforce the express terms of their respective settlement agree-\\nments. If there are further proceedings in this matter, the par-\\nties and their counsel will be subject to the requirements of\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1927, counsel may be liable for excessive costs for unreason-\\nable multiplication of proceedings.\\n The district court’s orders denying Michael Segal’s motion\\nto modify his settlement agreement are AFFIRMED. The dis-\\ntrict court’s orders denying Joy Segal’s motions to intervene\\nand for declaratory judgment are also AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4380,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661327,"string":"4,661,327"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2170"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Per Curiam\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 16, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBy the Court:\\n\\n\\n\\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\\n\\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\\n Wisconsin.\\n v.\\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\\n Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\\nby further order.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438580/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661327/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 16, 2019\n\n\n\n\nBy the Court:\n\n\n\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\n\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\n Wisconsin.\n v.\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\n Judge.\n\n\n\n\n ORDER\n\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\nby further order.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 16, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBy the Court:\\n\\n\\n\\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\\n\\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\\n Wisconsin.\\n v.\\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\\n Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\\nby further order.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4381,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661328,"string":"4,661,328"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2456"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2456\\nDENNIS DAVIS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\\n\\f2 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\\nfact suffered a stroke.\\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\\ndistrict court.\\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\\nclaim fails as well.\\n I. Background\\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 3\\n\\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\\n\\f4 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\\nfirmed.\\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 5\\n\\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\\nits author remains unidentified.\\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\\n\\f6 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\\ntestimony.\\n II. Discussion\\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 7\\n\\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\\nindifference.\\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\\n\\f8 No. 18-2456\\n\\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\\nhad suffered a stroke.\\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 9\\n\\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\\n\\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\\n\\f10 No. 18-2456\\n\\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\\nappeal.\\n\\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\\nspeaking to him.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 11\\n\\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\\nly before us.\\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2456\\n\\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438581/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661328/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2456\nDENNIS DAVIS,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Central District of Illinois.\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\n\f2 No. 18-2456\n\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\nfact suffered a stroke.\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\ndistrict court.\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\nclaim fails as well.\n I. Background\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\n\fNo. 18-2456 3\n\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\n\f4 No. 18-2456\n\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\nfirmed.\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\n\fNo. 18-2456 5\n\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\nits author remains unidentified.\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\n\f6 No. 18-2456\n\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\ntestimony.\n II. Discussion\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\n\fNo. 18-2456 7\n\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\nindifference.\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\n\f8 No. 18-2456\n\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\nhad suffered a stroke.\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\n\fNo. 18-2456 9\n\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\n\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\n\f10 No. 18-2456\n\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\nappeal.\n\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\nspeaking to him.\n\fNo. 18-2456 11\n\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\nly before us.\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\n\f12 No. 18-2456\n\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2456\\nDENNIS DAVIS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\\n\\f2 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\\nfact suffered a stroke.\\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\\ndistrict court.\\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\\nclaim fails as well.\\n I. Background\\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 3\\n\\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\\n\\f4 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\\nfirmed.\\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 5\\n\\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\\nits author remains unidentified.\\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\\n\\f6 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\\ntestimony.\\n II. Discussion\\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 7\\n\\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\\nindifference.\\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\\n\\f8 No. 18-2456\\n\\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\\nhad suffered a stroke.\\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 9\\n\\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\\n\\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\\n\\f10 No. 18-2456\\n\\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\\nappeal.\\n\\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\\nspeaking to him.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 11\\n\\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\\nly before us.\\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2456\\n\\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4382,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661371,"string":"4,661,371"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2170"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Per Curiam\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 16, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBy the Court:\\n\\n\\n\\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\\n\\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\\n Wisconsin.\\n v.\\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\\n Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\\nby further order.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438624/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661371/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 16, 2019\n\n\n\n\nBy the Court:\n\n\n\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\n\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\n Wisconsin.\n v.\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\n Judge.\n\n\n\n\n ORDER\n\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\nby further order.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n September 16, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBy the Court:\\n\\n\\n\\nNos. 18‐1498, 18‐1499, 18‐2170 & 18‐2177\\n\\nJ.K.J. and M.J.J., Appeals from the United States District\\n Plaintiffs‐Appellees, Court for the Western District of\\n Wisconsin.\\n v.\\n Nos. 15‐cv‐00428‐wmc and\\nPOLK COUNTY and 15‐cv‐00433‐wmc\\nDARRYL L. CHRISTENSEN.,\\n Defendants‐Appellants. William M. Conley,\\n Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n The petition for rehearing en banc is GRANTED. The opinion and judgment\\nentered by the panel are VACATED. Oral argument will be heard on a date to be set\\nby further order.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4383,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661372,"string":"4,661,372"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2456"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2456\\nDENNIS DAVIS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\\n\\f2 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\\nfact suffered a stroke.\\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\\ndistrict court.\\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\\nclaim fails as well.\\n I. Background\\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 3\\n\\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\\n\\f4 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\\nfirmed.\\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 5\\n\\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\\nits author remains unidentified.\\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\\n\\f6 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\\ntestimony.\\n II. Discussion\\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 7\\n\\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\\nindifference.\\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\\n\\f8 No. 18-2456\\n\\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\\nhad suffered a stroke.\\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 9\\n\\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\\n\\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\\n\\f10 No. 18-2456\\n\\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\\nappeal.\\n\\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\\nspeaking to him.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 11\\n\\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\\nly before us.\\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2456\\n\\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4438625/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661372/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2456\nDENNIS DAVIS,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Central District of Illinois.\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\nJudges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\n\f2 No. 18-2456\n\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\nfact suffered a stroke.\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\ndistrict court.\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\nclaim fails as well.\n I. Background\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\n\fNo. 18-2456 3\n\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\n\f4 No. 18-2456\n\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\nfirmed.\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\n\fNo. 18-2456 5\n\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\nits author remains unidentified.\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\n\f6 No. 18-2456\n\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\ntestimony.\n II. Discussion\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\n\fNo. 18-2456 7\n\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\nindifference.\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\n\f8 No. 18-2456\n\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\nhad suffered a stroke.\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\n\fNo. 18-2456 9\n\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\n\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\n\f10 No. 18-2456\n\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\nappeal.\n\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\nspeaking to him.\n\fNo. 18-2456 11\n\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\nly before us.\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\n\f12 No. 18-2456\n\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2456\\nDENNIS DAVIS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nFRANCIS KAYIRA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 15-cv-3075-SLD — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 25, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Dennis Davis is an Illinois prisoner\\nsuffering from kidney disease. After receiving dialysis on a\\nSaturday morning, he told a prison nurse that his mind was\\nfuzzy and his body was weak. Both complaints were similar\\nto side effects he had experienced in the past after dialysis.\\nThe nurse called Dr. Francis Kayira, the prison’s medical\\ndirector, who was on call. The doctor asked her whether\\n\\f2 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDavis had asymmetrical grip strength, facial droop, or was\\ndrooling—all classic signs of a stroke. When she said “no,”\\nDr. Kayira determined that Davis was experiencing the same\\ndialysis-related side effects as before rather than something\\nmore serious. He told the nurse to monitor the problem and\\ncall him if the symptoms got worse. Dr. Kayira didn’t hear\\nanything else for the rest of the weekend, but on Monday\\nmorning he examined Davis and discovered that he had in\\nfact suffered a stroke.\\n Davis later sued Dr. Kayira, alleging that he acted with\\ndeliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Davis also raised a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. The district court entered sum-\\nmary judgment for Dr. Kayira on both claims. The judge\\nruled that the deliberate-indifference claim failed because\\nthere is no evidence that Dr. Kayira was aware of symptoms\\nsuggesting that Davis was suffering a stroke. And the state-\\nlaw claim failed because Davis lacked expert testimony\\nabout the appropriate standard of care. A magistrate judge\\nhad blocked Davis’s sole expert because he wasn’t disclosed\\nin time, and Davis never objected to that ruling before the\\ndistrict court.\\n We affirm. Davis lacks evidence of deliberate indiffer-\\nence. And because he did not ask the district court to review\\nthe magistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert, his state-law\\nclaim fails as well.\\n I. Background\\n Davis is currently serving a prison sentence at the\\nGraham Correctional Center in central Illinois. He has a\\nhistory of diabetes, high blood pressure, and renal disease.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 3\\n\\nDavis’s renal disease requires dialysis, a treatment he began\\nin 1996 and continues to receive three times a week.\\n Davis received dialysis early on the morning of Saturday,\\nJune 21, 2014. He told a nurse almost immediately afterward\\nthat he was feeling weak. She observed a number of symp-\\ntoms, including slurred speech, an inability to follow com-\\nmands, weak hand grasps, and pupils that were pinpoint\\nand nonreactive. At 5:45 a.m. she called Dr. Kayira, the\\nmedical director at Graham Correctional Center. Dr. Kayira\\nwas on call for the weekend, but he wasn’t otherwise sched-\\nuled to return to the prison until Monday morning. The\\nnurse told him about the complaints and mentioned that\\nDavis had previously experienced similar symptoms after\\ndialysis. That isn’t surprising given that patients are often\\nfatigued after dialysis because of fluid withdrawal.\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis had asymmetrical\\nhand-grip strength, whether he was drooling, and whether\\nhis face was drooping. She said “no” to all three, which led\\nDr. Kayira to conclude that Davis wasn’t having a stroke but\\nwas instead suffering the same dialysis-related side effects as\\nbefore. Dr. Kayira directed the nurse to put Davis in the\\ninfirmary to be monitored more closely, and he told her to\\nhave the daytime nurse call back if symptoms worsened.\\n Over the weekend Davis’s condition deteriorated. But\\nwhile the medical staff reported its observations in a series\\nof handwritten notes, there is no evidence that anyone\\nnotified Dr. Kayira. A medical technician wrote at 6 a.m. on\\nSaturday that Davis was confused and his grip was weaker\\non one side than the other. The same note mentioned that\\nDr. Kayira had asked for the daytime nurse to evaluate the\\npatient and call him back, but it did not say whether\\n\\f4 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was told about the asymmetry. According to\\nanother note—written at an unknown time—Davis said that\\nhis left arm and leg weren’t working and he thought he was\\nhaving a stroke. A note written at 8 a.m. on Sunday said that\\nDavis couldn’t move one of his legs as much as normal. A\\nnote written at 3:30 p.m. the same day observed that Davis\\nwas weak in his left hand and leg but that he could raise his\\narms and sit up in bed. Notes the following morning contin-\\nued to record weakness on Davis’s left side. Again, none of\\nthe notes indicated that Dr. Kayira was notified of these\\nchanges in Davis’s condition.\\n When Dr. Kayira examined Davis in person on Monday,\\nhe immediately recognized that Davis’s strength was asym-\\nmetrical and he had likely suffered a stroke. Dr. Kayira\\ntransferred Davis to a hospital where the stroke was con-\\nfirmed.\\n The following year Davis sued Dr. Kayira under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he acted with deliberate indif-\\nference to his medical condition in violation of his Eighth\\nAmendment right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-\\nishment. He later amended his complaint to add a state-law\\nmedical-malpractice claim. Dr. Kayira was the only named\\ndefendant. More than a year into the litigation, Davis sought\\nleave to amend his complaint again to add five nurses. The\\njudge denied the motion because it was untimely and would\\ncause undue prejudice and delay.\\n After filing suit, Davis obtained a report from a board-\\ncertified physician stating that his claim had merit, a prereq-\\nuisite for the medical-malpractice claim under state law,\\nwhich requires a plaintiff to obtain a certificate of merit at\\nthe pleading stage. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2015).\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 5\\n\\nThe report concluded that “Dr. Kayira knew or should have\\nknown that Dennis Davis was suffering from a stroke, or\\nthat a stroke was imminent.” But the report is unsigned and\\nits author remains unidentified.\\n Once discovery began, the district judge adopted the par-\\nties’ proposed pretrial schedule, which required that Davis\\ndisclose experts by June 1, 2017. All discovery was to close\\non October 1, 2017, but in November Dr. Kayira moved to\\nextend the deadline. The judge granted the motion but\\nrejected the parties’ new proposed schedule, reasoning that\\nit would delay trial until four years after the initial filing.\\nRather than adopt another phased schedule, she simply\\nordered that all discovery be completed by February 15,\\n2018. Six weeks before that deadline, she referred the case to\\na magistrate judge to handle the remaining pretrial matters.\\n Davis retained Dr. Coleman Seskind as an expert but\\ndidn’t disclose the doctor’s report until February 13, 2018—\\njust two days before the final discovery cutoff. Dr. Kayira\\nmoved to strike the expert report as untimely. In a telephonic\\nhearing, the magistrate judge explained that all discovery\\nhad to end by February 15 under the district court’s order,\\nwhich meant that Davis had left Dr. Kayira no opportunity\\nto depose Dr. Seskind or otherwise respond to his proposed\\ntestimony. The magistrate judge concluded that it would be\\nimproper to allow Dr. Seskind to testify without that oppor-\\ntunity, so he granted the motion to strike.\\n Dr. Kayira then moved for summary judgment on both\\nclaims. The district judge granted the motion. She first\\nconcluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that\\nDr. Kayira acted with deliberate indifference to Davis’s\\nmedical condition. More specifically, no jury could find that\\n\\f6 No. 18-2456\\n\\nDr. Kayira was aware based on the initial phone call that\\nDavis was having a stroke. Moreover, there was no evidence\\nthat Dr. Kayira learned anything new until he arrived at the\\nprison on Monday, at which point he immediately trans-\\nferred Davis to the hospital. And Davis’s state-law claim\\nfailed because he had no expert testimony on the appropri-\\nate standard of care. Davis never argued to the district judge\\nthat the magistrate judge was wrong to exclude Dr. Seskind’s\\ntestimony.\\n II. Discussion\\n “We review the court’s order granting summary judg-\\nment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all reason-\\nable inferences in” the nonmovant’s favor. See Whiting v.\\nWexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nSummary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to\\njudgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A factual\\ndispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable\\njury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks omitted).\\nA. The Eighth Amendment Claim\\n The Eighth Amendment requires that the government\\nprovide “medical care for those whom it is punishing by\\nincarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But a\\nclaim for violation of this right is not synonymous with a\\nclaim for medical negligence. To prevail on a claim that a\\nprison healthcare provider violated the Eighth Amendment,\\na plaintiff must prove that he “suffered from an objectively\\nserious medical condition” and the defendant was “deliber-\\nately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 7\\n\\n722, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2016). Everyone agrees that Davis’s\\nstroke was an objectively serious medical condition. The\\nonly dispute is whether Dr. Kayira acted with deliberate\\nindifference.\\n The deliberate-indifference standard requires a “suffi-\\nciently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.\\n825, 834 (1994). A healthcare provider cannot be liable unless\\nhe “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate\\nhealth or safety.” Id. at 837. This is “essentially a criminal\\nrecklessness standard.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 481\\n(7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “[a] medical professional is entitled\\nto deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n When a plaintiff alleges that a healthcare provider knew\\nenough to infer a substantial risk of harm, he must prove\\n(1) that the provider was aware of facts supporting the\\ninference and (2) that the provider actually drew the infer-\\nence. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove the subjective\\ncomponent of the claim, a plaintiff might point to a number\\nof things, including “the obviousness of the risk,” “the\\ndefendant’s persistence in a course of treatment known to be\\nineffective,” or “proof that the defendant’s treatment deci-\\nsion departed so radically from accepted professional judg-\\nment, practice, or standards that a jury may reasonably infer\\nthat the decision was not based on professional judgment.”\\nWhiting, 839 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Davis claims that Dr. Kayira should have inferred that he\\nwas having a stroke based on the information in the initial\\nphone call on Saturday morning. But there is no evidence\\n\\f8 No. 18-2456\\n\\nthat the information relayed to Dr. Kayira at that time would\\nhave led every minimally competent doctor to conclude that\\nDavis was at risk of something that serious. The fatigue\\nDavis experienced is common in dialysis patients. Even\\nmore important, Davis himself had experienced similar side\\neffects following previous dialysis treatment. And when\\nDr. Kayira asked the nurse whether Davis was showing\\ntelltale signs of a stroke, she said “no.” Based on the then-\\navailable information, Dr. Kayira reasonably concluded that\\nDavis was not suffering a stroke. At the very least, there is\\nno evidence that Dr. Kayira actually drew the necessary\\ninference—in other words, that he actually believed Davis\\nhad suffered a stroke.\\n We addressed essentially the same issue in Whiting. The\\ndoctor there thought it possible a patient had lymphoma but\\nconcluded it was more likely he had an infection. See id. Like\\nDr. Kayira, that doctor was wrong. We nonetheless held that\\na reasonable jury could not conclude that the doctor acted\\nwith deliberate indifference because no evidence suggested\\nthat he knew his diagnosis was wrong or that the treatment\\nhe prescribed would be ineffective. See id. at 664. We empha-\\nsized that there was no expert testimony suggesting the\\ndoctor’s actions were a substantial departure from the norm.\\nSee id. This case is exactly the same. Dr. Kayira thought one\\ndiagnosis was far more likely than another and responded\\naccordingly. There is no evidence—and certainly no expert\\ntestimony—to suggest he clearly should have known better.\\n In response Davis directs us to Conley v. Birch, where we\\nheld that a jury could find a doctor deliberately indifferent\\nfor failing to order an x-ray in response to a nurse’s call\\nabout an inmate’s serious hand injury. See 796 F.3d 742, 747–\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 9\\n\\n49 (7th Cir. 2015). But there the evidence was sufficient to\\nconclude that the nurse gave the doctor enough information\\nto make it obvious that the hand was fractured and that an\\nx-ray was needed. The record showed that the nurse likely\\ntold the doctor that the inmate’s hand was swelling two days\\nafter the injury, that he had lost function in all five fingers,\\nand that the hand was discolored. See id. at 744–45. In fact,\\nthe record was sufficient for a jury to find that the nurse\\ndirectly told the doctor that he thought the hand was broken.\\nSee id. In Davis’s case the cause of his symptoms wasn’t\\nsimilarly obvious and there is no reason to think Dr. Kayira’s\\ndiagnosis was unreasonable, much less substantially so.\\n Of course, this might be a different case if Dr. Kayira had\\nlearned new information over the weekend about Davis’s\\nstatus. But there is no evidence that Dr. Kayira received any\\nupdates until he returned Monday morning. The record\\nincludes medical notes describing in detail how Davis’s\\ncondition worsened, but no evidence suggests that\\nDr. Kayira was made aware of this information. Davis’s best\\nevidence is the note written by the medical technician at\\n6 a.m. on Saturday morning. It says that Davis’s grip was\\nasymmetrical and also records Dr. Kayira’s order to watch\\nDavis and have the daytime nurse call him back. But the\\nnote says nothing about whether the technician called\\nDr. Kayira to tell him about the asymmetry. Instead, the\\ntechnician simply recorded what he personally observed\\nwhile simultaneously noting Dr. Kayira’s earlier order from\\nthe initial phone conversation during which the doctor was\\ndefinitively told there was no asymmetry. 1\\n\\n1 At times Davis seems to suggest that Dr. Kayira conceded in his\\ndeposition that the technician told him about the asymmetry. As Davis\\n\\f10 No. 18-2456\\n\\n Davis offers no evidence that Dr. Kayira knew more. He\\nargues that the nurses and the technician might testify at trial\\nthat they called Dr. Kayira a second time to relay new in-\\nformation. But without evidence that they would so testify\\n(say, an affidavit or a deposition), Davis cannot survive\\nsummary judgment. Based on the information from the\\ninitial (and only) phone call, Dr. Kayira thought Davis was\\nexperiencing normal side effects of dialysis. His response—\\nordering closer monitoring and asking that he be notified of\\nadverse changes—was not reckless. Granted, there is some\\nevidence that he said he would call back later to check in.\\nBut at best that’s probative of negligence. Without expert\\ntestimony establishing that every minimally competent\\ndoctor would have done so, that fact alone isn’t enough to\\nprove deliberate indifference. We therefore affirm the sum-\\nmary judgment on Davis’s Eighth Amendment claim.\\nB. The Medical-Malpractice Claim\\n Under Illinois law a medical-malpractice claim requires\\nexpert testimony about the appropriate standard of care\\n“[u]nless the physician’s negligence is so grossly apparent or\\nthe treatment so common as to be within the everyday\\nknowledge of a layperson.” Sullivan v. Edward Hosp.,\\n806 N.E.2d 645, 653 (Ill. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The\\nmagistrate judge excluded Davis’s sole expert because his\\ndisclosure was untimely. Davis challenges that ruling on\\nappeal.\\n\\ntells it, Dr. Kayira chose not to rely on the technician’s observation\\nbecause he thought him incompetent. But that’s a mischaracterization of\\nwhat Dr. Kayira said. While he did say that he didn’t think the technician\\nwas competent, he also said very clearly that he didn’t recall ever\\nspeaking to him.\\n\\fNo. 18-2456 11\\n\\n The problem is that Davis never objected to that ruling\\nwhen he was before the district court. Rule 72(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure says that a party may object\\nto a magistrate judge’s ruling on a nondispositive pretrial\\nmatter within 14 days. The very next sentence says: “A party\\nmay not assign as error a defect in the order not timely\\nobjected to.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); Flint v. City of Belvidere,\\n791 F.3d 764, 769 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[The] failure to challenge a\\nmagistrate’s pretrial ruling in the district court forfeits the\\nright to attack it on appeal.”).\\n In response Davis directs us to the local rules for the\\nCentral District of Illinois. He notes that the rule about\\nobjecting to nondispositive orders uses permissive rather\\nthan mandatory language. See C.D. ILL. L.R. 72.2(A) (“Ap-\\npeal of Non-Dispositive Matters. Any party may appeal\\nfrom any order of a magistrate judge within 14 days … .”).\\nHe contrasts that with the rule governing dispositive mo-\\ntions, which explicitly says that the failure to object counts as\\na waiver. See id. L.R. 72.2(B). Thus, he reasons, a party litigat-\\ning in that particular court need only object to a ruling on a\\ndispositive matter in order to preserve its argument for\\nappeal. But given that Rule 72(a) requires an objection to\\nnondispositive orders within 14 days and itself bars further\\nreview of untimely objections, there’s no need for the local\\nrules to parrot that mandate. Davis didn’t object to the\\nmagistrate judge’s exclusion of his expert within the\\ntimeframe required by Rule 72(a), so the issue is not proper-\\nly before us.\\n Without expert testimony, Davis’s malpractice claim\\ncannot succeed. Other than Dr. Seskind, the only doctor to\\nhave expressed an opinion on the standard of care is the\\n\\f12 No. 18-2456\\n\\ndoctor who wrote the certificate of merit. See 735 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 5/2-622. But that report is unsigned and the doctor\\nremains unidentified. To take a malpractice claim to trial,\\n“[t]he proponent of an expert’s testimony must lay a founda-\\ntion which affirmatively establishes the expert’s qualifica-\\ntions and competency to testify.” Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.\\n2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Davis obviously can’t lay that\\nfoundation without identifying who the doctor is. And\\nwithout expert testimony, his malpractice claim fails.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4384,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661936,"string":"4,661,936"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2054"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen sebled.)\\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n REVERSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439189/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661936/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2054\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\nes.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\n\f2 No. 18-2054\n\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\nbeen sebled.)\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\n\fNo. 18-2054 3\n\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\nto make the right “clearly established.”\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\nNor have the plaintiffs.\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\n\f4 No. 18-2054\n\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\ngenerality won’t do.\n\fNo. 18-2054 5\n\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\n\f6 No. 18-2054\n\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\nobligation does not exist.\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\n\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\nnance in DeShaney.\n\fNo. 18-2054 7\n\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\npart test” lacks.\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\n\f8 No. 18-2054\n\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\nsion is\n REVERSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen sebled.)\\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n REVERSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4385,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661996,"string":"4,661,996"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2054"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen sebled.)\\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n REVERSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439249/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661996/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2054\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\nes.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\n\f2 No. 18-2054\n\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\nbeen sebled.)\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\n\fNo. 18-2054 3\n\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\nto make the right “clearly established.”\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\nNor have the plaintiffs.\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\n\f4 No. 18-2054\n\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\ngenerality won’t do.\n\fNo. 18-2054 5\n\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\n\f6 No. 18-2054\n\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\nobligation does not exist.\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\n\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\nnance in DeShaney.\n\fNo. 18-2054 7\n\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\npart test” lacks.\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\n\f8 No. 18-2054\n\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\nsion is\n REVERSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen sebled.)\\n The defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\nS. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permibing a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n The district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does I–IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967–71 (N.D. Ill. 2018).\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permibing him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward—but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971–73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n The problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n Citing decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n Over and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152–53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16–17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757–58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5–6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\n The district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308–09 (citing other cases).\\n Consider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a maber of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n Because “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231–43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n In recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\n failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\n Every once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nabributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the maber differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510–\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n Other circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Johnson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14–23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff’s powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\n Estate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Johnson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a maber of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n REVERSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4386,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4661999,"string":"4,661,999"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3487"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\\nmatter of law or a new trial.\\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\\nto advertise the event online.\\n I. Background\\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\\n\\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\\npromoting the Maxim party:\\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\\n suite ticketholders\\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\\nreceived complimentary admission.\\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\\n\\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\\n\\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\\nat $90,000–$105,000.\\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\\n317, 323 (1986).\\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\\nCir. 2008).\\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\\nparties had a valid contract.\\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\\n\\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\\n\\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\\nsubsets of its larger database.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\\n\\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\\ntestimony.\\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\\nretrial or remittitur.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439252/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661999/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\n\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\nmatter of law or a new trial.\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\nto advertise the event online.\n I. Background\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\n\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\npromoting the Maxim party:\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\n suite ticketholders\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\nreceived complimentary admission.\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\n\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\n\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\n\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\nat $90,000–$105,000.\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\n II. Discussion\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\n317, 323 (1986).\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\n\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\nCir. 2008).\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\nparties had a valid contract.\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\n\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\n\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\n\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\n\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\nlaw.\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\nsubsets of its larger database.\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\n\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\ntestimony.\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\nretrial or remittitur.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\\nmatter of law or a new trial.\\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\\nto advertise the event online.\\n I. Background\\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\\n\\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\\npromoting the Maxim party:\\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\\n suite ticketholders\\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\\nreceived complimentary admission.\\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\\n\\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\\n\\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\\nat $90,000–$105,000.\\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\\n317, 323 (1986).\\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\\nCir. 2008).\\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\\nparties had a valid contract.\\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\\n\\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\\n\\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\\nsubsets of its larger database.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\\n\\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\\ntestimony.\\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\\nretrial or remittitur.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4387,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4662243,"string":"4,662,243"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2054"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\nFor the Seventh Circuit\\n\\n \\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\n\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\n \\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\nNo. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n\\n \\n\\nARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n\\n \\n\\nBefore EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n\\nEASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen settled.)\\n\\nThe defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\n5. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permitting a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n\\nThe district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does [I-IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967-71 (N.D. III. 2018).\\n\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permitting him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward —but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971-73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n\\nThe problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n\\nCiting decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n\\nOver and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757-58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5-6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\nThe district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 5. Ct. at 308-09 (citing other cases).\\n\\nConsider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a matter of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (Sth Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n\\nBecause “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231-43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n\\nIn recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n\\nFirst, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n\\ndanger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n\\nthe state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n\\nproximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\nfailure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\nEvery once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nattributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the matter differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510-\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n\\nOther circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Jonson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14-23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff's powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\nEstate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Jolinson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a matter of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n\\nREVERSED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439496/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662243/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nFor the Seventh Circuit\n\n \n\nNo. 18-2054\n\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\n \n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the\nNorthern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\nNo. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\n\n \n\nARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\n\n \n\nBefore EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\nes.\n\nEASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\n\f2 No. 18-2054\n\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\nbeen settled.)\n\nThe defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\n5. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\nstill is not) clearly established that permitting a prisoner to\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\n\nThe district judge first held that the complaint presents a\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does [I-IV v.\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967-71 (N.D. III. 2018).\n\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\n\fNo. 18-2054 3\n\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\nles, negligently permitting him to get the gun, and running\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\nstead, to be a feckless coward —but the district judge thought\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971-73. The\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\nto make the right “clearly established.”\n\nThe problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\nNor have the plaintiffs.\n\nCiting decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\n\f4 No. 18-2054\n\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\n\nOver and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\n757-58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014);\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5-6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\ngenerality won’t do.\n\fNo. 18-2054 5\n\nThe district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\nlenix, 136 5. Ct. at 308-09 (citing other cases).\n\nConsider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\nunder control was his responsibility as a matter of Illinois\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (Sth Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\n\f6 No. 18-2054\n\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\nobligation does not exist.\n\nBecause “clearly established” law does not support the\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\n223, 231-43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\n\nIn recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\n\nFirst, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\n\ndanger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\n\nthe state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\n\nproximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\nfailure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\n\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\nF.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\nnance in DeShaney.\n\fNo. 18-2054 7\n\nEvery once in a while, a court should step back and ask\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\nattributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\nThe Justices themselves saw the matter differently. They\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510-\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\npart test” lacks.\n\nOther circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\ndifferent from those of Jonson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\n24164 at *14-23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\npaired the plaintiff's powers of self-help or ability to obtain\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\n\f8 No. 18-2054\n\nEstate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\nto decide whether Jolinson and King are compatible with\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a matter of\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\nsion is\n\nREVERSED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\nFor the Seventh Circuit\\n\\n \\n\\nNo. 18-2054\\n\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\\n\\nSHAWN LOOMIS,\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\n \\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the\\nNorthern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\nNo. 17 C 6111 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n\\n \\n\\nARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n\\n \\n\\nBefore EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg-\\nes.\\n\\nEASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Tywon Salters, a pretrial de-\\ntainee in Kane County, Illinois, swallowed some cleaning\\nfluid, apparently in an effort to commit suicide. He was tak-\\nen to Delnor Community Hospital for treatment. Guards\\nwere instructed to keep him shackled. Shawn Loomis, one of\\nthose guards, disobeyed that order when Salters claimed\\nthat he needed to use the bathroom. Salters grabbed\\n\\f2 No. 18-2054\\n\\nLoomis’s gun and escaped. While Salters terrorized the\\nHospital’s staff, patients, and visitors, Loomis ran away and\\nhid. Salters took nurses hostage at gunpoint and assaulted\\ntwo of them. After three hours a SWAT team cornered Salters\\nand killed him. This appeal arises from claims under 42\\nU.S.C. §1983 by two persons at the Hospital who were\\nfrightened but not physically injured. (Other claims have\\nbeen settled.)\\n\\nThe defendants in the suit include Loomis, Kane County\\n(which employed Loomis as a correctional officer), Delnor\\nHospital, and Apex3 Security, LLC, which the Hospital hired\\nto provide security for its premises. The appeal, however,\\nconcerns only Loomis, who moved to dismiss the complaint\\non the ground of qualified immunity. A public employee is\\nentitled to immunity in §1983 litigation unless, at the time of\\nthe events in question, “clearly established” law would have\\nmade apparent to any public employee that his or her acts\\nviolated the Constitution. See, e.g., Escondido v. Emmons, 139\\n5. Ct. 500 (2019). Loomis argued that it had not been (and\\nstill is not) clearly established that permitting a prisoner to\\nescape violates the Constitution. He relied principally on\\nDeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,\\n489 U.S. 189 (1989), which holds that the Constitution, as a\\ncharter of negative liberties, does not require the govern-\\nment to protect the public from private predators—and it\\nwas Salters, not Loomis, who inflicted plaintiffs’ injuries.\\n\\nThe district judge first held that the complaint presents a\\nvalid claim for liability under what has come to be called the\\n“state-created danger exception” to DeShaney. Does [I-IV v.\\nKane County, 308 F. Supp. 3d 960, 967-71 (N.D. III. 2018).\\n\\nUnder this doctrine, the judge wrote, a public employee is\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 3\\n\\nliable for increasing the danger to which other persons are\\nexposed. Loomis did not create danger by transferring Salt-\\ners to the Hospital; that decision was made by others. So too\\nwas the decision that Loomis carry a weapon in a situation\\nthat posed a risk if he lost control of his sidearm. But Loomis\\ndid increase the danger by removing Salters from his shack-\\nles, negligently permitting him to get the gun, and running\\naway. Plaintiffs do not allege that Loomis intended harm to\\nthe Hospital’s staff, patients, and visitors—he appears, in-\\nstead, to be a feckless coward —but the district judge thought\\nthat negligence leading to bystanders’ danger could support\\nliability. Then, and for essentially the same reasons, the\\njudge rejected Loomis’s immunity defense. Id. at 971-73. The\\n“state-created danger exception” is established in the Sev-\\nenth Circuit, the judge observed, and it should have been\\nobvious to any guard that armed prisoners must not be\\nturned loose in hospitals. That was enough, the judge wrote,\\nto make the right “clearly established.”\\n\\nThe problem with this reasoning is that it starts and ends\\nat a high level of generality. The “state-created danger ex-\\nception” to DeShaney does not tell any public employee what\\nto do, or avoid, in any situation. It is a principle, not a rule.\\nAnd it is a principle of liability, not a doctrine (either a\\nstandard or a rule) concerning primary conduct. For that one\\nmust look elsewhere, but the district judge did not do so.\\nNor have the plaintiffs.\\n\\nCiting decisions of this circuit, the district court under-\\nstood the “state-created danger exception” to DeShaney as\\nequivalent to a constitutional rule prohibiting any act, by\\nany public official, that increases private danger. If that were\\nso, however, then DeShaney itself is wrongly decided. Joshua\\n\\f4 No. 18-2054\\n\\nDeShaney was removed from his father’s custody and hospi-\\ntalized as a result of injuries. Joshua’s stepmother reported\\nthat Randy DeShaney, Joshua’s father, regularly abused him\\nphysically. After deliberation, state child-welfare officials\\ndecided to return Joshua to his father. Randy then beat and\\npermanently injured Joshua. No one could have doubted\\nthat the child-welfare officials’ decision increased Joshua’s\\ndanger, compared with his safety in the hospital—indeed,\\nthat increase was the foundation of his claim for damages—\\nbut the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Due Pro-\\ncess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a\\nstate to protect its residents from private violence. Other\\ncourts cannot create an “exception” to DeShaney that contra-\\ndicts this principle, and as a result we cannot treat the “state-\\ncreated danger exception” as a rule of primary conduct for-\\nbidding any acts by public officials that increase private\\ndangers. (We have a few words toward the end of this opin-\\nion about what the “exception” might mean.)\\n\\nOver and over, the Supreme Court has held that a right is\\n“clearly established” only if it has been “defined with speci-\\nficity.” Escondido, 139 S. Ct. at 503. See also, e.g., Kisela v.\\nHughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152-53 (2018); District of Columbia v.\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,\\n552 (2017); San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76\\n(2015); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005); Carroll v.\\nCarman, 574 U.S. 13, 16-17 (2014); Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744,\\n757-58 (2014); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014);\\nStanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5-6 (2013); Reichle v. Howards, 566\\nU.S. 658, 664 (2012); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198\\n(2004). These decisions, and more, tell us that a high level of\\ngenerality won’t do.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 5\\n\\nThe district judge resisted the conclusion that “state-\\ncreated danger” is too general by observing that Loomis’s\\nproposal—something like a case establishing how guards\\nmust prevent being overpowered by prisoners in hospitals\\nduring bathroom breaks—would be too particular. 308 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 972. By insisting on a case identical to the one at\\nhand, public employees could insulate themselves from lia-\\nbility, for every case differs in some respect from its prede-\\ncessors. We agree with the district judge that a search for\\nidentity is not required and would be a fool’s errand. A prin-\\nciple can be clearly established without matching a later\\ncase’s facts. The search is for an appropriate level of generali-\\nty, not the most particular conceivable level. And the level of\\ngenerality is appropriate when it establishes the rule in a\\nway that tells a public employee what the Constitution re-\\nquires in the situation that employee faces. See, e.g., Mul-\\nlenix, 136 5. Ct. at 308-09 (citing other cases).\\n\\nConsider this possible rule: “The Constitution (through\\nthe Due Process Clause) requires guards to prevent prison-\\ners from escaping.” Loomis had to know that keeping Salters\\nunder control was his responsibility as a matter of Illinois\\nlaw and his employer’s instructions; this hypothetical rule\\nwould have told him that the Constitution, too, requires this.\\nIt would not be necessary for the rule to say anything about\\nhospitals, or toilets, or how strong a prisoner may be. But\\nthis is only a hypothetical, because other litigants have ar-\\ngued that the Constitution requires guards to prevent es-\\ncapes, and every appellate court that has considered the pos-\\nsibility has rejected it as incompatible with DeShaney. See,\\ne.g., Rios v. Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (Sth Cir. 2006); Davis v. Ful-\\nton County, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Common-\\nwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2054\\n\\n(same outcome before DeShaney). It is not possible to say that\\na constitutional obligation to keep a prisoner under control\\nhas been “clearly established” when every appellate court\\nthat has addressed the question has held that the proposed\\nobligation does not exist.\\n\\nBecause “clearly established” law does not support the\\n§1983 claim against Loomis, we need not decide whether we\\nagree with these decisions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.\\n223, 231-43 (2009). But it is apt to add that we also have not\\napproved the district court’s view that the complaint states a\\ngood constitutional claim. Plaintiffs allege that Loomis was\\nincompetent, but the Due Process Clause generally does not\\ncondemn official negligence. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.\\n327 (1986). Plaintiffs depict themselves as frightened but not\\notherwise injured, and, even in the law of torts, negligent\\nactors are not liable for conduct that threatens bodily harm\\nbut produces only emotional distress. Restatement (Second) of\\nTorts §436A (1965). And then there is DeShaney.\\n\\nIn recent years the “state-created danger exception” has\\nbeen treated as if it were a rule of common law. It has been\\nelaborated and turned into a “three-part test”:\\n\\nFirst, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a\\n\\ndanger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of\\n\\nthe state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the\\n\\nproximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s\\nfailure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.\\n\\nJohnson v. Rimmer, No. 18-1321 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2019), slip\\nop. 23, quoting from King v. East St. Louis School District, 496\\nF.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quota-\\ntion marks deleted). None of these elements has its prove-\\nnance in DeShaney.\\n\\fNo. 18-2054 7\\n\\nEvery once in a while, a court should step back and ask\\nwhether local jurisprudence matches the instructions from\\nhigher authority. If taken literally, the approach that Johnson\\nattributes to King would have justified liability in DeShaney.\\nThe Justices themselves saw the matter differently. They\\nhinted that the Constitution might support liability when a\\nstate has a duty that “arises not from the State’s knowledge\\nof the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of\\nintent to help him, but from the limitation which it has im-\\nposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 489 U.S. at\\n200. That is why the Constitution requires the state to supply\\nprisoners with medical care and protect them from each oth-\\ner; having disabled resort to self-help (or to the market in\\nprivate services), the state must provide a substitute. Several\\ndecisions in this circuit find liability outside of prisons when\\nthe state has disabled or undermined self-help or sources of\\nprivate assistance. See, e.g., Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510-\\n11 (7th Cir. 2012); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.\\n1993). Those cases have a footing in DeShaney that the “three-\\npart test” lacks.\\n\\nOther circuits have their own approaches. Estate of Ro-\\nmain v. Grosse Pointe Farms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (6th\\nCir. Aug. 14, 2019), discusses the “three-part test” (with parts\\ndifferent from those of Jonson and King) that the Sixth Cir-\\ncuit uses to evaluate claims of state-created danger. Judge\\nMurphy filed a concurring opinion, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS\\n24164 at *14-23, questioning whether the Sixth Circuit’s ap-\\nproach can be reconciled with DeShaney and suggesting that\\nit be refocused on the question whether the state has im-\\npaired the plaintiff's powers of self-help or ability to obtain\\nhelp from others. All three members of the panel joined this\\nopinion, making it an alternate majority opinion.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2054\\n\\nEstate of Romain did not need to decide whether the Sixth\\nCircuit’s approach should be revised, just as we do not need\\nto decide whether Jolinson and King are compatible with\\nPaine, Reed, and DeShaney. These subjects should be present-\\ned for consideration in some future case, when the outcome\\nmay turn on the difference. For now, it is enough to say that\\neven if Loomis is civilly and criminally liable as a matter of\\nIllinois law, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim\\nbased on the federal Constitution, so the district court’s deci-\\nsion is\\n\\nREVERSED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4388,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4662246,"string":"4,662,246"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3487"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\\nmatter of law or a new trial.\\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\\nto advertise the event online.\\n I. Background\\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\\n\\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\\npromoting the Maxim party:\\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\\n suite ticketholders\\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\\nreceived complimentary admission.\\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\\n\\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\\n\\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\\nat $90,000–$105,000.\\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\\n317, 323 (1986).\\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\\nCir. 2008).\\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\\nparties had a valid contract.\\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\\n\\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\\n\\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\\nsubsets of its larger database.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\\n\\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\\ntestimony.\\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\\nretrial or remittitur.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439499/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662246/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\n\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\nmatter of law or a new trial.\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\nto advertise the event online.\n I. Background\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\n\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\npromoting the Maxim party:\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\n suite ticketholders\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\nreceived complimentary admission.\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\n\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\n\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\n\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\nat $90,000–$105,000.\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\n II. Discussion\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\n317, 323 (1986).\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\n\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\nCir. 2008).\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\nparties had a valid contract.\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\n\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\n\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\n\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\n\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\n\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\nlaw.\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\nsubsets of its larger database.\n\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\n\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\ntestimony.\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\nretrial or remittitur.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\nKARMA INTERNATIONAL, LLC,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nINDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-02182 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 12, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 18, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. The Indianapolis 500 race has been a\\nfixture of American life since 1911, interrupted only by\\nworld war. So when its 100th running arrived in 2016,\\norganizers wanted to shift the race-weekend entertainment\\ninto high gear. They engaged Karma International, LLC, an\\nevent-planning company, to host a ticketed party.\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\n Unlike the Indianapolis 500 itself—which sold out for the\\nfirst time in history—the Karma party was a disappoint-\\nment. Poor ticket sales prevented Karma from covering its\\nexpenses. Karma sued the racetrack for breach of contract,\\naccusing it of failing to adequately promote the party. The\\nracetrack counterclaimed, alleging that Karma ignored its\\nown advertising obligations. The district judge rejected\\nKarma’s claim at summary judgment, ruling that the dam-\\nages theory rested on speculation. A jury found Karma liable\\non the counterclaim, awarding $75,000 in damages. Karma\\nappeals, seeking review of the summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions for judgment as a\\nmatter of law or a new trial.\\n We affirm. Karma’s evidence of damages is indeed specu-\\nlative, so its claim fails under Indiana law. And we see no\\nreason to second-guess the jury’s determination that Karma\\nbreached the parties’ contract by failing to fulfill its promises\\nto advertise the event online.\\n I. Background\\n The Indianapolis Motor Speedway, LLC, sponsors the\\nannual Indianapolis 500 race and associated race-weekend\\nevents, which include musical acts and other festivities. In\\n2015 Karma International became a licensee of Maxim, a\\nmen’s magazine. Karma has hosted Maxim-branded enter-\\ntainment at large sporting events, including a party prior to\\nthe 2016 Super Bowl in San Francisco.\\n In early 2016 Karma began negotiations with the Speed-\\nway to host a Maxim-branded event at that year’s 100th-\\nrunning of the race. The parties eventually agreed on terms\\nmemorialized in a March 2016 agreement. The Speedway\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 3\\n\\npromised to provide “marketing support via [its] social\\nchannels and … dedicated e-mail to [its] database.” In return\\nKarma pledged to promote race-weekend activities with a\\n“banner ad on Maxim.com (minimum 1 million impres-\\nsions).” It also promised to provide “marketing support via\\nMaxim social channels for [the Indy 500] [m]usic events\\n(Carb Day, Legend’s Day and Indy 500 Snake Pit).”\\n To fulfill its advertising obligations under the contract,\\nthe Speedway sent four promotional e-mails in May 2016\\npromoting the Maxim party:\\n • May 9: A dedicated e-mail to 334 sponsors and\\n suite ticketholders\\n • May 20: A dedicated e-mail to 13,824 fans\\n • May 21: A cross-promotional e-mail to 89,979 fans\\n • May 25: A dedicated e-mail to 149,430 “Wing and\\n Wheel Newsletter” subscribers\\nKarma, for its part, never ran the promised banner adver-\\ntisement on Maxim.com. Nor did it use Maxim’s social-\\nmedia channels to promote race-weekend events.\\n The Maxim party took place as scheduled on May 27.\\nKarma spent $635,855.71 on the event but generated only\\n$215,690.39 in revenue. While 1,787 guests attended the\\nparty, Karma sold just 92 full-price tickets. Some of the\\nremaining guests bought reduced-price tickets, but most\\nreceived complimentary admission.\\n In August 2016 Karma sued the Speedway for breach of\\ncontract, alleging that it failed to promote the Maxim party\\nas agreed under the terms of the contract. Karma sought\\n$817,500 in damages, a figure apparently gleaned from\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nconversations with Speedway officials who speculated that\\nthe party would generate $1 million in gross revenue “from\\nticket and table sales only.” 1 The Speedway filed a counter-\\nclaim alleging that Karma failed to place the promised\\nbanner advertisement on Maxim’s website or provide mar-\\nketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\n The Speedway moved for summary judgment on\\nKarma’s claim. The judge discerned a factual dispute regard-\\ning the alleged breach of contract. While the Speedway\\ninsisted it hadn’t promised to e-mail its entire database to\\npromote the party, the evidentiary record—construed in\\nKarma’s favor—permitted an inference that it had. But\\nKarma’s damages theory was entirely speculative. Karma\\nclaimed that Speedway officials gave assurances that its\\ne-mails would generate the sale of at least 1,500 tickets. The\\njudge held that those comments, without more, could not\\nestablish how many additional ticket sales an e-mail to its\\nentire database would have generated. Because Karma had\\nno nonspeculative evidence of damages, the judge entered\\nsummary judgment for the Speedway.\\n The counterclaim proceeded to trial, and Speedway em-\\nployees testified that no banner advertisement appeared on\\nMaxim.com and that Karma failed to provide the promised\\nmarketing support on Maxim’s social-media channels.\\nKarma’s CEO Dylan Marer admitted that he didn’t know\\n\\n1 Long after the deadline to amend the pleadings expired, Karma moved\\nto add allegations of additional contract terms not in the written agree-\\nment. A magistrate judge denied the motion, and Karma never objected\\nto that ruling in the district court. On appeal Karma faults the district\\njudge for not sua sponte conforming the pleadings to later-introduced\\nevidence. The judge had no obligation to do so.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 5\\n\\nwhether these marketing efforts had occurred. Jonathan\\nFaber, a damages expert, estimated that the Speedway’s lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent Maxim.com ad were\\napproximately $15,000–$75,000. And he pegged the lost-\\nvalue damages for the nonexistent social-media promotion\\nat $90,000–$105,000.\\n The jury found Karma liable and awarded $75,000 in\\ndamages. Karma moved for judgment as a matter of law,\\nand alternatively for a new trial, under Rule 50 of the Feder-\\nal Rules of Civil Procedure. The judge denied both motions\\nand entered judgment on the jury’s verdict.\\n II. Discussion\\n Karma challenges the judge’s summary-judgment ruling\\nand the denial of its posttrial motions. “We review a sum-\\nmary judgment de novo, asking whether the movant has\\nshown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material\\nfact.” Kopplin v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 914 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is\\nappropriate if Karma “failed to make a sufficient showing on\\nan essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]\\nhas the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\\n317, 323 (1986).\\n “We review the denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment\\nas a matter of law de novo” and “consider whether the\\nevidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences\\npermissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the\\nverdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the party\\nagainst whom the motion is directed.” Martin v. Milwaukee\\nCounty, 904 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks\\nomitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper ‘if a rea-\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nsonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary\\nbasis to find for the party on that issue.’” Lawson v. Sun\\nMicrosystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)). Finally, we review the denial of a\\nmotion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Clarett v.\\nRoberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011). “A verdict will be\\nset aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence\\nonly if ‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.”\\nMoore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th\\nCir. 2008).\\n Indiana law governs the dueling contract claims in this\\ndiversity suit. In Indiana “the essential elements of a contrac-\\ntual action” are “(1) a valid and binding contract; (2) perfor-\\nmance by the complaining party; (3) non-performance or\\ndefective performance by the defendant; and (4) damages\\narising from defendant’s breach.” U.S. Research Consultants,\\nInc. v. County of Lake, 89 N.E.3d 1076, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App.\\n2017) (quotation marks omitted). No one disputes that the\\nparties had a valid contract.\\n The judge concluded at summary judgment that Karma\\noffered only speculative evidence of its damages, an essen-\\ntial element of the claim. Under Indiana law “a factfinder\\nmay not award damages on the mere basis of conjecture or\\nspeculation.” Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Ward, 760 N.E.2d 1132,\\n1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Although mathematical certainty\\nis not required, the amount awarded must be supported by\\nevidence in the record.” Country Contractors, Inc. v. A\\nWestside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.\\nCt. App. 2014). Moreover, any “damages claimed for a\\nbreach of contract must be the natural, foreseeable, and\\nproximate consequence of the breach.” Masonic Temple Ass'n\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 7\\n\\nof Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E.2d 1032,\\n1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).\\n Karma’s damages theory rested on its contention that\\nSpeedway officials guaranteed sales of at least 1,500 tickets,\\na promise somehow premised on their characterization of\\nthe Speedway’s e-mail database. Because the Speedway\\ndidn’t e-mail its entire database, the theory goes, the Maxim\\nparty attracted far fewer than 1,500 paying customers.\\n To begin, the evidence of a 1,500-ticket guarantee is quite\\nsparse. It consists of Karma CEO Marer’s deposition testi-\\nmony that Speedway employees Kyle and Jarrod Krisiloff\\n“asked me how many [tickets] I would need to—to sell to\\nmake this worthwhile, and I said a minimum of 1,500, and\\nthey said, ‘No problem. We sell all of our events out. We’ll\\nsell it out, no problem, with our database.’”\\n This testimony perhaps sheds light on the parties’ expec-\\ntations, and if Karma had proof of damages, it might be\\nrelevant to the question of foreseeability. But it is not evi-\\ndence of harm caused by the alleged breach—namely, the\\nSpeedway’s decision to promote the event through certain\\nsubsets of its e-mail database rather than the whole thing.\\nKarma offered no expert testimony or other evidence of\\nharm proximately caused by the allegedly insufficient e-mail\\npromotion. Three words of Marer’s deposition testimony—\\n“with our database”—provide the only link between the\\nalleged breach and the alleged harm.\\n We cannot attribute low ticket sales to the Speedway’s\\nalleged promotional breach merely because its employees\\npredicted success. Karma blames the party’s disappointing\\nperformance on the Speedway’s e-mail strategy, but that\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nclaim doesn’t rise above the level of speculation. Karma has\\nno evidence indicating that the Speedway’s promotional\\nchoices were the sole or even primary driver of the lacklus-\\nter ticket sales. And the sheer number of alternative explana-\\ntions fatally undermines that assumption. Indiana law\\ndoesn’t require mathematical certainty, but it does require\\nmore than bare assertions. See Noble Roman’s, 760 N.E.2d at\\n1140 (explaining that proof of contract damages requires\\nmore than “mere … conjecture”).\\n At bottom, Karma is making a reliance argument: be-\\ncause it expected the Speedway’s advertising efforts to\\ngenerate 1,500 ticket sales and relied on that expectation, the\\nSpeedway should be forced to cover the shortfall. That\\nsounds like promissory estoppel, not breach of contract. But\\nin Indiana the existence of an “express contract” precludes\\nrecovery under a “theory implied in law.” Keystone Carbon\\nCo. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also\\nFiederlein v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)\\n(explaining that promissory estoppel “permit[s] recovery\\nwhere no express contract … exists”) (emphasis added). Here,\\nthe existence of an express contract is undisputed.\\n Karma also relies on a strained analogy to the Maxim-\\nbranded Super Bowl party, which brought in over $1 mil-\\nlion. But the fact that the Indy 500 party generated less\\nrevenue than its Super Bowl counterpart tells us nothing\\nabout the harm caused by the Speedway’s alleged breach.\\nWithout more information about how the Super Bowl party\\nwas promoted, we have no relevant point of comparison.\\n Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Karma,\\nthis record at best contains only speculative evidence of\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 9\\n\\ndamages. The judge was right to grant summary judgment\\nin favor of the Speedway on Karma’s claim.\\n Turning now to the posttrial motions on the counter-\\nclaim, Karma argues that no reasonable jury could conclude\\nthat Speedway officials actually anticipated that the race-\\ntrack would suffer damages if Karma failed to deliver on the\\npromised online advertising. The judge thought this argu-\\nment rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of contract\\nlaw, and we agree. Indiana courts follow the familiar horn-\\nbook rule that damages may not exceed the harm foreseea-\\nble to the parties at the time of drafting. See Hadley v.\\nBaxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48; 9 Exch. 341. Put\\ndifferently, a “promisor is not required to compensate the\\ninjured party for injuries which, when the contract was\\nmade, the promisor had no reason to believe would be a\\nprobable result of the breach.” Rogier v. Am. Testing & Eng’g\\nCorp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).\\n Karma doesn’t argue that the Speedway’s damages were\\nobjectively unforeseeable. It instead argues that Indiana’s\\nversion of the Hadley rule requires at least one fact witness to\\ntestify that he subjectively anticipated a precise sum of\\ndamages at the time of drafting. That’s wrong on two fronts.\\nFirst, expert testimony is an accepted method for proving\\ncontract damages. See Sony DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson,\\n56 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Second, Karma\\nmistakenly objects to a lack of subjective evidence when “the\\ntest is an objective one.” Rogier, 734 N.E.2d at 614. A plaintiff\\nin a breach-of-contract suit doesn’t have to prove his state of\\nmind during contract negotiations to receive damages. He is\\n“entitled to present evidence of the breach and resulting\\ndamages and have the trier of fact determine what was\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\\n\\nreasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” WESCO\\nDistrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682,\\n710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).\\n The upshot is that the jury could award objectively fore-\\nseeable damages. Contrary to Karma’s argument, it didn’t\\nneed to hear testimony on the subjective expectations of\\nSpeedway officials before awarding damages. The judge\\nproperly denied Karma’s motion for judgment as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n Finally, we see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s rul-\\ning on Karma’s motion for a new trial. The jury had plenty\\nof evidence that the Speedway complied with its promise to\\nsend a “dedicated email” to its database. Jarrod Krisiloff\\ntestified that the database “is a collection of personal rec-\\nords” and “is used for marketing efforts but is never solely\\nused in its entirety for any one specific cause.” He explained\\nthat the Speedway targets its promotional messages strategi-\\ncally rather than sending every message to every subscriber.\\nAnd he testified that sending a dedicated promotional e-mail\\nto the entire “Wing and Wheel Newsletter” subscriber list\\nwould have been an unprecedented step for the company.\\nRyan Hollander, manager of direct marketing for the race-\\ntrack, testified that the Wing and Wheel Newsletter was the\\n“largest, most broadest reaching email … of the database.”\\n As the judge observed in denying the motion for a new\\ntrial, “database” is a vague term, but the trial testimony\\nsupplied the jury with additional context. A rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Speedway complied with its contrac-\\ntual obligations by sending dedicated messages to multiple\\nsubsets of its larger database.\\n\\fNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487 11\\n\\n The record also contains sufficient evidence of Karma’s\\nbreach. Hollander and the Krisiloff brothers testified that\\nKarma never ran the banner advertisement on Maxim.com\\nand failed to provide social-media support for the Indy 500’s\\nlive music events. Even Karma’s CEO admitted that he\\ndidn’t know whether this was done. Karma maintains that it\\ncomplied with the agreement by introducing Speedway\\nemployees to personnel at Maxim who could assist in pre-\\nparing the promised promotional material. But Karma\\nagreed to deliver the advertisements, not to serve as a con-\\nduit between the Speedway and Maxim. What’s more, at\\ntrial the Speedway rebutted Karma’s version of events.\\nWhen asked whether he was “ever introduced by Karma to\\nanyone at Maxim for social media channel postings,” Kyle\\nKrisiloff said, “No.” And Jared Krisiloff couldn’t recall any\\nintroduction “for the purpose of this deliverable.” In short,\\nthe jury’s liability verdict was adequately supported by trial\\ntestimony.\\n Finally, Karma argues that it deserves either a new trial\\nor a remittitur because no Speedway official testified that he\\nactually anticipated damages stemming from the breach.\\nWe’ve already addressed that argument’s legal shortcom-\\nings. In any event, the jury’s damages award had sufficient\\nevidentiary support. Expert testimony valued the loss from\\nKarma’s failure to deliver the promised advertising at\\nbetween $115,500 and $198,000. The jury awarded less—\\n$75,000—and Karma hasn’t made a persuasive case for\\nretrial or remittitur.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4389,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4662525,"string":"4,662,525"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2054"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n\\n September 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\\n States District Court for\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n the Northern District of\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 17 C 6111\\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Order\\n\\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\\nfollows:\\n\\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439778/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FRANK H EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL S KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL B BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FRANK H EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL S KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL B BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662525/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n\n September 19, 2019\n\n\n\n Before\n\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\n\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\n\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\n States District Court for\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\n the Northern District of\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\n v.\n No. 17 C 6111\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n\n\n Order\n\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\nfollows:\n\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n\\n September 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\\n States District Court for\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n the Northern District of\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 17 C 6111\\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Order\\n\\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\\nfollows:\\n\\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4390,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4662594,"string":"4,662,594"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2054"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge No.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n\\n September 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\\n States District Court for\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n the Northern District of\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 17 C 6111\\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Order\\n\\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\\nfollows:\\n\\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4439847/\", \"author_raw\": \"SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FRANK H EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL S KANNE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MICHAEL B BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FRANK H EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL S KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"MICHAEL B BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662594/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n\n September 19, 2019\n\n\n\n Before\n\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\n\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\n\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\n\n\n\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\n States District Court for\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\n the Northern District of\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\n v.\n No. 17 C 6111\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n\n\n Order\n\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\nfollows:\n\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\\n\\n\\n September 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n\\n Before\\n\\n FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge\\n\\n MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 18-2054 Appeal from the United\\n States District Court for\\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\\n the Northern District of\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n v.\\n No. 17 C 6111\\nSHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Order\\n\\n The opinion of this court issued on September 18, 2019, is amended as\\nfollows:\\n\\n Page 4, “Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2005);” should be “Mullenix v.\\n Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015);”.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4391,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663053,"string":"4,663,053"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Donald Wayne Bush v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-3244"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 16-3244\\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\\n\\f2 No. 16-3244\\n\\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 3\\n\\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\\n\\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3244\\n\\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\\nstanding of that term.\\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\\n cases under title 11.\\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\\n title 11.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 5\\n\\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\\n 11.\\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\\n ruptcy.\\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\\n tate; and\\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\\n\\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\\n\\f6 No. 16-3244\\n\\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\\nrely on.\\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\\nhave not been satisfied.\\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\\nrisdiction is unavailable.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 7\\n\\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\\ndispute.\\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\\n\\f8 No. 16-3244\\n\\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 9\\n\\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\\nclaims.\\n\\f10 No. 16-3244\\n\\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 11\\n\\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440306/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663053/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Donald Wayne Bush v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-3244\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\n\f2 No. 16-3244\n\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\n2019).\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\n\fNo. 16-3244 3\n\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\n\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\n\f4 No. 16-3244\n\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\nstanding of that term.\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\n cases under title 11.\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\n title 11.\n\fNo. 16-3244 5\n\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\n 11.\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\n ruptcy.\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\n tate; and\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\n\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\n\f6 No. 16-3244\n\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\nrely on.\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\nhave not been satisfied.\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\nrisdiction is unavailable.\n\fNo. 16-3244 7\n\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\ndispute.\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\n\f8 No. 16-3244\n\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\n\fNo. 16-3244 9\n\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\nclaims.\n\f10 No. 16-3244\n\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\n\fNo. 16-3244 11\n\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Donald Wayne Bush v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 16-3244\\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\\n\\f2 No. 16-3244\\n\\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 3\\n\\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\\n\\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3244\\n\\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\\nstanding of that term.\\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\\n cases under title 11.\\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\\n title 11.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 5\\n\\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\\n 11.\\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\\n ruptcy.\\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\\n tate; and\\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\\n\\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\\n\\f6 No. 16-3244\\n\\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\\nrely on.\\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\\nhave not been satisfied.\\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\\nrisdiction is unavailable.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 7\\n\\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\\ndispute.\\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\\n\\f8 No. 16-3244\\n\\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 9\\n\\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\\nclaims.\\n\\f10 No. 16-3244\\n\\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 11\\n\\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4392,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663138,"string":"4,663,138"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Donald Wayne Bush v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-3244"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 16-3244\\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\\n\\f2 No. 16-3244\\n\\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 3\\n\\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\\n\\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3244\\n\\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\\nstanding of that term.\\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\\n cases under title 11.\\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\\n title 11.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 5\\n\\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\\n 11.\\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\\n ruptcy.\\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\\n tate; and\\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\\n\\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\\n\\f6 No. 16-3244\\n\\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\\nrely on.\\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\\nhave not been satisfied.\\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\\nrisdiction is unavailable.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 7\\n\\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\\ndispute.\\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\\n\\f8 No. 16-3244\\n\\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 9\\n\\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\\nclaims.\\n\\f10 No. 16-3244\\n\\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 11\\n\\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440391/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663138/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Donald Wayne Bush v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-3244\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\n\f2 No. 16-3244\n\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\n2019).\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\n\fNo. 16-3244 3\n\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\n\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\n\f4 No. 16-3244\n\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\nstanding of that term.\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\n cases under title 11.\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\n title 11.\n\fNo. 16-3244 5\n\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\n 11.\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\n ruptcy.\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\n tate; and\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\n\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\n\f6 No. 16-3244\n\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\nrely on.\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\nhave not been satisfied.\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\nrisdiction is unavailable.\n\fNo. 16-3244 7\n\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\ndispute.\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\n\f8 No. 16-3244\n\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\n\fNo. 16-3244 9\n\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\nclaims.\n\f10 No. 16-3244\n\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\n\fNo. 16-3244 11\n\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Donald Wayne Bush v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 16-3244\\nDONALD WAYNE BUSH and KIMBERLY ANN BUSH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-1318-WTL-DKL — William T. Lawrence, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the\\nquestion whether a bankruptcy court can determine the\\namount of a debtor’s tax obligations, when the debtor is un-\\nlikely to pay them. Bankruptcy Judge Carr answered yes and\\nscheduled a trial on the merits, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 4494\\n(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 7, 2015), but a district judge disagreed.\\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106671 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2016). The in-\\nterlocutory appeal to the district judge was authorized by 28\\n\\f2 No. 16-3244\\n\\nU.S.C. §158(a)(3). Because the district judge blocked further\\nproceedings in the bankruptcy court, his decision is final and\\nappealable to us under 28 U.S.C. §1291, for, outside of bank-\\nruptcy, tax obligations are stand-alone mahers independent-\\nly appealable. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686,\\n1692 (2015). See also In re Anderson, 917 F.3d 566 (7th Cir.\\n2019).\\n The dispute began in 2013 when the Internal Revenue\\nService demanded that Donald and Kimberly Bush pay\\n$107,000 in taxes, plus $80,000 in fraud penalties, for tax\\nyears 2009, 2010, and 2011. (We round all figures to the near-\\nest thousand.) The Bushes petitioned the Tax Court for re-\\nview. By the time trial was imminent the parties had stipu-\\nlated that the Bushes owed $100,000 in taxes, but penalties\\nremained in dispute: the IRS sought a 75% fraud penalty\\nunder 26 U.S.C. §6663(a), while the Bushes proposed a 20%\\nnegligence penalty under 26 U.S.C. §6662(a). On the date set\\nfor trial, the Bushes filed for bankruptcy, and the automatic\\nstay prevented the Tax Court from proceeding. The bank-\\nruptcy court declined to lift the stay. The United States did\\nnot appeal but did file a proof of claim seeking taxes and\\npenalties. It also proposed that the tax debt be given priority\\nover the Bushes’ other unsecured debts, while the penalty\\n(whatever its ultimate amount) be determined to be nondis-\\nchargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7). The Bushes then initi-\\nated an adversary proceeding, asking the bankruptcy court\\nto set the penalty at 20% of their unpaid taxes.\\n The Bushes pointed the bankruptcy court to 11 U.S.C.\\n§505(a)(1), which reads:\\n Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court\\n may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 3\\n\\n penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not\\n previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not\\n contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative\\n tribunal of competent jurisdiction.\\n\\nThe United States concedes that paragraph (2) does not ap-\\nply to its dispute with the Bushes. But it argues that §505 as\\na whole does not grant subject-maher jurisdiction to bank-\\nruptcy judges and that only a potential effect on creditors’\\ndistributions justifies a decision by a bankruptcy judge about\\nany tax dispute. The Bushes insisted that §505 does supply\\njurisdiction, a view that the bankruptcy judge accepted and\\nthe district judge did not. The parties’ briefs in this court\\ncontinue the debate about the “jurisdictional” nature of §505.\\n This is unfortunate, though we grant that other circuits\\nwriting about §505 have used a “jurisdictional” characteriza-\\ntion. See, e.g., In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)\\n(calling §505 a “broad grant of jurisdiction”); In re Custom\\nDistribution Services, Inc., 224 F.3d 235, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2000)\\n(“We have consistently interpreted §505(a) as a jurisdictional\\nstatute”). But we do not see what §505 has to do with juris-\\ndiction, a word it does not use. Section 505 simply sets out a\\ntask for bankruptcy judges. Almost the entirety of the Bank-\\nruptcy Code prescribes tasks for bankruptcy judges. For ex-\\nample, §503 tells bankruptcy judges how to determine ad-\\nministrative expenses, and §547 provides for resolution of\\ntrustees’ preference-recovery actions. Those and other sec-\\ntions in the Code are unrelated to jurisdiction, just as few of\\nthe many thousand substantive rules in the United States\\nCode as a whole concern jurisdiction.\\n The Supreme Court insists that judges distinguish proce-\\ndural and substantive rules from jurisdictional ones. See,\\ne.g., Fort Bend v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019); United States v.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3244\\n\\nKwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565\\nU.S. 134 (2012). The rule in §505 is on the non-jurisdictional\\nside. The Justices have acknowledged that in earlier years\\nthey used the word “jurisdiction” loosely, and our col-\\nleagues in other circuits may have been influenced by that\\nold usage when calling §505 “jurisdictional.” But the Su-\\npreme Court has restricted the category of laws that can be\\ncalled jurisdictional, and we must follow its current under-\\nstanding of that term.\\n Most genuine jurisdictional rules appear in Title 28, the\\nJudicial Code, and that’s true of bankruptcy too. The Bank-\\nruptcy Code itself tells us this. Section 105(c) reads: “The\\nability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a\\ndistrict court to exercise any of the authority or responsibili-\\nties conferred upon the court under this title shall be deter-\\nmined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge,\\nofficer, or employee set forth in title 28.” Bankruptcy judges\\nact as officers of the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. §157(a), so\\n§105(c) means that bankruptcy jurisdiction depends on Title\\n28. See also Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.\\nCt. 1932, 1939 (2015).\\n And Title 28 addresses bankruptcy jurisdiction in detail:\\n (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the dis-\\n trict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all\\n cases under title 11.\\n (b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding\\n any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court\\n or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall\\n have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceed-\\n ings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under\\n title 11.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 5\\n\\n (c)(1) Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11,\\n nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of\\n justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for\\n State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding\\n arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title\\n 11.\\n (2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a\\n State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case un-\\n der title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case un-\\n der title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been\\n commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction\\n under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing\\n such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely\\n adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.\\n (d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under subsec-\\n tion (c) (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding de-\\n scribed in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or oth-\\n erwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292\\n of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under\\n section 1254 of this title. Subsection (c) and this subsection shall\\n not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided\\n for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section\\n applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bank-\\n ruptcy.\\n (e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced\\n or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction—\\n (1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of\\n the commencement of such case, and of property of the es-\\n tate; and\\n (2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construc-\\n tion of section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules re-\\n lating to disclosure requirements under section 327.\\n\\n28 U.S.C. §1334. Other grants of jurisdiction also may apply.\\nA provision allowing district courts to resolve certain tax\\ndisputes, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1), comes to mind. But the par-\\n\\f6 No. 16-3244\\n\\nties disregard it, and so shall we. The Bushes, as the propo-\\nnents of jurisdiction, are entitled to choose which grants they\\nrely on.\\n The United States protests that sovereign immunity ne-\\ngates any jurisdiction based on §1334, but 11 U.S.C.\\n§106(a)(1) waives that defense for subjects within §505. What\\nis more, we have held that sovereign immunity does not\\naffect subject-maher jurisdiction. See United States v. Cook\\nCounty, 167 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 1999).\\n Section 1334 creates jurisdiction for three potentially rel-\\nevant categories of disputes: those “arising in” bankruptcy\\nlitigation, those “arising under” the Bankruptcy Code, and\\nthose “related to” the resolution of the bankruptcy proceed-\\ning. The Bushes rely on all three; the United States contends\\nthat none applies. We take them in order.\\n A dispute “arises in” bankruptcy if it concerns a maher\\nthat is exclusive to bankruptcy law and practice. See In re\\nRepository Technologies, Inc., 601 F.3d 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2010).\\nA proceeding to determine taxes and penalties does not arise\\nin bankruptcy in this sense. As we have mentioned, it was\\nset for trial in the Tax Court until the Bushes filed their peti-\\ntion under Title 11. Most tax disputes are resolved outside of\\nbankruptcy. The requirements of “arises in” jurisdiction\\nhave not been satisfied.\\n A dispute “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code when it\\npresents a substantive question of bankruptcy law. See, e.g.,\\nBarneN v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1990). This tax\\ndispute’s substance depends on the Internal Revenue Code,\\nnot the Bankruptcy Code, so the “arising under” grant of ju-\\nrisdiction is unavailable.\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 7\\n\\n What remains is the “related to” jurisdiction in the sec-\\nond clause of §1334(b), which is how most non-bankruptcy\\nissues, such as tort and contract disputes, come within a\\nbankruptcy judge’s powers. The Bushes contend that if this\\njurisdiction permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a contract\\ndispute, it also permits a bankruptcy judge to resolve a tax\\ndispute.\\n Language in In re Collazo, 817 F.3d 1047, 1053 (7th Cir.\\n2016), suggesting that entry of a money judgment following\\nthe conclusion of a bankruptcy always is “related to” that\\nbankruptcy for the purpose of §1334(b), is unreasoned and\\nhas the quality of a drive-by ruling, subject to ready reexam-\\nination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BeNer Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 91 (1998). We do not think that the unreasoned lan-\\nguage of Collazo can be given effect, particularly in light of\\nNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,\\n458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011),\\nwhich observe that the permissible authority of judges (in-\\ncluding bankruptcy judges) who lack life tenure is limited.\\n The difficulties in allocating authority between Article I\\nand Article III tribunals, and between federal and state\\ncourts, when a dispute is “related to” bankruptcy but not\\npart of it, need not concern us today, however. After all, dis-\\nputes about the financial demands of the Internal Revenue\\nService always are resolved by federal rather than state tri-\\nbunals—and the alternative to resolution by a bankruptcy\\njudge serving under Article I is resolution by a judge of the\\nTax Court serving under Article I. Whether the bankruptcy\\njudge or the Tax Court judge makes the initial decision, the\\ndisposition is subject to review by one or more judges serv-\\ning under Article III. The constitutional and prudential con-\\n\\f8 No. 16-3244\\n\\ncerns that have led to limits on the “related to” jurisdiction\\nfor state-law disputes are not salient to federal tax disputes.\\n The United States does not contend that resolution of tax\\ndisputes is never “related to” a bankruptcy. Instead it main-\\ntains that the tax dispute is not related to this bankruptcy,\\nbecause the disposition will not affect other creditors’ enti-\\ntlements. It points to In re FedPak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207,\\n213–14 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that a dispute is “related\\nto” bankruptcy when resolution “affects the amount of\\nproperty for distribution [to creditors] or the allocation of\\nproperty among creditors.” See also, e.g., In re Kubly, 818\\nF.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th\\nCir. 1987). That condition is not met here, the United States\\nmaintains, because other creditors’ claims exceed the Bush-\\nes’ assets. The existence of insufficient assets would not by\\nitself be enough to demonstrate the lack of a relation, for the\\nsize of any one debt may affect the allocation among credi-\\ntors. But tax debts are subordinated to many other claims, so\\ndetermining taxes and penalties has no effect here.\\n This line of argument suggests that the statement in Fed-\\nPak needs a qualification. If the related-to jurisdiction really\\ndepends on how things look at the end of the bankruptcy—if\\njurisdiction turns, for example, on how many other claims\\nare made—then authority cannot be determined at the time\\nof filing. Yet one of the most fundamental rules of federal ju-\\nrisdiction is that judicial authority depends on the state of\\naffairs when a case begins (equivalently, when a claim is\\nfiled in bankruptcy) rather than on how things turn out. See,\\ne.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567,\\n570–71 (2004); Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498\\nU.S. 426 (1991); Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. v. Louis-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 9\\n\\nville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552, 566 (1899); Mollan v. Torrance, 22\\nU.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824); Gardynski-Leschuk v. Ford\\nMotor Co., 142 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998). And when the Bushes\\nfiled their motion under §505, just two months into their\\nbankruptcy, only three creditors’ claims had been filed\\nagainst them. It does not appear—more importantly, the\\nUnited States does not contend—that on the date the Bushes\\nasked the bankruptcy judge to determine their tax liabilities,\\na decision could not have affected the allocation of assets\\namong the creditors with outstanding claims.\\n Instead of asking us to evaluate the potential effect of the\\ntax debt near the start of the bankruptcy, the United States\\ndraws our ahention to the fact that many creditors had filed\\nclaims against the Bushes by the time the bankruptcy judge\\nproposed to resolve the tax dispute. By then it seemed un-\\nlikely that the amount the Bushes owe in taxes and penalties\\nwould affect other creditors. But taking that ex post view\\nwould contradict the norm that jurisdictional issues must be\\nresolved ex ante, not in light of how things turn out.\\n The Supreme Court’s most recent engagement with the\\nrelated-to jurisdiction favorably quoted a rule, which it\\nahributed to nine courts of appeals, that a maher comes\\nwithin the related-to jurisdiction if it “could conceivably\\nhave any effect on the estate being administered in bank-\\nruptcy”. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1996).\\nThat’s an ex ante inquiry and avoids making a jurisdictional\\ndecision only after the merits have been resolved and the\\neffect can be known with certainty. Under this approach, the\\n§505 motion is within the related-to jurisdiction because it\\nmight well have mahered if no further creditors had made\\nclaims.\\n\\f10 No. 16-3244\\n\\n Celotex said that our circuit uses a “slightly different test”\\nand pointed to Xonics and Home Insurance Co. v. Cooper &\\nCooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1989). Xonics dealt with a\\ndifferent problem: whether the related-to jurisdiction follows\\nan asset after it leaves the estate. We held that it does not:\\nthat an asset’s chain of title includes a trip through bank-\\nruptcy does not make the asset a ward of the bankruptcy\\ncourt forever. Xonics does, however, contain the phrase\\n“affects the amount of property available for distribution or\\nthe allocation of property among creditors”. 813 F.2d at 131.\\nHome Insurance quoted this language, which also is the gene-\\nsis of the statement in FedPak.\\n None of our decisions addresses the distinction between\\nex ante and ex post perspectives. None considers the potential\\ndifference between demanding an actual effect at the case’s\\nend and a potential effect when the claim is filed. The nine\\ncircuits that have addressed that subject unanimously con-\\nclude that the ex ante perspective is the right one. We agree.\\nThis does not imply an overruling or even a modification of\\ncircuit precedent; instead we address an issue that the circuit\\nhas not previously considered and align this circuit with the\\nview widely held by our colleagues elsewhere: the related-to\\njurisdiction must be assessed at the outset of the dispute,\\nand it is satisfied when the resolution has a potential effect\\non other creditors. It follows that the bankruptcy court has\\nsubject-maher jurisdiction over this tax dispute.\\n Although the bankruptcy judge has the authority to de-\\ncide how much the Bushes owe in tax penalties, whether the\\njudge should exercise that authority is a distinct question.\\nWhen the bankruptcy began, the tax dispute was on the\\nverge of trial in the Tax Court. Only the automatic stay im-\\n\\fNo. 16-3244 11\\n\\nposed by 11 U.S.C. §362 blocked that trial. The bankruptcy\\nappears to be over—at least the parties have not suggested\\nthat anything remains to be done. The estate’s available as-\\nsets have been used to pay debts; most unpaid debts (though\\nnot the debt for 2011 tax penalties) have been discharged; the\\nautomatic stay has lapsed by its own terms; the Trustee’s fi-\\nnal report was filed on February 22, 2019. There is no reason\\nwhy this residual dispute about tax penalties should stick\\nwith the bankruptcy judge, who otherwise is done with the\\ncase, rather than the specialist judges in the Tax Court. Con-\\ngress has authorized district courts to relinquish jurisdiction\\nof bankruptcy disputes “in the interest of justice”, 28 U.S.C.\\n§1334(c)(1), and that description fits the Bushes’ situation.\\nToday the tax dispute stands in the same posture as if the\\nBushes had never filed for bankruptcy, and the appropriate\\nforum for its resolution is the Tax Court.\\n So although the bankruptcy judge was right to hold that\\nhe had authority to resolve the tax dispute while the Bushes’\\nbankruptcy was ongoing, the exercise of that authority is no\\nlonger appropriate. We vacate the district judge’s decision,\\nbased as it was on an erroneous jurisdictional view, and re-\\nmand with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy judge\\nfor the entry of an order under §1334(c)(1), which will mark\\nthe final step in the Bushes’ bankruptcy proceedings.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4393,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663415,"string":"4,663,415"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2609"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2609\\nADRIEL OSORIO,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\\n\\f2 No. 18-2609\\n\\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\\nJuly 2014.\\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\\nprevious draw payments.\\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 3\\n\\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\\nmade.\\n I. Background\\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 5\\n\\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\\nto his offer of employment.\\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\\ndefinition of the class:\\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\\n that paycheck.\\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\\ncertification motion.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\\nadvances.”\\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\\n1996).\\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 7\\n\\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\\nused in the Act.\\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\\n\\f8 No. 18-2609\\n\\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\\nsions.\\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 9\\n\\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\\nemployee’s pay.\\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\\n\\f10 No. 18-2609\\n\\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\\nother applicable deductions are made.\\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\\nviolate the IWPCA.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440668/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663415/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2609\nADRIEL OSORIO,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\n\f2 No. 18-2609\n\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\nJuly 2014.\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\nprevious draw payments.\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\n\fNo. 18-2609 3\n\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\nmade.\n I. Background\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\n\f4 No. 18-2609\n\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\n\fNo. 18-2609 5\n\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\nto his offer of employment.\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\ndefinition of the class:\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\n that paycheck.\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\ncertification motion.\n\f6 No. 18-2609\n\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\nadvances.”\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\n1996).\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\n\fNo. 18-2609 7\n\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\nused in the Act.\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\n\f8 No. 18-2609\n\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\nsions.\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\n\fNo. 18-2609 9\n\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\nemployee’s pay.\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\n\f10 No. 18-2609\n\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\nother applicable deductions are made.\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\nviolate the IWPCA.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2609\\nADRIEL OSORIO,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\\n\\f2 No. 18-2609\\n\\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\\nJuly 2014.\\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\\nprevious draw payments.\\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 3\\n\\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\\nmade.\\n I. Background\\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 5\\n\\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\\nto his offer of employment.\\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\\ndefinition of the class:\\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\\n that paycheck.\\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\\ncertification motion.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\\nadvances.”\\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\\n1996).\\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 7\\n\\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\\nused in the Act.\\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\\n\\f8 No. 18-2609\\n\\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\\nsions.\\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 9\\n\\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\\nemployee’s pay.\\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\\n\\f10 No. 18-2609\\n\\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\\nother applicable deductions are made.\\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\\nviolate the IWPCA.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4394,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663478,"string":"4,663,478"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2609"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2609\\nADRIEL OSORIO,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\\n\\f2 No. 18-2609\\n\\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\\nJuly 2014.\\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\\nprevious draw payments.\\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 3\\n\\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\\nmade.\\n I. Background\\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 5\\n\\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\\nto his offer of employment.\\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\\ndefinition of the class:\\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\\n that paycheck.\\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\\ncertification motion.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\\nadvances.”\\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\\n1996).\\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 7\\n\\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\\nused in the Act.\\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\\n\\f8 No. 18-2609\\n\\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\\nsions.\\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 9\\n\\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\\nemployee’s pay.\\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\\n\\f10 No. 18-2609\\n\\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\\nother applicable deductions are made.\\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\\nviolate the IWPCA.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440731/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663478/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2609\nADRIEL OSORIO,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\n\f2 No. 18-2609\n\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\nJuly 2014.\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\nprevious draw payments.\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\n\fNo. 18-2609 3\n\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\nmade.\n I. Background\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\n\f4 No. 18-2609\n\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\n\fNo. 18-2609 5\n\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\nto his offer of employment.\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\ndefinition of the class:\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\n that paycheck.\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\ncertification motion.\n\f6 No. 18-2609\n\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\nadvances.”\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\n1996).\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\n\fNo. 18-2609 7\n\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\nused in the Act.\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\n\f8 No. 18-2609\n\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\nsions.\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\n\fNo. 18-2609 9\n\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\nemployee’s pay.\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\n\f10 No. 18-2609\n\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\nother applicable deductions are made.\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\nviolate the IWPCA.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2609\\nADRIEL OSORIO,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nTHE TILE SHOP, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 15 C 15 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Anyone who has worked in a com-\\nmissioned sales position knows that earnings are unpredict-\\nable. Commissions often fluctuate from one pay period to\\nthe next. The Tile Shop, LLC, a specialty retailer of ceramic\\nand stone tile, uses a compensation system designed to\\nsmooth the earnings of its commissioned sales staff. The Tile\\nShop pays a semimonthly “draw” of $1,000 ($24,000 annual-\\nly) even if a sales associate earns less than that amount in\\n\\f2 No. 18-2609\\n\\ncommissions during the pay period. The Tile Shop reconciles\\nand recovers any shortfall between actual earned commis-\\nsions and the $1,000 draw in subsequent pay periods, but\\nonly from commissions in excess of $1,000.\\n For ten months Adriel Osorio sold tile and related prod-\\nucts for The Tile Shop, first in Illinois and then in New\\nMexico. His earnings reflected the ebb and flow of sales.\\nWhen business was slow and his commissions totaled less\\nthan $1,000 in a pay period, The Tile Shop paid him the\\nguaranteed $1,000 and reconciled the difference in later pay\\nperiods when his commissions exceeded $1,000. He quit in\\nJuly 2014.\\n Months later Osorio filed this class action alleging that\\nThe Tile Shop’s “recoverable draw” system violates the\\nIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA” or “the\\nAct”) and its implementing regulations. As relevant here, the\\nregulatory scheme prohibits employers from deducting\\nmore than 15% from an employee’s wages per paycheck as\\nrepayment for previous cash advances. Osorio’s suit claimed\\nthat The Tile Shop’s compensation system functions as a\\nseries of cash advances and his former employer deducted\\nmore than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup\\nprevious draw payments.\\n Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-\\ntrict judge held that The Tile Shop’s compensation system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances,” so no violation of Illinois\\nlaw occurred. We affirm, though on a different rationale. The\\nAct prohibits “deductions by employers from wages or final\\ncompensation” unless specified conditions are met. 820 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 115/9 (2018). The rules for repayment of cash\\nadvances are found in the regulations, but the threshold\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 3\\n\\nquestion is whether The Tile Shop’s draw reconciliations are\\n“deductions” from wages or final compensation. They are\\nnot. The reconciliations determine the employee’s gross\\nwages before tax withholding and other deductions are\\nmade.\\n I. Background\\n The Tile Shop, LLC, sells tile and related materials and\\naccessories. It operates 128 retail stores across 31 states. Each\\nstore employs a manager, one or two assistant managers,\\nand a staff of sales associates. Sales associates and assistant\\nmanagers are primarily responsible for sales.\\n The Tile Shop pays its sales associates and assistant man-\\nagers pursuant to a “Sales Associate Pay Plan.” The compa-\\nny gives prospective employees a copy of the plan with its\\noffer letter. Portions of the plan have been revised over the\\nyears, but the material terms have not changed. The plan\\nexplains how the company compensates its sales staff,\\nprimarily through commissions but also with bonuses on\\nsales of certain products and periodic incentives. The Tile\\nShop pays employees on a semimonthly basis.\\n Commission income naturally varies from pay period to\\npay period depending on sales volume, the profitability of\\nproducts sold, and the specific circumstances at the store in\\nquestion. To provide a stable and reliable income, The Tile\\nShop guarantees its sales staff a minimum of $1,000 for each\\nsemimonthly pay period, for an annual salary of at least\\n$24,000. If an employee earns less than $1,000 in commis-\\nsions in a pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles and recovers\\nthe difference in subsequent pay periods, but only against\\ncommission earnings in excess of the guaranteed minimum.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The $1,000 “draw” counts toward gross wages for pur-\\nposes of payroll and income taxes, and it is prorated if the\\nemployee does not work the full pay period. An employee’s\\nfirst three pay periods are essentially a grace period. The Tile\\nShop pays the guaranteed $1,000 and does not seek to\\nrecover any shortfall in actual commissions. Beginning with\\nthe fourth pay period, The Tile Shop reconciles any commis-\\nsion shortfalls below $1,000 against future commissions\\nexceeding $1,000 in subsequent pay periods until recovered\\nin full. Notably, this reconciliation formula determines gross\\nwages for purposes of payroll and income taxes and any\\nother applicable deductions. An employee who leaves the\\ncompany receives a draw payment during his final pay\\nperiod of employment even though he will not make addi-\\ntional sales. The Tile Shop does not require reimbursement\\nof an outstanding draw balance at the end of employment.\\n The Tile Shop employed Osorio as a sales associate in an\\nIllinois store from September 2013 until February 2014 and\\nas an assistant manager in a New Mexico store from\\nFebruary to July 2014. His pay schedule reflects The Tile\\nShop’s system of draws and reconciliations. For example,\\nOsorio’s total compensation for the second pay period in\\nDecember and first pay period of January included draw\\npayments. The Tile Shop recovered the difference after\\nOsorio’s strong performance to end January. In total, Osorio\\nreceived $2,038.47 in recoverable draw compensation during\\nhis employment, and $1,141.46 was reconciled against\\nsubsequent commissions and incentive payments. When he\\nleft the company, he did not have to repay the balance.\\n In January 2015 Osorio filed this class-action lawsuit\\nagainst The Tile Shop alleging violations of the federal Fair\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 5\\n\\nLabor Standards Act, the IWPCA, and the Illinois Minimum\\nWage Law. The district judge granted The Tile Shop’s motion\\nfor partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to\\nOsorio’s IWPCA claim. His original complaint alleged that\\nthe company did not have his written authorization to\\nrecoup the draw payments. The judge ruled that he had\\nauthorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan attached\\nto his offer of employment.\\n Osorio sought reconsideration, but the judge declined to\\nrevisit his decision. Osorio later moved to amend his com-\\nplaint to recharacterize the IWPCA claim as a challenge to\\nimpermissible recoupments of “cash advances.” The judge\\ngranted the motion. Osorio then moved for class certification\\non the reformulated IWPCA claim, proposing the following\\ndefinition of the class:\\n All persons employed in a Tile Shop retail store\\n in the State of Illinois, except store managers,\\n who had a deduction made to a paycheck re-\\n ceived at any time from January 2, 2005[,] up to\\n and including the date of trial, in order to re-\\n coup a cash advance where the deduction was\\n in excess of 15% of the gross pay received in\\n that paycheck.\\nThis definition correlated to Osorio’s new legal theory,\\nwhich rested on the Act’s implementing regulations—more\\nspecifically, an administrative rule providing that “[n]o cash\\nadvance repayment agreement shall provide for a repay-\\nment schedule of more than 15% of an employee’s gross\\nwages or final compensation per paycheck.” ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800 (2018). The judge granted the class-\\ncertification motion.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2609\\n\\n The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judg-\\nment on the IWPCA claim. The judge granted The Tile\\nShop’s motion and denied Osorio’s. He determined that the\\nclaim “hinge[d] on the question … whether [The] Tile\\nShop’s ‘recoverable draw’ system is a cash advance repay-\\nment agreement.” He then examined the pay plan in detail\\nand found one aspect particularly compelling: a departing\\nemployee receives a draw in his final paycheck even if he\\nmakes less than $1,000 in commissions, and he is not re-\\nquired to pay it back. “Because the undisputed facts estab-\\nlish that [The] Tile Shop does not always require repayment\\nof draws,” he concluded, “they do not constitute cash\\nadvances.”\\n The parties settled the FLSA and Illinois Minimum Wage\\nLaw claims, and the judge entered final judgment on the\\nIWPCA claim. Osorio appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, construing ev-\\nidence and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving\\nparty. Barefield v. Village of Winnetka, 81 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.\\n1996).\\n The IWPCA prohibits “deductions by employers from\\nwages or final compensation” unless certain conditions are\\nmet. § 115/9. As we’ve explained, the Act’s implementing\\nregulations establish requirements for deductions from\\nwages pursuant to a “cash advance repayment agreement,”\\none of which is the 15%-per-paycheck limitation. ILL. ADMIN.\\nCODE tit. 56, § 300.800. In the district court, The Tile Shop\\nmade two arguments in opposition to Osorio’s reformulated\\nIWPCA claim. The first was that the draw reconciliations are\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 7\\n\\nnot “deductions from wages or compensation” within the\\nmeaning of the Act. The second was that the draw system\\ndoes not involve “cash advances” within the meaning of the\\nregulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop’s second\\nargument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.\\n On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments. We\\nfind the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is triggered\\nonly if the draw reconciliations constitute “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation.” The Act broadly defines\\n“wages” as “any compensation owed an employee by an\\nemployer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement\\nbetween the 2 parties.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/2 (2018). But\\nneither the statute nor the implementing regulations define\\nthe term “deductions,” nor has any court defined the term as\\nused in the Act.\\n The Tile Shop relies on Cohan v. Medline Industries, Inc.,\\n843 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2016), but that case does not inform the\\nanalysis here. In Cohan two employees claimed that their\\nemployer, Medline, violated the IWPCA by making illegal\\ndeductions from their commissions without written authori-\\nzation. Id. at 661. The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the\\ncompany’s pay structure. First, Medline calculated a sales-\\nperson’s net growth in sales on a month-over-month basis,\\nand if a salesperson had negative net growth for an account,\\nthat resulted in a negative commission. Second, the commis-\\nsion calculation included a “carryover” component such that\\na salesperson with a negative overall territory sales growth\\nin one month was required to cover that loss with any\\npositive sales growth in subsequent months. Id. at 663–64.\\n We rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because Medline’s com-\\npensation plan “clearly and unambiguously provided for\\n\\f8 No. 18-2609\\n\\nnegative growth being taken into account when calculating\\ncommissions.” Id. at 667 (emphasis added). That final word is\\nkey—the challenged aspects of the Medline plan dealt with\\ncalculating the underlying commissions. This case, in contrast,\\ndoes not challenge how The Tile Shop calculates commis-\\nsions.\\n We return, then, to the question whether the draw recon-\\nciliations are “deductions … from wages or final compensa-\\ntion.” Although the Act does not define “deduction,” if a\\nstatutory term has “a settled legal meaning, [Illinois] courts\\nwill normally infer that the legislature intended to incorpo-\\nrate the established meaning.” People v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d\\n986, 988 (Ill. 2013). In the payroll context, a deduction refers\\nto “an amount of money that is taken by an employer from\\nan employee’s pay, for income tax, insurance, etc.” See Payroll\\nDeduction, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY,\\nhttps://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/\\npayroll-deduction (last visited September 18, 2019). Another\\ndictionary similarly defines the term: “[The] amount with-\\nheld by an employer from [an] employee’s earnings. It\\ntypically includes income tax, national insurance or social\\nsecurity contributions, and may also include group insur-\\nance or pension fund contributions … .” See Payroll\\nDeduction, BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.business\\ndictionary.com/definition/payroll-deduction.html last\\nvisited September 18, 2019). In other words, as used in this\\nparticular context, the term “deduction” refers to withhold-\\nings from an employee’s earnings, not the employer’s meth-\\nod of determining an employee’s earnings.\\n Related statutory provisions confirm this understanding.\\nIn Illinois, as elsewhere, a word appearing “more than once\\n\\fNo. 18-2609 9\\n\\nin a statute is presumed to have been used by the legislature\\nwith the same meaning each time, absent an indication that a\\ndifferent meaning was intended.” Baker v. Salomon,\\n334 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also ANTONIN\\nSCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\nINTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170–73 (2012). In section\\n115/10 of the Act, Illinois requires employers to “furnish\\neach employee with an itemized statement of deductions\\nmade from his wages for each pay period.” 820 ILL. COMP.\\nSTAT. 115/10 (2019) (emphasis added). And the implementing\\nregulations prohibit deductions for certain expenses, such as\\nfor training or educational courses, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56,\\n§ 300.780 (2019); damaged property, id. § 300.820; and uni-\\nforms required by the employer, id. § 300.840, “unless the\\nemployee’s express written consent is given freely at the time\\nthe deduction is made.” Under section 115/10 and the regu-\\nlations, the term “deduction” is used as a term of art to refer\\nto expressly stated categories of expenses withheld from an\\nemployee’s pay.\\n Considered in context, the term “deductions” as used in\\nthe Act refers to withholdings from an employee’s gross\\nwages, not the formula used to calculate an employee’s gross\\nwages. This poses an insurmountable obstacle for Osorio.\\nThe draw-reconciliation system is part of The Tile Shop’s\\nformula for calculating a sales associate’s semimonthly\\ncommission earnings. It is not a deduction from the sales\\nassociate’s wages or final compensation. Osorio’s paystub\\nconfirms this understanding: the draw payments and recon-\\nciliations appear as line items under “Earnings,” not under\\n“Deductions.” To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw\\nreconciliation is made “above the line” to calculate the\\n\\f10 No. 18-2609\\n\\nemployee’s gross wages before withholding for taxes and\\nother applicable deductions are made.\\n Because the draw reconciliations are not “deductions …\\nfrom wages or final compensation” within the meaning of\\nsection 115/9, The Tile Shop’s compensation system does not\\nviolate the IWPCA.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4395,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663545,"string":"4,663,545"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2571"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2571\\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\\nCOMPANY,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\\nInc.,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\\ndamages and fees.\\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\\nfees.\\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 3\\n\\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\\nprofessional liability claims.\\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\\nfalls within that provision.\\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\\ncoverage. That provision states that:\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 5\\n\\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\\n any “claim” or “suit”:\\n Based upon or arising out of:\\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\\ntaken. Id.\\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\\nlationship with DVO.\\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 7\\n\\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered. Id.\\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\\ntract claim).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2571\\n\\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 9\\n\\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2571\\n\\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\\nered above.\\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\\nnot brought by a third party.\\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 11\\n\\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\\nbrought by third‐parties.\\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\\n\\f12 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\\nthat clause.”)\\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\\nder the following Parts:\\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\\nContractual Liability provision.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 13\\n\\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\\nsonable expectation of coverage.\\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\\nthis opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440798/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663545/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2571\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\nCOMPANY,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\nInc.,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\n\f2 No. 18‐2571\n\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\ndamages and fees.\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\nfees.\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\n\fNo. 18‐2571 3\n\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\nprofessional liability claims.\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\n\f4 No. 18‐2571\n\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\nfalls within that provision.\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\ncoverage. That provision states that:\n\fNo. 18‐2571 5\n\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\n any “claim” or “suit”:\n Based upon or arising out of:\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\n\f6 No. 18‐2571\n\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\ntaken. Id.\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\nlationship with DVO.\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\n\fNo. 18‐2571 7\n\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\nevent not covered. Id.\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\ntract claim).\n\f8 No. 18‐2571\n\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\n\fNo. 18‐2571 9\n\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\n\f10 No. 18‐2571\n\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\nered above.\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\nnot brought by a third party.\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\n\fNo. 18‐2571 11\n\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\nbrought by third‐parties.\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\n\f12 No. 18‐2571\n\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\nthat clause.”)\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\nder the following Parts:\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\nContractual Liability provision.\n\fNo. 18‐2571 13\n\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\nsonable expectation of coverage.\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\nthis opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2571\\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\\nCOMPANY,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\\nInc.,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\\ndamages and fees.\\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\\nfees.\\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 3\\n\\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\\nprofessional liability claims.\\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\\nfalls within that provision.\\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\\ncoverage. That provision states that:\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 5\\n\\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\\n any “claim” or “suit”:\\n Based upon or arising out of:\\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\\ntaken. Id.\\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\\nlationship with DVO.\\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 7\\n\\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered. Id.\\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\\ntract claim).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2571\\n\\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 9\\n\\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2571\\n\\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\\nered above.\\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\\nnot brought by a third party.\\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 11\\n\\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\\nbrought by third‐parties.\\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\\n\\f12 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\\nthat clause.”)\\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\\nder the following Parts:\\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\\nContractual Liability provision.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 13\\n\\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\\nsonable expectation of coverage.\\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\\nthis opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4396,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663564,"string":"4,663,564"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2571"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2571\\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\\nCOMPANY,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\\nInc.,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\\ndamages and fees.\\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\\nfees.\\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 3\\n\\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\\nprofessional liability claims.\\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\\nfalls within that provision.\\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\\ncoverage. That provision states that:\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 5\\n\\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\\n any “claim” or “suit”:\\n Based upon or arising out of:\\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\\ntaken. Id.\\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\\nlationship with DVO.\\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 7\\n\\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered. Id.\\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\\ntract claim).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2571\\n\\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 9\\n\\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2571\\n\\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\\nered above.\\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\\nnot brought by a third party.\\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 11\\n\\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\\nbrought by third‐parties.\\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\\n\\f12 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\\nthat clause.”)\\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\\nder the following Parts:\\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\\nContractual Liability provision.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 13\\n\\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\\nsonable expectation of coverage.\\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\\nthis opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4440817/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663564/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2571\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\nCOMPANY,\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\nInc.,\n Defendant‐Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\n\f2 No. 18‐2571\n\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\ndamages and fees.\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\nfees.\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\n\fNo. 18‐2571 3\n\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\nprofessional liability claims.\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\n\f4 No. 18‐2571\n\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\nfalls within that provision.\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\ncoverage. That provision states that:\n\fNo. 18‐2571 5\n\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\n any “claim” or “suit”:\n Based upon or arising out of:\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\n\f6 No. 18‐2571\n\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\ntaken. Id.\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\nlationship with DVO.\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\n\fNo. 18‐2571 7\n\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\nevent not covered. Id.\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\ntract claim).\n\f8 No. 18‐2571\n\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\n\fNo. 18‐2571 9\n\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\n\f10 No. 18‐2571\n\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\nered above.\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\nnot brought by a third party.\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\n\fNo. 18‐2571 11\n\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\nbrought by third‐parties.\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\n\f12 No. 18‐2571\n\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\nthat clause.”)\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\nder the following Parts:\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\nContractual Liability provision.\n\fNo. 18‐2571 13\n\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\nsonable expectation of coverage.\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\nthis opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18‐2571\\nCRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE\\nCOMPANY,\\n Plaintiff‐Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDVO, INC., formerly known as GHD,\\nInc.,\\n Defendant‐Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:16‐cv‐01619‐WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 16, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from a diversity\\naction for declaratory relief brought by Crum & Forster Spe‐\\ncialty Insurance Company (“Crum”) against GHD Inc., now\\nknown as DVO Inc. (“DVO”), seeking a determination that\\nCrum does not have a duty to defend DVO in a state court\\naction filed against DVO. Crum provided insurance to DVO,\\n\\f2 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nand the question is whether the Errors & Omissions (“E&O”)\\ncoverage of the primary and excess insurance policies it pro‐\\nvided to DVO, along with any exceptions in the policies, co‐\\nvers the state court claim for a contract violation such that it\\nimposes a duty for Crum to defend DVO in that action.\\n The underlying contract claim was brought by WTE‐S&S\\nAG Enterprise, LLC (“WTE”) against DVO. DVO designs and\\nbuilds anaerobic digesters, which use microorganisms to\\nbreak down biodegradable materials to create biogas. DVO\\nand WTE entered into a Standard Form Agreement, created\\nby the Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee, un‐\\nder which DVO was to design and build an anaerobic digester\\nfor WTE. The digester was to be used to generate electricity\\nfrom cow manure which would then be sold to the electric\\npower utility. WTE sued DVO for breach of contract, alleging\\nthat DVO failed to fulfill its design duties, responsibilities,\\nand obligations under the contract in that it did not properly\\ndesign substantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and\\noperational systems of the anaerobic digester, resulting in\\nsubstantial damages to WTE. It sought over $2 million in\\ndamages and fees.\\n Crum initially provided a defense to DVO under a reser‐\\nvation of rights, but a couple of months later advised DVO\\nthat it would no longer provide a defense. WTE later filed for\\nbankruptcy and the case was transferred to the United States\\nBankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Follow‐\\ning a trial, that court found in favor of WTE and ordered DVO\\nto pay over $65,000 in damages and $198,000 in attorney’s\\nfees.\\n Crum issued primary and excess insurance policies to\\nDVO for periods of time spanning from June 2011 until April\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 3\\n\\n2014. Those policies provided coverage including commercial\\ngeneral liability (CGL) coverage, pollution liability coverage,\\nE&O coverage, third party pollution coverage, and onsite\\ncleanup liability coverage. The issue in this appeal concerns\\ntwo provisions. The first is the provision in the E&O profes‐\\nsional liability coverage, under which Crum is required to pay\\n“those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as\\n‘damages’ or ‘cleanup costs’ because of a ‘wrongful act’ to\\nwhich this insurance applies.” Dist. Ct. Decision and Order\\n(“Dist. Ct.”) at 3. The second relevant provision is the breach\\nof contract exclusion that was added by an endorsement,\\nwhich provides that the Policy does not apply to claims or\\ndamages based upon or arising out of breach of contract. Id.\\nDVO argued that the breach of contract exclusion was so\\nbroad as to render the E&O professional liability coverage il‐\\nlusory, and therefore could not be enforced to preclude the\\nduty to defend. The district court held that the professional\\nliability coverage was not illusory because it would still apply\\nto third party claims, and that even if it was determined to be\\nillusory, the remedy would be to reform the contract to allow\\ncoverage to third party claims, not to allow coverage for all\\nprofessional liability claims.\\n A determination of a duty to defend under an insurance\\npolicy involves a three‐part inquiry: first, whether the type of\\nclaim asserted against DVO is the type for which coverage is\\nprovided by the policy; second, whether an exclusion provi‐\\nsion in the policy precludes coverage; and third, if an exclu‐\\nsion applies, whether that exclusion contains any exceptions\\nthat would reinstate coverage. Marks v. Houston Cas. Co., 881\\nN.W.2d 309, 322–23 (Wis. 2016); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.\\nAmerican Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004). There is no\\ndisagreement as to the first part. The state court claim against\\n\\f4 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nDVO involves allegations that DVO entered into a contract\\nwith WTE to construct an anaerobic digester which would\\ngenerate electricity from cow manure, and that DVO failed to\\nfulfill its design duties because it did not properly design sub‐\\nstantial portions of the structural, mechanical, and opera‐\\ntional systems of the anaerobic digester causing damages. Un‐\\nder the E&O coverage of the primary and excess insurance\\npolicies from Crum to DVO, Crum agreed to pay those sums\\nthat the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages\\nor cleanup costs because of a wrongful act to which the insur‐\\nance applies. “Wrongful act” is defined to include a failure to\\nrender professional services, and “professional services” is\\ndefined as “those functions performed for others by you or by\\nothers on your behalf that are related to your practice as a\\nconsultant, engineer, [or] architect … .” Such a provision is a\\ncommon one, and essentially provides coverage for profes‐\\nsional malpractice. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 324, quoting\\nGrieb v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 148 N.W.2d 103, 106\\n(Wis. 1967) (“[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy is professional‐\\nliability insurance … designed to insure members of a partic‐\\nular professional group from liability arising out of the special\\nrisk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes and errors inher‐\\nent in the practice of the profession”); 1325 North Van Buren,\\nLLC v. T‐3 Group. Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 836 n. 13 (Wis.\\n2006) (same). All parties agree that the alleged conduct here\\nfalls within that provision.\\n The parties also agree, however, that the exclusion clause\\nadded as an endorsement to the contract, applies to preclude\\ncoverage. That provision states that:\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 5\\n\\n This Policy does not apply to “damages”, “defense ex‐\\n penses”, “cleanup costs”, or any loss, cost or expense, or\\n any “claim” or “suit”:\\n Based upon or arising out of:\\n a. breach of contract, whether express or oral, nor any\\n “claim” for breach of an implied in law or an implied\\n in fact contracts [sic], regardless of whether “bodily in‐\\n jury”, “property damage”, “personal and advertising\\n injury” or a “wrongful act” is alleged.\\nAppellant’s Appendix (“App.”) A116‐A119.\\n The parties do not dispute that a determination of whether\\nthat exclusion applies must focus on the incident that alleg‐\\nedly gave rise to the coverage, not the theory of liability. That\\nis consistent with Wisconsin caselaw. For instance, the Wis‐\\nconsin Supreme Court in 1325 North Van Buren, rejected the\\nargument that insurance liability is dependent on a theory of\\nliability, and noted that claims of negligence in the failure to\\nprovide competent professional services could raise both tort\\nand contract claims. 716 N.W.2d at 838. Therefore, even a\\nclaim that purports to be a tort claim can be excluded under\\nthe breach of contract exclusion if it arises out of that contract.\\nHere, the state court complaint against DVO alleged that\\nDVO was contracted to design and construct the anaerobic di‐\\ngester and, because of its faulty design, damages were in‐\\ncurred. That alleged a claim that arose out of the contract and\\ntherefore falls within the exclusion language.\\n The sole issue, then, is whether the language in that breach\\nof contract exclusion renders the exclusion broader than the\\ngrant of coverage, and therefore renders the coverage illu‐\\n\\f6 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nsory. “In the insurance context, ‘[i]llusory policy language de‐\\nfines coverage in a manner that coverage will never actually\\nbe triggered.’” Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328, (quoting Continental\\nWestern Ins. Co. v. Paul Reid, LLP, 715 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Wis.\\nApp. 2006)). If the purported coverage in a policy proves to\\nbe illusory, a court may reform the policy to meet the in‐\\nsured’s reasonable expectation of coverage. Id. Such contract\\nreformation, however, is an extraordinary remedy not lightly\\ntaken. Id.\\n The district court rejected the argument that the coverage\\nwas illusory. It held that although coverage for professional\\nmalpractice would effectively fall within that exclusion as to\\nclaims alleged by the party to the contract, third parties could\\nstill bring tort claims against DVO that would not fall within\\nthe exclusion and would trigger the duty to defend in the\\nE&O provision of the policy. The district court reasoned that\\nas a contractor, designer, engineer and builder, DVO has a\\nduty to use reasonable care in carrying out its contractual ob‐\\nligation so as to avoid injury or damage to the person or prop‐\\nerty of third parties, even though they have no contractual re‐\\nlationship with DVO.\\n But that analysis cannot support the court’s conclusion. If\\nmore narrow language was used, the district court’s determi‐\\nnation that third‐party liability would still be covered might\\nhave merit. But the language in the exclusion at issue here is\\nextremely broad. It includes claims “based upon or arising out\\nof” the contract, thus including a class of claims more expan‐\\nsive than those based upon the contract. Wisconsin courts\\nhave made clear that the “arising out of” language is broadly\\nconstrued. For instance, in Great Lakes Beverages, LLC v.\\nWochinski, 892 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Wis. App. 2017), the court\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 7\\n\\nheld that “the phrase ‘“arising out of” in an insurance policy\\nis very broad, general and comprehensive and is ordinarily\\nunderstood to mean originating from, growing out of, or\\nflowing from.’” (quoting Trumpeter Developments v. Pierce\\nCounty, 681 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Wis. App. 2004)); accord Shelley\\nv. Moir, 405 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. App. 1987). All that is re‐\\nquired is some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered. Id.\\n That same language has been applied by Wisconsin courts\\nto exclude coverage for third‐party claims. For instance, in\\nGreat Lakes Beverages, the court considered whether AMCO In‐\\nsurance’s policies providing coverage for personal and adver‐\\ntising injuries, including libel and slander, required coverage\\nof Wochinski’s tortious interference claim which was based\\non the allegation that Great Lakes Beverages was falsely in‐\\nforming people that Wochinski was subject to a non‐compete\\nagreement. 892 N.W.2d at 339‐40. The insurance policy ex‐\\ncluded any advertising or personal injury arising out of a\\nbreach of contract, and the court held that the exclusion\\nbarred coverage even though Wochinski had never had a con‐\\ntract with Great Lakes Beverages. Id. The court held that the\\ntortious interference claim arose out of a breach of contract\\nbecause the truth or falsity of the representations depended\\non whether the non‐compete agreement in the contract be‐\\ntween Wochinski and another party remained in effect. Id.\\nTherefore, Great Lakes Beverages held that the “arising out of”\\nlanguage in the exclusion is read broadly, and that it can be\\napplied to bar a tort claim brought by a third party. See also\\nShelley, 405 N.W.2d at 739‐40 (exclusion for claims arising out\\nof bodily injury operated to exclude third‐party breach of con‐\\ntract claim).\\n\\f8 No. 18‐2571\\n\\n Under Wisconsin law, therefore, the term “arising out of”\\nhas been interpreted broadly to reach any conduct that has at\\nleast some causal relationship between the injury and the\\nevent not covered, which sweeps in third‐party claims as well\\nwhen so related. And the “event not covered” in the policy\\nhere is itself quite expansive, explicitly applying the breach of\\ncontract exclusion to all contracts whether express or oral, and\\neven including contracts implied in law or fact. Given that\\nbroad language, the exclusion would include even the claims\\nof third parties. As to those third parties, the claims of profes‐\\nsional negligence will fall within the contract exclusion be‐\\ncause they necessarily arise out of the express, oral or implied\\ncontract under which DVO rendered the professional ser‐\\nvices. See 1325 North Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 838 (noting\\nthat the claim based on a negligent act for its failure to adhere\\nto professional standards is one sounding in negligence but\\narising in the context of a contract); Colton v. Foulkes, 47\\nN.W.2d 901, 903 (1951) (the contract creates the state of things\\nwhich furnishes the occasion of the tort).\\n To avoid that conclusion, Crum relies primarily on an un‐\\npublished Wisconsin appellate court opinion in General Casu‐\\nalty Co. of Wisc. v. Rainbow Insulators, Inc., 798 N.W.2d 320\\n(Wis. App. 2011). In that case, KBS filed a complaint for breach\\nof contract against E & A Enterprises (“E & A”). E & A had\\ncontracted to handle metal stud framing and drywall for a\\ncondominium project and E & A created noise problems in\\nthe units by attaching resilient channels to drywall in the\\nwrong direction and by using screws that were too long,\\nwhich caused acoustical problems and required KBS to re‐\\nmove and reinstall the channels. Id. at *1.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 9\\n\\n The court considered whether Acuity, an insurance com‐\\npany, had a duty to provide coverage. E & A had a profes‐\\nsional liability policy with Acuity called the Contractor’s Er‐\\nror & Omissions Coverage which provided coverage for\\n“damages because of property damage to your product, prop‐\\nerty damage to your work, property damage to impaired\\nproperty or recall expense that arises out of your product,\\nyour work, or any part thereof.” Id. at *6‐7. The court held that\\nthe policy provided initial coverage, but held that such cover‐\\nage was precluded under the “contract” exclusion, which ex‐\\ncludes coverage for “damages arising out of any … [d]elay or\\nfailure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a\\ncontract or agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id. at 7.\\nE & A argued that the contract exclusion was inapplicable be‐\\ncause the alleged property damage arose out of negligent acts,\\nerrors, or omissions. Id. The court held, however, that the\\ncharacterization of the claim was not dispositive; it further\\nheld that the conduct alleged in the complaint, if proven,\\nwould constitute failure to perform a contract, and therefore\\nthe exclusion applied. Id. The court rejected the argument that\\nsuch an interpretation would render the policy useless, hold‐\\ning that the exclusion did not exclude all claims of any sort\\nthat might arise during the course of the work performed un‐\\nder a contract. The court as an example stated that “because\\ncontractors owe common law duties of care to those with\\nwhom they contract, as to all other persons, the ‘contract’ ex‐\\nclusion would not operate to preclude E & O policy coverage\\narising from a tort claim that involves conduct that is not a\\ndelay or failure to perform under a contract term.” Id. at 8.\\n Crum relies on that case as support for the notion that the\\nexclusion does not render the coverage illusory here, but the\\ncomparison is a faulty one. First, the coverage provision was\\n\\f10 No. 18‐2571\\n\\ndifferent in General Casualty in that it covered property dam‐\\nage not professional malpractice generally. The overlap be‐\\ntween claims of professional malpractice and breach of con‐\\ntract is complete, because the professional malpractice neces‐\\nsarily involves the contractual relationship. Moreover, the ex‐\\nclusion was more narrow in General Casualty. It applied only\\nto damages arising out of delays or failures to perform a con‐\\ntract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Thus, the exclu‐\\nsion was tied to the terms of the contract, and would not nec‐\\nessarily include conduct that was merely causally related to\\nthe contract or which flowed from the contract as here. Fi‐\\nnally, the court’s analysis of the issue as to whether the cov‐\\nerage was illusory was limited to a couple of sentences, with\\nno further development of the reasoning, and even inter‐\\npreted as broadly as Crum argues, we do not find it persua‐\\nsive in light of the other, published Wisconsin cases consid‐\\nered above.\\n Based on that Wisconsin caselaw, we hold that the breach\\nof contract exclusion in this case rendered the professional li‐\\nability coverage in the E&O policy illusory. The district court\\nrecognized that possibility as well, but held that the contract\\ncould be reformed so as to avoid that impact. Specifically, the\\ncourt held that if the policy was read so as to preclude such\\nthird‐party suits, then the exclusion would render the cover‐\\nage illusory and the contract should be reformed so as to al‐\\nlow such suits. The court held, however, that such a refor‐\\nmation would not help DVO because the state court suit was\\nnot brought by a third party.\\n That focus on third‐party suits is misplaced in the context\\nof the contract reformation here. The court itself raised the\\npossibility that third‐party suits might not be excluded under\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 11\\n\\nthe language of the breach of contract exclusion, in an effort\\nto demonstrate that the professional liability coverage was\\nnot therefore illusory (in that it provided coverage for third‐\\nparty suits). As we have held above, that conclusion is incon‐\\nsistent with the broad “arising out of” language, which would\\nexclude all claims for professional liability whether or not\\nbrought by third‐parties.\\n When a policy’s purported coverage is illusory, the policy\\nmay be reformed to meet an insured’s reasonable expectation\\nof coverage. Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 328. Therefore, the focus\\nnow is not on the hypothetical third‐party actions, but on the\\nreasonable expectation of coverage of the insured in securing\\nthe policy. There is, after all, no reason to believe that DVO in\\npurchasing Errors and Omissions coverage to provide insur‐\\nance against professional malpractice claims had a reasonable\\nexpectation that it was obtaining insurance only for claims of\\nprofessional malpractice brought by third parties.\\n In determining the reasonable expectation of the insured,\\nwe consider the intended role of the coverage. Tri City Nat.\\nBank v. Fed. Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Wis. App. 2003).\\n“[T]he nature and purpose of the policy as a whole have an\\nobvious bearing on the insured’s reasonable expectations as\\nto the scope of coverage … .” Id., quoting Shelley, 405 N.W.2d\\nat 739. As we noted earlier, “[a]n errors‐and‐omissions policy\\nis professional‐liability insurance … designed to insure mem‐\\nbers of a particular professional group from liability arising\\nout of the special risk such as negligence, omissions, mistakes\\nand errors inherent in the practice of the profession.” Marks,\\n881 N.W.2d at 324, (quoting Grieb, 148 N.W.2d at 106); 1325\\nNorth Van Buren, 716 N.W.2d at 836 n. 13 (same). Accordingly,\\n\\f12 No. 18‐2571\\n\\nbecause the breach of contract exclusion renders the profes‐\\nsional liability coverage illusory, the contract should be re‐\\nformed so as to meet the reasonable expectations of DVO as\\nto the E&O policy’s coverage for liability arising out of negli‐\\ngence, omissions, mistakes and errors inherent in the practice\\nof the profession. See Marks, 881 N.W.2d at 329 (noting that if\\ncoverage is rendered illusory, “our task would be to reform\\nthe policy so that it ‘conform[s] to [the] real intent’ of the par‐\\nties; that is, to reform the policy so that it represents the ‘def‐\\ninite and explicit agreement’ originally reached by the parties\\nbefore any mistake occurred. … If a clause in Marksʹ policy\\nrenders the policy illusory, we consider whether to reform\\nthat clause.”)\\n The breach of contract exclusion is set forth in an endorse‐\\nment. The endorsement modifies the insurance provided un‐\\nder the following Parts:\\n Commercial General Liability Coverage Part\\n Contractors Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Errors and Omissions Liability Coverage Part\\n Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage Part\\n Onsite Cleanup Coverage Part\\nApp. at A119. As such, it replaces the standard Contractual\\nLiability provision. Because the breach of contract exclusion\\nrenders only the E&O coverage illusory, one possible refor‐\\nmation would be to delete the applicability of the endorse‐\\nment only as to the E&O Part, and contractual liability under\\nthat Part would then revert back to the terms of the original\\nContractual Liability provision.\\n\\fNo. 18‐2571 13\\n\\n But we need not determine precisely what reformation is\\nappropriate here. DVO did not file a cross‐motion for sum‐\\nmary judgment. The district court on remand may consider\\nDVO’s reasonable expectations in securing the coverage, and\\ncan reform the contract so as to give effect to that expectation.\\nThe focus, however, must be on that reasonable expectation,\\nwhich was upended by the breach of contract exclusion that\\nrendered it illusory. The availability of third‐party claims is\\nirrelevant unless it is determined to be a part of DVO’s rea‐\\nsonable expectation of coverage.\\n The decision of the district court is REVERSED and the\\ncase REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with\\nthis opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4397,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663883,"string":"4,663,883"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-3055"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and DEGUILIO, District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 16-3055\\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\\n\\n\\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 16-3055\\n\\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\\ntion prohibited by Reed.\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 3\\n\\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\\nwork.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3055\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 5\\n\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\\nthe ordinance works.\\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\\n(1984).\\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\\n\\f6 No. 16-3055\\n\\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\\nright.\\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\\nover the Internet.\\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4441136/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DEGUILIO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"DEGUILIO\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663883/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 16-3055\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\n\n\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\n\f2 No. 16-3055\n\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\ntion prohibited by Reed.\n\fNo. 16-3055 3\n\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\nwork.\n\f4 No. 16-3055\n\n\n\n\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\n\fNo. 16-3055 5\n\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\nthe ordinance works.\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\n(1984).\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\n\f6 No. 16-3055\n\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\nright.\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\nover the Internet.\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 16-3055\\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\\n\\n\\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 16-3055\\n\\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\\ntion prohibited by Reed.\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 3\\n\\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\\nwork.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3055\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 5\\n\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\\nthe ordinance works.\\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\\n(1984).\\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\\n\\f6 No. 16-3055\\n\\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\\nright.\\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\\nover the Internet.\\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4398,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4663945,"string":"4,663,945"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-3055"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and DEGUILIO, District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 16-3055\\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\\n\\n\\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 16-3055\\n\\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\\ntion prohibited by Reed.\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 3\\n\\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\\nwork.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3055\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 5\\n\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\\nthe ordinance works.\\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\\n(1984).\\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\\n\\f6 No. 16-3055\\n\\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\\nright.\\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\\nover the Internet.\\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4441198/\", \"author_raw\": \"Frank Hoover Easterbrook\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DEGUILIO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"DEGUILIO\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663945/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 16-3055\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\n\n\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\n\f2 No. 16-3055\n\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\ntion prohibited by Reed.\n\fNo. 16-3055 3\n\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\nwork.\n\f4 No. 16-3055\n\n\n\n\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\n\fNo. 16-3055 5\n\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\nthe ordinance works.\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\n(1984).\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\n\f6 No. 16-3055\n\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\nright.\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\nover the Internet.\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n\\nNo. 16-3055\\nLEIBUNDGUTH STORAGE & VAN SERVICE, INC.,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nVILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, ILLINOIS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 C 9851 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MARCH 27, 2017 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and\\nDEGUILIO, District Judge.*\\n EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. An ordinance in Downers\\nGrove, Illinois, limits the size and location of signs. Lei-\\nbundguth Storage & Van Service contends that this ordi-\\nnance violates the First Amendment to the Constitution (ap-\\n\\n\\n * Of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.\\n\\f2 No. 16-3055\\n\\nplied to the states by the Fourteenth) because it is riddled\\nwith exceptions and therefore is a form of content discrimi-\\nnation that the Village has not justified. See Reed v. Gilbert,\\n135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). But because the principal topic of the\\nordinance is commercial speech, the district court concluded\\nthat Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service\\nCommission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), rather than Reed supplies the\\nrule of decision, and it found the ordinance valid. 150 F.\\nSupp. 3d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2015). We conclude that, whether or\\nnot Reed applies, this does not do Leibundguth any good be-\\ncause it is not affected by the problematic exceptions.\\n Downers Grove has a comprehensive ordinance regulat-\\ning signs. Section 9.020 sets out rules for all signs, including\\na rule prohibiting “any sign painted directly on a wall”\\n(§9.020.P). Section 9.050.A sets a size limit: for buildings such\\nas Leibundguth’s, which are closer than 300 feet to a street,\\nthe maximum is 1.5 square feet per linear foot of frontage—\\nwhich implies a limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding. Section 9.050.C.1 provides that each business may\\nhave only one sign, though an amendment in 2015 allows\\nbusinesses that face both a street and a railroad an extra sign\\non the railroad side. Section 9.030 creates exceptions: the or-\\ndinance does not require permits for holiday decorations\\n(§9.030.D), temporary signs for personal events such as\\nbirthdays (§9.030.E), “[n]oncommercial flags” (§9.030.G)\\n(flags can be used to send political messages), political and\\nnoncommercial signs that do not exceed 12 square feet\\n(§9.030.I), “[m]emorial signs and tablets” (§9.030.K), and\\nabout a dozen more. These exclusions set up Leibundguth’s\\nargument that the ordinance represents content discrimina-\\ntion prohibited by Reed.\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 3\\n\\n The Village insists that the ordinance regulates commer-\\ncial speech only. We need not decide which decision—Reed\\nor Central Hudson—must give way when a commercial-sign\\nlaw includes content discrimination. (One circuit recently\\nheld that Reed supersedes Central Hudson. See Thomas v.\\nBright, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 27364 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019).)\\nThis ordinance is comprehensive. Section 9.010.B tells us so:\\n“The regulations of this article apply to all signs in the vil-\\nlage, unless otherwise expressly stated.” And if that were not\\nclear enough, the exceptions are revealing. Why exclude\\nmodestly sized political signs (§9.030.I) from the permit re-\\nquirement unless they are included for other purposes?\\n Suppose we were to hold that commercial signs must be\\ntreated the same as flags and political signs. Leibundguth’s\\nproblems come from the ordinance’s size and surface limits,\\nnot from any content distinctions. One of Leibundguth’s\\nsigns is painted on a wall; another is too large; a third wall\\nhas two signs (as the Village counts them); and the size of\\nthese signs, conceded to exceed 500 square feet, vastly ex-\\nceeds the limit of 159 square feet for Leibundguth’s building\\n(and the limit of 12 square feet for political signs).\\n Let us start with the largest of Leibundguth’s signs,\\nwhich faces the railroad tracks—and which Leibundguth\\ntells us leads to as much as 20% of its revenue, by appealing\\nto commuters who see the sign when going to and from\\nwork.\\n\\f4 No. 16-3055\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nThis sign is 40 feet long and 10 feet high, or 400 square feet.\\nIt is painted on a brick wall. The ordinance’s size limit and\\nno-paint-on-walls rules independently forbid this sign. It\\nwould fare no berer if it were a flag or carried a political\\nmessage. It exceeds 12 square feet, so it would not be saved\\nby §9.030.I. And the exemptions for flags (§9.030.G) and po-\\nlitical signs pertain only to the permit requirement; they do\\nnot exempt flags or political signs from §9.020.P, which bars\\nsigns painted on walls. Likewise with the exception for tem-\\nporary signs (§9.030.E)—not that “temporary” is a form of\\ncontent discrimination in the first place. Anyway, Leibund-\\nguth does not want to use temporary signs.\\n Leibundguth insists that the exclusions in §9.030 remove\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules for flags and other listed\\nsubjects. But that’s not what §9.030 itself says. It begins by\\nstating that the excluded signs do not require permits; it\\ndoes not say that rules for all signs stated elsewhere in the\\nordinance drop out. Section 9.010.B says that all of the ordi-\\nnance’s rules apply to all signs unless they are “expressly”\\nexcluded; §9.030 does not expressly remove any signs from\\n\\fNo. 16-3055 5\\n\\nthe size and no-paint-on-walls rules. Leibundguth’s argu-\\nment rests on a report prepared by a Village official suggest-\\ning that the ordinance does not prohibit purely decorative\\nmurals and flags. But the Village itself disclaims this non-\\ntextual reading. The Village’s understanding of its own or-\\ndinance carries the day, see Forsyth County v. Nationalist\\nMovement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992), in the absence of some\\nindication that it has enforced the ordinance in a way that\\npermits large political signs or flags painted on walls. See\\nConstruction & General Laborers Union v. Grand Chute, 915\\nF.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). And Leibundguth has not offered\\nany evidence that the Village has enforced the ordinance as\\nLeibundguth reads it, rather than as how the Village tells us\\nthe ordinance works.\\n A limit on the size and presentation of signs is a standard\\ntime, place, and manner rule, a form of aesthetic zoning. The\\nSupreme Court has told us that aesthetic limits on signs are\\ncompatible with the First Amendment. Members of City\\nCouncil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810–12 (1984).\\nLike other time, place, and manner restrictions, an aesthetic\\nrule must serve its ends; it cannot be arbitrary. The rule must\\nbe justified without reference to the content or viewpoint of\\nspeech, must serve a significant government interest, and\\nmust leave open ample channels for communication. See\\nClark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293\\n(1984).\\n As the district court explained, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 922–24,\\nthe Village gathered evidence that signs painted on walls\\ntend to deteriorate faster than other signs (Leibundguth’s\\nown sign is full of chipped paint and flaking bricks) and,\\nwhen revised or painted over, can become downright ugly.\\n\\f6 No. 16-3055\\n\\nOld paint may show through; efforts to remove paint may\\nleave a ghost image or bleach the brick so that the building\\nbecomes morled. Leibundguth tells us that those effects are\\ntoo slight to justify legislation, but de gustibus non dispu-\\ntandum est. (“There’s no accounting for taste.”) People’s aes-\\nthetic reactions are what they are; if a large number of peo-\\nple find paint-on-brick ugly, and paint-over-paint-on-brick\\nworse, this is a raw fact that a governmental body may con-\\nsider. It need not try to prove that aesthetic judgments are\\nright.\\n Likewise with size. Many people view signs as a neces-\\nsary evil and believe that smaller = less evil. Unless the gov-\\nernment has engaged in content or viewpoint discrimina-\\ntion, that aesthetic judgment supports legislation. The Vil-\\nlage’s ordinance contains content discrimination, but as we\\nhave explained that discrimination does not aggrieve Lei-\\nbundguth. And the parties agree that enforcement of the\\nsign ordinance leaves open plenty of ways to communicate.\\nAdvertising does not depend on applying paint to brick—\\nand although 159 square feet of signage on Leibundguth’s\\nbuilding is less than it prefers to use, 159 square feet is still a\\nlarge sign. Leibundguth also is free to advertise in print or\\nover the Internet.\\n The parties dispute how the Village’s ordinance applies\\nto the signs on two other faces of Leibundguth’s building,\\nbut none of the possibilities poses a constitutional issue dis-\\ntinct from the ones we have already addressed. What we\\nhave said is enough to show that the ordinance, as applied to\\nLeibundguth, does not violate the First Amendment.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":4399,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4664178,"string":"4,664,178"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Patricia Koehn v. Delta Outsource Group, Incorpo"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-09-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"19-1088"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1088\\nPATRICIA ANN KOEHN,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDELTA OUTSOURCE GROUP, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:18-cv-01084-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Patricia Ann Koehn\\nbrought this suit against a collection agency, alleging that its\\ncollection letter was misleading and violated the Fair Debt\\nCollection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The district\\ncourt granted the collection agency’s motion to dismiss for\\nfailure to state a claim, concluding that no significant fraction\\nof the population would be misled by the letter. We agree and\\naffirm.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1088\\n\\n The letter to Koehn was from defendant Delta Outsource\\nGroup, Inc. The letter said that the “current balance” of\\nKoehn’s debt was $2,034.03. Koehn contends the letter was\\nmisleading because (a) the phrase “current balance” implied\\nthat her balance could grow, even though (b) her account was\\nactually “static,” meaning that additional interest and fees\\ncould no longer be added to the balance. She contends the\\nphrase “current balance” thus violated 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 1692g(a)(1), which requires a debt collector to state “the\\namount of the debt,” and § 1692e, which prohibits more gen-\\nerally “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or\\nmeans in connection with the collection of any debt.” By\\nfalsely implying that the “current balance” might increase,\\nshe contends, the debt collector’s choice of wording will mis-\\nlead debtors to give such static debts greater priority than\\nthey otherwise would.\\n Delta moved to dismiss Koehn’s complaint under Federal\\nRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.\\nDelta argued that it is apparent from the face of the letter that\\nno significant fraction of the population would be misled by\\nit. See Zemeckis v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632,\\n636 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.,\\n365 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying “significant frac-\\ntion” standard). In response, Koehn relied on Chuway v. Na-\\ntional Action Financial Services, Inc. 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004),\\nto argue that “current balance” (as opposed to “balance”) can\\nmislead debtors. Chief Judge Griesbach correctly read Chu-\\nway more narrowly than Koehn does, and he granted the mo-\\ntion to dismiss.\\n To state a legally viable claim, Koehn needed to allege\\nplausibly that Delta’s use of the “current balance” phrase\\n\\fNo. 19-1088 3\\n\\n“would materially mislead or confuse an unsophisticated\\nconsumer.” Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc., 880\\nF.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018). An unsophisticated consumer is\\n“uninformed, naïve, or trusting,” Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690,\\n693 (7th Cir. 2003), but nonetheless possesses “reasonable in-\\ntelligence,” basic knowledge about the financial world, and\\n“is wise enough to read collection notices with added care.”\\nGruber v. Creditors' Protection Service, Inc., 742 F.3d 271, 273\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).\\n Whether a dunning letter will mislead or confuse is often\\na question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dis-\\nmiss. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. In addition, the federal judges\\nwho must decide such motions are not necessarily good prox-\\nies for the “unsophisticated consumers” protected by the\\nFDCPA. See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d\\n1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Revenue Management\\nCorp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999). Still, if it is apparent\\nthat “not even a significant fraction of the population would\\nbe misled” by a collection letter, then the complaint can and\\nshould be dismissed. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. We do not see\\nanything inherently misleading in the phrase “current bal-\\nance.”\\n The district court read Chuway correctly as not extending\\nto this case. The dunning letter in Chuway said that the\\ndebtor’s “balance” was a specified amount. It went on to re-\\nquest payment but added: “To obtain your most current bal-\\nance information, please call” a toll-free telephone number.\\n362 F.3d at 947. We said that if the letter had stopped after the\\nrequest for payment, “the defendant would be in the clear.”\\nId. That hypothetical assurance applies to this case. But the\\nfurther instruction in Chuway to call to “obtain your most\\n\\f4 No. 19-1088\\n\\ncurrent balance information” caused the problem. That in-\\nstruction implied to the debtor that the amount he owed\\nmight actually be different from the “current balance” set\\nforth in the dunning letter. The letter implied that the only\\nway the debtor could obtain the current balance was to call\\nthe debt collector (although in fact the printed balance was\\nnot subject to change). That was a reasonable interpretation of\\nthe letter, which was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of\\nproof of a violation of the statute. Id. at 947–48 (noting also\\nthat “the entire bench was confused about the meaning of the\\nletter until the defendant’s lawyer explained it to us at oral\\nargument”).\\n Chuway thus did not reach as far as the common and in-\\nnocuous language plaintiff challenges here. And in Barnes v.\\nAdvanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, 493 F.3d 838 (7th Cir.\\n2007), we affirmed summary judgment for a debt collector\\nwho used the phrase “Current Amount Due” on the “tearoff”\\nsection of the collection letter. “Absent some particularly am-\\nbiguous language in the rest of the letter, we cannot see how\\nan unsophisticated consumer would interpret the tearoff to\\nindicate that anything other than the ‘Current Amount Due’\\nwas ‘the amount of the debt.’” Id. at 841.\\n Delta’s letter challenged here contains no directive to call\\nfor a “current balance,” nor does it include any language im-\\nplying that “current balance” means anything other than the\\nbalance owed. We have cautioned before: “The Act is not vi-\\nolated by a dunning letter that is susceptible of an ingenious\\nmisreading, for then every dunning letter would violate it.”\\nWhite v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000), quoted\\nin Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948. It takes an ingenious misreading\\nof this letter to find it misleading. And that same ingenuity\\n\\fNo. 19-1088 5\\n\\nwould call into question the even simpler phrase that “the bal-\\nance is $____.” After all, the simple present-tense verb “is”\\nalso implies “current,” doesn’t it?\\n Dunning letters can comply with the Fair Debt Collection\\nPractices Act without answering all possible questions about\\nthe future. A lawyer’s ability to identify a question that a dun-\\nning letter does not expressly answer (“Is it possible the bal-\\nance might increase?”) does not show the letter is misleading,\\neven if a speculative guess to answer the question might be\\nwrong.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4441431/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4664178/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":9,"string":"9"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Patricia Koehn v. Delta Outsource Group, Incorpo\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-09-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1088\nPATRICIA ANN KOEHN,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nDELTA OUTSOURCE GROUP, INC., et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\n No. 1:18-cv-01084-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Patricia Ann Koehn\nbrought this suit against a collection agency, alleging that its\ncollection letter was misleading and violated the Fair Debt\nCollection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The district\ncourt granted the collection agency’s motion to dismiss for\nfailure to state a claim, concluding that no significant fraction\nof the population would be misled by the letter. We agree and\naffirm.\n\f2 No. 19-1088\n\n The letter to Koehn was from defendant Delta Outsource\nGroup, Inc. The letter said that the “current balance” of\nKoehn’s debt was $2,034.03. Koehn contends the letter was\nmisleading because (a) the phrase “current balance” implied\nthat her balance could grow, even though (b) her account was\nactually “static,” meaning that additional interest and fees\ncould no longer be added to the balance. She contends the\nphrase “current balance” thus violated 15 U.S.C.\n§ 1692g(a)(1), which requires a debt collector to state “the\namount of the debt,” and § 1692e, which prohibits more gen-\nerally “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or\nmeans in connection with the collection of any debt.” By\nfalsely implying that the “current balance” might increase,\nshe contends, the debt collector’s choice of wording will mis-\nlead debtors to give such static debts greater priority than\nthey otherwise would.\n Delta moved to dismiss Koehn’s complaint under Federal\nRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.\nDelta argued that it is apparent from the face of the letter that\nno significant fraction of the population would be misled by\nit. See Zemeckis v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632,\n636 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.,\n365 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying “significant frac-\ntion” standard). In response, Koehn relied on Chuway v. Na-\ntional Action Financial Services, Inc. 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004),\nto argue that “current balance” (as opposed to “balance”) can\nmislead debtors. Chief Judge Griesbach correctly read Chu-\nway more narrowly than Koehn does, and he granted the mo-\ntion to dismiss.\n To state a legally viable claim, Koehn needed to allege\nplausibly that Delta’s use of the “current balance” phrase\n\fNo. 19-1088 3\n\n“would materially mislead or confuse an unsophisticated\nconsumer.” Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc., 880\nF.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018). An unsophisticated consumer is\n“uninformed, naïve, or trusting,” Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690,\n693 (7th Cir. 2003), but nonetheless possesses “reasonable in-\ntelligence,” basic knowledge about the financial world, and\n“is wise enough to read collection notices with added care.”\nGruber v. Creditors' Protection Service, Inc., 742 F.3d 271, 273\n(7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).\n Whether a dunning letter will mislead or confuse is often\na question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dis-\nmiss. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. In addition, the federal judges\nwho must decide such motions are not necessarily good prox-\nies for the “unsophisticated consumers” protected by the\nFDCPA. See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d\n1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Revenue Management\nCorp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999). Still, if it is apparent\nthat “not even a significant fraction of the population would\nbe misled” by a collection letter, then the complaint can and\nshould be dismissed. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. We do not see\nanything inherently misleading in the phrase “current bal-\nance.”\n The district court read Chuway correctly as not extending\nto this case. The dunning letter in Chuway said that the\ndebtor’s “balance” was a specified amount. It went on to re-\nquest payment but added: “To obtain your most current bal-\nance information, please call” a toll-free telephone number.\n362 F.3d at 947. We said that if the letter had stopped after the\nrequest for payment, “the defendant would be in the clear.”\nId. That hypothetical assurance applies to this case. But the\nfurther instruction in Chuway to call to “obtain your most\n\f4 No. 19-1088\n\ncurrent balance information” caused the problem. That in-\nstruction implied to the debtor that the amount he owed\nmight actually be different from the “current balance” set\nforth in the dunning letter. The letter implied that the only\nway the debtor could obtain the current balance was to call\nthe debt collector (although in fact the printed balance was\nnot subject to change). That was a reasonable interpretation of\nthe letter, which was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of\nproof of a violation of the statute. Id. at 947–48 (noting also\nthat “the entire bench was confused about the meaning of the\nletter until the defendant’s lawyer explained it to us at oral\nargument”).\n Chuway thus did not reach as far as the common and in-\nnocuous language plaintiff challenges here. And in Barnes v.\nAdvanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, 493 F.3d 838 (7th Cir.\n2007), we affirmed summary judgment for a debt collector\nwho used the phrase “Current Amount Due” on the “tearoff”\nsection of the collection letter. “Absent some particularly am-\nbiguous language in the rest of the letter, we cannot see how\nan unsophisticated consumer would interpret the tearoff to\nindicate that anything other than the ‘Current Amount Due’\nwas ‘the amount of the debt.’” Id. at 841.\n Delta’s letter challenged here contains no directive to call\nfor a “current balance,” nor does it include any language im-\nplying that “current balance” means anything other than the\nbalance owed. We have cautioned before: “The Act is not vi-\nolated by a dunning letter that is susceptible of an ingenious\nmisreading, for then every dunning letter would violate it.”\nWhite v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000), quoted\nin Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948. It takes an ingenious misreading\nof this letter to find it misleading. And that same ingenuity\n\fNo. 19-1088 5\n\nwould call into question the even simpler phrase that “the bal-\nance is $____.” After all, the simple present-tense verb “is”\nalso implies “current,” doesn’t it?\n Dunning letters can comply with the Fair Debt Collection\nPractices Act without answering all possible questions about\nthe future. A lawyer’s ability to identify a question that a dun-\nning letter does not expressly answer (“Is it possible the bal-\nance might increase?”) does not show the letter is misleading,\neven if a speculative guess to answer the question might be\nwrong.\n The judgment of the district court is\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Patricia Koehn v. Delta Outsource Group, Incorpo\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-09-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 19-1088\\nPATRICIA ANN KOEHN,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nDELTA OUTSOURCE GROUP, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Eastern District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 1:18-cv-01084-WCG — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Patricia Ann Koehn\\nbrought this suit against a collection agency, alleging that its\\ncollection letter was misleading and violated the Fair Debt\\nCollection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The district\\ncourt granted the collection agency’s motion to dismiss for\\nfailure to state a claim, concluding that no significant fraction\\nof the population would be misled by the letter. We agree and\\naffirm.\\n\\f2 No. 19-1088\\n\\n The letter to Koehn was from defendant Delta Outsource\\nGroup, Inc. The letter said that the “current balance” of\\nKoehn’s debt was $2,034.03. Koehn contends the letter was\\nmisleading because (a) the phrase “current balance” implied\\nthat her balance could grow, even though (b) her account was\\nactually “static,” meaning that additional interest and fees\\ncould no longer be added to the balance. She contends the\\nphrase “current balance” thus violated 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 1692g(a)(1), which requires a debt collector to state “the\\namount of the debt,” and § 1692e, which prohibits more gen-\\nerally “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or\\nmeans in connection with the collection of any debt.” By\\nfalsely implying that the “current balance” might increase,\\nshe contends, the debt collector’s choice of wording will mis-\\nlead debtors to give such static debts greater priority than\\nthey otherwise would.\\n Delta moved to dismiss Koehn’s complaint under Federal\\nRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.\\nDelta argued that it is apparent from the face of the letter that\\nno significant fraction of the population would be misled by\\nit. See Zemeckis v. Global Credit & Collection Corp., 679 F.3d 632,\\n636 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.,\\n365 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying “significant frac-\\ntion” standard). In response, Koehn relied on Chuway v. Na-\\ntional Action Financial Services, Inc. 362 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2004),\\nto argue that “current balance” (as opposed to “balance”) can\\nmislead debtors. Chief Judge Griesbach correctly read Chu-\\nway more narrowly than Koehn does, and he granted the mo-\\ntion to dismiss.\\n To state a legally viable claim, Koehn needed to allege\\nplausibly that Delta’s use of the “current balance” phrase\\n\\fNo. 19-1088 3\\n\\n“would materially mislead or confuse an unsophisticated\\nconsumer.” Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc., 880\\nF.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018). An unsophisticated consumer is\\n“uninformed, naïve, or trusting,” Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690,\\n693 (7th Cir. 2003), but nonetheless possesses “reasonable in-\\ntelligence,” basic knowledge about the financial world, and\\n“is wise enough to read collection notices with added care.”\\nGruber v. Creditors' Protection Service, Inc., 742 F.3d 271, 273\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).\\n Whether a dunning letter will mislead or confuse is often\\na question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dis-\\nmiss. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. In addition, the federal judges\\nwho must decide such motions are not necessarily good prox-\\nies for the “unsophisticated consumers” protected by the\\nFDCPA. See, e.g., McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d\\n1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Revenue Management\\nCorp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1999). Still, if it is apparent\\nthat “not even a significant fraction of the population would\\nbe misled” by a collection letter, then the complaint can and\\nshould be dismissed. Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 636. We do not see\\nanything inherently misleading in the phrase “current bal-\\nance.”\\n The district court read Chuway correctly as not extending\\nto this case. The dunning letter in Chuway said that the\\ndebtor’s “balance” was a specified amount. It went on to re-\\nquest payment but added: “To obtain your most current bal-\\nance information, please call” a toll-free telephone number.\\n362 F.3d at 947. We said that if the letter had stopped after the\\nrequest for payment, “the defendant would be in the clear.”\\nId. That hypothetical assurance applies to this case. But the\\nfurther instruction in Chuway to call to “obtain your most\\n\\f4 No. 19-1088\\n\\ncurrent balance information” caused the problem. That in-\\nstruction implied to the debtor that the amount he owed\\nmight actually be different from the “current balance” set\\nforth in the dunning letter. The letter implied that the only\\nway the debtor could obtain the current balance was to call\\nthe debt collector (although in fact the printed balance was\\nnot subject to change). That was a reasonable interpretation of\\nthe letter, which was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of\\nproof of a violation of the statute. Id. at 947–48 (noting also\\nthat “the entire bench was confused about the meaning of the\\nletter until the defendant’s lawyer explained it to us at oral\\nargument”).\\n Chuway thus did not reach as far as the common and in-\\nnocuous language plaintiff challenges here. And in Barnes v.\\nAdvanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, 493 F.3d 838 (7th Cir.\\n2007), we affirmed summary judgment for a debt collector\\nwho used the phrase “Current Amount Due” on the “tearoff”\\nsection of the collection letter. “Absent some particularly am-\\nbiguous language in the rest of the letter, we cannot see how\\nan unsophisticated consumer would interpret the tearoff to\\nindicate that anything other than the ‘Current Amount Due’\\nwas ‘the amount of the debt.’” Id. at 841.\\n Delta’s letter challenged here contains no directive to call\\nfor a “current balance,” nor does it include any language im-\\nplying that “current balance” means anything other than the\\nbalance owed. We have cautioned before: “The Act is not vi-\\nolated by a dunning letter that is susceptible of an ingenious\\nmisreading, for then every dunning letter would violate it.”\\nWhite v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000), quoted\\nin Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948. It takes an ingenious misreading\\nof this letter to find it misleading. And that same ingenuity\\n\\fNo. 19-1088 5\\n\\nwould call into question the even simpler phrase that “the bal-\\nance is $____.” After all, the simple present-tense verb “is”\\nalso implies “current,” doesn’t it?\\n Dunning letters can comply with the Fair Debt Collection\\nPractices Act without answering all possible questions about\\nthe future. A lawyer’s ability to identify a question that a dun-\\nning letter does not expressly answer (“Is it possible the bal-\\nance might increase?”) does not show the letter is misleading,\\neven if a speculative guess to answer the question might be\\nwrong.\\n The judgment of the district court is\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":43,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":4300,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsImtpZCI6IjVHZDBvd0g5MTM2eDZjc1FvbE1zcktNWUZoRVFoUm5PVVVybEpjOUhaUEEifQ.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc4NjUyNzc5NiwianRpIjoiZDljYTQyODItYWQzOS00NTcwLWFhZjgtMThmNGNkZWRlODY2Iiwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3ODY1MzEzOTYsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.t0yy6kkevUAfYfRs3bvq5rLbXdFd8MgX1iIFIiwvtYnph-J_9eucD-mBLXmsrftEFb8IxRiFCeiVBW9iw2_jDQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4,659,751 | Maria Gonzales-Veliz v. William Barr, U. S. Atty G | 2019-09-10 | 18-60174 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before ELROD and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60174 Document: 00515111623 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | ELROD | WILLETT | ELROD | 1 | {"ELROD": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659751/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,037 | Tom Mays v. DOWCP | 2019-09-11 | 18-60004 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60004 Document: 00515113103 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/11/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | HIGGINBOTHAM | ELROD | HO | 1 | {"HIGGINBOTHAM": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660037/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,038 | Sealed v. Sealed | 2019-09-11 | 18-50115 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "REVISED September 11, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | SMITH | WIENER | ELROD | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "WIENER": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660038/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,039 | Esteban Garcia v. Professional Contract Svc Inc | 2019-09-11 | 18-50144 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before ELROD, WILLETT, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50144 Document: 00515113226 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/11/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | ELROD | WILLETT | DUNCAN | 1 | {"ELROD": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660039/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,214 | Stephen Montalto v. MS Department of Corrections | 2019-09-11 | 18-60274 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before DAVIS, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60274 Document: 00515113835 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/11/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | DAVIS | HIGGINSON | WILLETT | 1 | {"DAVIS": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660214/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,215 | Dialysis Newco, Incorporated v. Commty Hlth Sys Tr | 2019-09-11 | 18-40863 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before ELROD, GRAVES, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40863 Document: 00515113959 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/11/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | ELROD | GRAVES | OLDHAM | 1 | {"ELROD": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660215/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,621 | Ubaldo Padilla v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Gen | 2019-09-12 | 18-60509 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before WIENER, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-60509 Document: 00515115580 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/12/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | WIENER | HAYNES | COSTA | 1 | {"WIENER": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660621/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,623 | Baker Hughes Proc & Pipel Svc v. UE Compression, L | 2019-09-12 | 17-20709 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JONES, HO, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20709 Document: 00515115827 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/12/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR... | JONES | HO | OLDHAM | 1 | {"JONES": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660623/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,914 | Paul Cleveland v. Sid Gautreaux, III | 2019-09-13 | 18-30968 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SOUTHWICK, WILLETT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ANDREW S. OLDHAM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30968 Document: 00515116918 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | SOUTHWICK | WILLETT | OLDHAM | 1 | {"SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660914/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,016 | United States v. Mercy Ainabe | 2019-09-13 | 18-20689 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20689 Document: 00515117899 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | SMITH | DENNIS | OWEN | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661016/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,021 | Adedji Adekeye v. Lorie Davis, Director | 2019-09-13 | 17-20040 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before CLEMENT, HAYNES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20040 Document: 00515117336 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | CLEMENT | HAYNES | WILLETT | 1 | {"CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661021/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,348 | United States v. Susan James | 2019-09-16 | 19-30049 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before JOLLY, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 19-30049 Document: 00515119477 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FO... | JOLLY | HO | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {"JOLLY": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "ENGELHARDT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661348/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,349 | United States v. Asher Khan | 2019-09-16 | 18-20519 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge, with whom SMITH, Circuit Judge, joins", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20519 Document: 00515119469 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITE... | SMITH | DENNIS | OWEN | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661349/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,350 | Spring Branch Indep Sch Dist v. O.W. | 2019-09-16 | 18-20274 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HIGGINSON and WILLETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DEBRA M. BROWN, District Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515118880 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/16/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF... | HIGGINSON | WILLETT | BROWN | 1 | {"HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "BROWN": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661350/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,081 | Calvin Walker v. Beaumont Indep School Dist | 2019-09-18 | 17-40752 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KURT D. ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40752 Document: 00515122029 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/18/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "ENGELHARDT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662081/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,903 | Timothy Greene v. Maureen Underwood | 2019-09-20 | 19-10474 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 19-10474 Document: 00515126154 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/20/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | DAVIS | SMITH | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"DAVIS": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662903/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,904 | Diane Weaver v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, et | 2019-09-20 | 18-10517 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before DAVIS, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10517 Document: 00515126384 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/20/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | DAVIS | HIGGINSON | WILLETT | 1 | {"DAVIS": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662904/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,550 | Joseph Thomas v. Phil Bryant | 2019-09-23 | 19-60133 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD, HAYNES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ... | STEWART | JONES | SMITH | 2 | DENNIS; OWEN; ELROD; HAYNES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT; OLDHAM | {"STEWART": ", Chief", "JONES": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "ENGELHARDT": ", Circuit", "OLDHAM": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663550/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,665,713 | United States v. Antonyo Reece | 2019-09-30 | 17-11078 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-11078 Document: 00515138227 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/30/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED September 30, 2019\n\n IN THE U... | SMITH | DENNIS | OWEN | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4665713/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,506 | Katrina McGrew v. Sergeant Duncan | 2019-09-04 | 18-2022 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fi... | DAUGHTREY | COOK | GRIFFIN | 1 | {"DAUGHTREY": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658506/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,509 | Dwight Bullard v. United States | 2019-09-04 | 17-3731 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GUY, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fi... | GUY | THAPAR | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"GUY": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658509/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,866 | Timothy Neill, Jr. v. United States | 2019-09-05 | 18-5350 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DONALD, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Michael C. Holley, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEX... | DONALD | LARSEN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"DONALD": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658866/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,055 | United States v. Monique Ellis | 2019-09-06 | 18-5332 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: NORRIS, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LARSEN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name... | NORRIS | STRANCH | LARSEN | 1 | {"NORRIS": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659055/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,056 | United States v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Hamilton Cty. | 2019-09-06 | 18-4036 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: ROGERS, BUSH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: ... | ROGERS | BUSH | LARSEN | 1 | {"ROGERS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659056/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,057 | Ricardo Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc. | 2019-09-06 | 18-5850 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THAPAR, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n Fil... | GRIFFIN | KETHLEDGE | THAPAR | 1 | {"GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "KETHLEDGE": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659057/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,058 | PolyOne Corp. v. Westlake Vinyls, Inc. | 2019-09-06 | 19-5137 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GUY, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File ... | GUY | THAPAR | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"GUY": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659058/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,365 | United States v. Rene Boucher | 2019-09-09 | 18-5683 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SILER, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "The Honorable Marianne O. Battani, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n P... | SILER | STRANCH | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"SILER": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659365/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,023 | William Thomas v. Clay Bright | 2019-09-11 | 17-6238 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and DONALD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | COLE | BATCHELDER | DONALD | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660023/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,024 | United States v. Marshyia Ligon | 2019-09-11 | 18-4234 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COLE, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File ... | COLE | GRIFFIN | BUSH | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660024/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,025 | Island Creek Coal Co. v. Melyndia Bryan | 2019-09-11 | 18-3909 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURPHY, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 1... | MCKEAGUE | THAPAR | MURPHY | 1 | {"McKEAGUE": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "MURPHY": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660025/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,026 | In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. | 2019-09-11 | 19-3064 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, SILER, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SILER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0... | BOGGS | SILER | SUTTON | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "SILER": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660026/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,472 | United States v. Real Property 10338 Marcy Rd. N.W. | 2019-09-12 | 18-3347 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; STRANCH and READLER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32... | COLE | STRANCH | READLER | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "READLER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660472/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,473 | United States v. Lee Hope | 2019-09-12 | 18-5637 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: ROGERS, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROGERS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0239p.06\... | ROGERS | GRIFFIN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660473/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,474 | Tracy Greer v. United States | 2019-09-12 | 16-4755 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GUY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19... | GUY | CLAY | GRIFFIN | 1 | {"GUY": ", Circuit", "CLAY": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660474/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,477 | Beverly Swanigan v. FCA | 2019-09-12 | 18-2303 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n F... | COLE | GRIFFIN | BUSH | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660477/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,900 | Rebecca Morehouse v. Steak N Shake | 2019-09-13 | 18-4186 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BOGGS, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 1... | BOGGS | BATCHELDER | BUSH | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "BATCHELDER": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660900/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,247 | Mark Gerth v. Warden | 2019-09-16 | 17-4091 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: DONALD, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | DONALD | LARSEN | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"DONALD": ", Circuit", "LARSEN": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661247/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,500 | Willia Dean Parker v. Mervyn Winwood | 2019-09-17 | 18-5305 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | GRIFFIN | DONALD | BERTELSMAN | 1 | {"GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "BERTELSMAN": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661500/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,995 | Willia Dean Parker v. Mervyn Winwood | 2019-09-17 | 18-5305 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | GRIFFIN | DONALD | BERTELSMAN | 1 | {"GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "DONALD": ", Circuit", "BERTELSMAN": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661995/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,994 | Michael Gresham v. Terry Meden | 2019-09-18 | 18-1911 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: NORRIS, SILER, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: ... | NORRIS | SILER | SUTTON | 1 | {"NORRIS": ", Circuit", "SILER": ", Circuit", "SUTTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661994/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,469 | William Andrew Wright v. Stephen Spaulding | 2019-09-19 | 17-4257 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SILER and THAPAR, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 4:17-cv-02097-Christopher A. Boyko, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b... | SILER | THAPAR | HOOD | 1 | {"SILER": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "HOOD": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662469/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,592 | William Andrew Wright v. Stephen Spaulding | 2019-09-19 | 17-4257 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SILER and THAPAR, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No. 4:17-cv-02097-Christopher A. Boyko, District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b... | SILER | THAPAR | HOOD | 1 | {"SILER": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit", "HOOD": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662592/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,593 | In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings | 2019-09-19 | 19-5315 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | COLE | GRIFFIN | BUSH | 1 | {"COLE": ", Chief", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662593/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,891 | Rebecca Buddenberg v. Robert Weisdack | 2019-09-20 | 18-3674 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | MERRITT | MOORE | WHITE | 1 | {"MERRITT": ", Circuit", "MOORE": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662891/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,892 | Leticia Rudolph v. Daniel Babinec | 2019-09-20 | 18-1901 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0248p.... | MOORE | COOK | THAPAR | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662892/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,414 | Leticia Rudolph v. Daniel Babinec | 2019-09-20 | 18-1901 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MOORE, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name: 19a0248p.... | MOORE | COOK | THAPAR | 1 | {"MOORE": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663414/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,412 | Speech First, Inc. v. Mark Schlissel | 2019-09-23 | 18-1917 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: COOK, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Na... | COOK | MCKEAGUE | WHITE | 1 | {"COOK": ", Circuit", "McKEAGUE": ", Circuit", "WHITE": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663412/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,713 | United States v. Randall Keith Beane | 2019-09-24 | 18-5777 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SUTTON, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUTTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name:... | SUTTON | COOK | THAPAR | 1 | {"SUTTON": ", Circuit", "COOK": ", Circuit", "THAPAR": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663713/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,716 | Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB | 2019-09-24 | 18-2217 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SUTTON, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File ... | SUTTON | GRIFFIN | READLER | 1 | {"SUTTON": ", Circuit", "GRIFFIN": ", Circuit", "READLER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663716/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,664,303 | Charter Communications, Inc. v. NLRB | 2019-09-25 | 18-1895 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SILER, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n ... | SILER | STRANCH | NALBANDIAN | 1 | {"SILER": ", Circuit", "STRANCH": ", Circuit", "NALBANDIAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4664303/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,664,304 | Barbrie Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino | 2019-09-25 | 18-1381 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: BOGGS, GIBBONS and BUSH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION\n Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)\n File Name... | BOGGS | GIBBONS | BUSH | 1 | {"BOGGS": ", Circuit", "GIBBONS": ", Circuit", "BUSH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4664304/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,252 | United States v. Mohammad Khan | 2019-09-03 | 18-2612 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2612\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658252/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,322 | United States v. Mohammad Khan | 2019-09-03 | 18-2612 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2612\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658322/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,511 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-09-04 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Defendant-Appellant. Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the S... | WILLIAM J BAUER | DAVID F HAMILTON | AMY J ST EVE | 1 | {"WILLIAM J BAUER": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "AMY J ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658511/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,533 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-09-04 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Defendant-Appellant. Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the S... | WILLIAM J BAUER | DAVID F HAMILTON | AMY J ST EVE | 1 | {"WILLIAM J BAUER": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "AMY J ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658533/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,650 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-09-04 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Defendant-Appellant. Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the S... | WILLIAM J BAUER | DAVID F HAMILTON | AMY J ST EVE | 1 | {"WILLIAM J BAUER": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "AMY J ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658650/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,785 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-09-04 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Defendant-Appellant. Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the S... | WILLIAM J BAUER | DAVID F HAMILTON | AMY J ST EVE | 1 | {"WILLIAM J BAUER": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "AMY J ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658785/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,814 | McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution | 2019-09-05 | 18-2619 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2619\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658814/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,876 | Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | 2019-09-05 | 18-2327 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2327\nMOUNTAIN CREST SR... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658876/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,877 | McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solution | 2019-09-05 | 18-2619 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROVNER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2619\nMCGARRY & MCGARRY, LLC... | ROVNER | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"ROVNER": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658877/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,658,957 | Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV | 2019-09-05 | 18-2327 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2327\nMOUNTAIN CREST SR... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4658957/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,462 | Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske | 2019-09-09 | 18-3268 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3268\nTODD R. CHAZE... | FLAUM | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659462/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,463 | Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson | 2019-09-09 | 15-1501 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 15-1501\nSTEPH... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659463/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,477 | Todd R. Chazen v. Matthew Marske | 2019-09-09 | 18-3268 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3268\nTODD R. CHAZE... | FLAUM | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659477/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,478 | Stephen Linder v. Darryl McPherson | 2019-09-09 | 15-1501 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 15-1501\nSTEPH... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,659 | Ernest Odei v. DHS | 2019-09-10 | 18-3105 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3105\nERNEST A. ODEI and\nS... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659659/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,701 | Ernest Odei v. DHS | 2019-09-10 | 18-3105 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3105\nERNEST A. ODEI and\nS... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659701/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,702 | David Camm v. Stanley Faith | 2019-09-10 | 18-1440 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1440\nDAVID R.... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659702/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,659,792 | David Camm v. Stanley Faith | 2019-09-10 | 18-1440 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1440\nDAVID R.... | WOOD | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4659792/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,196 | First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold | 2019-09-11 | 18-3291 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3291\nIN RE: I80 EQ... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660196/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,253 | First Midwest Bank v. Jeana K. Reinbold | 2019-09-11 | 18-3291 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3291\nIN RE: I80 EQ... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660253/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,478 | Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd. | 2019-09-12 | 18-1141 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSU... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,525 | United States v. Cathy Truitt | 2019-09-12 | 18-2324 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2324\nUNITED STATES OF AM... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660525/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,526 | Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd. | 2019-09-12 | 18-1141 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSU... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660526/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,593 | United States v. Dino Greco | 2019-09-12 | 18-3496 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3496\nUNITED STATES OF AMERIC... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660593/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,594 | United States v. Cathy Truitt | 2019-09-12 | 18-2324 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2324\nUNITED STATES OF AM... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BARRETT | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660594/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,595 | Lexington Insurance Company v. Hotai Insurance Company, Ltd. | 2019-09-12 | 18-1141 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1141\nLEXINGTON INSU... | BAUER | HAMILTON | BARRETT | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,660,703 | United States v. Dino Greco | 2019-09-12 | 18-3496 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3496\nUNITED STATES OF AMERIC... | KANNE | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4660703/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,215 | United States v. Michael Segal | 2019-09-16 | 17-3317 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\nUNIT... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661215/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,326 | United States v. Michael Segal | 2019-09-16 | 17-3317 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2842 & 17-3317\nUNIT... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661326/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,327 | J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin | 2019-09-16 | 18-2170 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Per Curiam", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 16... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661327/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
4,661,328 | Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira | 2019-09-16 | 18-2456 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2456\nDENNIS DAVIS... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661328/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,371 | J.K.J. v. Polk County, Wisconsin | 2019-09-16 | 18-2170 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Per Curiam", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n Chicago, Illinois 60604\n\n September 16... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661371/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
4,661,372 | Dennis Davis v. Francis Kayira | 2019-09-16 | 18-2456 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2456\nDENNIS DAVIS... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661372/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,936 | Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis | 2019-09-18 | 18-2054 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-20... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661936/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,996 | Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis | 2019-09-18 | 18-2054 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-20... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661996/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,661,999 | Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L | 2019-09-18 | 18-3487 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\nKARMA INTE... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4661999/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,243 | Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis | 2019-09-18 | 18-2054 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judg- es.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nFor the Seventh Circuit\n\n \n\nNo. 18-2054\n\nVICTORIA WEILAND and DEANNA CHRONES,\nPlaintiffs-Appellees,\... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662243/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,246 | Karma International, LLC v. Indianapolis Motor Speedway, L | 2019-09-18 | 18-3487 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2583 & 18-3487\nKARMA INTE... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662246/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,525 | Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis | 2019-09-19 | 18-2054 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n ... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | MICHAEL S KANNE | MICHAEL B BRENNAN | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL S KANNE": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL B BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662525/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,662,594 | Victoria Weiland v. Shawn Loomis | 2019-09-19 | 18-2054 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SHAWN LOOMIS, Amy J. St. Eve, Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n ... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | MICHAEL S KANNE | MICHAEL B BRENNAN | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL S KANNE": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL B BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4662594/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,053 | Donald Wayne Bush v. United States | 2019-09-20 | 16-3244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-3244\nDONALD WAYN... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663053/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,138 | Donald Wayne Bush v. United States | 2019-09-20 | 16-3244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-3244\nDONALD WAYN... | FLAUM | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663138/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,415 | Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC | 2019-09-23 | 18-2609 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2609\nADRIEL OSORIO,\n ... | SYKES | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663415/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,478 | Adriel Osorio v. The Tile Shop, LLC | 2019-09-23 | 18-2609 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2609\nADRIEL OSORIO,\n ... | SYKES | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663478/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,545 | Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc. | 2019-09-23 | 18-2571 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2571\nCRUM & FORST... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663545/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,564 | Crum & Forster Specialty Insur v. DVO, Inc. | 2019-09-23 | 18-2571 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2571\nCRUM & FORST... | BAUER | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663564/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,883 | Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove | 2019-09-24 | 16-3055 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and DEGUILIO, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ___________... | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | DEGUILIO | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "DEGUILIO": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663883/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,663,945 | Leibundguth Storage & Van Serv v. Village of Downers Grove | 2019-09-24 | 16-3055 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and DEGUILIO, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ___________... | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | DEGUILIO | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "DEGUILIO": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4663945/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,664,178 | Patricia Koehn v. Delta Outsource Group, Incorpo | 2019-09-25 | 19-1088 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 19-1088\nPATRICIA ANN K... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4664178/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 9 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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